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This thesis examined the evolution and transition of agrarian labour relations in the 
aftermath of Zimbabwe‘s radical land redistribution, which reconfigured the agrarian 
structure in terms of landholdings, production practices and labour markets from 
2000. Despite the importance of agrarian labour as source of livelihood for the largely 
countryside based population, insufficient academic attention has been paid to its 
evolution following the land reforms. Specifically to the mobilisation, organisation 
and utilisation of wage and non-wage labour against background of the changed land 
ownership patterns, agrarian policies and macro-economic conditions.  
Historical-structural approaches rooted in Marxist Political Economy informed the 
analysis of the new agrarian labour relations since in former Settler colonies such as 
Zimbabwe these were based were based on a historical context of specific land-labour 
utilisation relations created by land dispossession and discriminatory agrarian policies 
during the colonial and immediate independence period. Beyond this, gender issues, 
intra-household relations, kinship, citizenship and the agency of the workers were 
taken into account to understand the trajectory of labour relations. 
Detailed quantitative and qualitative empirical research in Goromonzi and Kwekwe 
districts, as well as from other sources demonstrated that a new agrarian labour 
regime had evolved to replace the predominant wage labour in former large-scale 
commercial farms. There has been a growth in the use of self-employed family farm 
labour alongside the differentiated use of wage labour in farming and other non-farm 
activities. Inequitable gender and generational tendencies were evident in the new 
agrarian labour regime. The new labour relations are marked by the exploitation of 
farm workers through wages that are below the cost of social reproduction, insecure 
forms of employment and poor working conditions. While their individual and 
collective worker agency is yet to reverse their poor socio-economic conditions. 
Various policy interventions to protect their land and labour rights are thus required.  
The study shed light on the the conceptual understanding of agrarian labour relations 
in former Settler economies, including the role of land reforms in the development of 
employment, and how the peasantry with enlarged land access are reconstituted 
through repeasantisation and semi-proletarianisation processes. 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION  
This thesis examined the evolution and transition of agrarian labour relations in the 
aftermath of Zimbabwe‘s radical land redistribution, which reconfigured the agrarian 
structure in terms of landholdings, production practices and labour markets from 
2000. Specifically, it analysed changes in the utilisation of labour in the agricultural 
sector, linking the growth and differentiated use of wage labour in its varied forms to 
changes in the extent of self-employment on peasant farms, using various sources of 
family labour within the more diverse agrarian structure (including the peasantry, 
small to medium scale capitalist farms, and large estates) that has emerged.  
After discussing the background and rationale, which is focused on Zimbabwe‘s land 
and labour questions until 1999 and the implications of land redistribution outcomes 
of the  ―Fast Track‖ Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) on agrarian labour relations, 
this chapter defines the problem statement, research objectives and the research 
questions. An overview of the research methodology adopted to answer the research 
questions is briefly outlined in section 1.6. The theoretical/conceptual framework of 
the study is also summarised to introduce the epistemological ground of the study. 
The principles adhered to in conducting the study according to the ethical clearance 
issued by the university are then articulated next. The following two sections cover 
the limitations of the study and provide definitions of some key concepts used 
throughout the thesis. The organisation of the thesis forms the penultimate section 
preceding the conclusion. 
1.2 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE OF STUDY 
Whereas the transformation of Zimbabwe‘s agrarian labour relations has been on 
going since colonisation in the 1890s (Arrighi 1970; Rubert 1998; Moyo & Yeros 
2005a), the initiation of the FTLRP around 2000 dramatically altered the labour 
regime. Minimalist land redistribution up to 1999 meant that the labour reserve 
system generated by land dispossession  during the colonial era (Moyo 2011a) 
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influenced the agrarian labour relations as peasants from Communal Areas with 
limited access to land were compelled to sell their labour to the minority 4 000 large 
scale commercial farm(er)s (LSCFs) who owned most of the agricultural land (Bush 
& Cliffe 1984; Mhone 2001). Frequently the labour supply was based on the 
residential labour tenancy system that tied employment to accommodation on the 
LSCFs (Rutherford 2001a; Amanor-Wilks 1995). Since only 3.7 million hectares 
were redistributed to 75,697 households between 1980 and 1999, the dual agrarian 
structure was marginally changed (Moyo 2011a: 498). 
Agrarian wage labourers in the LSCFs, the largest section of the formal workforce 
nationally, however earned the least incomes compared to other segments of the 
formally employed and they also worked under various exploitative practices 
(Amanor-Wilks 1995; Moyo et al. 2000; Kanyenze 2001; Rutherford 2001). Whilst, 
the opportunities for peasants from Communal Areas to gain incomes adequate for 
their social reproduction through self-employment as own agricultural producers were 
inhibited largely due to their marginalisation in land access (Masuko 1998; Rukuni 
1994; Cliffe 2000). The rise in poverty levels
1
 and massive urban job retrenchments, 
which escorted the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) 
implemented from 1991 had intensely increased the demands for land redistribution 
by 1997 (Moyo 2000b; Yeros 2002; 2013a; Moyo & Yeros 2005b). 
These inequities were challenged by the emergence of a national land movement from 
1998 (Moyo 2001). Such agency culminated in the Veterans of Zimbabwe‘s liberation 
struggle leading the occupation of LSCFs alongside peasants, farm workers and urban 
working classes from around 1997. Land occupants escalated in the early 2000s after 
people voted against the draft constitution in a referendum that contained a clause on 
compulsory land acquisition (Musungwa 2001; Sadomba 2008; 2013). These 
processes pressurised the state to undertake land redistribution, which it formally 
initiated in 2001 by compulsorily acquiring mostly white owned LSCFs (Utete 2003).  
The Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) thus undertook an extensive land redistribution 
to redress these inequities by compulsorily acquiring mostly white owned LSCFs 
through the FTLRP (Utete Report 2003). Indeed, the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
                                                 
1
By 1995, 75.6 percent of the Zimbabwean population were poor and poverty affected the largely rural 
inhabitants (86.4 percent) compared to the urban residents (53.4 percent) (GoZ 1998a: 30). 
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Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013 emphasises the need to ―…to redress the unjust and 
unfair pattern of land ownership that was brought about by colonialism and bring 
about land reform and the equitable access by all Zimbabweans to the country‘s 
natural resources‖ (Section 289: 113). Over 90 percent of the 11.8 million hectares 
formerly owned by white LSCFs was transferred to a diverse range of smaller-scale 
farmer beneficiaries, dominated by the peasantry (Matondi 2012: 56). The A1 and A2 
settlement schemes
2
 promoted by the FTLRP generated about 145,775 and 22,896 
new farm units respectively (Moyo 2011a: 498). The land tenure relations were also 
substantially changed through the nationalisation of the acquired freehold LSCFs 
(Utete Report 2003; GoZ 2001a) to secure the rights of new landholders, while 
partially protecting former farm workers land rights.  
This process altered the unequal land ownership in the agrarian structure and changed 
key agrarian relations, the production relations, market structures, and the labour 
relations, which existed before 2000 (Moyo & Yeros 2005; Moyo 2011a; b; c; 2013). 
The structure of agricultural production has shifted from the production of export 
commodities such as horticulture and tobacco towards the predominant production of 
staple food crops such as maize for own consumption, while over 300,000 out of the 
1.4 million peasants produce on small-scale land units, cash and export crops, 
including surplus maize, for sales in domestic markets (World Bank 2012: 44). 
However, land utilisation is based on lower levels of productivity while replicating 
aspects of the LSCF export agricultural model (World Bank, 2006; Moyo, Chambati, 
Murisa, Siziba, Dangwa, Mujeyi & Nyoni 2009; Scoones, Marongwe, Mavedzenge, 
Mahenene, Murimbarimba & Sukume 2010; Matondi 2012).  
As LSCFs were redistributed into smaller sized plots under state tenures that diluted 
the control of landholders over labour (Adam 2000; Shivji 2009; Moyo 2011a), 
                                                 
2
 Maximum farm size regulations were applied to allocate land sizes according to the agro-ecological 
potential of each district. Zimbabwe is partitioned into five agro-ecological zones, Natural I to V (Muir 
1994). The agro-ecological potential encompassing the quality of the soils and rainfall recived per year 
decreases as you transition from Natural Region I to V. Natural Region I and II are most suited for 
intensive farming (cropping and livestock), while region III can support semi-intensive agricultural 
production. The last two regions are more adapted to extensive farming such as cattle ranching.   
Between 5 and 7 hectares of arable land and 15 hectares of grazing land were to be allocated to the 
beneficiaries in the A1 scheme in the higher potential agro-ecological regions (I to III) (GoZ 2001a; 
Sukume et al. 2004). While those in low potential agro-ecological regions (IV and V) were earmarked 
to receive relatively larger land sizes of about 10 hectares of arable land  and 30 hectares of grazing 
land. The three sub-models of A2 scheme were targeted to receive larger land sizes than those in the 
A1 settlement ranging from 20 to 2 000 hectares also contingent upon the agro-ecological location (see 
Utete 2003; Sukume & Moyo 2004; Moyo et al. 2009). 
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aggregate supplies of wage labour declined, leading to changing forms and scale of 
wage labour in a trajectory, which is not well documented. The impact of the FTLRP 
on agrarian labour relations which are now structured on more equitable land rights 
and property rights derived from the state (Moyo 2007; 2013) raises various questions 
on the future role of agriculture in employment and development. In fact the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013 assigns one of the functions 
of agricultural land as that of employment generation (Section 289[f]: 113).  
The FTLRP also coincided with a changing policy context characterised by a macro-
economic crisis between 2002 and 2008 (World Bank 2006; Moyo et al. 2009; 
Scoones et al. 2010; Moyo & Nyoni 2013). Then from 2009 onwards, economic 
stabilisation efforts were underway after the de-monetisation of the Zimbabwe dollar 
and adoption of multiple foreign currencies and re-liberalisation of the economy 
(World Bank 2012). These processes have also shaped the conditions for agricultural 
production and trajectory of agrarian labour relations. 
Little research has been done so far to explain the precise nature and trajectory of 
these changes in the agrarian labour relations that have emerged in relation to the new 
patterns of access to land and tenure relations, the shifting agricultural production 
systems, including the forms of labour and their material conditions, as well as the 
transforming agrarian labour and socio-economic policies. Substantial research efforts 
have been focused on tracking the agricultural production declines that accompanied 
the FTLRP (Zikhali & Chilonda 2013; Musodza 2015; Kapuya, Meyer & Kirsten 
2013; Masiiwa & Chipungu 2004; Richardson 2005; Murisa & Mujeyi 2015), while 
the transformation of agrarian labour relations has gone unnoticed.  
Existing knowledge on agrarian labour relations in former settler colonies such as 
Zimbabwe has mostly been framed within perspectives based on dual economy 
theories (Lewis 1954) and derived from empirical experiences involving dual agrarian 
structures, focusing on the labour relations as driven by the demands of large-scale 
capitalist farming (e.g. Loewenson 1992; Rutherford 2001; von Blackenburg 2003; 
Gibbon 2011) and peasantry (e.g. Adams 1991; Matshe 1998). Few have studied the 
evolving nature of labour relations during and following the transition from the 
dualist agrarian models of labour relations towards diverse forms of capitalist 
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farming. The recent redistributive land reforms in Zimbabwe thus provided the 
opportunity to undertake such analysis. 
An assessment of agrarian labour regimes in agrarian based economies is critical to 
enhancing the knowledge base on economic growth, inequality and social protection 
policies as such labour contributes immensely to the social reproduction of the 
majority rural based population. In the case of Zimbabwe, the LSCF sector was the 
largest formal employer accounting for 26 percent (or 350,000  permanent and casual 
employees) of the working class and over two million people were self-employed in 
agriculture in the Communal Areas (CSO 2000: 11). Cumulatively, over 65 percent of 
the country‘s population is dependent on incomes from agrarian employment through 
various forms of self-employment and wage work in agricultural and non-agricultural 
activities for their social reproduction (CSO 2002: 16). The role of the agrarian labour 
regimes to the social reproduction of many people has also grown in importance in 
the context of rising poverty levels and urban unemployment in much of the countries 
in the Global South, including Zimbabwe (ILO 2015a; ILO 2015b; ILO 2011; 
International Fund for Agricultural Development [IFAD] 2011; World Bank 2008). 
Furthermore, the projected 70 million jobs to be generated in the urban sector 
between 2010 and 2020 in Africa will be inadequate for the estimated 122 million 
youths that will join the labour force during the same period (Jayne 2014: 9), 
underlining the centrality of agriculture as a provider of employment.
3
 Hence, the aim 
of the study was to understand the agrarian employment dynamics entailed by the 
FTLRP and other socio-economic policies affecting labour relations, which were also 
changing during the 2000‘s. 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT  
One of the shortcomings perceptible in research evaluating the outcomes of the 
implementation of the land reform policy relates to their negation of the 
interconnections between the latter and various other policies and factors influencing 
the agrarian change post-2000.
4
 Yet the impacts of any particular policy are not 
shaped by one policy but through its interactions with other policies and factors 
                                                 
3
Another study also indicated  that about 17 million young people join the labour market annually in 
SSA and by 2025 they will total about 330 million (Losch 2012: unpaged). 
4
Some of the material presented in this section builds and expands on the analysis presented in 
Chambati (2017). 
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(French Council of Economic Analysis 2013). Pursuing this route can thus result in 
inadequate and partial proposals for policy reforms.  
For instance, the agricultural production declines that accompanied the FTLRP and by 
implication the agricultural employment trends and the quality of wage labour were 
largely attributed to singular factors such as the replacement of freehold title deeds 
with public land tenures, which did not offer adequate security to guarantee 
investment by new farmers (Richardson 2005; Tupy 2007). Others blamed the innate 
behavioural characteristics of the new farmers as lacking the requisite skills to engage 
in commercial farming (Masiiwa & Chipungu 2004). The interrelationships that the 
land reform policy had with the wider labour and specific agricultural policies such as 
agrarian financing to new farms, as well as the overall macro-economic policy context 
to impact the social and economic outcomes of the FTLRP, were missing in these 
perspectives. In general, the heterogeneous causal factors, which impacted on the new 
sources of farm labour, nature and forms of wage employment, diversification of 
family labour into non-farm activities, the quality of wage labour and the responses of 
farm workers to their poor socio-economic conditions, were thus not widely 
recognised.  
The redistribution of land to mainly peasant beneficiaries has largely been considered 
by some analysts after 2000  to have decimated agrarian labour markets and  whittled 
down their critical position in absorbing the majority of the formal workforce. 
Attention was paid to the number of farm worker jobs lost from the retrenchments on 
the LSCFs parcelled to new land beneficiaries (see Farm Community Trust of 
Zimbabwe [FCTZ] 2002; Hellum & Derman 2004; Magaramombe 2004; Sachikonye 
2003). The number of farm workers employed in the LSCFs prior to 2000 was 
exaggerated in some of the assessments leading to the overestimation in the extent of 
loss of formal farm employment. For instance, the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO 
Forum [ZHRF] & Justice for Agriculture [JAG] (2007: 29) claimed the employment 
levels to be in excess of 600,000 workers, sharply contrasting the estimates ranging 
between 320,000 and 350 000 farm workers documented in official statitics (CSO 
2002a: 128) and other research studies (Kanyenze 2001: 106; Moyo et al. 2000: 182; 
Sachikonye 2003: 5). An estimated 70 percent of the workers (approximately 420,000 
workers) were estimated to have lost their jobs by 2003 (ZHRF & JAG 2007: 29).  
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Moreover, some literature tended to treat the different types of LSCF employment 
such as permanent, seasonal and casual farm workers as one homogenous category of 
wage labour (see Ridderbos 2009; JAG & Research Advocacy Unit [RAU] 2008) and 
that their livelihoods were only based on farm wages (LEIDRIZ 2018; Daimon 2014; 
Waeterloos & Rutherford 2004). Yet in reality about half of the jobs entailed lowly 
paid part-time work, which farm workers combined with other sources of income, 
including commodity production in Communal Areas (Tandon 2001; Loewenson 
1992). This approach led to the neglect of critical assessment of the quality of jobs 
lost in comparison to new farm labour work created after 2000. It was argued that 
farm wages earned by workers in LSCFs ―… made the difference between starvation 
and survival, between extreme poverty and access to basic things of life‖ (Sachikonye 
2003: 46), despite the evidence which shows that such jobs were the basis of extreme 
poverty with over 70 percent of the labourers commanding incomes unable to match 
the Poverty Datum Line (PDL) around 1997 (Kanyenze 2001: 108; see also Amanor-
Wilks 1995; Mclvor 1995).  
Voices were also muted regarding the transition of peasant labour relations, 
particularly the character of wage and family labour utilisation and hired in wage 
labour was implied to be absent (Chambati & Moyo 2004). The number of jobs in the 
new peasant and commercial farming units and the financial returns they generated 
were considered to be limited by a few studies that addressed wage labour relations in 
the new resettlement areas (Magaramombe 2010; Sachikonye 2012; Johnson 2012; 
JAG & GAPWUZ 2008; Magure 2012). However, the extent to which this had 
resulted either from the absence of adequate farm labour protection policies or limited 
enforcement was not analysed. The ability of the new land beneficiaries to (re-)hire 
retrenched farm workers and others seeking employment was questioned since their 
capital and skills base was a pale shadow to that of the former LSCFs (Simpson & 
Hawkins 2018; Johnson 2012; Sachikonye 2012; Masiiwa & Chipungu 2004). But the 
production capacities of the new farmers was not linked to the limitations in the post-
settlement support and other wider constraints in agro-industrial input and output 
markets (World Bank 2012). Folllowing the decline in the agricultural output in most 
commodity sectors and the subsequent snail‘s pace in the recovery of lost production 
since 2000, the optimism for agricultural growth was limited as small-scale farming, 
which was now dominant was not viewed favourably (Moyo et al. 2009). Pessimism 
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was thus abound regarding the trajectory of farm wage labour and possibilities of self-
employed family labour to derive their livelihoods from the new landholdings.   
Additionally, the analysis on the quality of employment in the new farm units 
emphasised mostly the monetary wages. Therefore, limited information is available 
on other indicators of quality of employment, including  in-kind payments, terms of 
employment,  gender dimensions of the labour force and the skills base, as well as the 
fate of former LSCF repressive labour management practices such as physical 
violence and verbal abuse (Mugwetsi & Balleis 1994; Rutherford 2001; Amanor-
Wilks 1995; Loewenson 1992). The transformation of the tying of employment 
contracts to residency on the farms, which previously guaranteed the availability of 
farm labour for the LSCFs (Tandon 2001), is also not clear after the nationalisation of 
land tenure in redistributed farms and its consequent effects on farm labour supplies 
by both the retrenched  farm workers and others seeking employment in the 
resettlement areas.  
The growth in the utilisation of wage labour by the new landholders, as well the 
increase in the application of family labour has however been broadly captured by a 
few studies. Specifically, the enlargement of peasant and small capitalist farms has 
been associated with the increase in the number of permanent, casual and family 
workers (see Chambati 2013; 2009; Scoones et al. 2010). An important omission in 
these studies relates to the limited analysis of the differentiation in the new forms and 
material quality of agrarian labour across the agricultural production units. The 
understanding of the scale of hired in labour regardless of its payment in either cash 
or in-kind wages has also been obfuscated by the narrow conceptualisation of hired 
labour as those that receive monetary wages. For instance, the farm workers that 
remained in the farm compounds after 2000 have tended to be viewed as ―displaced in 
situ‖ and ―out of work‖ (Hartnack 2005; Hartnack 2009; Magaramombe 2010; 
Ridderbos 2009), notwithstanding their re-employment by the new land beneficiaries 
in diverse forms of farm labour (Chambati & Moyo 2004; Hanlon et al. 2013; 
Matondi 2012; Scoones et al. 2010; Scoones 2015b). The research attention on the 
new labour relations facing only the former farm workers (Scoones, Mavedzenge, 
Murimbarimba & Sukume 2018a)  or the continued preoccupation with wage labour 
dynamics in remaining LSCFs (Chakanya 2016; LEIDRIZ 2018) omits the 
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experiences of the new farm workers and thus limits the understanding of the 
dynamics entailed by the entry of the new farm workers. Not only has the variegated 
new labour relations been concealed by the narrow equating of farm wage labour with 
LSCF-types of formal farm labour, the examination of the character  of new agrarian 
labour markets, as well as the differences that exist among the diversified farm classes 
has also been limited (Moyo et al. 2009; Chambati 2013a; Chambati 2011).  
The new livelihoods gained by former farm workers as independent producers, via 
both formal and informal access to land and non-farm rural employment whose scope 
has increased since the FTLRP (Mkodzongi 2013b), are hardly considered worthy of 
note. Instead, land redistribution tends to be wrongly associated with the disruption of 
wider access to food and social services (Pilossof 2012) and wage labour 
diversification for Communal Areas residents, which it is presumed could only arise 
from the LSCF economy and labour rights regime (Hellum & Derman 2004; Derman 
& Hellum 2007). In addition, the latter scholars also assumed that the pursuance of 
farm wage labour was an open ended choice, neglecting to note that such labour 
relations were driven by historical processes of land dispossession and wider 
economic policy pressures (Arrighi 1970; Arrighi, Aschoff & Scully 2010; Bush & 
Cliffe 1984; Clarke 1977). Nonetheless, it has been noted that peasant struggles in 
Zimbabwe have been marked by the quest for access to land through various 
strategies, including the occupation of LSCFs since the 1980s (Moyo, Jha & Yeros 
2013). 
A key flow in the analysis of agrarian labour after 2000 related to neglecting that a 
new diversified agrarian structure had resulted from the land reforms, which not only 
transformed the landholding patterns, but also the land use practices, integration to 
markets and labour utilisation (Moyo 2011c; Moyo 2013). As such, the new forms of 
organisation of labour in the A1 and A2 farms have been incorrectly assumed to be 
similar and the latter have been particularly seen as unable to meet obligations of 
workers (Masiiwa & Chipungu 2004; Mutangi 2010; Sachikonye 2012). Furthermore, 
the evolution of the new and diverse forms of agrarian labour were masked by 
suggestions equating the production capacities of all the new land beneficiaries.  
The three farm classes, namely the peasantry, middle to large capitalist farms and 
agro-industrial estates that now characterise the new trimodal agrarian structure have 
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been noted to be to be highly differentiated according to the land use and agricultural 
production patterns, extent of production for the market and labour utilisation (Moyo 
2011a; Moyo 2011c; Moyo & Nyoni 2013). These new dynamics implied substantial 
transformation of the agrarian labour markets. Altogether, the varied land sizes, land 
uses and access to markets was leading to the rise in social differentiation tendencies 
in the countryside, with wider ramifications for the diverse agrarian labour relations 
(Moyo 2011a; Moyo 2011c; Moyo & Nyoni 2013). The new farm classes represent 
the sources of wage labour for the unemployed urbanites, new peasants and the 
remaining land short in Communal Areas and amongst former farm workers 
(Chambati & Moyo 2004; Chambati 2013; Chambati 2009). Yet the narrow 
recognition of LSCFs as the only source of farm wage employment by some analysts 
(LEIDRIZ 2018; Chakanya 2016) neglected the on-going absorption of labour by the 
new peasantry and the new middle-to-large scale farms.  
The debate on agrarian labour relations has also been distracted by a narrow focus on 
the human rights violations faced by former farm workers during the FTLRP, 
especially between 2000 and 2003 (e.g. Hartnack 2009; Hellum & Derman 2004; 
IDMC 2008; Mutanda 2013). Such research was engrossed with documenting the 
number of farm workers who were physically displaced from their farm compound 
residency and the physical violence (e.g. torture), death threats, political intimidation 
and unlawful detentions, which occurred during this period (ZHRF & JAG 2007; JAG 
& RAU 2008; GAPWUZ 2010)
5
 and portraying them as passive victims without any 
agency to improve their material conditions.  
The mainstream narrative on the formal loss of farm work thus depicted the farm 
workers as ―Zimbabwe‘s New Clothes‖ (West & Rutherford 2005: 398), which were 
seen as having lost their role in mobilising (new forms of) agrarian labour for the new 
farmers. Farm workers have in fact been seen as ―essentially squatting in their own 
homes [compounds] and at constant risk of forcible displacement by the new farm 
owners‖ (Ridderbos 2009: 73), and hardly capable of re-organising their livelihoods 
(Waeterloos & Rutherford 2004; Johnson 2012; GAPWUZ 2010; Zamchiya 2013). 
                                                 
5




However, it is true that one of the key challenges farm workers faced in claiming 
rights to land during the FTLRP relates to their contested citizenship status, given the 
colonial history of foreign migrant labour policies which initially formed the basis of 
labour supply in European farms until the 1960s (Arrighi 1970; Arrighi et al. 2010; 
Clarke 1977; Paton 1995). The tendency has been to view most farm workers as 
―foreigners‖ from Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia in official and public discourses, 
who did not deserve to be allocated land during the FTLRP (Daimon 2014; 
Muzondidya 2007; Rutherford 2003; Moyo et al. 2000).  
While stripping former farm workers of their agency, most studies failed to capture 
how they deployed their skills and practical experience accumulated from LSCF 
employment to construct new livelihoods after 2000. The precise nature of the 
different forms of social mobilisation utilised by farm workers, including through 
kinship and culture, seniority at the workplace, nationality and ethnicity, and gender 
relations, to regain farm work and to resist the poor working conditions in the new 
farms, (through the procurement of various resources), is yet to be adequately 
examined empirically. 
This study examined the quantitative and qualitative changes to the agrarian labour 
relations in the context of FTRLP that increased the number of smaller-scale 
agricultural employers who compete for access to agrarian labour in the new 
diversified farming sector that is characterised by differential production capacities. It 
sought to understand the contemporary agrarian labour relations in their historical 
context, and in former Settler colonies such as Zimbabwe, as these were hinged upon 
inequitable land access that evolved from land dispossession and agrarian policies 
marginalising the peasantry during the colonial and immediate independence period. 
Yet the study was also attentive to the fact that the agrarian change arose not only 
from the land reform, but other public policies also impacted on the labour relations 
perceived in the new farming units. 
The research tracked how the precise character of the resulting agrarian structures has 
shaped the agrarian labour markets. More specifically, it analysed how the 
differentiated access to and control of land resources, agricultural production patterns, 
extent of integration into the markets and access to farming inputs, influence the 
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scale/size of labour force used and the forms of labour mobilised between wage and 
self-employed labour from the family and other sources.  
The key issues that the research grappled with based on field empirical work and from 
various other sources included the manner in which the peasantry and its 
differentiated forms has been reconstituted through re-peasantisation and semi-
proletarianisation processes; the diverse forms of farm wage and non-wage labour use 
and the role of non-farm labour in the process of social reproduction, in light of  the 
wider policy changes.  
Beyond the monetary wages, the broad quality of labour and the diversity amongst the 
various classes of farms was uncovered by exploring the other broader issues that 
contribute to the material conditions of farm wage labour, including in-kind payments 
received,  ―social wages‖ such as access to informal land, the types of employment 
contracts, gender discrimination, skills, practices of labour management and methods 
of supervision of farm. To test the validity of claims that consider wage employment 
to be more important than self-employment in own farming in the sustenance of rural 
people, the net returns to labour amongst self-employed forms of labour, including 
through incomes and auto-consumption  from their own agricultural production, were 
investigated empirically and contrasted to those of farm workers.  
The study also surveyed the new forms of exploitation of agrarian labour 
characterising the new agrarian structure. The research paid attention to the resistance 
of agrarian labour to exploitation, including through individual and collective action. 
The research also focused on how different forms of social mobilisation, including 
along class identities, of kinship and culture, nationality and ethnicity and gender 
relations, are deployed towards resistances to poor working conditions in the farms 
and procurement of land and natural resources. 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The specific objectives which guided the study were to:  
Explore the literature on the factors influencing the formation and character of 
agrarian labour markets in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in general and more specifically 
in former Settler-economies in Southern Africa. 
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Examine the sources and forms of agrarian wage labour and self-employment that are 
being utilised by farm households in the new agrarian structure. 
 
Explore intra-household labour relations in terms of the allocation of farm and non-
farm labour tasks by gender, age and kinship ties. 
 
Investigate the diversification of family labour into non-farm rural activities and their 
importance to household incomes in relation to farm production activities. 
 
Examine the quality of farm wage labour engaged by the farming households in 
relation to the monetary wages, in-kind payments and other working conditions 
compared to the situation in the LSCFs. 
 
Determine the differences in the forms and scale of labour utilisation according to 
structural differences among farm households such as land sizes, gender dimensions, 
commodities produced, value of output; assets owned, inputs used and access to 
capital. 
 
Explore the different ways in which farm workers are mobilising individual and 
collective agency to resist poor working conditions and opportunities to improve their 
livelihood outcomes in the context of the reformed land tenure relations. 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The research questions posed concern the nature and extent to which structural 
change in the land ownership and property relations and the consequent changes in 
patterns of agricultural production and markets have reshaped the organisation of 
labour relations amongst the broader base of agrarian classes within the new 
diversified agrarian structure which has emerged since 2000. Specifically, in what 
forms has new agrarian labour regime evolved, and has this fully or partially replaced 
the labour regime that was shaped by unequal land distribution and freehold land 
rights?  
What does the literature say regarding which factors affect the formation and 
character of agrarian labour markets in SSA in general and more specifically in 
former Settler-economies in Southern Africa? 
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Does the redistribution of land to mostly small-scale producers and a retention of a 
reduced base of large-scale capitalist farms lead to a decline in capitalist wage labour 
relations alongside the rise in the use of family farm labour, and/ or do new extensive 
forms of wage labour emerge? 
 
To what extent is the diversification into non-farm rural labour activities replacing 
farm labour as an important source of income to land owning farm households 
domiciled in diverse locales? 
 
Has the expansion of the number of farm households following redistributive land 
reforms resulted in increased competition for farm wage labour and consequently 
improvement in the quality of wage labour? 
 
Has the reconstitution of the freehold land tenure into state land tenures, which 
compelled mandatory labour provision by labourers resident in the LSCFs‘ 
compounds, resulted in the undermining of the residential labour tenancy system and 
increased the autonomy of farm labourers to sell their labour and organise for 
favourable conditions of labour supply and/or engage in other forms of 
agency/resistance? 
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The study relied upon a variety of data sources to answer the research questions posed 
above, including a review of the literature, primary research, and other secondary 
sources of information. The study approach involved examining the labour relations 
within the farming units and/or households as the principal study units alongside the 
farm labourers and farm compounds at different levels from the farm to the national 
level. At the national level, the aim was to decipher the historical and current 
dynamics in the relationship between the agrarian labour markets and the landholding 
patterns and the changing agricultural and economic policies. The local differences in 
agrarian restructuring entailed by the FLTRP and their implications on agrarian labour 
markets were traced at the district level. The research issues on the sources of farm 
labour and their relationship with the land utilisation patterns were captured from the 
farm households, as well as the role of non-farm labour activities in their sustenance. 
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Additionally, they provided information on their dual roles as farm wage labour and 
self-employed family labour in their farming units. Farm labourers elucidated the 
understanding of the new forms of labour and its quality, and the agency of the 
workers to respond to the challenges and opportunities in the new agrarian structure. 
Lastly, farm compounds assisted in the tracking of residential labour tenancy 
relationship and its impact on the labour supplies and agency of farm workers. 
1.6.1 Literature review  
The literature review was divided into three parts and covered in detail in Chapters 
Two, Four and Five. In Chapter Two, the study sought to develop the theoretical and 
conceptual framework to underpin the study. Three dominant theoretical frameworks 
utilised to understand agrarian labour relations; namely the historical structural 
approaches, neo-classical equilibrium models and the livelihoods approach were 
reviewed. The latter two approaches were found short for the purpose of the study due 
to their under-emphasis of the role of land ownership, the key means of production in 
rural Africa, in the formation of labour markets. The neo-classical equilibrium 
models‘ assumptions about the linearity in agrarian transformation anticipate the 
reduction in the importance of self-employed agricultural labour as economies grow 
through its relocation to modern urban industries was found not to be plausible in the 
context of SSA. Indeed, most of Africa‘s people are still based in rural areas and 
largely derive their sustenance from agriculture since many of the countries retain 
only limited capacities to absorb labour to the urban sector even in the most 
industrialised countries such as South Africa. Moreover, there is inadequate concern 
on the influence of various socio-economic policies in compelling self-employed 
labour to the markets as they largely consider migration for work as voluntary and/or 
rational decisions of rural people. As a result, the historical-structural approaches 
rooted in the Marxist political economy frameworks were chosen for the study as they 
emphasise the importance of the broader historical context, economic and social 
structures such as the distribution of  land and the interactions of various policies in 
shaping agrarian labour relations. However, the review of literature also revealed that 
the class dynamics alone were inadequate to understand the contemporary agrarian 
labour relations and issues such as gender relations, intra-household relations, kinship, 
citizenship and the agency of the workers were integrated into the analysis. 
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The existing perspectives, knowledge and questions on agrarian labour relations were 
also analysed. The confinement of the existence of the agrarian labour markets to 
Settler Southern Africa where large-scale capitalist agriculture prevails was identified 
as one of the key problems in the conceptualisation of African agrarian labour 
relations (AALR). Contestations also revolved around the role of wage labour in 
capitalist farms and self-employment in the sustenance of rural people, and whether 
non-farm activities were part of labour relations of the peasantry. In general, it was 
also found that studies on labour tend to favour analysing urban labour markets 
primarily because they conform to the neo-classical definitions of employment. 
The second part of literature review positioned in Chapter Four was geared towards 
understanding the evolution of agrarian labour relations relative to the macro-level 
changes in land access, land utilisation patterns, economic policies, labour laws and 
various extra-economic measures from 1890 to 1999. This analysis provided a basis 
to evaluate transformation induced by the FTLRP.  
The main finding from this review was that the evolution of agrarian labour relations 
in Zimbabwe since the 1900s had been shaped by a process of extensive colonial era 
land alienation and dispossession, as well as the use of economic and extra-economic 
policies and processes to subordinate self-employed peasant family labour to wage  
labour markets in the European LSCFs, mining and urban industrial sectors (Arrighi 
1970; Clarke 1977; Mafeje 2003; Palmer 1977). There were however disagreements 
on the nature and exent of proletarianisation that had arisen from the agrarian change. 
Arrighi (1970) viewed this to have set in motion a continuing trajectory of 
proletarianisation. Due to the persistence of self-employed peasant family labourers 
engaged in petty commodity production in the Communal Areas (CAs), others 
considered incomplete land dispossession to have created ―worker-peasants‖ (Bush & 
Cliffe 1984: 77), in a process which has been defined as a systemic 20
th
 century 
trajectory of ―semi-proletarianisation‖ (Moyo & Yeros 2005a: 26). The latter view 
was more persuasive to the study on account of the empirical facts, which show that 
the labour absorption capacity not only stalled, but even proletarianised rural people 
still maintained a foothold in the countryside combining both wage work and farming 
on small plots to survive.  
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As observed in the review of literature in SSA, peasant labour relations were hardly 
considered worthy of note in most debates on agrarian labour relations in Zimbabwe, 
except for a few studies that examined the existence of wage labour markets in the 
Communal Areas (e.g. Adams 1991; Matshe 1998; Worby 1995; Cousins, Weiner & 
Amin 1992). Instead, research focus since independence was zoomed on LSCFs 
(Amanor-Wilks 1995; Loewenson 1992; McIvor 1995; Mugwetsi & Balleis 1994; 
Rutherford 2001). Of interest were the wage-employment trends during the early 
1980s (Loewenson 1992) and the increased retrenchment and casualisation of labour 
(GoZ 1983; Moyo & Ngobese 1991) following the introduction of new farm labour 
regulations in the 1980 (Kanyenze 2001; Moyo & Ngobese 1991), and later on, due to 
land use changes, export production and technological advances intensified during 
ESAP (Amanor-Wilks 1995; 2000; Chambati & Moyo 2004; Moyo 2000). The super-
exploitation of workers through the extremely low wages paid and residential labour 
tenancy was hardly a major research concern. 
In fact, the abuse of farm labour in the LSCFs, including through physical violence, 
racism and unpaid overtime work, were also examined, while the gender inequalities 
and discrimination that were reflected by the feminisation of lowly paid and insecure 
part-time work only became a focus during the 1990‘s (Amanor-Wilks 2001; 1995; 
Muchena & Dzumbira 2001). From 1995, the research became more attentive to the 
poor socio-economic conditions of farm workers and their families, but focused on 
their poor and limited access to social amenities such as housing, education and health 
facilities (Magaramombe 2001; McIvor 1995). The nature of resistance of farm 
workers against their low wages and poor socio-economic conditions drew less focus 
(Kibble & Vanlerberghe 2000), including through union organised strikes and their 
own independent actions (Tandon 2001). 
Rather than agrarian labour dynamics, the research outside the LSCFs sought to 
explain the constraints to growth of the peasant agricultural production in the 1980‘s 
(e.g. Muir 1985; Rohrbach 1988; Rukuni & Eicher 1994; Weiner, Moyo, Munslow & 
O‘keefe 1985), and the impact of land redistribution on agriculture and social welfare 
(Kinsey 1983; Moyo 1995; Palmer 1990). From the mid-1990‘s, the subsequent 
effects of ESAP on agriculture, including peasant production, became the pre-
occupation, (e.g. Chipika 1995; Matanda & Jeche 1998, Masuko 1998; Oni 1997; 
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Moyo 2000), while a few studies tracked the underperformance of land reform (Moyo 
1995; 1999), again to the neglect of agrarian labour relations. 
Some of the literature on agrarian labour relations generally sought to uncover the 
underlying gender relations of peasant labour (Batezat 1984; Gaidzanwa 1995; 
Muchena 1994; Mvududu & McFadden 2001). These studies observed that it was 
mostly women‘s labour that was exploited in household agricultural production, 
alongside their reproductive roles, by men who largely controlled the landholdings 
and agrarian resources in Communal Areas. The burden to provide farm labour to 
household agricultural production was noted to be more onerous for women de-facto 
household heads whose males had migrated to seek wage employment in the LSCFs 
and elsewhere (O‘Laughlin 1998; Potts 2000). Overall, data gaps were apparent in the 
literature on the agrarian labour relations of the peasantry. 
The third part of literature review discussed the extent of agrarian restructuring 
imposed by the FTLRP, alongside the changing agrarian labour policy regime at the 
national and district levels. The main finding was that a new diverse agrarian structure 
had emerged at the national level containing many smaller-scale farming units with 
implications on the sources of farm employment. At the district level, it was exposed 
that the agrarian structures differed in the size and composition of the agrarian classes 
contingent upon the nature of land redistribution at the local level, which in turn 
influenced the local level labour markets. The analysis showed that the decline and 
partial recovery of the economy and the shifts in the various public policies during the 
2000‘s had wider ramifications on the land utilisation and farm labour demand 
examined by the research. 
1.6.2 Primary research  
It could be gleaned from the literature that the combination of quantitative and 
qualitative research methods not only gathers complimentary information to 
illuminate the picture of the phenomenon being studied (Erzeberger & Kelle 2003: 
461), but can serve to triangulate research results (Bryman 2004; Greene et al. 1989; 
Mikkelsen 2005; Neuman 2006). Oya (2013; 2010) has argued in favour of 
combining both methods since either method used alone is not able to collect all the 
information required to understand agrarian labour relations in Africa. Qualitative 
research, the latter scholar has averred, is helpful in conceptualising the local 
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perception of wage employment as in many contexts they are some forms of wage 
labour, which are regarded lowly by rural communities. Examples cited included 
piecework paid in-kind that is normally associated with poor people. The 
understanding of the local context derived from qualitative research can therefore help 
researchers to design and word quantitative surveys and thus prevent the 
underestimation of rural wage employment. Quantitative surveys are considered 
useful to capture broad employment trends that this study was also interested in. 
A mixed methods approach was thus chosen by the study. The quantitative method 
entailed separate questionnaire surveys administered to farm households and farm 
labourers. The former included households allocated land during the FTLRP and 
peasants from the Communal Areas that were randomly selected through stratified 
random sampling. The farm labourers included both the former farm workers 
previously employed in the redistributed LSCFs and new workers who were engaged 
in various economic activities prior the land reforms. Because of the absence of a 
sampling frame, respondents to farm labour questionnaire survey were purposively 
selected across the variegated farm units and the research strived for the 
representation of the different forms of labour in the survey.  
The qualitative data was gathered through direct physical observations and key 
informant interviews that were interviewed face-to-face on aspects and experiences 
about the study units that they were familiar with. They included purposively selected 
state actors from the Ministry of Lands and Rural Ressettlement (MLRR), Ministry of 
Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation (MAEMI), and Ministry of Public Service, 
Labour and Social Welfare (MPSLSW). The non-state actors interviewed included 
senior former farm workers, local leaders, trade unions and Non Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) dealing with farm labour issues. The direct physical 
observations were structured in order to investigate specific issues of interest to the 
study that included land and labour utilisation patterns, intra-household labour 
relations, working conditions of wage workers and the recruitment of labour in 
compounds and at different rural and urban centres. 
1.6.3 Secondary sources  
The primary research was supplemented by secondary data sources. Some of the 
useful secondary material consulted by the study included: MLRR land records, 
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Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency (ZIMSTAT) labour surveys, population 
censuses and agricultural production reports, MAEMI agricultural production reports, 
MPSLW labour outlook reports, newspaper articles, court records on litigation 
relating to farm labour relations and district maps from the Surveyor General‘ Office. 
1.7 ETHICAL CLEARANCE  
This study was guided by the ethical clearance provided by UNISA (Annex 1.1). In 
particular, informed consent was sought in writing from all those who participated in 
research as elaborated upon in Chapter Three. No respondent was forced to participate 
in the study, but all did so voluntarily and were notified of their right to withdraw at 
any given time without any repercussions visiting them. The confidentiality of the 
data collected from the participants was safeguarded by relying on pseudonyms 
throughout the dissertation, except in cases where some public officials granted their 
permission for their names to be used. Permission to undertake the research was also 
sought and granted by government authorities in writing at national and local levels 
(Annex 1.2). 
1.8 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The study focused on the examination of the transition of agrarian labour relations in 
Zimbabwe in general and more specifically in Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts. Four 
aspects of agrarian labour relations were analysed, namely; the new sources of farm 
labour, role of non-farm labour activities in the sustenance of rural people, quality of 
wage employment and the resistance of labour to the new material conditions in the 
new agrarian structure. These issues were assessed for the period between 2000 and 
2017. Shifts in agrarian labour regime were assessed in the A1 and A2 farming units 
and the Communal Areas land tenure categories, where most of the data gaps 
currently exist. The study did not examine the evolving patterns in the LSCFs and 
plantations that were not acquired for resettlement during FTLRP since the agrarian 
labour relations in these land tenure categories have been fairly documented prior to 
2000 (Loewenson 1992; Amanor-Wilks 1995; 2000; Kanyenze 2001; Mugwetsi & 
Balleis 1994; Moyo, Rutherford & Amanor-Wilks 2000; Kibble & Vanleberge 2000).  
Due to the highly differentiated outcomes of the FLTRP (Scoones et al. 2010; 
Scoones et al. 2018a; Moyo et al. 2009; Matondi 2012; Hanlon, Manjengwa & Smart 
2012; Mutopo 2013), the study does not reflect the transformation of agrarian labour 
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relations nationally. However, it provides a foundation for understanding the 
transformation of agrarian labour relations in the context of extensive land 
redistribution initiated by the FTLRP in two districts with contrasting farming 
systems that are in general representative of the land uses and agro-ecological patterns 
countrywide.  
1.9 TERMINOLOGY 
This section provides definitions for the various concepts to illuminate their meaning 
in relation to the context of the study. Other definitions of key terminologies deployed 
by the research are detailed in Chapter Two, which outlines the conceptual and 
theoretical framework for understanding agrarian labour relations in Africa.  
Agrarian labour relations broadly refer to the mobilisation, organisation and 
utilisation of wage and non-wage labour, in farm production in the context of wider 
agrarian transformations, involving changes in land ownership, and increasing 
integration into global markets (Jha 1996; Moyo 2011a; Moyo, Jha & Yeros 2013), as 
well as the use of self-employed family farm labour in other rural based non-farm 
activities that are enabled by access to land and natural resources (Ellis 1996: 7; 
Moyo 1995: 209).  
Farm wage labour is the sell of labour to farm production, which may be paid for 
cash and/or in-kind. It occurs in different forms, including full- and part-time labour. 
In the Zimbabwean context, those employed in the LSCFs were commonly referred to 
as farm workers (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Rutherford 2001). The wage labourers 
encompass all people that are hired by farm households irrespective of the duration of 
employment, and availability of a written contract, and frequency of wage payments 
(Oya 2013; Oya & Pontara 2015).  
Self-employment entails jobs where remuneration is derived from profits of the 
commodities produced, and consumption of food they produce constitutes a share of 
the profits (ILO 2015b: 32). It therefore includes the owners of the means of the 
production endowed with decision-making powers on the welfare of the enterprises 
and other unpaid members of their family who contribute labour to the household‘s 
agricultural production units (Standing 2006).  
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Non-farm rural labour activities are those activities where the income source 
originates from the value addition of agricultural output, transportation and marketing 
of non-value added agricultural, forest and fish items spatially located in rural areas 
(Barret et al. 2001: 3018). Incomes obtained from direct agricultural and harvesting of 
natural resource products (e.g. firewood and fish) without any value addition  
(including farm wage labour regardless of its location) are excluded (Barret, Reardon 
& Webb 2001: 318). Off-farm activities are not synonymous with non-farm labour as 
they refer to the geographical location of where the activity is performed. 
Labour markets imply the existence of hiring in of labour by employers and selling 
of labour by employees (Ehrenberg & Smith 2006: 26). Agrarian labour markets 
therefore reflect the presence of this phenomenon in the agricultural sector in the rural 
areas.  
Peasantry are rural people that own and farm small plots of land utilising mainly 
self-employed labour from their families, but some of them do hire wage labour to 
complement the family (Moyo 2014: 17; Moyo & Yeros 2005a: 25-26 Ellis 1998: 
13). They produce for own consumption and are integrated into markets for surplus 
sales and acquisition of modern farm inputs (Mafeje 2003; Petras & Veltmeyer 2001). 
Indeed, agrarian labour relations among the peasantry are defined by the 
interdependency between farm and non-farm labour activities, which compete for the 
same family labour (Moyo & Yeros 2005; Petras & Veltmeyer 2001; Shivji 2009; 
Van der Ploeg 2010). 
Agrarian structure represents the categorisation of farming units into different 
classes on the basis of their landholdings, land tenure, labour utilisation, access to 
economic and social resources, types of crops and livestock produced and market 
participation (derived from de Janvry 1981: 110; Moyo 2011a: 510-17). Three classes 
commonly found in agrarian structures are the peasantry, small-scale capitalist and 
large-scale capitalist farms. The capitalist farms primarily produce for the market. 
Large-scale capitalists usually command expansive landholdings; they are directly 
inserted into the global production networks and have an agro-industrial character. 
Moreover, they are also exclusively reliant on hired wage labour for their farm 
production. While small-scale capitalist farms are also dependent on hired wage 
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labour, they also contribute their self-employed labour to their agricultural production 
units, owning relatively less land and capital than the latter.  
Redistributive land reform  involves transferring land from large land owners  such 
as LSCFs to mostly land short peasants and landless workers (Adam 2000: 4; Bush 
2002: 4).  
Residential labour tenancy is a form of tenancy that is characteristic to former-
Settler Southern Africa where accommodation for farm workers in farm compounds 
in LSCFs was linked to their employment rights (Chambati 2011: 1048). It is different 
from the classical tenancy where land is provided in exchange for solely supplying 
labour to the landlord (Lastarria-Cornhiel & Mehmed-Sanjak 1999: 43; Gibbon, 
Daviron & Barral 2014: 177) in that residential labour tenants also received wages for 
their labour. 
Social reproduction broadly implies ―… the security of the conditions of life (e.g. 
food, education, health and clothing) and of future production from what is produced 
or earned now‖ (Bernstein 2010: 128). 
Agency or resistance refers to the human actions that peasants and agrarian labourers 
engage in to respond to the opportunities and constraints affecting their socio-
economic conditions (Paton 1995). 
1.10 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
Following this Chapter, the discussion in Chapter Two details the theoretical and 
conceptual framework(s) used in this study and critically evaluates the existing 
perspectives, knowledge and questions raised on agrarian labour relations in SSA as 
found in the literature.  
Chapter Three elaborates on the study approach and methods used, and introduces 
the study area to clarify the specific context in which local dynamics of agrarian 
labour are presented. 
Chapter Four re-examines the historical evolution of agrarian labour relations at the 
macro level, highlighting how the changing patterns of agrarian wage labour 
employment relates to periodic changes in landholding patterns, agrarian labour 
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policy and law reforms, and outlines the national level changes in agricultural 
employment patterns during colonial period between 1890 and 1979 and after the 
country gained independence in 1980 until 1999.  
Chapter Five provides the study context, highlighting the extent of agrarian 
restructuring in the land ownership and land tenure relations emerging from the 
FTLRP, as well as the shifts in the agrarian and labour policies and their implications 
on labour relations outcomes. The new agrarian structure is first examined at the 
national level and extended to the district level in order to highlight the specificities of 
the new agrarian labour regime and/or sources of employment at the local level. 
Chapter Six presents the data analysis and interpretation of the findings based on the 
detailed quantitative and qualitative research undertaken in Goromonzi and Kwekwe 
districts and from other sources. It begins by outlining the sources of farm labour for 
the farm households, including from their families and hired in labour, scale of 
utilisation, intra- and inter- household relations, gender and generational dynamics in 
the use of self-employed labour and proceeds to unpack the diversification of family 
labour in non-farm rural activities is covered. The differentiation in the wider 
production relations that is entailed by the extent and use of hired in labour to 
organise their farming is then examined. The analysis is extended to expose the 
precise character of the forms of full and part-time agrarian wage labour, and their 
distribution in the diverse range of producers. It outlines how wage labour is being 
procured and the organisation of work in the new small-scale capitalist farms. The 
quality of wage labour is also examined in terms of the monetary wages, in-kind 
payments and the working conditions. The mobilisation of individual and collective 
agency by farm workers to respond to poor working conditions and opportunities to 
improve their livelihoods through the procurement of land and other natural resources 
concludes the chapter.  
Chapter Seven, the concluding chapter, presents findings, recommendations and 
conclusions relating to the nature and scope of the new agrarian labour markets, 
quality of labour and their role in employment development and livelihood outcomes 
and draws out their implications. 
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1.11 CONCLUSION  
This chapter provided the reader with a general overview of the research. It presented 
the background and rationale of the study, centred on the land and labour questions in 
Zimbabwe until 1999 and the ramifications of the extensive land redistribution since 
2000 on the agrarian labour relations. The other sections covered included the 
problem statement, research objectives, research questions, research methodology, 
ethical clearance, limitations of the study, terminology used and also outlined the 
organisation of the thesis.  
In general, it was clear that agrarian labour dynamics, especially those of the 
peasantry, do not receive much academic attention in SSA. The situation in 
Zimbabwe was no different as land use and agricultural production patterns pre-
occupied agrarian research before the FLTRP and investigations of agrarian labour 
focused on the LSCFs to the exclusion of peasant labour relations. This problem 
extended to the post-FTLRP period. It was apparent agrarian labour relations during 
the post-FTLRP period has received limited research attention, but the few that 
address the labour questions have directed their optics to displacement and 
retrenchment of farm workers from LSCFs to the exclusion of the ensuing labour 
relations in the new small-scale capitalist farms and the peasantry.  
Quite crucially, it was also highlighted that a challenge in most studies evaluating the 
outcomes of FTLRP has been of over-simplification of the factors, which contributed 
to the agrarian change witnessed today. Specifically, there was a tendency to attribute 
the impacts on labour and other agrarian relations on the land reform itself to the 
exclusion of how the processes interacted with other public policies to shape the 
outcomes. As is known, the evaluation of public policies does not only need to look at 
the policy of interest, but also consider its interactions with other policies to influence 
the impacts. The study thus sought to contribute to existing knowledge by filling the 
data gaps on the sources of farm labour, diversification of family labour, nature and 
quality of the new wage labour and resistance of labour to their socio-economic 
conditions in the new agrarian structure on the basis of research questions defined in 
section 1.5, taking into cognisance how other pubic policies put to bear their influence 
on the contemporary agrarian change beyond the FTLRP induced outcomes.  
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The next Chapter Two,  develops the theoretical and conceptual framework utilised 
by the study and provides a critical assessment of the viewponts and knowledge on 
agrarian labour relations in the SSA literature.  
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CHAPTER TWO 




The previous chapter provided a general overview of the research subject. This 
chapter provides the conceptual framework anchoring this study and critically 
examines the existing perspectives, knowledge and questions raised on agrarian 
labour relations in SSA in general and more specifically in former Settler Southern 
Africa in order to inform the analysis on the new agrarian labour relations, which 
have accompanied the FTLRP and various changes in agrarian labour policies. The 
chapter is divided into five broad sections. Initially, the perspectives on agrarian 
labour are presented, including a review of the three dominant theoretical 
frameworks, which are applied to analyse agrarian labour in Africa. The historical-
structural approaches were identified as being better placed to understand the new 
agrarian labour relations in Zimbabwe compared to the livelihoods and neo-classical 
economic approaches since these were based on the historical context of land-labour 
utilisation generated by land dispossession and discriminatory agrarian policies during 
the colonial era and early independence period.  
The next section extends the discussion by exploring the role of existing agrarian 
structures in shaping the agrarian labour relations. The analysis of the specificities of 
the agrarian wage labour and formal agricultural labour markets in the context of 
Settler Southern Africa then follows. Attentive to the inadequacies of the structural 
factors in explaining the agrarian labour relations alone, the next two sections prior to 
the conclusion explore the influence of gender relations and agency of the agrarian 
labourers, and their intersection with the class dynamics to evolve the agrarian labour 
relations.  
2.2 PERSPECTIVES ON AFRICAN AGRARIAN LABOUR REGIMES 
This section presents the perspective on African agrarian labour regimes. An 
overview of agrarian labour debates is first outlined, succeeded by a review of the 
three dominant theoretical frameworks that have informed the understanding of 
labour relations in the continent and beyond.  
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2.2.1 Overview of the African agrarian labour debate 
African agrarian labour regimes (AALRs) are largely seen as devoid of (capitalist) 
wage labour relations, in terms of the scale or sizes of the labour employed and the 
quality of the employment due to the presumed absence of agrarian labour markets, 
contingent on the presumed absence of capitalist farms, particularly LSCFs. Peasant 
households that predominate the rural areas are assumed not to hire in agricultural 
labour and exclusively rely on self-employed labour from their families and inter-
household labour exchanges (Barret et al. 2001; Barret et al. 2005; Binswanger et al. 
1995; Griffin et al. 2002; Robillard, Sukume, Yanoma & Lofgren 2001). As such, the 
redistribution of LSCFs  to peasants is largely associated with the complete reversal 
of wage labour relations in the countryside (see de Janvry 1981; Sender & Johnston 
2004; Sender 2016).  
Despite its importance in sustaining the reproduction of Africa‘s populace, the nature 
and evolution of agrarian labour in Africa is apparently not well understood due to the 
lack of knowledge resulting from conceptually poor and limited empirical research 
leading to a paucity of data on labour (Leavy & White 2003; Oya 2013; 2010). 
However, understanding agrarian labour relations deserves urgent attention, 
particularly against the backdrop of mounting poverty levels and urban 
unemployment in much of the countries in the Global South, including Africa (Jha 
2016; Oya & Pontara 2015; IFAD 2011; ILO 2011; 2015; World Bank 2008). 
The neglect of African agrarian labour is partly attributed to the complexity of the 
character of rural employment, as this largely falls outside of the purview of neo-
classical economic definitions of employment (Leavy & White 2003; Oya 2013; 
2010). In general, research emphasis has been placed on urban labour markets 
(Krishnan, Selassie & Dercon 1998 & Glick 1999; LEDRIZ 2016; Mengistae 1998a; 
1998b; Teal 1997). Oya (2013) cites a few studies which have devoted attention to 
rural labour market formation (Ghai & Radwan 1983; Kitching 1980; Sender & Smith 
1986; Swindell 1985) and decries the decline in agrarian labour studies in Africa since 
the mid-1980s in favour of smallholder farmers and economic reforms. In Settler-
Southern Africa, formal farm wage labour has received the most research attention as 
outlined earlier.  
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A long standing unresolved question in contemporary SSA‘s predominantly agrarian 
economies, which are unevenly integrated into global capitalism since the colonial 
period (Moyo 2008; 2014), concerns the extent and nature of rural proletarianisation, 
in which dispossessed peasants are compelled into wage labour and whether farm and 
non-farm labour activities constitute a continuum of the labour processes of the 
peasantry. The disappearance of self-employed forms of labour through full 
―proletarianisation‖ has been postulated assuming that peasants struck by inadequate 
land for social reproduction would be converted into fully-fledged wage labourers in 
the capitalist sectors (Arrighi 1970; Arrighi & Saul 1973).  
Economic theories generally posit a similar outcome, arguing that urban industrial 
growth will reduce the importance of agriculture and absorb peasantry into wage 
employment (Lewis 1954). Further reflections, however argued that since land 
dispossession was uneven, it produced worker-peasants (Bush & Cliffe 1994) or 
resulted in a process of perpetual semi-proletarianisation entailing the combination of 
farming on small plots and wage employment by peasants for their survival (Moyo & 
Yeros 2005a; Neocosmos 1993). Other recent contributions (Bernstein 2014: S97; 
2006) have argued that under capitalist social relations, rural Africa is permeated by a 
variety of ―classes of labour‖ whose means of production are totally dispossessed or 
inadequate for their social reproduction. For Bernstein (2014: S97-8; emphasis in 
original), the ―classes of labour‖ means all those ―…who depend directly and 
indirectly on the sale of their labour power for their own reproduction‖.  
For others, however, the proliferation of non-farm rural labour activities amongst the 
peasantry was induced by economic crises associated with Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs), leading to the unravelling of new agrarian labour relations 
(Bryceson 2000; 2002; Bryceson, Kay & Mooij 2000; Riggs 2006). A de-
agrarianisation process, entailing a permanent transformation of rural livelihoods 
from agriculture towards non-farm labour activities, is said to reduce the importance 
of agricultural labour (Bernstein 2014; Bryceson 2002; Bryceson et al. 2000; Riggs 
2006). In similar vein, some descriptive livelihoods studies have argued that 
agriculture is just but one of many activities for which household labour resources are 
utilised in the construction of people‘s livelihoods (Carney 1998; Ellis 1998) through 
a complex set of open ended choices and its importance varies for different places and 
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times (Scoones 1998). This combination of a different set of activities to construct 
people‘s livelihoods is termed livelihoods diversification (Scoones 1998: 9). Overall, 
these perspectives undervalue the significance of self-employed agricultural labour in 
the social reproduction of peasants. 
A key problem with the conceptualisation of AALR in the existing literature is that 
agrarian labour markets are largely considered to be absent in the majority of African 
countries, except in regions such as Settler-Southern Africa where large-scale 
capitalist agriculture exists (Barret, Besfuneh, Clay & Reardon 2005; Barret, Reardon 
& Webb et al. 2001; Binswanger, McIntire & Udry 1989). Thus, the different forms 
of agrarian labour and the diverse sources of employment that obtain among different 
classes of producers are understudied.  
An important difference on AALR perspectives concerns the material quality of the 
conditions of agrarian labour in both its self-employed and wage forms. Wage labour 
in capitalist farms, rather than self-employment, is seen to be a more important form 
of agrarian labour, and more crucial to the survival of rural people (Cramer, Oya & 
Sender 2008; Hellum & Derman 2004; Sender & Johnston 2004; Sender Oya & 
Cramer 2006; Sender 2016). Yet the returns to labour amongst the peasantry through 
farm incomes and use values from consumption of own produce are rarely empirically 
measured and compared to farm wage returns (Kevane 1994). 
This is one of the reasons why the focus of debate tends to be on the nature of 
resistance by agrarian labour to various forms of oppression and exploitation arising 
from their employment conditions under the evolving socio-economic contexts. 
However, some commentators view agrarian labourers as passive victims of structural 
disadvantages (such as land shortage or landlessness) (Ridderbos 2009; Mugwetsi & 
Balleis 2004; Waeterloos & Rutherford 2004; Zamchiya 2013). The prospects of 
improving the material conditions of agrarian labour have been studied in terms of 
individual and collective actions within the existing socio-economic framework 
(Moyo & Yeros 2005a; O‘Laughlin 2002; Paton 1995; Petras & Veltmeyer 2001; 
Shivji 2009).  
Current understandings of the scope of forms and agrarian labour relations in Africa 
are generally poorly conceptualised due to a focus on the conventional forms of wage 
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employment and the related inadequacy of empirical data on broader forms of labour 
(Leavy & White 2003; Oya 2013; 2010). The paucity of data on rural labour issues in 
Africa is also a result of various methodological limitations in the collection of data 
on labour markets amongst the peasantry on the basis of formal definitions of wage 
employment, which are not common in SSA (Oya 2013). 
An enduring methodological challenge in former settler zones also relates to analysis 
of agrarian labour relations within the peasantry separately from those in capitalist 
farms, especially LSCFs, with a bias on the latter (e.g. Adams 1991; Amanor-Wilks 
2001; 1995; Wisborg, Hall, Shirinda & Zamchiya 2013; McIvor 1995). This has 
tended to limit the understanding of the agrarian labour relations, due to pervasive 
nature of the semi-proletarian condition that entail many peasants are straddling 
between LSCF wage labour and petty commodity production on small plots (Moyo & 
Yeros 2005b; Mintz 1974). A complete understanding of labour relations within the 
peasantry is not possible without examining the LSCF labour relations, otherwise 
false dichotomies of peasant-LSCF wage relations are generated (Mintz 1974).  
The literature also differs on the influence of gender relations, kinship, ethnicity, 
citizenship and identity on AAL. These wider factors, alongside the class dynamics, 
combine to shape access to and control of resources, which in turn affect the agrarian 
labour relations in variety of ways including the control of labour within families and 
wage labour hiring relations (Elson 1999; Moyo 2008; Tsikata 2009). In contrast, 
neo-classical economic perspectives view households as egalitarian structures and 
agrarian labour markets as outcomes of the interactions of demand and supply forces 
not amenable to these wider social factors (Binswanger, Deininger & Feder 1995; 
Deininger & Binswanger 1999; Dorner 1992; Griffin, Khan & Ickowitz 2002).  
2.2.2 Competing theoretical frameworks on agrarian labour 
Three theoretical approaches have been dominant in the analysis of labour relations 
since the 1960s; firstly, the neo-classical individual equilibrium approaches, that 
postulate agrarian labour relations as an outcome of demand and supply of labour in a 
―free‖ market. Secondly, the historical/structural approaches developed within the 
Marxist political economy framework, which argue that the broader historical context, 
economic and social structures are key in shaping labour relations. Lastly, the 
Sustainable Livelihoods Approaches (SLA), which analyse the labour processes in 
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terms of the deployment of assets/capital base in diverse agricultural and non-
agricultural activities by households to realise their ―livelihoods‖ and labour.  
Neo-classical economics considers labour only as a factor of production obtained 
from the free market and its price (wage) and how much of it is used is determined by 
the demand for the final product it contributes to producing (Ehrenberg & Smith 
2006; Ellis 1988). In contrast, Marxist analytical frameworks view labour as ―wealth 
producing activity‖ and analytical interests include what the selling of labour 
contributes to its social reproduction in relation to the rates of profit extracted by 
capital and their consequent reinvestment to expand production (capital accumulation) 
(Freund 1984; Mamdani 1996a).  
2.2.2.1 Neo-classical economic approaches – Equilibrium models 
Neo-classical equilibrium approaches have been espoused in terms of dual economy 
theories pitting rural versus urban to explain the structural change in developing 
countries, specifically the labour phenomenon. At the forefront of these theories has 
been the ―two sector surplus labour‖ or ―unlimited labour supplies‖ model (Lewis 
1954). The flow of labour or labour supply between the traditional/subsistence/rural 
and modern/industrial/urban sectors is determined by the differential market 
incentives or wages existing between the two sectors.
6
 Similar to the utility theory of 
consumer choice which assume the objective of individuals as the derivation of 
maximum satisfaction or utility from their limited purchasing power (Hill 1990; 
Coleman & Young 1991), labour is motivated by income maximisation and is thus 
influenced to migrate from low wage rural sector to higher wage modern sectors (de 
Haas 2008). 
Marginal Productivity of Labour (MPL)
7
 determines the demand for labour under 
competitive market conditions
8
 and enterprises will hire labour until the juncture 
                                                 
6
The traditional sector is defined by production geared for own consumption using self-employed 
labour, whilst the modern sector is focused on the production of surpluses which can be re-invested to 
grow the enterprises using hired labour and modern technologies (Todaro 1989).  
7
 The MPL is the additional increase to total output as a result of an additional unit of labour added to 
the production process (Ehrenberg & Smith 2006).  
8
Competitive or free markets are those where the price is mediator of demand and supply, economic 
power is evenly distributed among all economic actors (thus no domination or coercion), accurate 
information on market prices is available to everyone who requires it and there is freedom of entry and 
exit into the markets (Ellis 1996). 
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where the Value Marginal Product of Labour (VMPL)
9
 is equivalent to the price of 
labour or wage rate. At this point the total cost of hiring additional labour is equal to 
the additional total revenue generated by employing additional labour. Since the MPL 
is assumed to be zero in rural areas, there exists ―surplus‖ labour, which can be 
transferred to the high productivity modern sector without affecting the output and/or 
revenue. The wages in the urban industrial sector are assumed to be constant and 
should be higher by a minimum threshold of 30 percent than the fixed average 
subsistence wage levels in the traditional agricultural sector to induce worker 
migration from rural to urban areas (Lewis 1954: 149-50). Thus, all those in the 
subsistence sector are inclined to entering the wage labour market in the modern 
capitalist sector.  
The movement of labour from surplus labour but scarce capital (rural areas) to capital 
abundant but scarce labour (urban areas) thus resolves the imbalances between the 
factors of production (land, labour, capital and natural resources) in an economy and 
concentrate economic activity in the modern sector (Freund 1984; de Haas 2008; 
Wood 1982). 
The continued expansion of the modern industrial sector through capital accumulation 
and/or reinvestment of surplus/profit implies that all the surplus labour will be 
absorbed from the traditional agricultural sector, until the MPL is no longer zero 
(Todaro 1989). Further extractions of labour from the traditional agricultural sector 
after this will thus come at higher cost specifically to food production as output will 
decrease with the withdrawal of labour since the MPL is now above zero.  
Various weaknesses in the two sector surplus labour model inspired further 
theorisation on the reallocation of labour resources from rural areas to the capitalist 
sector, including Todaro‘s labour migration theory (Paton 1995).  
Todaro (1989) critiqued the two sector surplus model, firstly for wrongly assuming 
that the rate of employment creation of the modern industrial sector and rate of labour 
transfer from the traditional agricultural sector were directly proportional to the rate 
of capital accumulation. Yet industrial expansion largely entails labour displacing 
                                                 
9
 The VMPL is the additional revenue generated to the enterprise as a result of an additional unit of 
labour in the production process (Ehrenberg & Smith 2006). 
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technologies rather than labour demanding technologies and profit repatriation abroad 
is a key feature of global capitalist transition. Secondly, rural-urban migration has 
been empirically shown to continue despite rising rates of urban unemployment, and 
surplus rural labour is largely limited to countries characterised by with unequal land 
ownership patterns. Lastly, rather than constant real wages in the urban sector under a 
competitive market, empirical observations show the tendency of absolute and real 
wages to increase in relation to the mean incomes in the rural areaas, even under 
conditions of high unemployment and low marginal productivity of labour in 
agriculture, partly because of institutional factors such as trade unions bargaining 
power.  
Todaro‘s labour migration theory thus sought to account for the continuous movement 
of rural labour to the urban areas regardless of rising unemployment in the metropolis 
(de Haas 2008). It modified the rural-urban wage differentials in the two sector 
surplus labour model to explain labour migration not only on the basis of the current 
income gaps, but also adjusting it with the probability of obtaining employment in the 
city posited as an inverse relationship to the urban unemployment rate (Todaro 1989). 
However, the theory still emphasised labour migration as primarily an ―economic‖ 
phenomenon (Paton 1995). The basic premise underlying this model was that 
migration to the cities to look for wagework will continue if the rural-urban wage 
differentials are larger than the risk of being unemployed (Paton 1995). A decision 
will be made to migrate if the expected incomes in urban areas are greater than the 
average rural incomes over a given period of time. The equilibrating force in the 
Todaro model is expected rural and urban incomes rather than wages as in the Lewis 
model.  
The underlying problem with dual economy theories pertains to their assumptions of 
the existence of free markets, yet the norm in the majority of the developing countries 
is that of market imperfections in access to capital and financial services, for 
instance(Leavy & White 2003). Access to information is poor and capital markets are 
fragmented and inaccessible to the majority of rural citizens (Leavy & White 2003) 
and powerful groups such as (colonial) capital manipulated the market to their own 
benefit (Arrighi 1970; Mhone 2001). The information on the expected incomes or 
wages that determine labour migration decisions is thus not easily available for the 
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potential migrants to make rational decisions (de Haase 2008). The dual economy 
theories also ignored the differentiation of various individuals by assuming 
homogeneity among the labour migrants (personal skills, educational background, 
age, gender etc.), given that urban labour markets are segmented (de Haas 2008).  
2.2.2.2 Historical-structural approaches 
The historical-structural approaches rooted in Marxian political economy were a 
response to the failure of the neo-classical economic approaches to explain labour 
relations in the developing world (Woods 1982; Paton 1995). Its proponents critiqued 
the ―two sector surplus labour model‖ and other microeconomic equilibrium 
approaches for incorrectly assuming the universal applicability of the models at all 
times. Yet contemporary agrarian labour relations have been shaped by historical 
specificity, including colonial land alienation and discriminatory agrarian policies 
dispossession. This in turn reduced the MPL to zero in the rural areas for some 
peasants and economically compelled them to wage employment (O‘Laughlin 2002; 
Peters 2011). Labour migration was thus key to the capital accumulation of colonial 
capital and continues to be critical in the post-independent period (Delgado Wise & 
Veltmeyer 2016; Paton 1995).  
Furthermore, wage and income differentials emphasised by equilibrium models are 
only applicable in a capitalist mode of production (Wood 1982).
10
 However, the 
introduction of capitalism in Africa did not entirely extinguish non-capitalist labour 
relations (i.e. labour is not sold in the market – self-employed labour) (Woods 1982). 
Agricultural labour in some peasant societies continues to be provided through 
traditional family kinship systems and exchange is through barter trade (Phimister 
1986; Amanor 2008). 
The historical/structural approaches thus propose that labour relations are influenced 
by the wider history of the people (e.g. with colonisation and global capitalist 
integration) and structural factors (e.g. asset distribution) in particular economy 
(Wood 1982:302). The structural factors can both be internal or external to the 
economy (O‘Laughlin 2002) and in SSA are rooted in historically specific conditions 
                                                 
10
Capitalist agricultural production relations are those that involve the employment of hired labour that 
is accompanied by accumulation (reinvestment of surpluses and expansion of production) (Patnaik 
1996). 
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such as the differentiated and uneven colonial land dispossessions and the 
incorporation of peasant into the global capitalist system (Arrighi 1970; Wood 1982; 
Neocosmos 1993; Mafeje 2003).  
Rather than the ―choice‖ for the ―rational‖ individual decision maker to move to 
highly productive work, the constraints imposed by wider economic pressures and 
unequal distribution of means of production influence the labour supplies to the 
capitalist sector. For instance, the income of those entirely dispossessed of their land 
in the rural areas is reduced to zero, and wage labour becomes critical for their 
survival (Wood 1982; Moyo 2011a). Moreover, the extra-economic measures that 
existed during the colonial period (e.g. compulsory taxes, controls on movement of 
people and forced labour contributions) and still exist albeit in different forms in 
independent Africa also influenced the evolution of labour markets (Arrighi 1970; 
Johnston 2007; Neocosmos 1993; Mafeje 2003; Shivji 2009). As such, market 
incentives alone are not solely responsible for the flow of labour from the peasant 
sector and labour markets were not generated ―in a social, cultural, political and 
institutional void‖ (de Haas 2008:6-7) as suggested by the dual economy theories.  
Migration from the countryside develops the urban sector and underdevelops the rural 
areas (Mhone 2001), rather than reduce the disparities in economic development 
between the two sectors as predicted by the equilibrium approaches on the premise of 
higher income earnings in the capitalist sector (Paton 1995), that will be invested in 
the rural areas by migrants (Neocosmos 1993). 
Although the historical-structural approaches have been critiqued for over-
emphasising the role of economic and social structures and undermining the agency 
of (peasant) households to respond to the structural conditions that affect their social 
reproduction (de Haas 2008; Johnston 2007), their propositions largely reflect 
empirical realities in SSA. However, the livelihood approaches emerged to address 
the structure (neglected by neo-classical economists but emphasised by structural 
approaches) and agency of people transcending the individual level to encompass the 
broader social context of the households, village communities, etc (allegedly 
neglected by structural approaches) (Bebbington 1999; Hebinck 2002; de Haas 2008; 
Scoones 2015; 2009), to explain how people realise their livelihoods and evolution of 
agrarian labour relations. 
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2.2.2.3 Livelihoods analytic frameworks 
The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) (Carney 1998; Ellis 1998; Scoones 
2015; 2009; 1998) is the dominant approach within the livelihoods analytic 
frameworks that is used to analyse rural livelihoods (Niehof 2004; Chimhowu & 
Hulme 2006; Mutenje et al. 2010).
11
 By definition, a livelihood ―...compris[es] the 
capabilities, assets (including both the material and social resources) and activities 
required for a means of living‖ (Scoones 1998: 5) and resistance to shocks ―without 
undermining the natural resource base‖ determines its sustainability (Scoones 1998: 
5-6). The SLA argues that (rural) ―livelihoods‖ are generated by what poor people 
have at their disposal at different places and times
12
 rather than what they ―need‖ for 
their sustenance commonly termed as assets or capitals (that include, natural capital; 
economic or financial capital; human capital and social capital) to construct their 
livelihoods (Farrington, Ramasut & Walker 2002).
13
 
Households are said to deploy their agency in ―acquiring, utilising and managing 
assets and resources in a more or less strategic manner‖ (Niehof 2004: 323) 
suggesting the existence of open-ended choices in realising livelihoods. Choices are 
made on how to combine, substitute and switch different assets/capitals in their 
livelihood portfolios to generate livelihoods at different places and times (Scoones 
1998; 2009). The SLA acknowledges the differentiated access to assets amongst rural 
people, but is silent in how this very differentiation influences the livelihood patterns. 
The emphasis is that people are engaged in various activities for their sustenance, also 
                                                 
11
The Capabilities and Assets framework is the other approach differing with the SLA on the 
conceptualisation of assets. The former attaches a broader view of assets/capitals as ―... not simply 
resources [as the SLA does] that people use in building livelihoods: they are assets that give them 
capability to and to act (Bebbington 1999:2022; [emphasis in original]). The assets are in fact 
―...vehicles for instrumental action (making a living), hermeneutic action (making a living meaningful) 
and emancipatory action (challenging the structures under which one makes a living) (Bebbington 
1999:2022; see also Scoones 2009:178). Furthermore, the Capabilities framework places greater 
importance to social capital in comparison to the rest of the capitals (Bebbington 1999). 
12
Utsa Patnaik (1996) makes the same point about resource endowments in the process of class 
formation. The difference between Patnaik‘s formulation is that she links the resource endowments to 
the evolution of labour relations, whilst in the livelihood approaches these are treated as discrete 
categories which are not linked in the diversification process (see Tsikata 2009) as discussed later.   
13
 Natural capital includes land, water and genetic resources, while the human capital encompasses the 
―…skills, knowledge, and capacity to work‖ (Farrington et al. 2002: 20). Social capital describes 
―…the mutual support that exist within and between households, extended family and communities, 
which people can mobilise to access for example, loans, childcare, food, accomodation and 
information…‖  (Farrington et al. 2002: 24). 
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termed livelihood diversification, with the objective of attaining success in livelihood 
security rather than as a survival strategy (Niehof 2004: 326). 
The livelihoods are shaped by five components, namely, (i) livelihood context; (ii) 
livelihood resources; (iii) livelihood strategies; (iv) institutions and organisation and; 
(v) livelihood outcomes (Scoones 1998; 2009; Carney 1998).  
The livelihood context encompasses the historical, political, social and economic 
conditions, and its variation across time and places shapes the differentiation in the 
livelihoods. Access to different livelihood resources is mediated by the ―institutions‖ 
that are conceptualised as ―…established ways of doing things, such as social norms 
and belief systems‖ (e.g. land tenure systems, labour exchanges, market and credit 
relations) (Farrington et al. 2002: 2; Scoones 1998: 12). Consequently, the households 
engage in different livelihood strategies to handle short-term and long-term risks 
(Farrington et al. 2002; Niehof 2004). 
In the rural areas, the strategies entail three ―clusters‖, which are ―agricultural 
intensification/extensification‖, ―livelihood diversification‖ (including wage labour) 
and ―migration‖ contingent upon access to different types of capitals/assets and their 
variation in scale, time (e.g. seasonality) and spatially (over different places) (Scoones 
1998: 3; 2015; 2009). These strategies produce livelihood outcomes that are measured 
by the employment generated (wage and self-employment); poverty levels, capacities 
to shift livelihoods in relation to dynamic contexts, alongside their ability to withstand 
shocks and stresses  (Scoones 1998). 
Agrarian labour is thus conceptualised as one of the resources at the household 
disposal that could be diversified in different agricultural and non-agricultural 
livelihood portfolios (Bebbington 1999; Niehof 2004; de Haas 2008) rather than the 
fulcrum of peasant livelihoods. Wage labour relations thus emerge from the 
diversification of household labour resources across rural and urban locales in both 
farming and non-farming activities (Bebbington 1999; de Haas 2008; Niehof 2004). 
Labour migration is considered ―... not so much... a coping strategy, but the deliberate 
diversification of family and household forms and sizes‖ (Niehof 2004: 327) that 
improves livelihoods, enhance financial capacity to develop other non-farm activities  
and curtail instability of household incomes sourced mainly from rain-fed farming, 
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which is increasingly strained by recurrent adverse weather patterns  (de Haas 2008: 
37). It is thus associated with the building of an asset base by households that serve as 
a buffer for future shocks and stresses in the rural areas (Scoones 1998). 
The point of departure of these approaches is that agriculture is just but one of many 
activities in people‘s livelihoods and its importance varies for different places and 
times. The importance of land to peasants is neglected since it is seen ―...as just one 
among several different assets/capitals required to make a living....‖ (Chimhowu & 
Hulme 2006: 729-30), despite its multiple functions that are critical to the sustenance 
of households (Moyo 1995).
14
 Consequently, the importance of self-employed 
agricultural labour in the livelihoods of the peasantry is also undervalued. 
Analysing land and labour as disconnected entities, livelihoods approaches conceal 
how land access can extend self-employment in agriculture or wage labour in the case 
of landlessness (Amanor 2001; Tsikata 2009). Livelihood approaches are thus bereft 
of class analysis and class struggles, which are central in how people realise their 
social reproduction (Murray 2002).  
Moreover, the neglect of colonial histories in SSA limits the value of livelihood 
approaches in understanding contemporary agrarian labour relations. Indeed, history 
is treated as a contextual issue rather than a central one in influencing livelihood 
patterns and the evolution of assets/capitals and their differentiation according to class 
and their importance in accumulation cannot be traced (O‘Laughlin 2002; Scoones 
2009). Critics have also noted that although the ―context‖ is emphasised in the 
livelihood approaches, in most cases it is ignored in the analysis in favour of agency 
of the people to come with strategies for their living (Whitehead 2002). Livelihoods 
perspectives also offer less in terms of prediction of long term outcomes, which can 
either undermine or strengthen livelihood strategies since focus is on short term 
adaptation, while excluding long term variables such as demographic change, land 
                                                 
14
Moyo (1995:49-50) lists up to six functions of land: ―…(i) store-house of nature for reproduction of 
future generations, (ii)… an agricultural production tool for subsistence and exchange incomes, (iii)… 
receptacle of direct household utility needs – water, wood fuel, organic fertiliser, medicine, shade, fruit, 
housing and home, game meat etc., (iv)… potential investment in water development for irrigation, 
tourist development, woodlands enterprises, for trading specific natural resources as commodities, 
(v)… social and political territory of governance and community reproduction [and] (vi)…security or 
collateral in financial transactions‖.  
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use, migration, regional economic shifts and urbanisation, and climate that impact on 
the transformation of livelihoods (Scoones 2009; 1998).  
Since the evolution of the agrarian labour relations in former Settler countries such as 
Zimbabwe were structured by a historical context of colonial land alienation and 
agrarian policies sidelining the peasantry, the historical-structural approaches are 
better placed to explain the consequences of land repossession. However, the 
weaknesses of these approaches is acknowledged, particularly their under emphasis of 
the role of individual agency and other social relations such as gender and kinship in 
shaping agrarian labour relations. It is for this reason that the analysis presented in 
this research is informed by an understanding that structural factors combine with 
other wider policies and social relations to generate the agrarian labour relations. The 
following sections elaborate on such a perspective, and begins by outlining how the 
specificities of the agrarian structures, including the distribution of landholdings are 
key in analysing the labour processes.  
2.3 AGRARIAN STRUCTURE AND THE DIVERSIFICATION OF 
AGRARIAN LABOUR RELATIONS 
Some scholars (Barret, Besfuneh, Clay & Reardon 2005; Barret, Reardon & Webb 
2001; Binswanger, McIntire & Udry 1989) suggest the pervasive nature of self-
employment in rural areas in Africa is due to the low population densities and 
abundance of land that are reflected in high land to labour ratios. The wide 
availability of simple technologies for production implies that both the potential 
employer and employee can realise almost the same amount of output (Binswanger et 
al. 1989). For hired workers, the opportunity cost of wage employment is the missed 
output of cultivating own plot of land given the seasonality of agriculture in SSA 
(Binswanger et al. 1989). Moreover, the inadequate capacities of small rural 
producers to monitor hired labour results in limited efforts by wage workers, also 
known as the moral hazard problem and thus family labourers who are ―… residual 
claimants to profits and thus have higher incentives to provide effort than hired 
labour‖ (Deininger & Feder 1998:17-18) are preferred. 
Accordingly, wage labour relations are largely seen as non-existent and not important 
for rural social reproduction in arid and semi-arid Africa (Binswanger et al. 1989:125-
6; Barret et al. 2005: 5-6), as well as sub-tropical Africa (Canagarajah, Newman & 
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Bhattamishra 2001). However empirical evidence shows that low land and labour 
ratios are not peculiar to Africa, as these also exist in Latin America where higher 
rural wage employment rates obtains (Oya 2013). According to the latter scholar, 
countries such as semi-arid Botswana and tropical Gabon with the lowest land and 
labour ratios, and the highest rates of rural wage employment also contradict the 
attribution of absence of agrarian labour markets to the former. 
Understanding the dynamism and specificities of the agrarian structure enables the 
identification of different farmer classes in a particular location, and this is key to 
analysing the agrarian labour relations (Moyo & Yeros 2005a).  
2.3.1 Land alienation, proletarianisation and changing labour market regimes 
In general, the agrarian structure in most African countries can be characterised as 
predominantly comprising the peasantry, and a rise in small and medium-to-large 
scale capitalist farms, as well as a few agro-industrial estates established since 
colonial times (Moyo 2008; 2011a; 2014). Within such agrarian structures are 
landless and/or land short people and their families who provide wage labour services 
across the differentiated range of producers. The farm classes differ in terms of the 
land sizes accessed, land tenure relations, commercial orientation of production and 
the extent of the use of wage labour (Moyo 2011a; Hall, Scoones & Tsikata 2017).  
Thus, agrarian labour relations in African countries can be broadly differentiated 
according to the varying degrees of land alienation and extra-economic coercion faced 
by the peasantry under colonialism (Freund 1984; Mafeje 2003; Mamdani 1996b; 
Neocosmos 1993) with relatively distinct landholding patterns emerging in settler and 
non-settler Africa (Amin 1972).  
In Settler-Southern Africa, uneven land dispossession resulted in dual agrarian 
structures composed of large-scale capitalist farms (LSCFs) existing alongside a 
differentiated peasantry (Bush & Cliffe 1984; Clarke 1977; Neocosmos 1993; Palmer 
1977). These studies show that peasantry was generally subordinated to the wage 
labour markets in the LSCF farms and beyond while also farming small plots to meet 
their costs of social reproduction.  
Under ―indirect mode of colonial rule‖ in non-Settler Africa (e.g. Ghana, Nigeria, 
Ivory Coast), where land was not expropriated from the peasantry and remained under 
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customary tenure except for few agricultural plantations and mining extraction 
enclaves (Amanor 2001; Austin 2005; Mamdani 1996b), peasant labour was not 
directly incorporated into the labour markets. Rather, such labour was systematically 
exploited through the extraction of surplus by the state and markets and through 
indirect taxation of production and compulsion into export/cash crops (Amanor 2005; 
2001). A differentiated peasantry however emerged comprising independent lineage 
family producers, farming labour tenancies and share cropping arrangements, as well 
as small-scale agricultural estates (e.g. palm oil and cocoa) in Ghana and Ivory Coast 
(Amanor 2008).  
These broad agrarian structures that emerged from colonialism have however been 
dynamic, shaped in some instances by resistance to global capitalist transformation 
through domestic pressures from below for more equitable land distribution. Such 
processes culminated in extensive redistributive land reforms of large-scale capitalist 
farms in some former Settler-colonial countries in Southern Africa such as Zimbabwe 
(Moyo & Yeros 2005a) and the demand for the same has been escalating in South 
Africa and Namibia (Jacobs 2018, Cousins, Dubb, Hurnby & Mtero 2018, Zhan & 
Scully 2018, Hendricks, Ntsebeza & Helliker 2013). The beneficiaries of land reforms 
are not only peasants, but include small to medium capitalist farms, while some large 
farms and agro-industrial estates are also retained (Moyo & Yeros 2005b; Moyo 
2011a; 2011b; 2013; Scoones 2010; Matondi 2012). 
Land concentration has also been underway during the 2000s in much of non-Settler 
Africa through acquisition of lands owned by peasants by both domestic and foreign 
capital and their subsequent development into middle-to-large-scale capitalist farms 
(Hall et al. 2017; Cheru & Obi 2010; Cotula 2013; Moyo 2008; 2014; Moyo, Jha & 
Yeros 2013; 2019, World Bank 2007). Consequently, the importance of middle and 
large-scale capitalist agriculture has been on the rise in non-settler Africa where they 
were largely absent until the post-2000 period (Moyo 2008; 2014; Oya 2013). 
Notwithstanding the on-going land alienation, the peasantry remains the dominant 
form of production in Africa (Moyo 2014). 
The orientation of production is also differentiated amongst various forms of 
production, with the peasantry tending towards food production and the large 
capitalist farms and agro-industrial estates focusing on export and cash crops, such 
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that differentiated access to and application of farming inputs, and integration into 
commodity markets (e.g. contract farming, credit) (Moyo 2014) shape agrarian wage 
labour relations. Oya (2013: 265-266) also argues that the differentiation in 
agricultural productivity and technologies, as well as linkage to global commodity 
markets between peasants and large-scale capitalist farms (especially mono-crop 
plantation estates) results in ―scale bias‖ in rural labour markets. The LSCFs, which 
rank highly on these indicators, are associated with superior terms of employment for 
farm labourers (including wage rates) compared to peasants and small to medium 
capitalist farms (Oya 2013).  
However, the existence of labour hiring relations amongst the peasantry themselves, 
is understated as is the rise of wage labour among emerging capitalist farms in SSA. 
For instance, by associating large-scale capitalist agriculture with only Settler-
Southern Africa, Bernstein (2014) neglects the growing importance of new middle-to-
large farms as a source of agrarian wage labour. The increased convergence of 
African agrarian structures towards tri-modal landholdings (Moyo 2014; 2008) partly 
explains inadequate capturing of the substantially different labour relations between 
the peasantry and capitalist classes. 
While the ownership and control of land is however not the only decisive factor in 
explaining the evolution of agrarian labour relations, it is critical in shaping who sells 
or hires labour in Africa (Cousins 2009; Mafeje 2003; Mamdani 1996; Moyo 2013; 
Moyo 2011a; Moyo & Yeros 2005a; O‘Laughlin 2002). More often than not, ―… 
property rights in land also strongly influence access to other productive resources, 
most notably credit, but sometimes water rights, grazing rights and other 
entitlements‖ (Evers & Walters 2000:1342-1343, emphasis added). Under capitalist 
social relations, ―...productive assets (capital) are unequally distributed and held 
largely as private property, those who do not own capital must sell their labour power 
[for their social reproduction]‖ (Cousins 2010: 10-11). Meaning those deprived of 
autonomous means of production (including land) are induced into wage work in 
order to survive. The hiring in or out of labour by rural households is thus a class 
relation evolving from the ownership of property (Cousins 2010; O‘Laughlin 2002). 
This proposes the need to carefully examine the distribution of landholdings and 
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related productive resources within a given agrarian structure in order to understand 
the varied forms of wage labour that exists in countryside. 
Yet the significance of the ownership and control of land resources in shaping wage 
labour tends to be neglected in some analyses, which conceptualise wage labour 
largely as diversification of household labour resources (Carney 1998; Ellis 1998; 
Niehof 2004; Scoones 1998) as stated earlier.  
The differences in land ownership also generate non-capitalist labour relations such as 
sharecropping and labour tenancies, as well as land rental markets (Amanor 2008; 
2001). Sharecropping involves a landowner leasing out their land to another 
household in exchange for a portion of the harvest (Amanor 2001). Different types of 
sharecropping arrangements exist with some involving the complete control of land, 
labour and production process by the household leasing in the land or tenants, while 
in others, the tenant only provides the labour and the rest of the production process is 
controlled by the landowner (Lastarria-Cornhiel & Mehmed-Sanjak 1999). Labour 
tenancies, on the other hand, involve the provision of labour to land owning 
household‘s agricultural production by tenants in return for a usufruct right to a piece 
of agricultural land (Lastarria-Cornhiel & Mehmed-Sanjak 1999).  
Empirical research in the forest region of Southern Ghana showed that sharecropping 
arrangements were being extended beyond migrant farmers to also include the local 
youths that could no longer be offered land subdivisions from family lands due to 
increasing land scarcity (Amanor 2001). Between 19 and 34 percent of the households 
sampled by Amanor (2001: 78) were using sharecropping to access land in the 
Dwenease and Apinaman communities respectively. Lastarria-Cornhiel & Mehmed-
Sanjak (1999: 45) also observed that in Ethiopia the leasing out of land by poor land 
owners to rich tenants in return for a share of the crop was also common in order to 
resolve the imbalances in the factors of production. To avoid wage labour costs, the 
latter scholars note that it was common for groundnut producers in Gambia to deploy 
migrant labour tenancies . 
By grouping African rural households who have claims to land ownership and those 
dispossessed of their means of production as ―fragmented classes of labour‖ Bernstein 
(2014: 97-98) also understates the centrality of land for rural social reproduction and 
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the impact of land shortages in generating agrarian wage labour relations. More 
precisely, the notion of ―classes of labour‖ is based on abstraction, rather than any 
linkage to the ownership of capital, which defines class formation. This conceals the 
class positions of the peasantry as landowning households who subsequently hire in 
labour power for their agricultural production units since they are grouped together 
with those that rely on exploiting their own labour or the landless who hire out their 
labour. The net result is that the substantially different labour relations between those 
exhibiting capitalist tendencies through hiring in labour and non-capitalist relations 
through the primary exploitation of self-employed labour and land leasing cannot be 
clearly distinguished.  
In order to show that rural-urban migration to join wage labour markets is a 
―voluntary‖ choice, it is also argued that the abolishment of institutionalised and 
forced labour migration after the end of colonisation in Settler Southern Africa did not 
stem the flow of labour to towns to seek employment (Niehof 2004). This perspective, 
however obscures the influences of structural factors, such as the persistence of land 
shortages and adverse economic conditions in economically compelling peasants to 
wage labour markets in the post-independence period (Moyo 2008). In relation to 
Southern Africa, the analysis of contemporary livelihoods cannot be divorced from 
the ―historical understanding of the proletarianisation‖ of peasants that evolved during 
the colonial period (O‘Laughlin 2002: 513-4). What passes off as diversification of 
household labour resources is therefore rooted in the uneven distribution of means of 
production promoted by colonial administrations (O‘ Laughlin 2002)? 
Overall, these perspectives highlight the contemporary importance of agrarian wage 
labour among the peasantry, especially agricultural labour in the process of social 
reproduction in rural SSA. 
2.3.2 Persistent peasantries and re-peasantisation: diverse agrarian labour 
relations 
The peasantry has persisted to exist in the countryside, representing the dominant 
agrarian labour relation in rural Africa, centred as it is on the ―ownership‖ and 
utilisation of small plots of land mainly by self-employed family labour in various 
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agricultural and non-farm production and exchange activities.
15
 Such labour relations 
are to a large extent shaped by their degree of access to land, and are thus modified by 
processes of land alienation or extension of access through land redistribution.  
Various theorists have however predicted a post-peasant society due to the absorption 
of peasant labour into wage labour in the industrial sector and recent transition into 
multiple non-agricultural activities in the process of social reproduction. Economic 
transformation is said to reduce the importance of land and agriculture in national 
output since economic activity is shifted to the modern or urban industrial capitalist 
sector. Based on the ―Unlimited labour supplies model‖, it was predicted that labour 
would be transferred from the peasantry, which constitute reservoirs of surplus labour 
and scarce capital to the expanding modern capitalist sector endowed with abundant 
capital and scarce labour (Lewis 1954).  
As stated earlier, the migration of labour out of the peasantry is attributed to higher 
wages and/or income offered in capitalist sectors in relation to agricultural incomes 
(Todaro 1989; see section 2.2.2). Consequently, this process resolves the inequities in 
the factors of production (land, labour, capital and natural resources) between the 
peasant and capitalist sectors (Todaro 1989). Capitalist wage labour relations thus 
replace peasant labour relations. This view remains influential in multi-lateral 
institutions such as the World Bank who continue to view economic development 
through the transfer of labour from rural areas to the industrial sectors (World Bank 
2012; see also Lopes 2015). 
Colonial land dispossession and the accompanying extra-economic measures in 
Settler-Southern Africa were also argued to have destroyed the peasantry (Arrighi 
1970; Arrighi & Saul 1973; Legassick & Wolpe 1976; Wolpe 1972). A ―linear 
process of proletarianisation‖ of the peasantry in the capitalist sector was predicted by 
these analysts as they argued that land alienation had irrevisibly dented the capacity of 
the peasantry to survive only on the basis of farming. Proletarianisation implies the 
conversion of self-employed forms of farm labour into wage labour in the capitalist 
sector (Arrighi 1970).  
                                                 
15
These include natural resources extraction (e.g. firewood collection, fruits, medicine, minerals etc.), 
petty commodity trading, rural artisans and processing of farm and non-farm produce (Ellis 1996; 
Moyo 1995). 
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Although the whole of the peasantry had not been proletarianised in the various 
capitalist sectors (including large-scale farming), it was inevitable that the peasantry 
were on their way to become proletariats in the expanding capitalist sector, since land 
alienation had generated an imbalance between the means of production and the 
peasantry‘s subsistence needs (Arrighi 1970). Indeed, petty commodity production on 
land remaining under peasant control, if any, had become insignificant for their 
sustenance (Arrighi 1970). Alternatively, colonial land dispossession had converted 
the peasantry into a labour reserve destined to be wage labourers in the capitalist 
sectors (Arrighi 1970). 
Although the effects of land alienation were severe on the capacity of the peasantry to 
survive only from own farming, the unevenness and incompleteness of dispossession 
meant that some of them retained small pieces of land, which they continued to farm 
alongside selling their wage labour resulting in what has been characterised as 
perpetual semi-proletarianisation process (Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Neocosmos 1993). 
In fact, the process of land alienation was differentiated by districts and local class 
structures, implying others were totally dispossessed, while the land sizes retained by 
others were variegated (Ranger 1985; Phimister 1986). During the colonial and post-
independence period, semi-proletariats are seen as subsidising capital since they 
received low wages that are inadequate to meet the costs of social reproduction, hence 
their supplementation with farming on small pieces of land. This process is also 
known as the ―subsidy thesis‖ (Scully 2012: 91) or ―functional dualism‖ (de Janvry 
1981: 220; Moyo & Yeros 2005a: 20) or ―cheap labour system‖ (Bush & Cliffe 1984: 
78; see also Mhone 1996; 2001).  
At any rate, the industrialisation process in Settler-Southern Africa and elsewhere in 
SSA stalled and was unable to provide employment to the expanding labour force 
from the peasantry, such that unemployment and underemployment have remained 
chronic problems in many countries (ILO 2015; Mhone 2001; 1996). Moreover, 
advances in labour displacing technologies and capital flight to the investing countries 
in Europe during the colonial and post-colonial periods combined to deflate the labour 
absorptive capacities of the modern industrial sector (Mhone 2001; 1996). The 
balance in the distribution of factors of production did also not materialise as most 
rural areas in (Settler) Africa remained underdeveloped (de Haas 2008), as migrant 
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labour earned ―subsistence wages‖ instead of ―market wages‖ that were largely 
inadequate for re-investment in petty commodity production in the Communal Areas 
(Mafeje 2003).  
More recently, the increases in the participation of the peasantry in non-farm labour 
activities over the last three decades following the implementation of SAPs in Africa 
has been conflated to the ―end of the peasantry‖ or that a process of ―de-
agrarianisation‖ or ―de-peasantisation‖ was underway in the countryside (Bernstein 
2014; Bryceson 2000; 2002; Bryceson et al. 2000; Riggs 2006). De-agrarianisation 
implies a ―permanent‖ shift from ―agricultural based modes of livelihoods‖ in the 
countryside towards more non-farm activities (including migration to towns) as a 
result of the crisis induced on agriculture by SAPs in Africa (Bryceson 1999:192-3). 
This process is said to reduce agricultural labour importance in both its wage and non-
wage variants to the social reproduction of rural dwellers (Jayne, Chamberlain & 
Benfica 2018; Bernstein 2014; Bryceson 2000; 2002; Bryceson et al. 2000; Riggs 
2006) and replace it with non-farm labour activities. Others even go further to claim 
that ―… an increasing number of rural households have no commitment to farming 
whatsoever …‖ (Riggs 2006: 181-182). A key gap in the diversification literature 
relates to the limited examination of wage labour relations in non-farm rural labour 
activities as they are largely considered as an extension of self-employment outside 
farming (Reardon 1997). 
This perspective is also akin to Bernstein‘s (2014: S97-98) argument that since ―petty 
commodity production‖ is not viable across most of Africa, due to limited access to 
finance even for those holding land, rural households pursue their reproduction 
through ―…various and complex combinations of employment and self-employment‖ 
in small-scale farming and non-farm activities across rural and urban spaces . There 
are ―… infinitely diverse combinations of elements of this or that type of labour ...‖ 
(Bernstein 2014 :S99 – 100) rendering the ―identities‖ of ―worker‖, ―peasant‖, 
―trader‖, ―urban‖, ―rural‖, ―employed‖ and ―self-employed‖ (Bernstein 2014: S98) 
inadequate in analysing agrarian labour relations. According to Bernstein (2014:S97-
98), the countryside is instead permeated by ―fragmented classes of labour‖ that are 
differentiated by resource inequalities, gender and kinship. Implicitly, non-farm rural 
employment opportunities are assumed to exist in perpetuity, allowing for the infinite 
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combinations of types of employment activities, yet there are rural households 
entirely disconnected from these activities. 
Beyond the distress induced shift away from agriculture, defined as a ―push‖ scenario, 
the diversification literature also argues that the growth of non-farm labour activities 
in ―productive agricultural zone‖ characterised by egalitarian asset distribution also 
arise from increases in farm labour productivity (Andersson Djurfeldt & Djurfeldt 
2013: 283-84). This they add in turn increases per capita food access allowing family 
farm labour to be deployed in non-farm labour activities. Since the rise in agricultural 
labour productivity also implies increases in farm income, these analysts aver it 
widens the capital base to invest in ―pull‖ scenario ―high return‖ non-farm labour 
activities. Thus, backward and forward linkages with small rural towns enhance the 
demand for goods produced in the ―high return‖ non-farm activities. The conclusion 
they arrive at is that over time, these non-farm labour activities are expected to 
replace agriculture and/or farm labour as the main economic driver in the rural 
economy, while distressed driven ―low return‖ non-farm labour activities are reduced 
to insignificance. 
However, non-farm activities have been historically combined with farming by 
peasants in the process of social reproduction long before the onset of SAPs. Peasants 
in Southern Africa benefitted from natural resources on the lands they accessed 
through direct consumption and selling in the markets (Bojo 1993; Moyo 1995; 
Shackleton, Shackleton & Cousins 2001). Various natural resources are important to 
the sustenance of peasants including indigenous wood for fuel, housing construction, 
household utilities and fencing; fruits, herbs, plants with medical value, thatch grass, 
clay and sand (Bradley & Mcnamara 1993; Moyo 1995; Shackleton et al. 2001).
16
 
Trade in natural resources has also featured in Zimbabwe‘s rural economy since the 
colonial period. Some scholars (Gelfand, Mavi & Ndemera 1985; Whitlow 1979) 
documented the collection of medicinal plants by Communal Area residents for resale 
to urban herbalists. In the early 1980s, as much as 10 percent of the Communal Area 
residents in areas with low woodland reported purchasing wood for fuel whilst in 
areas that were heavily deforested, as high as 50 percent of the rural households 
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In Zimbabwe, in the early 1980s, for instance, wood fuel was utilised by 99 percent of the rural 
households for cooking, and 96 percent and 45 percent for constructing roofs and walls for their homes 
respectively (Campbell, Grundy & Matose 1993: 43-44).  
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Prior to the onset of ESAP in 1991, research in Zimbabwe‘s Communal Areas also 
noted that the share of households engaged in the sale of forest products ranged from 
two percent (ropes) to 37 percent (domestic fruits) (Bradley & Dewees 1993: 97-98). 
Furthermore, about 15 percent of the Communal Area residents were reportedly 
involved in non-farm rural enterprises such as blacksmith, pottery and construction 
(Bradley & Dewees 1993: 97-98). 
Empirical research has shown that despite the decline in farm incomes over the last 
three decades, there has been an expansion of the number of African households for 
which farming is the centre of their social reproduction strategies (Hazell, Poulton, 
Wiggins, & Dorward 2010). Another study of nine countries representing 51 percent 
of the SSA population found that 92 percent of the rural households surveyed were in 
involved in own farming and income from this averaged about 69 percent of the total 
household income (Davis, Di Giuseppe & Zezza 2017: 169).
18
 This points to the 
continued importance of agricultural labour, especially in its self-employment forms 
to the sustenance of rural households. In fact, the agricultural population in SSA has 
grown from 316.21 million in 1988 to 432.49 million in 2007 (IFAD 2011: 247-248). 
The rising demand for land to farm small plots is also evidenced by the re-emergence 
of land reclamation movements in much of the countryside in the Global South in 
response to the dispossession of their means of production (Edelman & Borras 2016; 
Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Petras & Veltmeyer 2001). These findings suggest that the 
peasantry is, in fact being resuscitated rather than ―disappearing‖. Such a vision is 
expressed in the concept of re-peasantisation. 
Re-peasantisation is a process where farming is taken up by former proletariats and 
semi-proletariats as a major component of their social reproduction (Bernstein 2010: 
128; van der Berg, Hebinck & Roep 2018: 4). It epitomises the re-orientation from 
non-agricultural based social reproduction strategies towards those which are 
dominated by farming. This definition recognises the past linkages of these land short 
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Moreover, firewood from the Communal Areas was also fed into the commercial urban markets that 
accounted for three percent of the total fuel wood use in Zimbabwe in the late 1980s (Bojo 1993: 231). 
18
 The nine countries examined were Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger, 
Tanzania and Uganda. 
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categories to peasant forms of production, albeit as a minor constituent to their social 
reproduction. Thus, re-peasantisation should not be construed to imply that the 
peasant option had been totally absent from the social reproduction of semi-
proletariats.  
At the centre of the notion of re-peasantisation is the ownership of land which 
―…[represents] autonomy and the opportunity to create a livelihood through often 
hard and bodily struggles with a hostile environment. Land access enables formerly 
land short people to ―liv[e] from the land‖ through self-employed farming and 
exploitation of associated natural and social resources‖ (Van der Ploeg 2010: 4-5).  
The sources of re-peasantisation are varied. The economic crisis context expressed 
through, for instance massive formal urban unemployment, job retrenchments and de-
industrialisation, food shortages and energy crisis is accelerating re-peasantisation in 
the Global South (van der Berg et al. 2018; Moyo, Jha & Yeros 2013) and even in 
Europe (Van der Ploeg 2008). Many urban based social reproduction strategies are 
thus under threat and the countryside is increasingly becoming an option for the 
reconstitution of social reproduction through petty commodity production (Moyo et 
al. 2013). The quality of employment is also a major challenge, as 80 percent of the 
people employed in SSA are in vulnerable employment (ILO 2015b: 54).
 19
 
In Zimbabwe, the return to the countryside by retrenched mine and LSCF workers 
and the bidding for land under land reform programmes by urbanites represent forms 
of re-peasantisation or re-agrarianisation (Chigumira 2018; Mkodzongi 2013b; Moyo 
2000; Yeros 2002; Moyo & Yeros 2005b). Potts (2012; 2010) showed that increasing 
numbers of rural migrants in Harare in the 1990s were planning to trek back to the 
countryside due to the SAP induced economic deprivation they faced. Furthermore, 
the high rates of urbanisation in SSA that are used as an indicator of de-
agrarianisation are being attributed to mostly natural increases in the population rather 
than net in-migration from the countryside (Potts 2012). 
A similar situation was also observed among retrenched copper mine workers and 
urban industrial workers in Zambia in the 1990s during the era of SAPs (Ferguson 
1999; Hasangule, Feeney & Palmer 1998; Potts 1995; World Bank 2007). The 
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Vulnerable employment includes workers that earn less than US$2 per day (ILO 2015b: 43). 
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empirical evidence suggested that most of the retrenchees moved to the countryside to 
subsist through farming. Indeed, there was a growth in the proportion of agricultural 
labourers in relation to the total labour force in Zambia from 50 percent in 1990 to 72 
percent in 2000 (Mususa 2014: 21). Ncapayi (2005) also observed a trend of migrants 
abandoning town jobs to establish themselves in farming in the economically 
distressed former Bantustans of Xhalangeni magisterial district in the Eastern Cape 
Province in South Africa. Another study also in the same province illustrated the 
increased investments in agricultural production activities by former urban working 
classes in the countryside (Fay 2015). Jacobs (2018) also illustrated that the social 
reproduction strategies of migrant workers in the City of Cape Town did not resemble 
permanent divestment from the rural areas as they continued to invest there with a 
hope of returning one day. A panel survey in eight African countries
20
 between 2002 
and 2008, covering 2,354 households, also showed that small producer households 
were abandoning their non-farm micro-business to focus on farming and dependency 
on non-farm incomes (rents, interest payments, remittances and pensions) and non-
farm salaried employment was also on the decline (Anderssson Djurfeldt, Djurfeldt, 
Hall, Francisca & Bustos 2018). Rather, diversification was located within the 
agricultural sector itself through the expansion of crop mixes, together with the 
intensification of grain production by applying more productivity enhancing inputs in 
response to producer incentives (Andersson Djurfeldt & Djurfeldt 2013: 291-2). 
This evidence shows that de-agrarianisation is in fact not a permanent phenomenon, 
but part of the dynamism of the peasantry‘s labour process (Oya 2010). Redistributive 
land reforms that benefit formerly landless and land short peasants is theorised to 
open a path of re-peasantisation (van den Berg et al. 2018) and broaden the prospects 
for more stable semi-proletarianisation (Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Moyo 2013; 2011a; 
2011b). Extension of land access to various (land short) peasants and landless workers 
is therefore indicated to provide them the opportunity to exit from super-exploitation 
in LSCFs and engage in own petty commodity production via self-employment on 
redistributed lands. Furthermore, it is also said to expand the possibilities for the poor 
peasantry to combine independent agricultural production drawing labour from their 
families and farm wage labour. In addition, such land is not used solely for farming; it 
opens access to other non-farm sources of wage rural employment, particularly in 
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Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia. 
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trading of  natural resource products such as fuel wood and alluvial gold previously 
monopolised by large scale capitalist farmers (Moyo et al. 2009). 
As such, re-peasantisation does not preclude the peasantry‘s involvement in other 
non-farm based labour activities, including wage labour. Yet the predisposition by 
some theorists has been to view re-peasantisation and semi-proletarianisation as 
independent of each other, to the neglect of interactions between them. Alain de 
Janvry (1981), for instance, emphasises increases in semi-proletarianisation amongst 
the Latin America peasantry who benefit from land reform but could not fully utilise 
their land for farming. Neo-classical economists also implicitly focus on re-
peasantisation by emphasising the increase in self-employment in farming amongst 
the peasantry following land reforms (e.g. Cornia 1985; Griffin et al. 2002; Heltberg 
1998; Lipton 1977; 2005). 
Re-peasantisation and semi-proletarianisation emerge side-by-side from the evolving 
socio-economic conditions faced by peasantry in the countryside (Moyo & Yeros 
2005d). Their trajectories are partly shaped by the transformation of the agrarian 
structures that is underway in the countryside, including through land reforms as well 
as the wider shifts in the economic conditions. 
2.3.3 Increasing incorporation of agriculture into world markets 
More generally, capitalist transformation of SSA economies entailing the 
incorporation of both peasants and capitalist farmers into various global agricultural 
input and output markets (Clapp & Isakson 2018; Martiniello 2016; Perez Nino 2016; 
Shivji 2009) has been modifying African agrarian labour relations in a way that is not 
yet adequately understood. State intervention through providing or withdrawing input 
subsidies has often modified the way in which peasants are incorporated into global 
markets. Moreover, the expansion of capital through the increased use of out-grower 
and/or contract farming has also altered the conditions for peasant production. 
However, the factors influencing peasant agricultural production are dynamic and 
unstable, such that their ―…resource base and productivity can often wane or 
improve‖ (Moyo 2014:8), with critical implications for farm (wage) labour demand 
and supply. Yet Bernstein (2014: S98-99) has argued that the ―viability or 
reproduction‖ of commodity production of the ―fragmented classes of labour‖ in the 
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countryside was contingent upon the wages and salaries obtained in the labour 
markets. According to the latter scholar, those ―classes of labour‖ whose wages from 
different markets are low and inadequate for investment into own farming are thus 
considered not able to ―viably‖ participate in commodity production since credit is 
limited in SSA.  
Indeed, the context of growing food insecurity since the SAP period, up to the 2005 to 
2008 food crisis has seen increased state input subsidy programmes geared towards 
enlarging food production capacities (Bush & Martiniello 2017; Kherallah, Delgado, 
Gabre-Mauin, Minot & Johnson 2002; Dorward, Fan, Kydd, Lofgren, Morrison, 
Poulton & Wobst 2004). Contract farming has also been on the rise in Africa since the 
1990s (Sachikonye 2016; Martiniello 2016; Watts & Little 1994), and in line with 
recent large-scale land ―grabs‖ (Hall, Scoones & Tsikata 2015). These processes have 
changed both family farm and farm-wage labour relations in ways that are not yet 
quantified. 
The recent transformation of agrarian labour relations in Zimbabwe is closely tied to 
its re-integration into global capitalist markets. For example, the differentiated 
recovery of production of crops in Zimbabwe following output declines during the 
early phases of the FTLRP is largely attributed to the changes in policies on subsidies 
and the re-insertion of export financing arrangements (Scoones, Mavedzenge, 
Murimbarimba & Sukume 2018b; Moyo 2013a; 2011a; Mukwereza 2013). Tobacco 
output recovery entailed foreign capital leveraging domestic finance through farming 
contracts, which provide producers with inputs on credit in return for the sale of the 
product (World Bank 2012; Sakata 2017; Sachikonye 2016). By 2014, peasants from 
the old Communal Areas and the new A1 areas accounted for 81 percent of the 
tobacco contract growers while producing 76 percent of the contracted output (TIMB 
2014: 24). Indeed, the demand for farm wage labour has been shown to be higher in 
the peasant and small capitalist farms engaged in tobacco contract farming (Chambati 
2013a). However, whether and how contract farming converts peasants to ―disguised 
wage workers‖ (Clapp 1994: 81) requires further investigation (Shonhe 2017; Mazwi 
2015). 
Agrarian labour relations in food crop production are however closely associated with 
state support. For instance, the maize grain surpluses obtained by peasants in Malawi 
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and Zambia over the last decade are largely attributed to the provision of input 
subsidies by the state (Dorward & Chirwa 2011; Druilhe, & Barreir-Hurle 2012). 
Dorward and Chirwa (2011) indicate a tightening of the farm wage labour demand 
and supply in Malawi as poorer households who received subsidies reduced their 
participation in wage piecework, while demand for labour was escalating amongst the 
better-off recipients. The fluctuations in maize grain production in Zimbabwe since 
about 2009 are also partly related to the volatile pattern of input subsidies distributed 
to peasants by the state and development partners (World Bank 2014).  
It is evident from the preceding discussion that land occupies a critical role in 
structuring who hires in and who hires out farm labour in the rural areas in SSA. Yet 
various processes such as the increased commercialisation of agriculture through 
linkages of the peasantry to global agricultural markets not only alter the demand 
patterns land but also affect the farm labour utilisation trends. Altogether, this 
illustrates that understanding of the relations through the lens of the structural factors 
alone is inadequate without the consideration of the other wider factors that also shape 
access to other agrarian resources that are applied to the land. The failure to 
appreciate the changing nature of the agrarian structures that emerged from 
colonialism can lead to the neglect of the diverse sources of employment in the rural 
areas such as the rise of middle and large farms on lands dispossessed from the 
peasantry in former non-Settler economies, as well as shifting wage labour relations 
within the former as new inequalities arise.  
2.4 AGRARIAN FAMILY LABOUR DYNAMICS WITHIN THE PEASANTRY 
Agrarian labour occurs in various forms within the peasantry and within capitalist 
farms, as well as in various non-farm arenas. In contrast to large-scale capitalist 
farms, the peasantry mainly draw self-employed labour from their families and inter-
household labour exchanges for their agricultural and non-agricultural production 
activities. The family farm labour relations are gendered and generational, entailing 
mostly the exploitation of the labour of women and children by older men. However, 
peasant differentiation is a key process that shapes various forms of agrarian labour, 
as some households also employ wage labour to boost  self-employment while other 
poorer households hire out their labour for farm wages. 
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2.4.1 Peasant family structures, kinship relations, identity and labour 
The peasant condition combines proprietorship and labour as small property or 
landowners, who mainly rely on family labour for their agrarian production activities, 
although this does not preclude hiring wage labour to augment family supplies in peak 
periods (Boltvinik 2016). Peasants are defined as ―... small scale/ family 
agriculturalists operating within a generalised system of commodity production 
[which do] not constitute a class in itself but inherent in it are the antagonistic 
tendencies of proletarian and proprietor‖ (Moyo & Yeros 2005a:25-26). Rather than 
being ―backward‖ or ―traditional‖, peasants are in fact modern ―producing for own 
consumption‖ and integrated into markets for surplus sales and acquisition of modern 
farm inputs (Mafeje 2003; Petras & Veltmeyer 2001). 
Differentiation tendencies are inherent among peasants due to the uneven dispersal of 
capital and labour within and across peasant households (Moyo & Yeros 2005a; 
Moyo 2014). Men commonly head most peasant households and control the 
organisation of production and labour (Djurfeldt, Hillborn, Mulwafa, Mvula & G. 
Djurfedlt 2017), but the growth of female-headed households in SSA has been 
recently documented (SOFA & Doss 2011). 
Besides peasants, various terms are used to characterise these rural people who own 
and use small plots of land, to include ―small-scale farmers‖/―smallholders‖, and 
―communal farmers‖. Additionally, the term peasant is also the subject of varied 
definitions and contestations in the existing literature. 
Neo-classical economics conceptualise peasants as ―subsistence producers‖ who 
produce entirely for their own consumption utilising ―traditional methods‖ of farming 
and self-employed labour from their households (Ellis 1996). This definition views 
them in opposite of large-scale capitalist who produce for the market by using modern 
inputs and technologies (e.g. hybrid seeds, inorganic fertilisers, varied forms of 
machinery and irrigation) (Ellis 1996; Moyo 2014). Limiting ―subsistence‖ as the 
exclusive objective of peasant households is empirically inaccurate since the evidence 
from several countries shows that ―…virtually all small producers practiced more than 
subsistence production‖, including during the colonial period when peasant 
agriculture faced repression (Mafeje 2003: 15–16).  
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Agricultural economists thus prefer the terms ―small farmers‖ or ―smallholders‖ that 
reinforce only their role as agricultural producers (Hazell et al. 2010; Rukuni & 
Eicher 1994; World Bank 2008). This definition is largely based on the relative size 
of the landholdings they operate, with some even fixing ranges of land sizes that fit 
within small farmers (e.g. less than three hectares of cropped land), while for others 
―smallness‖ represents a wider breadth of the resource base in terms of capital, land, 
skills and labour (Hazell et al. 2010: 1-2). Achieving uniform criteria is a major 
constraint, given that farm sizes are context specific and widely differentiated within 
and across countries, as a small farm in Africa may not be viewed as such in Asia or 
Latin America (Ellis 1996). The terms smallholders or small farms also imply 
homogeneity of their land sizes and other means of production and negates their 
involvement in different non-farm labour activities (Cousins 2010; Gibbon, Havenik 
& Hermele 1993; van der Ploeg 2008). 
In some countries (e.g. Namibia and Zimbabwe), the areas inhabited by peasants are 
legally known as Communal Areas that are governed under customary tenure (GoZ 
2013; Government of Nambia [GoN] 1990). On this basis, some scholars incorrectly 
perceive the inhabitants who live in these places as ―communal farmers‖ (Rukuni 
1994: 1) suggesting that agricultural production and labour is collectively organised 
amongst groups of households (Moyo 2014). However, empirical researches in 
African rural areas have consistently shown that the individual household is the unit 
of organisation for both agricultural production and labour processes (Mafeje 2003).  
Across Settler Southern Africa in numerical terms, the peasantry represents the 
dominant form of organisation of production and labour, while in non-Settler Africa 
they not only constitute the largest share of farm households but also hold most of the 
land. The peasantry in Settler-Southern Africa did not disappear following colonial 
land dispossession and small-scale farming remains an important constituent of rural 
social reproduction. Since the colonial period, Zimbabwean peasants were producing 
food for themselves, as well as surpluses that fed the urban industrial workers (Clarke 
1977; Neocosmos 1993). At independence in Zimbabwe, the majority black 
population controlled 16.4 million hectares at an average of two hectares of arable 
land per household and were engaged in mostly food production, alongside the export 
oriented LSCFs (UNDP 1999: 24). The 5,400 mainly white LSCFs controlled about 
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15.5 million hectares with farm sizes averaging over 2,000 hectares (Moyo 2011a: 
512), while producing a diversified range of commodities
21
 utilising wage labour and 
capital-intensive technologies (Muir 1994). Moreover, about 75 percent of the urban 
industrial workers, a decade after independence, had a residential base in both rural 
and urban areas  (Peta, Chibatwa, Whanya, Ngirandi & Phiri 1991: 99), while about 
half of those employed in the LSCFs on a part-time basis straddled between the latter 
and petty-commodity production in the Communal Areas (Vhurumuku et al. 1998).  
In South Africa, the most industrialised country in SSA, 12.7 million people 
(representing 31.4 percent of the population) were domiciled in the former homelands 
around 1997 (Statistics South Africa 1999: unpaged). The population in the former 
homelands had access to about 17 million hectares in comparison to over 102 million 
hectares owned by approximately 55,000 LSCFs (Sihlongonyane 2005: 146). Access 
to land was limited to the 71 percent of the 2.4 million households in the former 
homelands, with more than 50 percent of them owning less than one hectare of arable 
land (Statistics South Africa1999: unpaged). Regardless of the limited access to land, 
over 93 percent of the households in the former homelands were practicing 
subsistence agriculture using mostly their family members to provide labour 
(Statistics South Africa 1999: unpaged). Few of the households (six percent) were 
however selling surplus to the local markets (Statistics South Africa 1999: unpaged ). 
Many of the black migrant labourers from the former homelands remain on the verges 
of the formal economy and reside in the slums dotted around major cities (Davis 
2006; Hall & Ntsebeza 2007; Jacobs 2018, Zhan & Scully 2018).
22
 Chitonge (2013) 
also cites studies that showed households in the former homelands with migrant 
labourers continuing with crop and livestock production during both apartheid (May 
1987) and post-apartheid periods (Makhura et al. 1998).  
The resilience of the peasantry in the other settler-economy in Southern Africa 
(Namibia) is no different with about 70 percent of the black population, five years 
after democratic dispensation, subsisting in the Communal Areas on approximately 48 
percent of the total agricultural land (33.5 million hectares), alongside about 4,200 
large-scale farmers on 36.2 million hectares with an average landholding in excess of 
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 Including sugar, cotton, wheat, soya beans, coffee, tea, beef and diary. 
22




 in terms of population size in 
list of the 30 largest slums compiled by Davis (2006: 24-25). Peasant forms of production have thus 
remained resilient in SSA (Chitonge 2013; Mhone 2001). 
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8,000 hectares (GoN 1995: 1-2). Around 2003, livelihoods for approximately 50 
percent of the 210,000 rural households were centred on access to land in the 
Communal Areas and farming was their main source of income (GoN 2003: 49).  
As before, farming on small plots remains the predominant activity in countryside in 
non-Settler countries in Southern Africa despite the on-going waves of land alienation 
aimed at developing middle and large-scale capitalist farms (Moyo 2014; 2008). In 
Malawi, for instance, owning on average 1.2 hectares per household, 2.2 million rural 
households produce most of the food crops, while about 30,000 middle to large farms 
ranging from 10 to 500 hectares in size specialise in export production (Zuka 2013: 
155). While in Mozambique, 90 percent of the rural households (translating to about 
80 percent of the national population) practice farming on arable plots less than two 
hectares (Mucavele undated). Small-scale producers in Zambia, account for 76 
percent of the estimated 600,000 farming households, while agriculture is the largest 
income contributor for 97.4 percent of the rural households (approximately 45 percent 
of the population (Mucavele n.d: 4). 
However, the utilisation of family labour is also broadly shaped by the structure and 
demographics of peasant families, which are also closely tied to kinship structures and 
gendered and generational relations. Moreover, identity differences arising from 
kinship ties affect access to land and other resources, and consequently the inter-
household labour relations. 
While the term self-employment is generally utilised to characterise the labour 
relations of the peasantry, it has been noted that in most cases it is not adequately 
defined (Oya 2013). Self-employment should be associated with the ownership of the 
means production and include the landowners and their immediate family members 
who contribute unpaid labour but benefit from the profits from farming and own 
consumption (ILO 2015a: 32-33). Most families in rural Africa are organised as 
extended families, including other kin members who do not control the means of 
production (Mafeje 2003; Tsikata 2009). Yet the provision of labour by landless 
people tied to peasant households through kinship tends to be incorrectly 
conceptualised as self-employment even though it might entail the exchange of goods 
and services that are not entirely limited to cash payments (Mintz 1974) and involving 
super-exploitation practices. Inadequate attention is paid to the organisation of 
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families, which in turn influences land resource control and the intra-household 
labour relations. Such intricacies in peasant households labour relations are obscured 
in neo-classical economic analyses that perceive households as egalitarian structures 
(Binswanger et al. 1995; Deininger & Binswanger 1999; Griffin et al. 2002).  
The emphasis in rural/agrarian studies on the multifaceted permutations of farm and 
non-farm labour activities (Bernstein 2014; Carney 1998; Niehof 2004; Scoones 
1998) also tends to obfuscate understanding of the variegated forms and quantity of 
rural/agrarian labour within the two sectors. Reardon (1997) also observed that even 
non-farm rural labour activities generally tend to be considered as the extension of 
farm self-employment activities. Yet wage labour relations are also existent in this 
labour practice, under variegated arrangements including profit sharing, money wages 
and in-kind payments (Wuyts 2011). Oya (2013: 259-260) thus concludes,―… the 
distinction between self-employment and wage employment in rural settings remains 
one of the biggest challenges ….‖  
This proposes that research ought to examine the organisation of families and the 
exchange relations that exist between the landholder and the different household 
members in order to accurately portray the forms of labour that are being utilised by 
peasant households. Such an assessment will also provide information on the socio-
economic characteristics of self-employed workers, as well as the differences across 
and within countries, that is largely absent in most research on labour (Gindling & 
Newhouse 2014). 
Kinship or lineage ties that constitute the dominant form of organisation in rural 
African areas (Mafeje 2003) shape intra- and inter-household agrarian labour relations 
in a variety of ways. Dynamics within kinship groups, allowed (male) kin leaders 
such as chiefs and village headmen to mobilise their power and political influence to 
accumulate land for themselves and their families and friends during both the colonial 
and post-colonial periods (Baker 1989; Bruce 1988). Within families, kinship norms 
that are more often defined by men, determine who controls resources and their 
allocation (Evers & Waters 2000; Manji 2003; Tsikata 2015; 2012; 2009). While 
differential land control between ethnic groups in countries such as Kenya, Malawi 
and Uganda can be traced to the colonial ―divide and rule‖ strategies (Mafeje 2003; 
Moyo 2008; Mamdani 1996b). This has and continues to reproduce inequalities in the 
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distribution of means of production within kinship groups (between families and, men 
and women) and across different kinship groups, which in turn shape agrarian labour 
relations as outlined earlier. 
During the colonial and post-colonial period, kinship ties also influenced the 
recruitment of farm wage labour in both the peasantry (Kerr 2005) and LSCFs 
(Rutherford 2001a). Not only do they avail key information about labour markets, 
securing of a job placement sometimes depend on them (Mano, Yamano, Suzuki & 
Matsumoto 2011; Granovetter 1995; Scott 1994). Field based studies in Zimbabwe 
(Rutherford 2001a) and South Africa (Ewert & Hamman 1996) observed that 
permanent farm workers in the LSCFs actively mobilised their relatives for seasonal 
job opportunities, and promotion from part-time to full-time work sometimes 
depended on securing labour from their families.  
The intra-household labour relations sometimes interact with inter-household labour 
relations through practices such as non-reciprocal and reciprocal labour exchanges 
between households that are normally, but not exclusively, bound by kinship ties, as 
they sometimes incorporate neighbours (Maast 1996; Moyo 2014; Worby 1995). 
Non-reciprocal labour arrangements occasionally entail labour cooperation of groups 
of households to assist poor community members (Scoones et al. 2010) and in some 
places they are coordinated by traditional leaders through cultural practices such as 
zunde raMambo in Zimbabwe (Nyambara 2001).
23
 Reciprocal labour exchanges are 
also varied in form, but mostly commonly organised either as ―beer‖ or ―food‖ parties 
served by the hosts (Worby 1995; Shiraishi 2006). These involve groups of peasant 
households taking turns to work on each others‘ plots on various farm tasks (e.g. 
planting and harvesting) and the labour exchanges are gendered in nature since they 
commonly involve labour of women and girls (Worby 1995; Shiraishi 2006). 
Nonetheless, the literature differs on the importance of reciprocal labour exchanges as 
a source of labour for peasants in the context of global capitalist transition in SSA. 
Some scholars argue that reciprocal labour exchanges are on the wane and are 
increasingly being replaced by money wages under capitalist transition (Berry 1993; 
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Zunde raMambo is cultural practice where traditional leaders in Zimbabwe designate land as 
community field which all household contribute labour and inputs to build grain stocks to assist poor 
community members in situations of poor harvest (Nyambara 2001).  
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Ponte 2000), while others note their continued resilience in changed forms existing 
alongside wage labour and self-employed family labour (Shiraishi 2006). Further 
empirical research is thus required to unpack the continued utilisation of reciprocal 
labour exchanges among the peasantry. 
Internal and cross-border labour migrations reinforce the dynamics within and across 
kinship groups. Migration in its different variants has been a feature of agrarian 
labour relations in SSA since the colonial period entailing institutionalised forms in 
Settler-Southern Africa (Arrighi 1973; Bush & Cliffe 1984; Mamdani 1996; Mhone 
2001; O‘Laughlin 2002; Paton 1995) and voluntary and involuntary migrations 
(Delgado Wise & Veltmeyer 2016). A key outcome of labour migration has been the 
generation of identity differences in the destination communities between ―insiders‖ 
(local inhabitants) and ―outsiders‖ (migrants) (Neocosmos 2008; Nyamnjoh 2006). 
The identity differences are based on the contestations of who qualifies for 
community membership according to nationality in the case of foreign migrant labour 
or kinship or ethnicity for in-country migrants (Neocosmos 2008; Nyamnjoh 2006). 
Various labels are attached to both local and foreign migrants, to include vauyi, 
makwerere, mosken and mabwidi in the Southern African context.
24
 
While in post-independent SSA migration is viewed as a diversification of household 
labour resources (Hellum & Derman 2004; Niehof 2004; Scoones 1998), its effects in 
shaping the agrarian labour relations in destinations of migrant labour have largely 
remained unattended. Attention has however been on the labour processes of the 
remaining female-headed households and role of remittances from migrant wages in 
rural differentiation (O‘Laughlin 1998; Potts 2000). 
Identity differences manifest in the agrarian labour relations through the 
intensification of competition for wage employment (Murray Li 2011; Selwyn 2014; 
Oya & Pontara 2015) and scarce resources such as land in which the ownership of 
such resources by migrants may be contested by locals, as well as state policy (Moyo 
2008; Nyambara 2001). For instance, in Ivory Coast, foreign migrants were denied 
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Vauyi is local vernacular Shona word meaning those who have come to ―our‖ place used to describe 
local migrants by locals from other parts of the country in Zimbabwe. While mosken and mabwidi are 
derogatory terms used to describe mostly farm workers of migrant origin from Mozambique and 
Malawi respectively. Makwerekwere is reference term for foreigners in South Africa (Neocosmos 
2008; Nyamnjoh 2015; 2006). 
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formal land certificates during the titling programmes as they failed to produce proof 
of their citizenship and their land was consequently transferred to locals (Assie-
Lumumba 2016) reducing them to landless labourers.  
Beyond farming, agrarian labour in peasant households is also deployed in non-farm 
rural activities either as self-employed or wage workers. Peasant labour 
diversification is not only an outcome of the exploitation of the associated natural 
resources that accompany land ownership, since the seasonal nature of dry land 
agricultural production in SSA and elsewhere also opens possibilities to sell labour in 
the broader labour markets (Boltvinik 2016; Shivji 2009). Yet this has not translated 
to full wage employment outside agriculture (Chitonge 2013). Peasants should thus 
not be viewed only as agriculturalists as this creates a false dichotomy between 
farming and non-farm labour activities, which are interdependent in the process of 
social reproduction (Gibbon et al. 1993). 
Van der Ploeg (2008) also argued that the peasantry enter non-farm activities 
(including wage labour) not only to augment their social reproduction, but also to 
raise incomes that are re-invested into petty commodity production. Studies on 
Southern Africa in the late 1970s and 1980s showed this relationship empirically as 
wage labour remittances to peasant households were partially influential to the social 
differentiation of the peasantry (Mazambani 1991; O‘Laughlin 1998; Potts 2000). 
Moreover, despite the diversification of livelihoods into other sectors outside 
agriculture, ―…many residents of Communal Areas [in Southern Africa] regard 
themselves primarily as agriculturalists‖ (Shackleton, Shackleton & Cousins 2001: 
581-2, emphasis added). 
Moyo and Yeros (2005a) further argue that these peasant farm labour diversification 
strategies in the post-independence period represent a spreading of risk into various 
economic spheres, in the context of land alienation and economic crises intensified by 
SAPs.
25
 The risks and opportunities of peasant production manifest themselves 
through their forms of land control, integration into various markets, linkages to large 
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The SAPs in Africa rolled back state support to rural, agricultural and social development, and 
entrenched the economic distress and impoverishment of the peasantry (Mkandawire & Soludo 1996; 
Gibbon & Olukoshi 1996; Moyo 2000). The drastic reduction of agricultural input subsidies for 
instance, worsened the access to critical productivity enhancing inputs for the poor peasants and their 
ability to survive on petty commodity production on their small plots (Oni 1995). This perpetuated 
multiple occupational strategies by the peasantry (Mafeje 2003; Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Shivji 2009). 
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land owners and agrarian capital,  external shocks (droughts and disease) and the 
dynamic agricultural and economic policies (Cousins 2010; Mamdani 1996b). Shivji 
(2009: 67-68) puts it more succinctly: 
―... In the post-independence period and the neo-liberal period, the process of labour 
subsidising capital continues in different forms. The peasant sector is the reservoir of cheap 
seasonal, casual, forced, and child labour under various disguises. Unable to survive on the 
land peasants seek other casual activities – petty trading, craft making, construction, 
quarrying, gold scrapping etc. Foreign researchers document and celebrate these ―multi-
occupations‖ as diversification of incomes [livelihoods] and the ―end of the peasantry‖. It is 
nothing of the sort. These are survival strategies which at the end of the day mean that peasant 
labour super-exploits itself by intensifying labour in multiple occupations and cutting down on 
necessary consumption‖. 
Therefore, the concept of ―semi-proletarianisation‖ (Moyo & Yeros 2005a; 
Neocosmos 1993) and its variant labels such as ―worker-peasant‖ [Bush & Cliffe 
1984; Potts 2000] or ―partial-proletarianisation‖ [Munslow & Finch 1984 [2011]) 
better captures the diversity of agrarian labour relations in the process of social 
reproduction not only in former settler colonies such as Zimbabwe, but elsewhere. 
This enables research to define the scope of the diversity of agrarian labour relations 
in the countryside. 
These propositions call into question the validity of the unravelling of a de-
agrarianisation process as a result of the increases in non-farm incomes (Bernstein 
2014; Bryceson 2019; 2000; 2002; Bryceson et al. 2000; Riggs 2006) as stated earlier. 
As well as the livelihoods diversification processes which claim the involvement of 
peasants in different farm and non-farm labour (including wage employment) is a 
deliberate diversification strategy in relation to their labour resources (Bebbington 
1999; de Haas 2008; Niehof 2004). The common thread in these perspectives relates 
to their relegation of farm labour practices of peasants to insignificance. Auto-
consumption and income from market sales of surplus produce from their farm units 
on the basis of self-employed labour is no longer considered important to the survival 
of rural households since other non-farm sources now provide the bulk of the income.  
However, challenges are also abound in the classification of non-farm labour 
activities, as it differs from study to study in the existing diversification literature 
(Barret et al. 2001a). Not only is there no common definition of what constitutes non-
farm activities, the framework for collecting and classifying data on diversification is 
also largely absent (Barret et al. 2001a: 317-318). Accordingly, this results in limited 
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comparability among studies, as well as wrong conclusions on the nature and scope of 
diversification (Barret et al. 2001a). Indeed, the most common problem identified by 
these researchers entails the classification of farm wage employment as a non-farm 
activity as done by Canagarah, Newman & Bhattamishra (2001: 407-408) causing the 
underestimation of the scope of farm labour markets.  
It has thus been suggested that classification of activities should be guided by 
―sectoral distinctions‖ of the ―national accounting systems‖, namely ―primary 
(agriculture, mining and other extractives)‖; ―secondary (manufacturing) and tertiary 
(services)‖ (Barret et al. 2001: 318-319). Agricultural incomes from non-value added 
crop and livestock farming and harvesting of natural resource products are thus 
differentiated from the non-farm income that embrace all income sources originating 
from value addition of agricultural products, transportation and trading of non value 
added agricultural and natural resource products (Barret et al. 2001: 318 -319). 
These debates however suggest that the role of non-farm labour activities in the 
process of social reproduction requires further empirical research including whether it 
is replacing self-employed labour or supplementing their agricultural production 
activities. 
2.4.2 Peasant differentiation and agrarian labour: family and hired labour 
Peasants are differentiated into various classes due to the ―…historically given 
inequality of resource endowments‖ characteristic of capitalist social relations 
(Patnaik 1997: 209-10). Such differentiation in Africa is rooted in the historically 
specific conditions such as the varied and uneven colonial land dispossessions, 
alongside the integration of rural production into global capitalist markets (Mafeje 
2003; Moyo 2011c).  
As argued earlier, the production relations of the peasantry are subject to risks and 
opportunities regarding their land tenure and incorporation into the markets, state 
policies and climate variability (Cousins 2010; Mamdani 1996b; see section 2.3.2). 
Differentiation arises from the variegated responses of peasants to these agrarian 
conditions as others are able to accumulate (land) and capital and recruit wage labour, 
while others struggle to meet their social reproduction needs and are compelled into 
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wage labour markets (Mamdani 1996b). This situation is vividly reflected in Patnaik‘s 
theorisation on rural class differentiation: 
―…Marxist analyses of rural class structures ...posit a hierarchy of resource endowments 
relative to the production capacity and consumption needs of the peasant households, at any 
given point of time. This generates relations of labour hiring and land leasing in the process of 
production and determines the terms on which different groups of producers participate in the 
markets for commodities, land lease, credit or labour hire. …..it follows that any given point 
in time there will be a hierarchy of different situations with regards to the satisfaction of 
subsistence needs and appropriation of surplus: some ―peasants‖ will fail to get enough to eat, 
other ―peasants‖ will break even, yet other ―peasants‖ will generate large enough surpluses 
not only to maintain higher –than-average consumption levels….In short the peasantry maybe 
expected to be highly differentiated economically into more or less distinct class‖ (Patnaik 
1997: 209-10). 
Most commonly, peasant social differentiation has been examined in terms of three 
(social land class) categories, namely the ―rich‖, ―middle‖ and ―poor‖ (Moyo & Yeros 
2005a: 25; see also Shivji 2009). The rich peasantry endowed with more capital is 
able to hire labour power beyond the family, whilst the middle peasantry neither hires 
nor sells its labour power and relies on self-employed family labour for its social 
reproduction. The poor peasantry combines petty commodity production utilising its 
family labour and sells its surplus labour power to other households. Wage labour 
relations, on account of socio-economic differences, exist among the peasantry who 
should be viewed as both a source and employer of wage labour.  
According to Patnaik (1996: 212), the labour process is a key indicator of class 
differentiation among the peasantry. The labour process is reflected by the degree to 
which they hire-in labour to contribute to their own agricultural production and hire-
out their family labour to work for others, in relation to the self-employment of family 
workers on their own fields. Three broad classes can be discerned from Patnaik‘s 
schema, namely those that (i) are primarily exploiting others; (ii) primarily self-
employed and (iii) those primarily exploited by others (see also section 3.7). Those 
primarily exploiting the labour of others include the landlords who rely exclusively on 
hired in manual labour of others to work on their holdings, while the rich peasants 
hire in labour almost equating to the self-employment invested by family workers. 
Middle and small peasants encompass those who primarily exploit self-employment. 
More self-employment than hired in labour is utilised by middle peasants, whilst 
small peasants do not hire in labour of others and hire-out small amounts of labour 
that is less than their self-employment. The primary labour sellers group includes poor 
peasants whose amount of labour hired out to others is more than self-employment, 
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whilst landless labourers, due to the absence of means of production, sell only their 
labour to others. 
Apart from use of hired labour, the peasantry is also differentiated according to the  
production technologies utilised, the basis of scale and quality of land resources they 
control, financial resource base, access to capital assets (mechanisation, irrigation 
equipment), livestock ownership, socio-economic characteristics (gender, educational 
levels, employment etc.), social identities (ethnicity, religion and age), and socio-
political connections (Moyo 2014). Together these factors influence the scale of 
farming operations and intensity of labour utilisation (Moyo 2014). The land 
utilisation patterns (including the variation in the areas ploughed and livestock herds), 
yields and quantum of harvests are an outcome of these socio-economic differences 
(Moyo 2014; Hall et al. 2017). 
The empirical literature shows that the rich peasantry who employ more hired labour 
also tend to dominate the larger landholding sizes, ownership of capital assets, wage 
remittances, utilisation of modern technologies and are associated with the sale of 
surpluses to the market (Cousins, Weiner & Amin 1992; Moyo 1995; 2014). Middle 
peasants, on average, rank lower than the rich peasants in terms of the capital 
intensification of production, but they are largely able to produce most of their food 
and sell little surpluses (Moyo 2014). The poor peasantry are largely marked  by 
ownership of small pieces of land  and limited finance  to invest in their agricultural 
production units and labour sales are key to their sustenance since they barely produce 
enough food to eat from their production (Moyo 2014, Moyo & Yeros 2005a). It has 
also been noted that most middle and rich peasants in customary areas are linked to 
families of traditional chiefs that are influential in allocating land rights (Worby 1995; 
Nyambara 2001).  
Despite the fact that the peasantry are not a homogenous group, but are instead 
differentiated according the land sizes, access to finance and technologies among 
other factors, the wage labour relations which this scenario implies remain 
understudied. Instead, it is the self-employed forms of labour of the peasantry that 
receive most academic attention. Therefore, the understanding of the scale of wage 
labour utilisation, types of workers that are recruited and the subsequent working 
conditions remains a key gap in the research on agrarian labour. Whether non-farm 
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rural labour activities are part of the character of the peasantry remains an unresolved 
question in the academic debates. Specifically, whether there is permanent 
displacement of farm labour that has been underway in SSA induced by the SAPs, 
which withdrew state support to peasant agriculture or whether the situation reflects 
the continuation of the semi-proletarianisation process that has defined the historical 
character of the peasantry. Further empirical research is thus required to unravel the 
dynamics in the importance of agricultural labour in the rural livelihoods and how 
these processes evolve in the context when access to land to peasants is enhanced by 
land redistribution programmes. 
2.5 AGRARIAN WAGE LABOUR AND FORMAL AGRICULTURAL 
LABOUR MARKETS 
The forms of agrarian labour which obtain among the peasantry and capitalist farms 
are substantially different, with the former deriving most of their labour for 
commodity production from self-employed family members, while the latter are 
largely reliant on hired wage labour (da Silva 1984; Langyuito 2005).  
2.5.1 Forms of capitalist agrarian wage labour 
Overall, wage employment in LSCFs that is characterised by defined contractual 
arrangements and receives a monetary wage, qualifying its fit within the recognised 
neo-classical economics criteria of formal employment, tends to receive most research 
attention (Leavy & White 2003). The less commonly recognised forms of wage work, 
such as piecework, however face neglect in the agrarian labour analysis. Also the 
variants of wage labour are not adequately defined in most cases, yet they are context 
specific in nature. 
Agrarian labour under capitalist agriculture, especially LSCFs, has been addressed as 
the full and part time wage labour that are employed on either family or private 
agribusiness managed farms that produce for the (export) market and are exclusively 
reliant on hired labour for agrarian production (du Toit & Ally 2003; Gibbon 2011; 
Wisborg et al. 2013; Visser & Ferrer 2015; Hall et al. 2017).  
The landholding and agrarian systems in Settler Southern Africa, with a few white 
farmers controlling large tracts of agricultural land, generated a peculiar form of 
labour management system (Gibbon 2011; Gibbon et al. 2014) different from feudal 
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and tenancy system elsewhere. Farm compounds on small portions of LSCFs housed 
full and part-time wage labour from neighbouring Communal Areas and a few 
workers sometimes had access to small pieces of land for own agricultural production 
in these compounds (Rutherford 2018; 2001a; Scoones et al. 2018a; Clarke 1977; 
Arrighi 1970; Rubert 1997). Precarity characterised the farming land and residency 
rights of farm labour, which were contigent upon their continued employment 
engagement on the LSCFs (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Rutherford 2001a; Sachikonye 
2003). As noted earlier, this scenario resembles what Moyo (2011a) has 
conceptualised as a ―residential labour tenancy‖ system. 
The diverse forms of wage employment in LSCFs tend to be defined in terms of the 
permanency (or completeness) extent of labour services; namely, terminologies that 
include ―full-time‖, ―permanent‖, ―part-time‖ and ―casual‖, although such terms 
obfuscates the differentiated character of employment, particularly the varied degrees 
of part-time forms of labour. Permanent or full-time employment is defined as person 
who is engaged in a job with the ―same employer‖ continuously, possessing either a 
written or verbal contract (ILO 2015: 33-34). Whilst part-time work includes those 
hired for a ―specific period of time‖ for a ―task-based contract‖ (piecework) or 
―…occasional[ly] or intermittent[ly]‖ for a ―…specific number of hours, days or 
weeks‖ (also called casual work) or ―fixed term contracts‖ for pre-defined period of 
time that are regulated by ―..specific legal provisions on the maximum length‖ (also 
referred to as seasonal work) (ILO 2015: 33-34). Another variant of part-time work 
entails the use of agents by farm employers to mobilise labour on their behalf for a 
defined period of time (ILO 2015: 33-34). The agents remunerate the workers 
employed who are also known as contractors for work performed for the LSCFs who 
are in a contractual agreement with the agent (ILO 2015: 33-34). This is also known 
as labour brokering or externalisation of labour in the South African context (Wisborg 
et al. 2013; Visser & Ferrer 2015). 
There are thus many variants of what is commonly referred to as part-time or casual 
farm wage labour such that broad references to it in terms the proportions of 
households using this type of labour or the number of part-time workers limits the 
understanding of its differentiated categories. It is also important to note that while 
permanent farm workers in SSA are attached to an employer continuously, they also 
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work for other employers on part-time basis in order to raise additional income to 
cover the gaps in the subsistence costs that the paltry wage are unable to procure, as 
well as engage in independent agricultural production. In light of this, permanent farm 
workers should not be viewed as tied to just one employer in order to expose the 
multiple jobbing character that exists in agrarian labour markets. 
Permanent farm workers in Zimbabwe, for instance, also engaged in task-based part-
time farm work within and outside the LSCFs during their rest days (Rutherford 
2001a), and an estimated 40.5 percent were peasant producers in neighbouring 
Communal Areas (Vhurumuku et al. 1998). This was sometimes actively supported 
by some LSCFs in districts such as Hurungwe who provided farm inputs either for 
free or on credit for workers to crop their pieces of land in neighbouring Communal 
Areas (Rutherford 2001a). 
Indeed, permanent farm wage labour does also not necessarily mean a worker is a 
―pure proletarian‖ (Oya 2013; Moyo et al. 2000). Indeed, Petras & Veltmeyer (2001) 
argue that wage workers in the developing world are different from those that 




 century who totally severed their links to 
land. Even permanent employees are not just ―workers‖, as many of them are 
connected to the land both in theory and practice through their origin or family links 
and actually owning land respectively (Petras & Veltmeyer 2001). They are also 
engaged in diverse labour processes.  
Piecework is the most informal type of work across the different variants of part-time 
farm work. It entails two broad categories, namely; time rated tasks where an 
employment contract is for an agreed number of hours of work or task rated which 
involves finishing specific quantum of work such as weeding a portion of land area or 
harvesting an agreed quantity of output (Chambati 2013b; Gibbon 2011). 
Remuneration is based on an agreed fee for the specific task for task rated piecework 
or daily or hourly wage rate for time rated piecework (Pérez Niño 2016; Shiraishi 
2006). These piecework wage rates are sometimes standardised within a given farm 
community (Visser & Ferrer 2015). Piecework only survived in the agricultural sector 
in Zimbabwe after independence and is legally banned in all other sectors (GoZ 
2001b: 12-13).  
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In some contexts, piecework is stigmatised or considered as demeaning by rural 
communities and is thus underreported in quantitative surveys causing the underrating 
of the scale of agrarian labour markets (Oya 2013). Derogatory terms are sometimes 
utilised in the local lingua franca to refer to piecework. For instance, a Swahili term, 
kibarua commonly used in Tanzania is associated with slave forms of labour (Mueller 
2011), whilst terms such as ganho-ganho and ganyu are associated with a low social 
status and despair in Mozambique and Malawi respectively (Bryceson 2006; Perez 
Nino 2016; Kerr 2005) in the same way as maricho is used in Zimbabwe. It has thus 
been suggested that qualitative research is important to uncover the stigmas that can 
be deployed to carefully word questions in quantitative surveys (Oya 2013) in order to 
capture the full extent of the hiring in and hiring out of labour in rural areas.  
Piecework is also differentiated in some contexts in relation to its purpose. In Malawi, 
for example, piecework referred to as ganyu, is distinguished between ―seasonal 
ganyu for food‖ and ―short-term ganyu for cash‖ meant to cover food and cash 
shortages respectively (Kerr 2005: 170-171). Seasonal ganyu for food occurs mostly 
in the midst of the rainy season when poorer households have exhausted food stocks 
from their harvest and are paid either in cash or in-kind (Kerr 2005: 170-171). Its 
primary purpose is to mobilise food resources from in-kind payments or cash to 
procure food (Kerr 2005: 170-171). Whilst short-term ganyu is done between 
agricultural seasons to harness cash for other household expenses as food is relatively 
available after the harvest period (Kerr 2005: 170-171). 
The extent of inclusion of the informal variant of part-time work, piecework, in 
official labour statistics of LSCFs in Zimbabwe is not clear since the categories of 
non-permanent employees are not adequately defined but are said to include including 
casual, temporary, seasonal, and contract workers (ZIMSTAT 2011; 2015). In South 
Africa, casual and seasonal employees are grouped together in the official statistics to 
include occasional and day labourers, e.g. shearers, repairs and fruit pickers, but 
exclude contractors and their employees (Statistics South Africa 2009: 23-24). In fact, 
Sender and Johnston (2003) complain of the incompleteness of the official casual 
labour statistics, perhaps indicating the limited or non-inclusion of informal labour 
such as piecework. It is thus not possible to disaggregate the scope of the different 
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categories of part-time work in relation to the size of labour force and their 
distribution across the different types of LSCFs from official labour statistics. 
The aggregation of the forms of wage labour in official labour statistics and studies 
(e.g. Chambati 2009; 2007; Mutangi 2010) also neglects the variation in the legal 
protection of farm jobs, especially the part time labour. In Zimbabwe, the Collective 
Bargaining Agreements (CBA) for the agricultural sector that came into effect in 
1992 protect permanent farm workers, including their wage rates and benefits (e.g. 
paid annual leave, sick leave, working hours, industrial holidays, and provision of 
protective clothing), as well as other working conditions and handling of labour 
grievances (GoZ 1993). Seasonal farm workers are the only part-time workers that are 
covered by the CBA, which legally defined them as employees who have a 
continuous employment lifespan of not more than eight months in a calendar year 
(GoZ 1993: 2-3). The working conditions of pieceworkers are not legislated in the 
CBA and are negotiated at the local level between employer and employee As such 
they are classified by the law as contract workers (GoZ 1993: 2-3). Those employed 
through third party agents also known as contractors are also not catered for and the 
responsibility of meeting the agreed remuneration is deferred to the agents (GoZ 
1993: 2-3).  
Oya (2010) also observed that part time workers in Mozambique who constituted the 
lion‘s share of the agricultural wage labourers were also not covered by existing 
legislation that largely catered for permanent employees. As a result, a large section 
of the farm wage labour force is excluded from legal protection through the selective 
inclusion of some categories of workers. This means that nature and scope of 
inequality in the agrarian labour markets can be uncovered more clearly by research 
that disaggregates the different types of farm work. 
As such, generalised references to increased ―casualisation‖ of LSCF farm wage 
labour tends to be commonly used to discern the agrarian labour relations during the 
era of economic liberalisation in South Africa (e.g. Wisborg et al. 2013; Devereux & 
Solomon 2011)
26
, although most studies obscure the differentiation of the precise 
variants of casual labour being hired in the countryside. Which variants of casual 
                                                 
26
 Casualisation is generally understood to be the displacement permanent jobs by casual jobs (Wisborg 
et al. 2013).  
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labour are associated with casualisation is not clarified due to a failure to explain the 
types of employment that are now being occupied by the former permanent 
employment or nature of part-time work that is being recruited by LSCFs. The 
complexity of part-time farm wage labour relations requires the deconstruction of the 
precise constitution of the form of employment in a particular locale, as this is critical 
in the exposition of the differentiation of this broad form of labour.  
2.5.2 Trends in formal agricultural wage labour 
Rather than self-employment in the peasantry, wage employment in the LSCF is 
considered a key source of (formal) agricultural employment for poor rural people 
(Hellum & Derman 2007; Palmer & Sender 2006; Sender 2016; Sender & Johnston 
2003), despite declining LSCF employment trends over the last three decades 
(Wisborg et al. 2013; Kanyenze 2001; Visser & Ferrer 2015). Simultaneously, the 
demand for jobs is growing beyond the capacity of the industrial sectors to employ 
(ILO 2015a). Indeed recurring economic crises under capitalist social relations (Davis 
2006; Harvey 2012; Zhan & Scully 2018) imply that wage employment is unstable 
and the backwards and forth movement between wage employment, reproductive 
labour (relating mostly to women and children), self-employment and unemployment 
is not uncommon (O‘Laughlin 2002). 
For instance, between 1993 and 2007, the number of permanent and casual farm 
workers in South African LSCFs declined from 1,093,265 to 796,806, but nominal 
gross farming income increased from R19.6 billion to R79.5 billion during the same 
period (Statistics South Africa 2009: 10-11). Economic crises combined with other 
factors, including the withdrawal of LSCF subsidies in the 1970s, the consolidation of 
LSCFs that was accompanied by capital intensification (Wisborg et al. 2013) had 
displaced the South African LSCF labour force, particularly the permanent labour 
from about 0.8 million workers in 1972 to 0.6 million in 1995. Casual farm labour 
also declined during the same period from just under 0.8 million to about 0.4 million 
workers (Aliber, Baipethi & Jacobs 2007: 135). 
In Zimbabwe‘s LSCFs, the number of full and part time workers grew from 270,496 
in 1991 to only 314,419 in 2000 (Table 4.5) with increases largely driven by part-time 
workers. Between 1983 and 2000, permanent farm workers in LSCFs hovered just 
over 150,000 workers for most of the years (Table 4.5). However, as observed by 
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Loewenson (1992), technological advances in LSCFs had led to a substantial decline 
of farm labour from 286,513 workers in 1972 to 220,228 workers in 1982 (Table 4.5). 
It is permanent farm labour that was retrenched as it fell from 210,862 to 164,044 
workers between 1972 and 1982 and replaced by casual farm labour that rose from 
33,884 to 56,184 workers during the same period (Clarke 1977: 28). This period 
featured the diversification of land uses in the LSCFs away from labour intensive 
crops (e.g. maize and cotton) towards capital-intensive land uses (e.g. irrigated wheat 
and horticulture) (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Loewenson 1992) as elaborated in Chapter 
Four. It is perhaps important to mention that the increasing share of part-time workers 
is not just limited to the agriculture sector, but a key feature of the neoliberal period as 
employers in a wide range of sector tend towards flexible employment arrangements 
with lower financial implications on employee benefits (e.g. pensions and health care) 
and labour can be disposed of easily in relation to the changing socio-economic 
contexts (Jha 2016); ILO 2015a; 2015b). 
2.5.3 Quality of employment of agrarian labour 
The significance of various forms of (peasant) agrarian labour, particularly in terms of 
their importance in the process of (household) social reproduction is generally 
contested in the existing literature, because the ―quality‖ of such labour in terms of 
wage levels, ―formality‖ and security is considered pitiable, precisely, the treatment 
of agricultural wage labour in LSCFs is considered to be superior (Sender 2016; 
Palmer & Sender 2006; Sender & Johnston 2003). 
The quality of wage labour tends to be assessed mostly in terms of the monetary 
wages earned by the workers (Binswanger et al. 1989; Magaramombe 2010; Mutangi 
2010; Sachikonye 2003), as well as the formality and/or job security in relation to the 
nature of employment contracts (e.g. verbal or written) and the duration of 
employment (e.g. piecework or continuous engagement) (Visser & Ferrer 2015). 
However, in reality it needs to include an evaluation of other benefits (e.g. pensions, 
medical benefits) and in-kind payments received by workers, their working conditions 
(e.g. hours of work, provision of leave - annual and sick, provision of protective 
clothing and other requisite tools to requisite tools required to perform assignments), 
methods of supervision of labour (e.g. physical violence or negotiations) and gender 
discrimination in employment offered and remuneration (Jha 2016: 1996). The 
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adequacy of the wages and other benefits in meeting the social reproduction needs of 
wage labourers and their families (e.g. food, education, health, and clothing) is a key 
marker of the quality of labour (Jha 2016; 1996; Mamdani 1996a). In contrast, the 
quality of self-employed peasant labour tends to be measured in terms of the profits 
earned from the sale of agricultural commodities (Deininger, Naidoo, May, Roberts & 
van Zyl 1999) to the neglect of the use values derived from own consumption, as well 
as the uneven distribution of workloads between the different members of the 
household as elaborated later (see section 2.6). 
In Mozambique, for instance, the monetary wages earned (Cramer, Oya & Sender 
2008; Sender, Oya & Cramer 2006) in large-scale capitalist agriculture are considered 
better than the wages realised by wage labourers employed in other types of farms 
and among self-employed peasants. Indeed, it has been argued that many rural people 
are more inclined to low-wage work in the capitalist sectors including LSCFs than 
engaging in self-employment in petty commodity production that is subject to low 
returns (e.g. profits from surplus commodities sold) and fluctuations in the volumes of 
outputs produced and thus the incomes earned (Sender 2016; Palmer & Sender 2006).  
Consequently, Sender and Johnston (2004: 158-159) view the increases in self-
employment following land reforms in South Africa as a regression since it decimates 
the rural wage labour opportunities provided by LSCFs that are ―... so crucial for their 
survival …‖. 
27
 To address the food insecurity and malnutrition in rural South Africa, 
Sender (2016) advocates for policies that would boost wage employment in the large-
scale capitalist farms. Tellingly, the advice was that ―…Policy-makers must recognise 
the continuing, central importance of waged employment for the survival and well-
being of households in rural areas‖ (Sender 2016: 23 emphasis added). The fulcrum 
of this suggestion, according to the later commentator, should be hinged around the 
provision of state subsidies to a few large-scale capitalists farmers involved in labour 
intensive export crops. These authors (Sender & Johnston 2004; Sender 2016) thus 
view the formal farm wage labour economy on LSCFs as the only significant form of 
agrarian wage labour in terms of realising adequate incomes from wages that can 
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Such biases partly explain the focus of research on LSCF wage labour relations to the exclusion of 
self-employed labour relations amongst peasants. In the case of Southern Africa see for example 
(Amanor-Wilks 1995; du Toit & Alley 2003; Wisborg et al. 2013; Loewenson 1992; Rutherford 
2001a;b; Wegerif, Russell & Grundling 2005). Casualisation is generally understood to mean the 
replacement of permanent workers with part-time workers. 
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sustain households rather than self-employed peasant labour. For instance, the 
empirical evidence of 87 land redistribution projects utilised to reach these 
conclusions suggested that the median profit per beneficiary from agricultural 
production amounted to R161 or US$20 (Sender & Johnston 2004: 158-59).  
However, there is no discussion on the use values derived by the beneficiaries from 
consumption of own commodities produced that would enable the presentation of the 
complete picture of the ―profits‖ from agriculture. Despite the absence of data on 
wage employment in the land redistribution projects, the authors implicitly suggest its 
scale is limited and instead highlight the declining trends in LSCF employment since 
1994 as largely responsible for the decline in the standards of living of poor rural 
people in South Africa (Sender & Johnston 2004: 158-59). Not only is the quality of 
labour in LSCFs in terms of wage rates eschewed by these authors, they also seem 
oblivious of the long term declining trends of LSCF employment that set in the 1970s 
as noted above. The self-employment prospects that could be generated through 
increased state support to the peasantry are also negated by Sender (2016: 23) who 
argues for the denial of subsidies to ―…extensive rain-fed farming of low-value food 
and livestock for the domestic market‖, which are mostly produced by the latter 
because it is cumbersome to coordinate such programmes for millions of small 
farmers. 
The history of wage labour relations in large-capitalist farms in Settler-Southern 
Africa and elsewhere however suggests an entirely different outcome regarding the 
quality of the labour and its contribution to the social reproduction of agrarian 
labourers. The widespread super-exploitation of wage labour through wage repression 
and extremely poor working conditions has been reported throughout Settler-Southern 
Africa (Addison 2007; Amanor-Wilks 1995; Wisborg et al. 2013; Visser & Ferrer 
2015; Loewenson 1992), Latin America (Fernandes 2005; de Janvry 1981; Mattei 
2005; Pereira 1997) and some parts of Asia (Li Murray 2011; Rao 1999). 
For instance, in LSCFs during the colonial period in Zimbabwe, an average monthly 
wage could only purchase a pair of khaki trousers in the 1930s (Arrighi 1970). More 
so LSCFs took a very long time to adjust wage rates as reflected by their stagnation 
between 1940 and 1970 (Amanor-Wilks 1995). White farmers used intimidation, 
racial abuse, threats of dismissal from work and indeed physical violence to manage 
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labour (Palmer 1977; Rutherford 1995; 2001; Rubert 1997). Unlike other sectors, 
farm labour was only integrated into the labour regulations in Settler-Southern Africa 
after the attainment of independence (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Gibbon 2011; Visser & 
Ferrer 2015). Instead, the labour relations were administered through the Masters and 
Servants Act of 1899 that considered farm workers more or less as the property of 
LSCFs and excluded possibilities of collective bargaining (Clarke 1977; Jeeves & 
Crush 1997).  
New legislation after independence, including the incorporation of farm labour in the 
labour regulations (e.g. minimum wages), improved the lot of farm workers 
(Kanyenze 2001; Visser & Ferrer 2015). Farm labourers in Zimbabwe however 
remained the lowest paid amongst the formal employment and the majority of them 
were living below the poverty datum line (over 75 percent around 1996) (Kanyenze 
2001: 108-9). A similar situation is also reflected in South Africa where Wisborg et 
al. (2013: 53-54) observed that LSCF farm workers were also the poorest category of 
employees despite contributing 11 percent of the total formal employment. In fact, the 
minimum wage around 2015 (below R150 per day) of South African farm workers, 
twenty one years after apartheid, have been noted to be inadequate to prepare meals of 
―… acceptable nutritional standards for a family of four‖ (Visser & Ferrer 2015: vii). 
Since residency and employment were linked, forced evictions from residency in 
freehold LSCFs after loss of employment was a key challenge faced by both farm 
workers in South Africa (Wisborg et al. 2013; Visser & Ferrer 2015) and Zimbabwe 
(Clarke 1977; Sachikonye & Zishiri 1999) since the colonial period. For example, 
between 1984 and 2004, over 1.679 million farm workers and their families were 
forcibly evicted from the South African LSCFs after being retrenched from work 
(Visser & Ferrer 2015: 83-84). 
As a result, the struggles of semi-proletariats and rural proletariats especially those 
employed in LSCFs and plantations across much of the Global South, reportedly seek 
to exit from super-exploitation in such workplaces through bidding for access to land 
to enable independent production (Bernstein 2003; Byres 2004; Wisborg et al. 2013; 
Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Moyo 2011a). Male farm workers in Zimbabwe, for instance, 
actively sought land in the neighbouring Communal Areas after independence, 
including through purchasing plots in the informal land markets and entering into 
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marriages with Communal Area residents that enabled them to access land (Moyo et 
al. 2000; Rutherford 2001a). Surveys also showed that most farm workers (52 
percent) preferred land allocations during the FTLRP rather than continued 
employment (31.3 percent) (Moyo et al. 2009: 33-34). Research in South Africa‘s 
Communal Areas also showed that amongst most landless people, acquiring land was 
a key aspiration, while the majority of those with access to land were keen to expand 
their land access (Marcus, Eales & Wildschut 1996).  
It is noteworthy that widespread resistance to the creation of large-scale capitalist 
farms through land dispossession in non-Settler Africa and other regions of the Global 
South (Cheru & Obi 2010; Cotula 2013; Moyo, Jha & Yeros 2019; 2013; World Bank 
2007) emanates from historical experiences on the oppression of LSCF wage labour 
(Li Murray 2011). A growing corpus of literature has highlighted the displacement of 
self-employed peasant labour in the new wave of land dispossession (Cotula 2013; 
Hall, Scoones & Tsikata 2015; Torvikey, Yaro & Teye 2016; Yaro, Teye & Torvikey 
2017; Nyantakyi-Frimpong & Kerr 2017) and a major concern has been the 
reproduction of poor working conditions in the new LSCFs being created similar to 
those observed in Settler-Southern Africa. For instance, the working conditions 
observed in foreign owned plantations in Mozambique, including their failure to 
satisfy the minimum wage requirements and manipulation of labour contracts to avoid 
regulated benefits (Oya 2013), come close to experiences of LSCFs in South Africa 
and Zimbabwe. According to Silver (2003), such resistance to land dispossession, 
including those witnessed during colonialism, represent the agency of the peasantry to 
protect their self-employed jobs and/or push back against proletarianisation in the 
emerging LSCFs and plantations. In other words, these struggles should not just be 
perceived as land reclamation struggles for they are also forms of labour resistance.  
Additionally, the examination of the quality of labour in the LSCFs tends to be 
limited by reporting mostly on the monetary wages and omission of the incidence of 
in-kind payments and precise assessment of their value that could provide insights on 
the complete picture of the total wage earnings of farm workers. In-kind payments 
represent a wage that is not paid in cash, but is paid in terms of goods and services 
including land, food and residency (Gibbon 2011). Cramer et al. (2006) and Sender et 
al. (2006) neglect in-kind payments in LSCFs since they associate them with mostly 
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the poorer segments of farm labourers employed on small farms and thus potentially 
underestimate the total farm wage and the overall quality of labour. However, both 
monetary and in-kind payments combine to form the broader wage structure in 
LSCFs, and the latter tend also to be used as an instrument of labour control in 
LSCFs. The in-kind payments received by workers such as residency and land to 
grow crops reinforced a sense of ―belonging‖ to the farm (Addison 2014; 2013) and 
allowed LSCFs to curtail labour mobility.  
As observed by other researchers (Ewert & Hamman 1996; Rutherford 2008; 2001a), 
access to land to grow own crops and the relatively better accommodation in South 
African and Zimbabwean LSCFs also tended to be used in some farms to muster 
employee loyalty, particularly to reward the senior and/or trusted workers. The LSCFs 
dispersed their authority to these workers including ensuring the satisfactory 
performance of work by fellow farm workers and discretionary powers to discipline 
truant workers (Addison 2014; 2013). The senior workers also served as conduits of 
information for the LSCFs on the happenings beyond the work sphere to include the 
social lives of workers in the farm compounds (Addison 2014; 2013). 
The quality of labour in LSCFs is also shaped by labour migration dynamics. 
Agricultural employers, including large-scale capitalist farms, can instrumentalise the 
presence of (foreign) migrant labour to repress wages and impose poor working 
conditions, which are readily accepted by migrants with limited survival options (Oya 
2013; 2010; Murray Li 2011). Rather than being lazy (Breman 1990; Alatas 1977), 
local labour is able to resist wage repression in the LSCFs, including total 
disengagement from wage labour markets, due to existence of other survival 
possibilities especially if they retain control of some land (Murray Li 2011). This is 
what Silver (2003:13) has characterised as ―market based bargaining power‖ as 
expounded upon later (Section 2.7).  
The returns from self-employed forms of labour in the ―backward‖ peasant sector are 
generally assumed to be less than those of farm wage labour (Freund 1984). Most 
studies which under-value the self-employed agricultural labour in petty commodity 
production tend to have limited empirical analysis on the value of peasant incomes in 
relation to wages in the capitalist farms (Sender 2016; Sender & Johnston 2003). 
Indeed, the use values derived from own farming and production for family 
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consumption are poorly quantified. Hence, Oya (2013: 256-257) notes ―… it is hard 
to find studies that systematically and rigorously compare wage rates with net returns 
to labour in own account activities, especially farming‖. Thus, the supposed 
superiority of wage labour in the LSCFs compared to peasant labour returns is not 
empirically founded. 
Assessing the quality of agrarian labour thus requires a precise understanding of 
broad material (and social) conditions which shape ―returns‖ to agrarian labour and 
their significance in (household) social reproduction. Apart from monetary wages, the 
complete picture of the material conditions of LSCF wage labour has been obscured 
by the limited consideration of other other income receipts such in-kind payments and 
―social wages‖ such as access to land. Research efforts in this direction will enhance 
the comprehension of the diverse sources of income derived from LSCF wage labour, 
as well as the wider mechanisms of labour control and mobilisation. It is also evident 
that the assignment of the LSCF wage labour as being more important to the 
livelihoods of rural people over their self-employment in own farming in former 
Settler-economies is based on inadequate empirical assessment of the net returns to 
peasant farming derived from auto-consumption and surplus sales. Therefore, they are 
key gaps on the contributions that self-employed farm labour makes to the sustenance 
of the rural people and how that compares to the returns from wage employment in 
LSCFs. The material quality of labour is also an outcome of the gender relations and 
resistances waged by agrarian labour to poor working conditions, which are discussed 
next. 
2.6 GENDER AND AGRARIAN LABOUR RELATIONS 
Gender intersects with class dynamics, kinship and customary practices to influence 
agrarian labour relations in diverse ways, including the distribution of the means of 
production, division of labour between men and women, as well as the inter- and 
intra-household power relations in rural SSA (Tsikata 2016; 2015; 2009; SOFA & 




 from which self-employed labour is mobilised among the peasantry are 
constituted in a variety of forms, comprising nuclear families that are composed of a 
mother and father connected by (customary) marriage and their children and extended 
families that include other relatives from their kinship (Mvududu & McFadden 2001). 
Other families are also constituted as polygamous units, while marriage is not a pre-
requisite for the make-up of a family as single parented households are also common 
(Mvududu & McFadden 2001). Family members are not necessarily domiciled in 
single residential place at any given point in time, as some members are straddling 
between different locations in and out of jobs (Mvududu & McFadden 2001; 
O‘Laughlin 2002; 1998; Potts 2010; 2000; Tsikata 2015).  
Patriarchal customary law and practices that govern land allocation, land tenure and 
land use across most parts of rural SSA marginalise women in the access to and 
control of resources (including land) (Chiweshe, Chakona & Helliker 2014; Mafeje 
2003; Tsikata 2009). Family patriarchs (who are mostly older men) in patrilineal 
societies monopolise the access and control of land, but women also own land under 
differentiated situations in SSA (Tsikata 2009). While matrilineal societies such as 
those in Northern parts of Malawi confer land rights to women (Moyo 2008), the 
control over such land is increasingly falling into the hands of men upon inheritance 
(A. Djurfeldt et al. 2018; Koopman 1997).  
The peasant family or household is differentiated along gender and generational lines 
which shape the uneven control of capital and land resources between its male and 
female members (Evers, Walters & Tsikata 2009). Hierarchy in family organisation 
tends to be under the headship of men (Mvududu & McFadden 2001), although de-
facto and de-jure female-headed households also exist in the countryside, with the 
latter trend considered to be dominant (SOFA & Doss 2011).
29
 
Nevertheless, neo-classical economic models on the family farm household has 
tended to treat the household as unitary models, neglecting internal differentiation 
within households, and their consequent impacts on the allocation of resources, 
                                                 
28
 The term family is narrowily utilised here to characterise the household. Social scientists sometimes 
deploy the term to widely imply a group of households tied by kinship ties (see Ellis 1996; Mathambo 
& Gibbs 2009). 
29
A FAO report produced in 2011 revealed that up to 25.5 percent of the rural households were led by 
de-facto and de-jure female heads (SOFA Team & Doss 2011: 44-45). The report argues that the 
majority of these households are de-jure female heads. 
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including labour (see Ellis 1996). The unitary model is premised on the fact ―… that 
household members seek to maximise utility on the basis of a set of common 
preferences represented by any aggregate utility function, and a common budget 
constraint‖ (Agarwal 1997: 2-3). The economic outcomes are not only a function of 
the total household income, but also how it is spread among the different members 
that constitute the household (Doss 2013: 54-55; Nyantakyi-Frimpong & Kerr 2017).  
The majority of women in SSA access land through male relatives (Evers & Walters 
2000; Tsikata 2009). Women‘s marginalisation in the control of land resources 
reproduces gender inequalities in intra-household labour relations, which men deploy 
to control women and children‘s labour (Evers & Waters 2000; Manji 2003; Tsikata 
2016; 2012; 2009). Moreover, the power derived from resource control enables men 
to define the social norms, including resource entitlements and the allocation of men 
and women‘s labour in agriculture (Evers & Waters 2000; A. Djurfeldt et al. 2018). A 
combination of unequal resource control, patriarchal gender and generational relations 
thus enables older men to exploit the self-employed labour of women and children to 
work on household agricultural production and reproductive activities, largely 
through coercion and compulsion (Lyon, Mutersbaugh & Worthen 2017; Evers & 
Walters 2000; Manji 2003; Tsikata 2009).  
Indeed, women tend to be prevented from leaving the household in search for wage 
work, and older men are also known for restricting school leavers, especially girls, 
from migration in order to stabilise family farm labour supplies (O‘Laughlin 1998).
30
 
Such influence over the mobilisation of self-employed labour from their families is 
not always obvious for women landowners. For instance, women landholders growing 
cocoa on small plots in Ghana fared poorly in comparison to men in the mobilisation 
of self-employed labour, such that a disproportionate burden of farm work fell on 
women and children (SOFA & Doss 2011; Tsikata 2009). 
While the extended family, which is culturally seen as a form of social security by 
helping poor members of kin, it is also used to exploit the labour of relatives that are 
accommodated within family farm units (Moyo 2014; Oya 2013). The ravages of the 
                                                 
30
 A 2010 World Bank database of 98 developing countries showed that the share of men ―…working 
as non-paid employees is high for teenagers then falls sharply from after men reach 20 years old. For 
women, the proportion of working as non-paid employees remains high until they are about 40 years 
old‖ (Gindling & Newhouse 2013: 318-319).  
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HIV/AIDS pandemic, as children are increasingly accommodated within the 
households of relatives of their deceased parents, has widened the existence of 
extended family units in Africa (Mathambo & Gibbs 2009). 
Beyond the household, patriarchal practices restrict women‘s participation in farm 
and non-farm wage employment (Elson 1999; Scott 1994).
31
 Surveys in post-colonial 
Mozambique showed that most women wage workers were ―autonomous‖ from male 
domination, living in ―female headed or female dominated‖ households (Oya 2013). 
At the same time, regional specificities such as farm compounds that housed workers 
and their families in large-scale capitalist farms in Settler-Southern Africa since the 
1920s, enabled the earlier proletarianisation of women compared to other regions in 
SSA (Arrighi 1970; Clarke 1977; Gibbon 2011; Rutherford 2001a; Tandon 2001; Vail 
& White 1980). However, in a changing context, various bargaining processes within 
the confines of patriarchal institutions have allowed women to enter wage labour 
(Bryceson 1980; O‘Laughlin 2002; 1998; Potts 2012). The need to widen family 
income to meet key needs such as children‘s education, especially in the context of 
declining agricultural incomes induced by neo-liberal reforms, is a case in point 
(Bryceson 1980; Shivji 2009). The avoidance of the marital institution and changing 
attitudes on gender equality within families has also facilitated their proletarianisation 
(Bryceson 1980). Consequently, the gap between  wage labour force participation 
rates of males and females has been declining in many countries (ILO 2015a), 
although female participation rates in rural wage employment are differentiated.
32
 
Nonetheless, the entry of women into (agrarian) wage labour markets has however not 
necessarily translated to improvement of women‘s material conditions (Ghosh 2019; 
Tsikata 2016; Naidu & Ossome 2015; Elson 1999). Gender inequalities at the 
workplace has also meant that women mostly access the irregular, insecure and poorly 
paid types of jobs at lower rung of the occupation ladder, which are also broadly 
defined by their low educational status and skills base in comparison to men (ILO 
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In Southern Africa, this was reinforced by colonial policies that preferred the extraction of male 
labour, while restricting the movement of women from the rural areas through various pass laws 
(Arrighi 1970; Clarke 1977; O‘Laughlin 1998; Rubert 1997). 
32
A Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) report showed that in 2004, 16.6 
percent and 1.4 percent of the rural women (15 – 60 years) were employed in rural labour markets in 
Malawi and Nigeria respectively, while in Ghana female participation rates were 3.8 percent in 1998 
(SOFA Team & Doss 2011:19 -20).  
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2015a; SOFA Team & Doss 2011; Torvikey et al. 2016).
33
―Gendered hierarchies‖ in 
wage payments also reinforce disparities between men and women. For example, in 
South Africa‘s LSCFs, men reportedly earn more money than women for the same 
work (Devereux & Solomon 2011: 6-7). Research in Mauritania and Mozambique 
showed that women were restricted to the lowly skilled tasks that commanded the 
lowest wages (Oya 2013; 2010). The rural wage gap in Ghana and Malawi reported in 
2009 was 58 and 35 percent respectively (SOFA Team & Doss 2011: 23). Up to 32 
percent of the difference in wages was attributed to gender discrimination in Ghana, 
while it was 26 percent in the case of Malawi (SOFA Team & Doss 2011: 23). 
Thus, ―… labour market institutions have typically been constructed on the 
assumption that women employees were secondary earners who could draw upon the 
assets and earning of men (male partners, husbands, fathers, brothers etc.) to cushion 
them against risk‖ (Elson 1999: 616-617). Rather than assuming that labour outcomes 
are a result of the interactions between demand and supply (Ehrenberg & Smith 2006; 
Ellis 1996), research must take cognisant of the gendered nature of labour markets to 
avoid blurring the markedly different experiences of men and women. 
The literature reviewed here reinforces the idea that a multiplicity of factors need to 
be incorporated in the analysis of the labour relations beyond the disproportions in the 
access to and control of land. Gender relations are as crucial to analysing the intra-
household and inter-household labour relations, as they are to the labour markets, 
which also feature varied experiences between men and women. 
2.7 AGENCY OF AGRARIAN LABOURERS 
Agrarian labour relations are also influenced by the ―agency‖ of the agrarian 
labourers and peasants themselves through individual and collective action (Paton 
1995). Agency or resistance is defined as the human actions that peasants and 
agrarian labourers engage in to respond to the structural conditions and constraints 
hindering their material conditions (Paton 1995). However, structural approaches 
largely assign the fate of peasants and agrarian labour to the wider socio-economic 
structures within global capitalist system. The linear proletarianisation thesis, for 
                                                 
33
In 2004, only 10.9 percent of women rural wage workers in Malawi occupied full-time positions, 
compared to 40.7 percent in Ghana in 1998 (SOFA Team & Doss 2011: 19-20). The same study notes 
that Nigerian women rural wage workers fared better with 72.1 percent in full time positions in 2004. 
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example, forecloses the resistance of the peasantry to the conversion into fully-
fledged wage workers after colonial land dispossession in Settler-Southern Africa 
(Arrighi 1970; Clarke 1977). The control of land by white LSCFs was assumed to 
entrench their total control over the landless wageworkers. In other words, structural 
approaches:  
―.... [give] such an overwhelming power to the economic structures of imperialism and capital 
that the African people seem powerless to affect their own destinies in any meaningful way. 
The result is that history lies beyond the control of the masses‖ (Neocosmos 1993: 29-30). 
 
Peasants and agrarian labourers, within this perspective, are passive subjects of the 
macro-social forces or ―subjects‖ of structural forces (de Haas 2008; Johnston 2007), 
who are devoid of agency. Nonetheless, peasants have a long history of resistance 
since the colonial period including through continued farming of areas designated as 
European farms in Zimbabwe and participating in the struggles for independence 
(Ranger 1985) and resistance to the imposition of various land and labour taxes 
imposed by the apartheid government in South Africa (Beinart & Bundy 1987).  
Descriptive livelihood approaches, on the other hand, reduce agency to the open 
ended choices peasants make in realising their livelihood either in agricultural and 
non-agricultural activities, which is exhibited through ―acquiring, utilising and 
managing assets and resources [at their disposal including labour]...in a more or less 
strategic manner‖ (Niehof 2004: 323-234). Individuals are endowed with causal 
powers to intervene to particular situations they confront in their livelihoods 
(Bebbington 1999; de Haas 2008; Hebinck 2002; Scoones 1998). The inadequate 
consideration of structural factors imply that mere survival strategies of peasants are 
conflated to central forms of agency, as opposed to those responses that are aimed at 
redressing structural conditions that lead to exploitation. In reality, some choices are 
constrained by structural factors and resource access is embedded with struggles 
between ―winners and losers‖ of a particular livelihood strategy being pursued by 
certain classes (O‘Laughlin 2002; 2004).  
Marxian political economy, however posits that the exploitation and oppression of 
peasants and agrarian labourers by other classes such as large farm capitalists, through 
unequal control of means of production, elicits resistance from the former in a bid to 
improve their material conditions. The ―economic and political structures‖, that 
impinge  the social reproduction of the peasantry/rural working classes at different 
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points in time thus shapes agency (Petras & Veltmeyer 2001: 91; see also O‘Laughlin 
2002; Shivji 2009). Under capitalist social relations, the question of agency is taken as 
a given and analysis is focused on the different ways of its expression and reaction to 
it (O‘Laughlin 2002). Therefore as the previous scholars argues dialectical unity 
between structure and agency is inevitable and the two cannot be conceived of as 
separate from each other. 
Class-consciousness, which implies how the oppressed perceive themselves in 
relation to the means of production, leads to action by members of a particular class in 
search of solutions to their problems (Petras & Veltmeyer 2001). Variations can 
however exist in the class-consciousness amongst members of the same class based 
on the ―…specific conditions under which such a person lives‖ (Mintz 1974: 314). 
Resistance of the peasantry to oppression, for instance, is coloured by dynamic and 
sometimes contradictory interests of various classes due to the social differentiation 
that pervades rural areas in SSA (Cousins 2010). As such the struggles of semi-
proletariats reflect not only the grievances of land shortages and insecurity of tenure 
they face as petty commodity producers, but also the poor wages and working 
conditions in their role as wage labour (Moyo & Yeros 2005a). However, in some 
cases, resistance to exploitation reflects the ―class for itself‖ tendencies, with 
grievances identifiable with a distinct class (Jha 1996; Petras & Veltmeyer 2001). 
Examples include actions by landless workers against their employers on plantation 
estates aimed at redressing the poor social conditions of wage labour. These actions 
express themselves as purely working class or proletarian struggles.  
The agency of workers in the labour markets can be examined in relation to how they 
deploy different forms of powers to advance their material conditions (Wright 2000). 
By ―power‖, Wright (2000: 962) meant the ―…capacity of individuals and 
organisations to realise class interests‖. For the working class, this translates to secure 
employment, earning wage above the costs of social reproduction and good working 
conditions. According to Wright (2000: 962), the workers derive their power to 
respond to their socio-economic conditions in the labour markets from two sources, 
namely; ―structural power‖ and ―associational power‖. Structural power ―…results 
simply from their location in the economic system. The power of workers as 
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individuals… results from tight labour markets or from the strategic location of a 
particular group of workers within a key industrial sector…‖ (Wright 2000: 962).  
Silver (2003: 13) extended this analysis and delineated structural power into ―work 
place bargaining power‖ that arises ―…directly from tight labour markets‖ and 
―market place bargaining power‖, which is derived ―…from the strategic location of a 
particular group of workers within a key industrial sector. More specifically, the 
―market place bargaining power‖ is an outcome of the ―…(1) possession of scarce 
skills that are in demand by employers, (2) low levels of general unemployment and 
(3) the ability to pull out of the labour market and survive on non-wage sources of 
income‖ (Silver 2003: 13). ―Associational power‖, on the other hand, emerges from 
belonging to ―collective organisations of workers‖ such as trade unions and political 
parties that act to advance the interests of the working class (Wright 2000: 962).  
Actions in the labour markets by workers could be equated to what Moyo et al. (2000: 
190) have categorised as ―workerist‖ struggles that are mainly aimed at addressing 
their conditions as wage labourers. However, these authors were also clear that 
workers‘ responses to their socio-economic conditions transcend their actions in the 
labour market to constitute what they termed as ―transformative‖ struggles (Moyo et 
al. 2000: 190). The latter seeks their transition from the wage economy towards more 
autonomous social reproduction and for rural workers this often includes struggling 
for access to land to engage in independent farming. Focus on only the labour markets 
thus risks the danger of omitting the semi-proletarian tendencies of the struggles of 
the rural working classes (Moyo & Yeros 2005a) and thus limit the understanding of 
the different dimensions of agency in the countryside. 
The forms of resistance by rural people, including the working class, are 
differentiated and can occur concurrently and/or spread over time (O‘Laughlin 2002; 
Moyo & Yeros 2005a). These include deploying their universal suffrage in electoral 
politics, confronting agrarian capital through encroaching private property to access 
land and natural resources monopolised by large capitalist farms, organised land 
occupation movements to expand their access to land, participation in trade unions for 
improved working conditions and involvement in revolutions and rebellions (Jacobs 
2018; Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Moyo & Matondi 2008; Peters 1994). 
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Absence of the commonly recognised collective actions such as labour protests (e.g. 
strikes) and visible organisational forms (e.g. trade unions) should, however not be 
misconstrued to imply non-existence of resistance (Jha 2016; 1996; Wilderman 2014; 
Silver 2003). Since agricultural labourers in India could not openly confront 
employers over poor working conditions because of the ―structural disadvantages‖ 
against them, the resistance of agrarian labourers took the form of the actions 
described by Scott (1985: 35) including ―…foot-dragging, dissimulation, false 
compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson etc.‖ (see Jha 1996: 200-201). 
In other contexts, exclusive private property rights on LSCFs can be activated to 
hinder collective actions by denying trade unions access to workers, leveraging 
legislation such as trespass laws. Such experiences were common in Zimbabwe‘s 
LSCF‘s prior to 2000 (Kibble & Vanlberghe 2000). In fact, less than a third of the 
LSCF workers were unionised around 2000 with most of them in the plantation 
estates in the lowveld (Kibble & Vanlberghe 2000: 26). Further afield in countries 
such as Brazil, not only are union leaders excluded from the LSCFs, they are 
subjected to physical violence by the landlords (Selwyn 2014; Pereira 1997). 
Despite being invisible, the ―weapons of the weak‖ have delivered social change to 
agricultural labourers alongside other labour policy reforms in places such as India, 
including the disappearance of physical assault and sexual exploitation of female 
workers (Jha 1996). However, others (Oya 2013) largely emphasise the role of 
collective action and note that the ―better‖ working conditions enjoyed by workers in 
LSCFs is due to the presence of trade unions and closer labour inspections by state 
officials not found on small farms. As a result of the inadequate attention paid to the 
less visible forms of struggle by workers, a fuller understanding of workers‘ influence 
on labour relations is incomplete.  
Farm labour struggles are also affected by identity differences as migrant labourers 
are more prepared to accept poor working conditions than local labourers because of 
limited survival options as argued earlier (see sections 2.4.1 & 2.5.3). Resistance to 
the conditions of work by local labour thus leads to intra-class conflicts between the 
local farm labourers and migrant labourers with detrimental effects on collective 
action (Breman 1996; Standing 2006). For instance, in the Limpopo Province in 
South Africa, large capitalist farms deploy the illegal status of Zimbabwean migrant 
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farm workers to offer poor working conditions (Addison & Rutherford 2007; Wisborg 
et al. 2013), while similar situations embodied Mozambican workers in Mpumalanga 
Province (Sender & Johnston 1996). Such intra-class conflicts have also been 
observed in the rubber plantations of Malaysia (Li Murray 2011). Different 
circumstances such as labour and skills shortages can however have differential 
labour market outcomes, induced by competition for migrant labour that paves the 
way for improvement of wages and related conditions of work (Oya 2013). 
Specific forms of social exploitation and conflict that are peculiar to Settler-Southern 
Africa such as the conditions of farm labour residential tenancy (Arrighi 1970; Clarke 
1977; Neocosmos 1993; Rubert 1997) shape the various aspects of regionally specific 
agency among agricultural workers. Intertwinning employment and residential rights, 
the scenario facing farm workers in Settler-Southern Africa on LSCFs has been 
characterised by some researchers as ―…living on other people‘s land‖ (Speirenburg 
2019: 1).  This is qualitatively different from labour tenancy found in other parts of 
SSA and Latin America and Asia, whereby labour tenants provide labour unpaid 
labour to large land owners in exchange for land access (Lasstarria-Cornhiel & 
Melmed-Sanjak 1999; see also section 2.3.1). 
The residential labour tenancy of Settler Southern Africa, also known as ―labour 
stabilisation‖, guaranteed LSCF labour supplies from the resident workers and their 
families (Gibbon 2011: 29; see also Tandon 2001). The LSCFs instrumentalised the 
farm labour residential tenancy to control labour at the workplace and beyond in ways 
that were sometimes at variance with laws. It was thus characterised as a form of 
―domestic government‖ by Rutherford (2001a: 95); it was exploitative and based on 
dependency of employees on one farmer for both work and residency (Clarke 1977; 
Gibbon 2011). This arrangement impinged on the resistance to poor farm wage labour 
relations, including both individual and collective action as workers feared losing 
both residency and employment (Chambati 2013a). Recent research from South 
Africa has demonstrated that the possibilities for self-organisation to confront LSCFs 
over poor wages and working conditions are enhanced if the encumbrance of the 
residential labour tenancy is absent. Wilderman (2014) showed that workers who 
lived off-farms were crucial in organising the wildcat strike in De Doorns in the 
Western Cape Province that resulted in the rise in the minimum wage in 2011/12 
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without the active involvement of rural trade unions. Selwyn (2014) reported similar 
effects in export grape farms in the South-East of Brazil, as off-farm residency was 
associated with increased worker militancy. As a result of this, the study notes that 
many LSCFs have been reverting to on-farm residency to reassert their control over 
labour, including who visited them in the farm compounds. 
Clearly, the interests of the working classes act in direct opposition to the interests of 
the capitalist class that are driven by maximising profits and keeping wages low is 
part of the cost containment strategies. It is therefore not unexpected, that the 
capitalist classes would respond to the actions of working in defense of their profits. 
Silver (2003: 39) characterises four types of responses to worker resistances in the 
labour markets in the United States of America and Europe in the 1960‘s; namely, 
―spatial fix‖, ―technological fix‖, ―product fix‖ and ―financial fix‖. Migration of  
capital to areas of low labour resistance, which imply the possibilities to pay low 
wages and thus enhance their profitability is represented by the ―spatial fix‖. 
Although not specifically addressed by Silver (2003), the sourcing of labour from 
other places should also be equally considered as a spatial fix to the resistance of local 
labour as seen in the early years of establishment of European mines and farms in 
Rhodesia (Chapter Four). In fact, as will be seen later, foreign migrant labourers from 
Nyasaland (now Malawi), Mozambique and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) dominated 
the wage labour markets until the 1960s when locals began joining as land 
dispossession efforts were widened by the colonial government (Chapter Four).  
Technological fixes, put simply, involve the adoption of labour displacing 
technologies and thus reduce the costs of wages. Product fix entails the movement of 
capital into the production of goods characterised by less challenges in their labour 
markets within their original geographical spaces or relocation to other sites. Again, 
these tendencies were self evident in the restructuring of LSCF agriculture in 
Zimbabwe after the introduction of regulated labour markets after independence in 
1980 through the movement away from labour intensive commodities to more capital 
intensive products promising more profits in the lucrative European export markets 
(Chapter Four). The last strategy, the financial fix, relates to the total withdrawal of 
capital from trade and production into finance and speculation. 
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This literature thus suggests that the agency of agrarian labour should be analysed not 
only in terms of their individual actions but also collective worker responses in order 
to expose the diverse struggles and their effects in improving their material 
conditions. The outcomes of labour resistance are not only contingent upon actions of 
the workers, but are mediated by the responses that they elicit from the capitalist 
classes. Moreover, the actions of the agrarian labourers transcend the labour markets, 
including their quests for autonomy through land ownership for independent farming. 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed the theoretical and conceptual perspectives on agrarian labour 
relations in SSA and more specifically in former Settler-Southern Africa. The 
historical-structural approaches were found to be more applicable to understand the 
new agrarian labour relations compared to the neo-classical economic and livelihoods 
framework. Indeed, the agrarian labour relations in former Settler colonies such as 
Zimbabwe were based on a historical context of specific land-labour utilisation 
relations created by land dispossession and discriminatory agrarian policies during the 
colonial and immediate independence period. The literature review illustrated that the 
character of the agrarian structures, including the distribution of landholdings and 
land tenure relations, shaped agrarian labour markets.  
However, it was also evident that the structural factors and/or class dynamics 
reflected in the existing agrarian structures alone were by no means the only 
determinant of the agrarian labour relations in Settler-Southern Africa. Specifically, 
these class dynamics intersected with socio-economic policies and other social 
relations such as gender, generational hierarchies, kinship and citizenship, for they 
also influence access to land and other agrarian resources and produce differences 
between families, men and women. Further to this, the nature of resistance by 
agrarian labourers to their socio-economic conditions in the labour markets and 
beyond impacted on the perceived labour relations, a point neglected by historical 
structural approaches. This framing of the intersection of structural factors and other 
wider social relations informs the analysis of Zimbabwe‘s new agrarian labour 
relations arising from the extensive agrarian restructuring and shifting agrarian policy 
dynamics presented in this research. 
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In general, agrarian wage labour relations have been incorrectly associated with 
former-Settler economies such as South Africa and Zimbabwe that have expansive 
large-scale capitalist farms. Alternatively, self-employed labour relations are assumed 
to predominate amongst the peasantry. As such, the different forms of agrarian labour 
and the diverse sources of employment that exist among the differentiated peasant 
classes are understudied. Certainly, there has been a growing body of knowledge on 
the farm labour relations in LSCFs in former-Settler Southern Africa but only a few 
studies focused on the peasantry. Also worth mentioning is that the understanding of 
the wider labour relations has been limited by independent assessments of the LSCF 
labour relations separately from those of the peasantry, resulting in the omission of 
the inter-linkages between these two sectors. 
The literature tends to undervalue the importance of self-employed farm labour of the 
peasantry for their sustenance, but with inadequate examination of the net income 
returns from farming and use values derived from auto-consumption of food they 
produce in comparison to wage employment in LSCFs, which is considered superior 
and important for their survival. Moreover, this was against a background of 
overwhelming emerging evidence, which has shown the insufficiency of farm wage 
incomes in the costs of social reproduction, alongside the snail‘s pace in growth of 
employment in the capital intensive LSCFs. The importance of self-employed 
agricultural labour and by implication access to land among the peasantry has also 
been questioned and a permanent reallocation of labour away from farming to other 
non-farm activities is considered to be underway especially in the context of the SAPs 
experienced in SSA that reduced state support to small-scale farming. The validity of 
some of these assertions is tested in the analysis presented in this study.   
The research methodology and study approach utilised to examine the transition of 





RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND STUDY APPROACH 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter outlined the theoretical and conceptual framework undergirding 
study, and critically reviewed the existing knowledge and perspectives on AALR. The 
main research question posed earlier concerns the nature and extent to which 
structural changes in the land ownership and property relations and the consequential 
shifts in agricultural production patterns and markets, and various agrarian policies 
have reshaped agrarian labour markets, the nature and organisation of labour relations 
within and among the diverse range of farming units. This chapter sets out the 
research methodology and approach applied to analyse the new agrarian labour 
relations.  
The study approach adopted to address the research questions posed in Section 1.5 
entailed examining labour relations within farming units and/or farm households as 
the principal study units and various sources of data at different levels from the farm 
to the national level.  
Post-FTLRP agrarian labour relations were assessed at the national and/or macro-
level to trace historical and contemporary dynamics of the relationships between 
agrarian labour markets and; land access patterns and changing agricultural and 
economic policies and, at the level of district through two case studies to track the 
differentiation in FTLRP agrarian restructuring and effects on the agrarian labour 
markets; at the farm household level to capture the sources and forms of labour being 
utilised and the influences of various socio-economic factors on labour utilisation; 
household structures and dynamics of intra-household labour relations in terms of 
gender, age and kinship; and at the level of farm labourers and their households to 
analyse the forms of farm labour, as well as the quality of wage labour and individual 
agency and farm compounds to understand the trajectory of residential labour tenancy 
and collective action undertaken by farm workers to improve their material 
conditions.  
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This multi-layered analysis enabled the triangulation of data sources and inclusion of 
diverse standpoints from different actors in the agrarian labour markets that include 
both the former and new farm labourers and farm households in their variegated roles 
as either self-employed family labourers or employers of farm wage labour or sellers 
of farm labour to others. 
Methodological triangulation through detailed quantitative and qualitative research in 
the two case study districts of Goromonzi and Kwekwe and various other sources of 
information enabled the study to unpack the transition the agrarian labour relations 
that had emerged from the agrarian restructuring and dynamic agrarian and socio-
economic policies. The various sources of information, which supplemented the 
primary data, included literature reviews of existing studies, secondary data from 
government reports, media articles and court records. 
Following this introduction, the chapter outlines the research paradigm influencing 
the study. The next section defines the study units that provided information to track 
the new labour relations and the levels of analysis in relation to the research 
questions. To provide the specific level and context in which the agrarian labour 
relations were assessed, Section 3.5 provides a background of the study areas. The 
section prior to this details of why the case study approach was selected to understand 
the transition of agrarian labour relations since 2000.  
The data collection approaches to elicit primary data on the new agrarian labour 
relations at the micro-level through the quantitative surveys of farm households and 
farm labourers and qualitative surveys, which involved key informant interviews and 
direct physical observations extends the discussion on the procedures followed by the 
study. The other issues covered in the remaining sections of the chapter encompass 
the sampling techniques utilised to select the study participants, and the analytical 
approaches employed to make sense of the information collected in field. Before 
concluding, reflections on the validity and reliability of the research and the ethical 
principles adhered to by the study are exposed.  
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3.2 RESEARCH PARADIGM  
This research is anchored on the critical theory paradigm that is driven not only by the 
production of knowledge, but also to influence the transformation of societies 
(Howell 2013). In particular, it seeks to influence the emancipation of farm labourers, 
whose voices have been largely silent in the rural research following the FTLRP. 
They constituted a substantial section of the populace that has been historically 
marginalised in the ownership of land since the colonial period and eked out a 
precarious living from toiling in the LSCFs. Critical theory ontology assumes that the 
reality is an outcome of social and historical processes including political, economic, 
cultural, ethnic and gender dimensions (Howell 2013; Neuman 2006). Therefore, the 
reality is dynamic and the historical dimensions shape the social and economic 
phenomena, and theories are not universally applicable but are dependent on the time 
and place (Mwanje 2001a). 
3.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND DATA SOURCES: STUDY LEVELS AND 
UNITS  
A series of sub-questions were posed to help answer the study‘s four broad research 
questions, and clarify the levels of analysis, data requirements, source of data and the 
data collection methods (Table 3.1). The multi-layered analysis of the new agrarian 
labour relations is elaborated below and the study units that included farm labourers 
and their families, farming units and/or households and farm compounds are also 
described detail and linked to the research issues explored by the thesis.  
Sub-research questions 
Below, the sub-questions that were asked for each research question are presented.  
Does the redistribution of land to mostly small-scale producers and a retention of 
a reduced base of large-scale capitalist farms lead to a decline in capitalist wage 
labour relations alongside the rise in the use of family farm labour, and/ or do 
new extensive forms of wage labour emerge? 
To understand the transformation of the capitalist wage labour relations and family 
farm labour that the research question intended to address, the following sub-
questions were posed: (i) what is the structure of landholdings and/or sources farm 
(wage) labour that has arisen following the FTLRP at national and sub-national 
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levels? Tied to this were a range of questions: (i.a) What is extent of the incidence of 
farm wage labour utilisation among the different range of farm households? (i.b) 
What is the degree of formality of the farm wage employment being offered by farm 
households (e.g. duration of employment/extent of permanency of employment, types 
of contracts and mode of wage payments)? (i.c) What is the extent of the incidence of 
hiring out of farm wage labour to other farm households by land owning and farm 
labourers‘ households? (ii) Are other non-capitalist farm labour relations such as 
inter-household labour exchanges (reciprocal and non-reciprocal), sharecropping and 
labour tenancies associated with small-scale producers also emerging alongside 
family and wage labour? (iii) What is the extent of incidence of the utilisation of 
family farm labour among farm households? (iv) To what extent is social 
differentiation among farm households shaped by the use of family and wage labour 
and/or on the (need to) supply farm wage labour to others? Thus: (iv.a) what is the 
scale and proportions of family and wage labour utilisation among the different farm 
households? (iv.b) What are the emerging class positions of the different farm 
households in relation to the extent of dependence on either family or wage labour in 
their agricultural production enterprises? (v) What is the relationship between the 
emerging class position of the farming units and their size of land holdings, gender of 
landowners, commodities produced, and value of output, agricultural assets owned, 
inputs used and access to capital? 
To what extent is the diversification into non-farm rural labour activities 
replacing farm labour as an important source of income to land owning farm 
households domiciled in diverse locales? 
The diversification into non-farm rural labour activities was examined from the 
following lens: (i) What proportions of land owning farm households and land short 
and/or landless rural households participate in non-farm rural labour activities? (ii) To 
what extent does the location shape the levels of participation of households in non-
farm rural labour activities? (iii) What is the proportion of family members involved 
in non-farm rural labour activities in relation to the total family size and what are their 
positions within the households? (iv) How much income is contributed by farm and 
non-farm rural labour activities in the total household income? (v) Are non-farm rural 
labour activities an avenue to mobilise finances that are invested in household 
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agricultural production activities or do incomes from family farm labour finance non-
farm rural labour activities? 
Has the expansion of the number of farm households following redistributive 
land reforms resulted in increased competition for farm wage labour and 
consequently improvement in the quality of wage labour? 
Five sub-questions were asked to answer whether or not the increase in the number of 
farm households had led to increased competition for farm wage labour, as well as its 
quality. (i) What are the relative sources of farm wage labour (whether it is from other 
the farm households, the landless, from nearby Communal Areas or district sites; 
urban areas) and which sectors does farm wage labour compete with for its demand? 
(ii) What is the extent of the incidence in the recruitment of cheap sources of wage 
labour such as children, extended family relatives, women and labour migrants? 
Linked to this is the extent of the incidence of the exploitation of the unpaid family 
labour of women, children and extended family relatives in farm households‘ 
agricultural production enterprises? (iii) What proportions of farm households are not 
able to mobilise adequate wage labour as a result of shortages of labour and/or limited 
supplies of farm labour? (iv) What is the direction of change in the quality of farm 
wage labour in terms of the wages earned (money and in-kind) and other working 
conditions (e.g. working hours, provision of rest days and/ or annual leave, methods 
used by employers to supervise labour negotiation using physical violence; and 
provision of material to accomplish tasks) and do variations exist among farm 
households? Consequently, are farm wages adequate to meet the livelihood needs of 
farm workers and their families such as food, clothing, education, health and 
household assets? (v) Do the wages and working conditions vary according to the 
skills and gender of farm labourers, scale of agricultural production, commodities 
produced and location? 
Has the reconstitution of the freehold land tenure into state land tenures, which 
compelled mandatory labour provision by labourers resident in the LSCFs’ 
compounds, resulted in the undermining of the residential labour tenancy system 
and increased the autonomy of farm labourers to sell their labour and organise 




The above research question was divided into the following sub-questions: (i) Are the 
locations of farm wage and non-farm labour employment contingent upon the farm 
labourers‘ places of residency? (ii) What is the level of dependency on wage incomes 
among farm labourers and their families for their sustenance and/or what proportion 
do farm wages contribute to the total household income? (iii) How are farm workers 
mobilising individual agency to respond to poor wages and working conditions? (iv) 
What is the extent of participation of farm wage labourers in formal and informal 
organisations that represent their labour rights such as formal trade unions, workers 
committees, and informal labour groups and what roles do these organisations play in 
resisting poor wages and working conditions (e.g. strikes/demonstrations)? (v) Are 
there any other forms of social, political and economic organisations that mobilise 
farm wage labourers to advance their socio-economic conditions? (vi) Are farm 
labourers mobilising their agency to access other resources such as agricultural land 
to improve their socio-economic conditions? 
National/Macro-level analysis  
A review of the existing historical literature on the macro-level changes on the 
relationships between agrarian (wage) labour and land access, land utilisation 
patterns, economic policies, labour laws and various extra-economic measures since 
1890 was undertaken to provide context to the continuities and changes arising from 
the FTLRP (Chapter Four). Since historical conditions were changing both nationally 
and internationally, in relation to the political mode of rule and economic structures, a 
broad periodisation approach was used to analyse agrarian labour relations. The 
political economy of Zimbabwe‘s agrarian history has tended to be periodised 
according to the mode of political rule (Paton 1995; Rukuni 1994), changing land 
distribution patterns and scale of redistributive land reforms (Moyo 1999; 2001; 2003; 
2005) and the economic policy framework adopted by the state (Kanyenze 2001; 
World Bank 2012; Muir 1994). 
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Table 3.1: Linkage of research questions, data requirements, study units and levels 
of study  
Research 
questions 
Sub-questions Data required Study units Level of study  
1. Trajectory of 
capitalist wage 
labour relations 
and use of family 
farm labour 
1a. Structure of landholdings and sources of 
farm (wage) labour 
 Distribution of landholdings  
 Wage labour hiring in and out 
patterns 
 Mode of wage payments  
 Types of labour contracts 
 Households (farm 
& labour) 
 National 
 District  
 Farm households  
1b. Emergence of non-capitalist labour 
relations 
 Frequencies of reciprocal labour 
exchanges  
 Land and labour exchanges  
 Households (farm 
and labour) 
 Households (farm 
and labour) 
1c. Extent of incidence of utilisation of 
family labour 
 Proportions of households utilising 
family labour  
 Households (farm 
& labour) 
 Households (farm 
and labour) 
1d. Shaping of social differentiation among 
farm households by use of family and wage 
labour 
 Net labour ratio 
 Family farm labour days worked 
 Hired in and out farm labour days  
 Farm households  Farm households 
 
1e. Relationship between emerging class 
position of labour utilisation and various 
socio-economic variables 
 Volume and value (output 
produced/sold), gender of land 
owners, access to credit, asset 
endowments, inputs used (quantity 
and value) 
 Farm households  Farm households 
2. Replacement of 




2a. Proportions of households involved in 
non-farm rural labour activities 
 Number of households involved in 
non-farm activities  
 Households (farm 
& labour) 
 Farm households 
2b. Location specificity of non-farm rural 
labour activities 
 Non-farm labour employment 
opportunities  




2c. Proportions of family members 
deployed in farm and non-farm rural labour 
activities 
 Total family sizes  
 No. of family members involved in 
farm and non-farm activities  
 Households (farm 
and labour) 
 Farm households  
2d. Farm and non-farm income contribution 
to total household incomes 
 Income shares of farm and non-
farm activities  
 Households (farm 
& labour) 
 Farm household 
2e. Social and economic activities farm and 
non-farm incomes are utilised 
 Expenditure patterns and their 
sources of incomes  
 Households (farm 
& labour) 
 Farm household 
3. Increased 
competition for 
farm wage labour 
and quality of 
wage labour 
3a. Sources of farm wage labour and sectors 
competing with farm (wage) labour 
 Locations of labour recruitment 
 Non-farm employment 
opportunities 
 Farm household  District 
 Farm household  
3b. Extent of recruitment of cheap sources 
of farm (wage) labour 
 Family and wage labour 
composition by gender, age and 
kinship 
 Farm household  Farm household 
3c. Proportions of farm households facing 
shortages of farm wage labour 
 Number of households facing 
shortages  
 Farm household  Farm household 
3d. Direction of change in the quality of 
wage labour and adequacy of wages to meet 
livelihood needs 
 Trends in wage rates and in-kind 
payments  
 Labour management practices 
 Food consumption patterns 
 Access to education and health 




 Households (farm 
and labour) 
3e. Variation of the quality of wage labour 
by skills and gender of labourers, scale of 
production, commodities produced and 
location 
 Wages earned by gender, skill 
 Land sizes cropped 
 Types of commodities produced  
 Households (farm 
& labour) 
 Farm household  
4. Increased 
autonomy of farm 
labourers to sell 




4a. Relationships between location of farm 
and non-farm employment and residency of 
farm labourers 
 Locations of employment 
 Places of residency of farm labour  
 Labour household 
 Farm compound 
 Farm compound 
4b. Dependency of farm labourers on farm 
wages for sustenance 
 Share of wages in total household 
incomes  
 Labour household  Labour household 
4c. Mobilisation of individual agency to 
resist poor wages and working conditions 
 Actions undertaken by workers   Labour household  Labour household 
4d. Extent of participation of farm labourers 
in formal and informal labour rights 
organisations and their roles in collective 
action 
 Membership to trade unions 
 Labour conflicts 
 Incidences of labour strikes 
 Labour household 
 Farm compounds 
 National 
 Districts 
 Households (farm 
& labour) 
4e. Mobilisation of farm labourers by other 
social, political and economic organisations 
to advance their socio-economic conditions 
 Participation of farm labourers in 
political parties, NGO activities, 
kinship, community groups and 
religious groups  
  Assistance received from the 
different groups  




 4f. Mobilisation of agency by farm 
labourers to access land and other natural 
resources 
 Access to agricultural land 
 Ways of accessing land 
 Labour household 
 Farm compound 
 Labour 
households 
 Farm compound 
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Therefore, the evolution of the national agrarian labour relations was periodised into four 
phases, namely; 1890-1979 covering the settler-colonial labour policy regime;
34
 1980-
1989 covers the post-independent decade characterised by state intervention in the 
(labour) markets (e.g. minimum wages and commodity price controls); 1990-1999 covers 
the neo-liberal era marked by economic liberalisation and state withdrawal from the 




Data sources on colonial agrarian labour relations included Arrighi (1970), Bush and 
Cliffe (1984), Clarke (1977), Palmer (1977), Ranger (1985), Rubert (1997) and Phimister 
(1986), which provided information showing the development of wage labour in the 
LSCFs in relation to land alienation, the quality of wage labour, labour management 
practices, LSCF land utilisation trends, and reclining peasant agricultural production. 
These studies also show how specific economic conditions and colonial policies such as 
semi-feudal labour laws (e.g. Masters and Servants Act of 1899) and extra-economic 
measures (e.g. hut and poll taxes imposed on peasants) impacted on the evolution of wage 
agrarian labour relations. Post-colonial developments on agrarian labour in the LSCFs 
and Communal Areas are analysed in Amanor-Wilks (1995); Kanyenze (2001); Moyo 
(1995; 1999; 2000); Moyo et al. (2000); Rukuni & Eicher (1994); Rutherford (2001) and 
Loewenson (1992) amongst other literature sources. 
These studies were supplemented by the periodic official reports on the agricultural 
employment patterns, farm wages, agricultural production patterns, investment patterns, 
and farm technologies in the LSCFs and Communal Areas produced by the Central 
Statistical Office (now called Zimbabwe Statistical Agency [ZIMSTAT]) including the 
Labour Force Surveys; Agricultural Production Surveys and Population Census Reports. 
Data on gazetted farm wages and benefits since 1991 and benefits following collective 
bargaining agreements between trade unions and employer representatives were obtained 
from the National Employment Council for the Agricultural Industry in Zimbabwe 
                                                 
34
 Based on modern political rule, the colonial period is sometimes categorised into three distinct historical 
periods namely; British South Africa Company rule (1890 to 1923); self-governing colonial rule (1924 to 
1964); and Unilateral Declaration of Independence (1965 to 1979); Independence decade (1980 to1990) 
(Rukuni 1994; Paton 1995).  
35
 Moyo (2013) has further divided the FTLRP into four phases namely; the revolutionary situation (March 
2000 to June 2001); rationalisation of land reform (July 2000 to December 2003); bureaucratisation of land 
reform (January 2004 to June 2008); and residual land redistribution (July 2008 to December 2011) (Table 
2.1: 36-37). More broadly, the degree of control of the state on the FTLRP processes following land 
occupations and the political and economic restructuring processes underway in the post-2000 characterise 
these different phases as outlined in Chapter Four. 
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(NECAIZ). Media articles and court records mainly provided information on farm labour 
disputes that were occurring in the newly resettled areas.  
The examination of the agrarian labour markets that have emerged as a result of the 
redistribution of LSCFs required an understanding of the new agrarian structure in order 
to identify the sources of farm (wage) employment and/or farming classes. Drawing on 
previous research (Moyo & Yeros 2005b; Moyo 2011a; 2013), the new national agrarian 
structure and consequent shifts in production trends and markets were analysed to 
contextualise the post-FTLRP labour relations at the district level, as well as the 
implications of the various socio-economic, labour and agricultural polices that were also 
changing during the 2000‘s (Chapter Five).  
District level analysis  
Detailed empirical work was undertaken to construct the new agrarian structures in 
Goromonzi and Kwekwe with a view of characterising the broad picture of the new 
farming classes and consequently the potential wage labour employing farm households 
and/or demand patterns for farm wage labour at the district level. This process also served 
to identify the land short and/or landless households that formed the potential farm wage 
labour supply base. As elaborated below (Section 3.4), this analysis allowed the study to 
track the local level differentiation that arose from the agrarian restructuring between the 
districts and understand the new agrarian labour regimes on the basis of local specificities 
and illuminate similarities and differences to the situation that evolved nationally.  
Data on landholding patterns and land tenure relations to compute the new agrarian 
structures at the district level was obtained from MLRR land records and supplemented 
with Population Census data from ZIMSTAT and other secondary studies. AGRITEX 
Annual Production reports were deployed to deduce the district production patterns and 
labour utilisation. District level maps on landholding patterns provided insights on the 
spatial dimensions of the agrarian labour market in each district through the identification 
of potential sites of labour recruitment and labour receiving zones. The scope of the 
potential labour force in the wider district labour markets was inferred from population 
and demographic data disaggregated by age and gender found in the Population Census 
and Labour Force Survey reports (ZIMSTAT various years). These reports also present 
data on the districts‘ economic activities and thus the sources and patterns of employment 
across spatial locations and sectors, including agriculture, manufacturing, mining and 
services.  
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Micro-level analysis: farm households, farm labourers and farm compounds  
The household in many parts of rural SSA is the unit of organisation of agricultural and 
non-agricultural production activities, consumption and (farm) labour (Moyo 2014; 
Mafeje 2003), justifying it as an important unit of analysis or source of data as employers 
of farm wage labour, as well as being self-employed labourers in their agricultural 
production units or sellers of labour power to other farm households and other non-farm 
rural labour activities. Farm households were defined as all the members that depended 
on or regularly contributed to the survival of the household (Oya 2013). This enables the 
capturing of all members belonging to a particular households regardless of their absence 
from home at any given time. Importantly, this illuminates agrarian labour relations in 
SSA that entail some members of a household straddling between places in and out of 
employment, and/or temporarily accommodated in labour dormitories in farm compounds 
(Tsikata 2015; Potts 2012). Definitions of households, which use residency and/or eating 
habits as the basis of belonging to a particular household omit this character of agrarian 
labour relations, potentially resulting in the lower approximation of the scale and reliance 
of households on (farm) wage labour markets (Oya 2013). 
Therefore, research issues on the sources and forms of farm labour in the new agrarian 
structure were captured at the farm household level, as well as the diversification of 
family labour into other non-farm rural activities (Table 3.1). Data to establish if wage 
and family labour utilisation is differentiated by the landholdings, gender of landowner, 
inputs utilisation, types of crops and livestock produced, access to income and market 
participation were also sourced at the farm household level. The farm households 
employing wage labour also provided data on the quality of labour (e.g. money wages, in-
kind payments, duration of employment, working conditions etc.).  
To understand the intra-household labour relations and their differentiation, farm 
households also provided information on their household structures and dynamics 
including their sizes and composition by gender, hierarchies, age and kinship relations, 
and occupations of all the household members. The labour allocation decisions, 
disaggregation of farm labour tasks and time contributions of the different members of 
the household in their agricultural production units were also captured at the farm 
household level.  
The farm households studied encompassed FTLRP land beneficiaries and Communal 
Area households. The FTLRP process entailed a socially differentiated process of 
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allocation of land and state based tenure systems, in which the A1 beneficiaries got 
smaller land sizes under permit tenure than the A2 beneficiaries with leasehold tenure 
(see section 1.2). Moreover, within these two resettlement models land sizes redistributed 
also vary markedly by agro-ecological region, districts, provinces and so forth and by the 
variant of the specific model - villagised or self-contained in the case of A1 and small, 
medium or large scale in the case of A2.
 
 
The Communal Areas generated by colonial land tenure systems (renamed from Tribal 
Trust Lands [TTLs] after 1980) are home to the majority of the rural households owning 
individual small arable plots and homesteads, and share grazing land amongst several 
households (Moyo 1995; Rukuni & Eicher 1994). In both Goromonzi and Kwekwe, these 
are located in the peripheries of the districts with the lowest agricultural potential. 
Differentiation in terms of land access, land sizes, socio-economic characteristics, labour 
utilisation and resource endowments is also a characteristic of these areas (see Adams 
1991; Cousins et al. 1992; Moyo 1995). The Communal Area households that provided 
information to the study were those that did not benefit from the FTLRP and still live and 
practice petty commodity production in these areas. Their inclusion contributed to the 
filling of data gaps on the scope of agrarian labour markets in this land tenure category, 
which has been excluded in most post-FLTRP studies focused on the new farm units in 
redistributed LSCFs (Matondi 2012; Moyo et al. 2009; Scoones et al. 2010) and before 
2000 as well (Chapter Four). Altogether, this enhanced the understanding of labour 
relations within the peasantry now constituted by the new A1 farming units and the 
Communal Area households. 
Farm labourers and their families aided the understanding of the forms of farm labour and 
its quality as either full- or part-time wage labourers to farm households, as well as being 
independent producers in the own right (Table 3.1). Data provided by farm labourers also 
enabled the triangulation of similar data to be elicited from farm households employing 
wage labour (Denzin 1989; Neuman 2006). The individual and collective action aimed at 
improving working and material conditions was also captured from the farm labourers 
themselves.  
The farm labourers consist of self-employed and wage workers in farm households. Wage 
workers sell their labour power for cash and/or kind payments in farming and non-
farming activities in the countryside (Table 3.1). The self-employed labourers (or family 
labour) include landowners and their families who provide unpaid labour to the 
household‘s agricultural production units and non-farm activities. Farm wage labourers 
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can be categorised into two broad classes on the basis of their employment history in the 
LSCFs before 2000, namely; former farm workers that were employed in the LSFCs 
before the FTLRP and new farm workers whose employment history is limited to the A1 
and A2 households.  
Farm compounds were also studied to examine the agency of labour, their role as a source 
of labour to the new A1 and A2 farming units and consequently track the trajectory of 
residential labour tenancy. Data on employment patterns of the farm compound residents 
was mobilised to gauge whether it was tied to residency within the confines of former 
LSCFs or new farm units in the case of new compounds. 
Most LSCFs had separate sections on the farm that provided housing to full-time workers 
and their families and also accommodated part-time workers from Communal Areas that 
was tied to employment rights called farm compounds (Tandon 2001). Another 
dimension of the farm compound has entailed the construction of new housing units for 
workers by A1 and A2 households within their FTLRP subdivisions (Chambati 2013a). 
These are referred to as new farm compounds, while the former are termed old farm 
compounds in this study.  
3.4 DISTRICT CASE STUDIES APPROACH 
As is now apparent, a case study approach of Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts was 
employed to understand the transformation of agrarian labour relations after 2000. The 
two cases examined are defined in terms of the geographic boundaries of the districts (see 
Burton 2000). Although case study research is sometimes thought of as the analysis of a 
single ―case‖, the research followed the suggestions of some scholars (Platt 1988; Burton 
2000) who have argued that the number of ―cases‖ is not important, such that the analysis 
of multiple ―cases‖ can also be considered to be case study research. The units of analysis 
in case study research can be a person, small group of people, community, event , a 
country or continent (Burton 2000). The latter type of case study research was employed 
because of the possibilities it offers in producing ―more compelling and more robust‖ 
results than singe case studies (Burton 2000: 14 -15). Furthermore, results of the case 
studies can be compared and contrasted, while ―tentative generalisations‖ can also be 
made (Burton 2000). Indeed,  a notable weakness of case study research relates to its 
limits for scientific generalisations to be made to the wider population (Burton 2000; Yin 
2003). Generating an in-depth analysis of a unit to test theoretical propositions motivates 
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case study research (Yin 2003). Therefore, case study research is not about inference on 
the wider population, but about ―analytical generalisations‖ (Burton 2000:14-15).  
Through the case study approach,  it was possible to decipher the depth of structural 
changes initiated by the FTLRP and determine the nature of their changing agrarian 
economies and gain insights on the new agrarian labour regime and/or markets based on 
the historical specificities of each district, including their varied socio-economic 
character, different agro-ecological zones and unique mix of farming system (Chapter 
Five). By examining two district case studies with contrasting socio-economic 
characteristics, the study managed to compare and expose the differentiated outcomes of 
the FTLRP on agrarian labour relations, which previous studies have noted (Moyo et al. 
2009; Matondi 2012; Hanlon et al. 2013; Scoones et al. 2010). The approach of 
comparing varied districts to capture the dynamic outcomes of the FTLRP differs from 
the common practice of focusing only on a few farms in a single district (e.g. FTCZ 2002; 
Hartnack 2005; 2009; 2016; Marongwe 2009; Mandidzadza 2010; Mutangi 2010; 
Magaramombe 2010). The next section provides detailed descriptions of the study areas 
and the reasons why they were chosen.  
3.5 STUDY AREA AND JUSTIFICATION 
A background to the study areas is provided in this section to set out the local context in 
which the new agrarian labour relations were examined in the two districts. An overview 
of the two districts and reasons why they were chosen opens the section followed by a 
detailed description of their socio-economic character. 
3.5.1 Overview of study areas and justification of choice 
Two districts with contrasting socio-economic characteristics and agricultural land uses 
were included in the study to elucidate the diverse effects of the FTLRP on agrarian 
labour relations. Goromonzi district is a per-urban district near Harare in Natural Region 
II that supports intensive agricultural production. The road networks and other public and 
social services are relatively well developed compared to other rural areas. The district is 
also a frontier for urban expansion for Harare and Ruwa (Figure 3.1). Kwekwe evolved 
historically as a gold mining district and extensive farming predominates on account of its 
location in the low rainfall, Natural Regions III and IV. This variation in the character of 
the districts influences the differentiated land uses and consequently the farm labour 
relations (Figure 3.1).  
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Land was more unevenly distributed between the LSCFs and the Communal Areas in 
Goromonzi compared to Kwekwe district. Furthermore, Kwekwe district experienced 
land reforms in the 1980s that generated the old resettlement areas. Sharp differences also 
existed on the scale of wage labour engaged in the LSCFs between the provinces where 
these districts are located. Around 2000, over 55,606 permanent and casual farm workers 
constituted in the LSCF employ in Mashonaland East (location of Goromonzi) in 
comparison to 9,255 workers in Midlands (location of Kwekwe) (CSO 2000: 132-133).  
Figure 3.1: Map showing the location of Goromonzi and Kwekwe Districts 
 
Source: Compiled by author from MLRR data  
3.5.2 Description of the study areas  
 
This section details the socio-economic character of the study areas, covering their broad 
geographies, agrarian structures, local economies and administrative structures. 
3.5.2.1 History and geography (agro-ecology and demography) 
Goromonzi is part of the nine rural districts in Mashonaland East Province, bordering the 
Communal Areas of Seke district in the South-Western part and the poor semi-formal 
urban settlement of Epworth. The former LSCFs of Shamva district are on the Northern 
boundary of the district, while Murehwa and Marondera districts are on the Eastern side. 
The road infrastructure is composed of major highways,including the Harare-Mutare 
Road and the Nyampanda Highway, which both link Zimbabwe to its Easern neighbour, 
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Mozambique. Another highway connects Goromonzi to Shamva district. As shown in 
Figure 3.2, the Communal Areas of Chikwaka and Chinhamora are located in the 
peripheries of the district enveloping the former LSCFs. The other Communal Area, 
Chinyika, is at the centre of the former LSCFs (Figure 3.2). A thin stretch of SSCFs 
border the Chikwaka Communal Area on the South-Western side of the district. Farm 
labour supplies for the former LSCFs originated from the Communal Areas within 
Goromonzi and its neighbouring districts. 
Kwekwe district, on the other hand, is found in the Midlands Province bordering Gokwe 
North in the North, Gweru in the South and Chirumhanzu in the East.
36
 The district lies 
approximately 212.5 kilometres in the South-East of Harare and 245 kilometres to North-
East of second major city, Bulawayo. An area of 886,649 hectares is divided between 
urban (Kwekwe and Redcliff towns) and rural ([former] LSCFs, Communal Areas, Old 
Resettlement Areas and SSCFs [Small-Scale Commercial Farms]) (MLLR land records 
2017). The urban areas of Kwekwe and Redcliff towns are located approximately in the 
centre of the LSCFs, along the Harare-Bulawayo highway traversing through the district. 
Old Resettlement areas lie between the former LSCFs and the Communal Lands of 
Zhombe and Silobela in the Western part of the district (Figure 3.3). Patches of the 
SSCFs are located in the South-West along the border with Gweru district. The LSCFs 
farm labour was mostly sourced from the Communal Areas of neighbouring Gokwe 
South district, as gold panning with higher wages was more attractive to the residents of 
Zhombe and Silobela Communal Areas (MRT 2017: Interview). 
                                                 
36
 Other districts in Midlands Province are Gokwe South, Shurugwi, Mberengwa and Zvishavane. 
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Figure 3.2: Map of Goromonzi District 
 
Source: Compiled by author from MLRR data 
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Figure 3.3: Map of Kwekwe District 
 
Source: Compiled by author from MLRR data  
Between 2002 and 2012, the population of Goromonzi  had increased by close to 70,000 
people to 223,879 persons that were resident in 56,248 households (ZIMSTAT 2012: 39-
40; CSO 2002b: 15). While the Communal Area‘s residents share of the total district 
population decreased to 54.8 percent from 57 perecent and that of former LSCFs 
increased to 45.4 percent (calculated from ZIMSTAT 2012: 39) from 42.7 percent in 
2002 (calculated from CSO 2002b: 105). However, between the 2002 and 2012 
population censuses, the number of households in both the former LSCFs and Communal 
Areas increased from 18,230 to 26,789 and 19,976 to 29,392 respectively (CSO 2002b: 
105; ZIMSTAT 2012: 39). The average family sizes in Communal Areas declined from 
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4.5 to 4.2 persons during the same period, while a slight increase from 3.7 to 3.8 persons 
was recorded in the former LSCFs (CSO 2002b: 105; ZIMSTAT 2012: 39). This suggests 
that the potential family farm labour that could be mobilised from the Communal Area 
resident population was shrinking.  
Kwekwe‘s population is split between 136,379 urban dwellers (43.7 percent) and 175,835 
(53.6 percent) rural inhabitants located in 38,107 households (calculated from ZIMSTAT 
2012: 84-85). In both urban (52.1 percent) and rural (56.4 percent), women accounted for 
slightly the larger proportion of the population in the respective regions (ZIMSTAT 2012: 
84-85). Zhombe and Silobela Communal Areas contributed 76.7 percent of the total 
population and each of the  28,405 households had average family size of 4.7 persons 
(Calculated from ZIMSTAT 2012: 89-90 & Kwekwe District AGRITEX Annual Report 
2016). Whilst the former LSCFs constituted 19.2 percent of the total district population 
resident in 8,260 households averaging about 4.09 persons per household. Family sizes in 
SSCFs and Old Ressetlement areas averaged about 5.0 persons per household located in 
384 and 1,058 households respectively (ZIMSTAT 2012: 84-85). In general, the larger 
family sizes in the Communal Area, Old Resettlement and SSCFs households imply that 
more family members were available to be mobilised as self-employed farm labour than 
in A1 and A2 households. Around 2002, 126,061 and 159,467 persons lived in urban and 
rural areas respectively in Kwekwe (CSO 2002c: 9-10). 
Two intensive conservation areas (ICAs) dermacated according to the agro-ecological 
potential formed the Goromonzi LSCFs (Chambati 2013b; Marongwe 2008). The Acturus 
ICA in the Northern part of the district was home to intensive farming because of the rich 
clay soils and Bromely ICA in the Southern part of the district was endowed with sandy 
soils that were fit for tobacco and cattle production. Sandy soils also featured in the 
Communal Areas and SSCFs. Similarly, the Kwekwe LSCFs were also divided into three 
ICAs namely Bembezani, Manyati-Sebakwe and Sessombi (MRT 2017: Interview). 
Munyati Sebakwe ICA with its clay loam soils and home to the bulk of the dam and 
rivers was dominated by crop and livestock mixed farming. The major crops grown by 
the LSCFs included irrigated barley and wheat along the Sebakwe River, soyabeans, 
sugarbeans and horticulture. Dairy farming was also found in this ICA, mostly on farms 
that could access irrigation water from the Sebakwe and Bembezani rivers. Cattle 
ranching was the predominant agricultural activity in the Bembezani and Sessombi ICAs 
that was characterised by loam sandy soils and low rainfall veering towards Natural 
Region IV. 
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Natural Region II where Goromonzi is located receives between 900 and 1200 
millimetres of rainfall per annum (Goromonzi District AGRITEX 2016). Irrigation 
facilities are concentrated in the Acturus ICA and seasonal rain-fed agriculture is 
characteristic of the production in the A1 farms and Communal Areas (MPEW 2017: 
Interview).  Whilst in Kwekwe, about 77 percent of the district‘s land area falls within 
Natural Region III, which receives between 500 and 750 millimetres of rain  per year, but 
spread unevenly throughout the season (Kwekwe District AGRITEX Annual Plan 2016). 
The remaining 23 percent of the land area, mostly in the Silobela Communal Areas lie in 
Natural IV characterised by sandy soils with a low annual rainfall (between 450mm and 
800mm) and recurrent severe droughts (Kwekwe District AGRITEX Annual Plan 2016). 
Irrigation activities in the district are supported mainly by the Kwekwe River, Munyati 
River and Bembezani River.  
3.5.2.2 Broad agrarian structures  
The FTLRP increased the number of farm household units in both districts significantly. 
Over 2,500 new farm households had been added to the Goromonzi agrarian structure by 
2012 on land previously owned by about 200 LSCFs as further discussed in Chapter Five 
(Chambati 2013b: 4). More FTLRP beneficiaries were however resettled in Kwekwe, 
amounting to 3,852 households resettled on 140 of the 291 LSCFs (MLRR land records 
2014). But in terms of numbers, Goromonzi accommodated more A2 farm households 
(873) than Kwekwe.  
About 89 and 91 black and white owned LSCFs were still operational by the end of 2014 
in Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts respectively. In Kwekwe, these included about 13 
conservancies (Kwekwe District AGRITEX Annual Plan 2016) that were not affected by 
the FTLRP policy (Moyo 2011c; Scoones 2015)
37
 The A2 farm households in both 
districts were mostly resettled in areas with the best agro-ecological potential, in Acturus 
and Munyati-Sebakwe ICA, whilst A1 farm households were settled in the former cattle 
ranching zones of Bromely and Sessombi ICA in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively 
(MPEW 2017: Interview; MRT 2017: Interview). Consequently, the agricultural 
employment base for both self and wage employment in both districts was radically 
transformed by the FTLRP. 
                                                 
37
 These include Sebakwe Recreational Park (government owned), Midlands Black Rhino Conservancy, 
East Range Wildlife Farm, Bemthree Wildlife Farm, Twin Springs Wildlife Farm, Chenyika Wildlife Farm, 
Mazuri Wildlife Farm, Pavlova Wildlife Farm, Murima Range, Circle G Wildlife Farm, Rolling River 
Range, among others (Agritex District Annual Plan 2016).  
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3.5.2.3 Broad district economies  
Goromonzi‘s district‘s economy revolves around agriculture in Communal Areas and 
new resettlement areas. Gold mining activities also feature in the economic activities, but 
restricted to the Northern part of the district. Acturus Mine run by Metallon Gold 
company is the largest in the district. The latter operates alongside other small mines and  
informal alluvial gold panning along the river banks. Tourism activities on game farms  in 
the LSCF sector, which resulted from land use changes motivated by foreign currency 
generation during ESAP (Moyo 2000b) have dissipated after the FTLRP. Industrial 
development in the district is limited to agro-industrial estates that include the state 
owned Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) farms. 
Most people are employed in farming, but Kwekwe‘s economic history has revolved 
around mining activities. Chrome and iron ore mining mainly take place in the Eastern 
parts of the districts within former LSCFs, while formal and informal gold mining are 
pervasisve in all wards. The mineral rich belt, the Great Dyke that cuts across Zimbabwe 
from north to south runs through the district. Overall, there were about 59 registered gold 
mines around 2013, most of them operating on a small-scale (Zibagwe Rural District 
Council undated).
38
 As such, competition for labour between agricultural production units 
and informal gold mining activities is intense in Kwekwe. Various industries largely tied 
to the mining sector also provide employment within the district.
39
 Other sources of rural 
employment include the district civil service and the two major rural service centres and 
30 business centres within the Communal Lands of Kwekwe (Zibagwe Rural District 
Council undated). Likewise, about four rural district centres in Goromonzi district namely 
Juru Growth Point, Goromonzi, Zimbiru and Parirerwa Rural Service Center providing 
retail and agro- dealership services also provide employment to the district‘s populace 
(Makura-Paradza 2010). 
The agricultural commodity base in Goromonzi is wide and incorporates most of the 
crops and livestock farmed in Zimbabwe (see Muir-Leresche 2006; World Bank 2012). 
The A1 and Communal Area households produce mostly maize and small grains to feed 
their families and sell surpluses in local and national market (Goromonzi District 
                                                 
38
 Existing formal large-scale mines include Globe & Phoenix, Gaika, Riverlea, Tiger Reef, Big Boom, 
Dendald, Techmate, Duration Gold, Mafuta 18, Indarama and Jena mines dotted around the district 
(Zibagwe Rural District Council undated). 
39
 These include the steel processing company, New Zimsteel (formerly Ziscosteel), fertiliser manufacturers 
(Sable Chemicals and Zimbabwe Fertiliser Company) and other companies supplying an array of mining 
products and services (e.g. explosive dynamites, chemicals and laboratory testing) (Zibagwe Rural District 
Council undated). 
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AGRITEX Annual Report 2016). Irrigated land uses, including wheat, seed 
multiplication, and export horticulture were observed mainly in the A2 and remaining 
LSCFs in the Northern sections of the district. Increasingly many households amongst all 
the farm classes have been drawn into tobacco growing due to the expansion of contract 
farming, but the A1 accounted for the largest share of producers (Moyo Qondisile 2017; 
Sakata 2017).  
A mix of livestock were also kept by the farmers encompassing cattle, pigs, goats and 
poultry. Commerical beef and dairy production featured prominently in the A2 and 
remaining LSCFs and the few herds in the peasant farms in the A1 and Communal Areas 
chiefly supplied draught power.  
Fewer agricultural products are farmed in Kwekwe than in Goromonzi. Maize and 
groundnuts were the key agricultural products in A1 farms and cash crops such as soya 
beans, wheat and horticulture feature in A2 farms (Section 6.4; Chambati 2017). The 
LSCFs not acquired during the FTLRP in the Munyati Sebakwe ICAs were the main 
actors in dairy production.
40
 The conservancies continue to rear wildlife and providing 
tourist facilities such as overnight accommodation, game viewing and trophy hunting and 
were largely concentrated in two wards (1 and 2) in the Eastern part of the district 
(Zibagwe Rural District Council undated). Analogous to Goromonzi, ownership sizeable 
herds of cattle chiefly characterise the large A2 land owners and  LSCFs in Kwekwe.  
In the Communal Areas, rain-fed crop farming is a key source of agricultural 
employment. Besides maize, other crop products farmed in this sector included 
groundnuts, rapoko, millet, and sorghum (Kwekwe District AGRITEX Annual Plan 
2016). Cotton production is however largely grown in the Silobela Communal Lands 
located in Natural Region IV. Irrigation facilities are limited in the Communal Areas with 
about 454 hectares developed in nine communal schemes that benefitted about 1,391 
households (about 0.07 percent of Communal Area households) when fully functional 
(Kwekwe District AGRITEX Annual Plan 2016).
41
  
On average, about 10 permanent farm workers were employed in the cattle ranching 
farms in the Sessombi ICA compared to 30 permanent workers in the Munyati-Sebakwe  
                                                 
40
 Dendairy, one of the largest dairy farms and milk processors in Zimbabwe, is located in the Kwekwe 
district. 
41
 Around March 2014, only three schemes covering about 242.8 hectares were operational (Kwekwe 
District AGRITEX Annual Plan 2014).  
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ICA prior to the FTLRP (MRT 2017: Interview). The latter interviewee also revealed that 
majority of the farm-wage labour was located in the Munyati-Sebakwe ICA, which is 
most suited for crop production.  
In contrast to LSCFs in the Mashonaland Provinces such as Goromonzi, small batches of 
workers were housed in farm compounds in Kwekwe district, especially in the cattle 
ranches averaging about 10 houses per farm that were not centrally located in one place 
but dotted around the LSCFs (NYT 2017: Interview). Moreover, multiple farm ownership 
and limited demand for large batches of farm wage labourers also meant that farm 
compounds were not found on all LSCFs (NYT 2017: Interview) as was common in 
Goromonzi district. Instead, the sharing of farm compound infrastructure located on one 
of the LSCF properties to house labour for the various LSCFs owned and operated by the 
same farmer was a common tendency. In Goromonzi district, farm compounds were 
found on almost all the LSCFs.  
3.5.2.4 Local administrative structures  
Local governance in the rural areas in Zimbabwe is bifurcated comprising traditional 
leadership and elected rural councils (Murisa 2013; 2010). Chiefs Chinhamora, Chikwaka 
and Chinyika administer the traditional affairs in Goromonzi (Chambati 2013b; Makura-
Paradza 2010; Marongwe 2009; Murisa 2009). The jurisidiction was limited to the three 
Communal Areas prior to 2000, but the chieftancies were extended into the new 
resettlement areas, albeit with limited roles in land allocation and disputes thereon that 
they superintend in the Communal Areas (Mkodzongi 2015; Murisa 2010; Moyo 2007). 
Village heads or sabhukus appointed by the chief are the face of the traditional leadership 
institution and are found on almost all former LSCFs resettled under the A1 scheme 
(Chambati 2013b). Twenty five administrative units called wards constitute the 
Goromonzi Rural District Council. An elected councillor represents in each ward in the 
council.Twelve of the wards are located in the former LSCFs while 11 are in the 
Communal and SSCFs respectively (CSO 2002b: 105). 
Kwekwe district, in contrast, has seven chieftanships, namely; Malisa, Govo, Ruya, 
Sigodo, Samamba, Gwesela and Ntabeni (Kwekwe Agritex District Annual Plan 2014). It 
is also divided into 33 wards, of which 24 of them are in Zhombe and Silobela Communal 
Areas. Returns from the recent 2018 general elections and before indicate that ZANU 
(PF) dominates the seats in the elected councils in both districts. 
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3.6 DATA COLLECTION APPROACHES AND METHODS 
The data collection approaches and methods that were applied to mobilise information to 
decipher the new agrarian labour relations are elaborated here. An overview of the 
approaches is first provided prior to the detailing of the specific quantitative and 
qualitative methods relied upon in the field. 
3.6.1 Overview of data collection approaches and methods  
Primary data to understand the transformation of agrarian labour relations following the 
FTLRP was collected through a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. Not 
only did this permit the study to triangulate of research results (Bryman 2016; Denzin 
2012; Flick, Vjenka, Wolfram, Joachim, & Gundula. 2012), but mobilised complimentary 
information that ―…yield[ed] a fuller and more complete picture of the phenomenon 
concerned [when the two methods were] brought together‖ (Erzeberger & Kelle 2003: 
461). 
This methodological triangulation approach allowed the study to collect data on some 
aspects on agrarian labour relations such as employment histories, kinship and family 
relations and cases of labour abuses that are difficult to obtain from quantitative surveys 
alone (Nyantakyi-Frimpong & Kerr 2017; Oya 2013). Quite crucially, qualitative surveys 
were important in uncovering the local conception of the different types of wage 
employment some of which can be despised locally as stated in Chapter Two and thus 
assisted in the design and wording of quantitative surveys, as well as exposing the hidden 
exchange relations that existed between households and extended family members in 
order to prevent their misclassification as self-employed labourers. Quantitative surveys 
on the other hand were critical in capturing the broad employment trends including the 
scales of wage and family labour utilisation and their relationships with other social and 
economic resources. Moreover, quantitative surveys targeted households and information 
was elicited from their representatives and/or household heads, which were usually men, 
the qualitative surveys purposively selected women to elucidate their perspectives that 
tend to be concealed in the research process (Adams 1991; Munyuki-Hungwe 2011; 
Makura-Paradza 2010).  
The quantitative method involved questionnaire surveys of farm households and farm 
workers, and the qualitative methods entailed key informant interviews and direct 
physical observations (Table 3.2).  
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Table 3.2: Overview of data collection approaches and sources of information 
Data collection approaches Application of instruments on sources of information 







Quantitative     
Household questionnaire surveys √ X X X 
Farm worker questionnaire surveys X √ X X 
Qualitative      
Key informant interviews X X √ X 
Observations √ √ √ √ 
Secondary data collection √ √ √ √ 
key √=yes X=no  
3.6.2 Data collection phases  
A two phased approach was adopted to collect the empirical data. Key informant 
interviews done with government officials at the national and district levels and other 
local leaders formed the initial phase. These interviews mobilised information to 
understand more broadly the district case studies selected, including their geographies, 
local economies, demographic patterns, overview of the labour utilisation trends, land 
resettlement patterns and agricultural production patterns. The process entailed visiting 
the districts to collect this information from government officials and inform them of the 
intended study. Data collected during phase also enabled the definition of the study 
samples, as well as assisting in the refinement of the wording used in the draft survey 
questionnaires to accommodate the local perceptions of wage labour as noted above.  
During this phase, the study also recruited the field workers from within the district to 
assist the administration of the questionnaire surveys. Using the contacts gained while 
being part of the AIAS team that conducted surveys in the two districts in 2005 and other 
follow up research, 15 field workers (five in Goromonzi and ten in Kwekwe) with 
accumulated experience in administering questionnaire interviews were recruited. The 
field workers were provided detailed training on the questionnaire surveys by the 
researcher over a period of three days, which also included aspects on the ethical 
principles that guided the study such as the process of seeking informed consent from the 
prospective study participants (Section 3.9). Before they started work, the field workers 
were asked to sign confidentiality agreements that bound them not disclose the 
information they collected to anybody else except the researcher. After the training, a pre-
test of the questionnaire survey was organised to assess the research instrument and 
comprehension of the field workers of the data collection process, as well as the ethical 
principles under the supervision of the researcher. One day follow up training was 
organised to correct challenges observed. This process also enabled the researcher to 
improve the design, particularly the sequencing and clarity of the questions, how the 
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questions should be asked in the interviews and restructure biased questions as 
recommended by Alreck and Settle (2004). Additionally, the pre-test provided an idea of 
the time required to complete the administration of the questionnaires and the time for 
undertaking the main field work was allocated accordingly.  
The main field work in the study districts, through the survey questionnaire was launched 
in the second phase. The prospective study participants were selected according to the 
sampling procedures outlined in Section 3.5. The farm household survey was undertaken 
first before the study transitioned to the farm labour survey to enable the triangulation of 
information provided by the latter. Since researchers are often interested in confirming a 
hypothesis utilising information they obtain from participants, and this can affect they 
way the collect data from study participants (Sarniak 2015). The latter notes that this 
could involve influencing participants to answer in a particular way in order to mobilise 
information which they consider reliable and relevant for proving their hypothesis, while 
dismissing other evidence provided by participants. To avoid the researcher‘s bias, the 
field workers trained by the researcher conducted the questionnaire surveys. To guarantee 
quality of the data collected, the questionnaires administered by the field workers were 
assessed daily to detect problems of recording information, missing data and outliers 
(Beaman & Dillon 2012; Sue & Ritter 2012). While the survey data was being collected, 
the researcher focused on implementing the additional key informant interviews and the 
structured observations. 
3.6.3 Quantitative surveys  
Since the data required to investigate the research questions required establishing the 
―behaviours‖ and ―experiences‖ of farm households and farm labourers in organisation 
and mobilisation of agrarian labour (Neuman 2006: 273-4; Pennings, Keman & 
Kleinnienhuis 2006), the questionnaire was choosen as a tool to collect information. 
Moreover, this data is largely measured through quantitative indicators (e.g. number of 
workers hired in, wages, farm sizes, land areas cropped, frequency of labour recruitment), 
entailing many variables that are best collected through questionnaires (Neuman 2006). 
The questionnaires utilised in this study were adapted from the instruments applied by the 
African Institute for Agrarian Studies (AIAS) in the surveys in 2005 and the researchers 
was granted permission for the same (Annex 3.1). The questionnaires collected data, not 
only about the respondents, but also the labour activities of the individual members of 
their households. This elucidated the organisation of labour within households and their 
participation in (farm) labour markets. Differences between farm households and farm 
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labourers in the utilisation of the wage and family labour in relation to the land use and 
agricultural production patterns were best assessed by questionnaire surveys, which 
collected standardised data from respondents. According to Chambers (2008), one of the 
key limitation of questionnaires relates to the inclusion of concepts by researchers,  which 
sometimes do not necessarily identify with participants who are in turn disempowered to 
articulate their experiences in the own terms. In this scholar‘s view, largely the 
researchers themselves drive the interpretation of the reality. This deficiency was 
addressed by the inclusion of qualitative methods to supplement the data from 
quantitative survey. Additionally, all the questions in the surveys that were pre-coded 
provided an option for the study participants to provide answers, which they consider 
important, thus minimising researcher‘s bias.  
The questionnaire surveys were administered through face-to-face interviews with the 
farm household heads or representatives knowledgeable about the household in their 
absence, and farm labourers themselves. This followed a well-established research 
practice to ask an individual to speak on behalf of the household, when the study unit is 
not the individual (Pennings et al. 2006). However during the pre-testing of the 
questionnaires a common challenge in quantitative surveys (Jha 1996; Nachmias & 
Nachmias 1992) of  recalling some historical data such as agricultural production outputs 
and labour utilisation from past seasons was exposed. This was remedied by asking other 
adult household members present to assist in the filling of these data gaps. The face-to-
face administration of the interviews ensured all questionnaires administered were 
collected by the researcher since the field workers retained them after the interviews and 
provided opportunities to clarify the questions to the respondents. 
3.6.3.1 Farm household questionnaire surveys 
The quantitative survey for the farm households entailed a structured questionnaire 
administered by the trained field workers in A1 and A2 resettlement sectors and 
Communal Areas in Goromonzi and Kwekwe. The questionnaires elicited data on the 
social and economic character of farm households and their individual members (family 
size, gender, kinship, age, current social status, migration and employment patterns) 
(Annex 3.2). It took about one and half hours to administer the questionnaire and to avoid 
inconveniencing the farmers, appointments were set up for the interviews. One of the 
challenges in the implementation of the questionnaire surveys related to the distances that 
the field workers had to traverse from one household to the next, especially in the A2 
sector. The study therefore had to incur unanticipated costs in bus fares for the field 
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workers to ensure time was not consumed by walking between the households. The fears 
by some of the targeted households that the survey was related to a planned government 
land audit were allayed by detailed explanations of the purpose of the survey and 
provision of the letters from the authorities granting permission for the study to be 
undertaken. To ensure accuracy in the data collected and efficiency of the research 
process, each field worker was assigned to do a maximum of three questionnaires per day 
as the pre-test revealed that fatigue crept in after the third interview and mistakes were 
observed in entry of responses from the study participants thereafter. 
3.6.3.2 Farm labourers questionnaire surveys  
New and former farm workers responded to farm labourer questionnaire survey also 
administered by the trained field workers. The labour survey examined the participation 
of farm workers and their families in the farm and non-farm sources of rural employment 
(Annex 3.3). The issues covered included their socio-economic character of their 
households, employment histories, land access, land tenure security, forms of 
employment and conditions and other survival strategies Similar data on labour 
conditions was also triangulated with the information obtained from the farm households. 
The interviews with farm labourers were scheduled after their working hours and off days 
to avoid conflicts with their income earning opportunities. Visits were made to the farm 
compound residencies to introduce the study and set up appointments with the workers. 
3.6.4 Qualitative surveys 
A qualitative survey was developed to triangulate the results of the quantitative surveys  
as enunciated by Neuman (2006) and White (2002), as well as collect complimentary 
information on the forms of labour, kinship relations within families and its influences on 
labour allocations and mobilisation of farm wage labour, intra-household labour relations, 
labour conflicts and agency of farm labourers. The techniques that were employed to 
collect qualitative information are elaborated below. 
3.6.4.1 Key informant interviews  
Key informants are actors who possess information about the study units that can be 
tapped to validate findings from the subjects and triangulate data (Neuman 2006). They 
not only provide qualitative information on their perspectives on familiar aspects and 
experiences on the study units, but also quantitative information. These included the 
recognised ―knowledge bearers‖ within the state bureaucracy and non-state officials that 
are also differentiated by the positions they occupy and their spatial location at the 
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national or local level. Beyond generating additional information to expose the new 
agrarian labour relations, the key informant interviews allowed the research to verify the 
data sourced from the farmers and farm labourers. In total, 22 key informant interviews 
were conducted by the research (Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3: Summary of key informant interviews conducted 
Designation of key 
informant  
Goromonzi Kwekwe National Total 
State officials M F M F M F  
MLRR 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
MPSLSW 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
MAEMI 2 0 1 1 0 0 4 
Non-state officials        
Trade unions 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Former farm workers 2 1 2 2 0 0 7 
NGOs 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 
War veterans 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Total 4 1 4 3 9 1 22 
 
State officials that included national representatives of the Ministries of Lands and Rural 
Resettlement, Local Government, Agriculture and Rural Development and Labour and 
Social Welfare were approached during the exploratory field research phase. Local level 
key informants were composed of districts heads of Government (District Administrator, 
Extension Officers, and Lands Officers). Further to the background data provided by 
these informants in the initial phase of the data collection, the other matters pursued 
during the main field work included the agricultural production patterns, labour 
utilisation, input and output markets, incidences of farm labour disputes and 
implementation of existing policies on labour (wages, working conditions, residency and 
other social services), agriculture, economic and social protection in the new farms.  
It was very difficult to secure appointments with state officials and when they were set up 
after repeated attempts, several officials requested postponements due to their ―busy 
schedules‖. Delays were also experienced as officials sought clearance to speak to the 
researcher from the head of the ministries in addition to the provision of the letters of 
research permission. At the district level, the main field work also coincided with the 
distribution of input assistance to farmers under the Presidential Inputs and Command 
Agriculture schemes and repeated efforts bore fruit in securing appointments. These 
challenges were not experienced with the other group of key informants.  
Non-state category key informants included national and local trade unions and farm 
worker NGO officials. Trade union representatives provided information on the status of 
the collective worker organisations, mobilisation of farm labourers into their membership 
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and promotion of collective action as well as the constraints they faced in delivering their 
mandate. With farm worker NGOs, discussions focused on the various programmes they 
were running in newly redistributed areas and their effects on livelihoods of farm 
labourers. Liberation war veterans‘ leaders and political party representatives were 
interviewed on the mobilisation for land during the early 2000‘s, political organisation 
and conflicts in the countryside and the extent to which farm labourers were involved in 
these processes.  
The key informant interviews with former farm workers captured the transition of their 
employment experiences and livelihoods of former farm workers from the LSCFs to the 
new farming units. The issues covered included the quality of labour, working conditions, 
individual and collective action undertaken, practices of labour management, residential 
labour tenancy and their material conditions in the LSCFs and the changes they have 
experienced since 2000. The respondents in this group were former senior permanent 
workers (usually men), middle level workers (machine operators, supervisors, tractor 
drivers), women labourers and general hands. This served to expose the diverse effects of 
the FTLRP on farm workers from different socio-economic backgrounds, and allowed 
voices of the weak such female farm labourers to be heard.  
Information from key informants was solicited through the use semi-structured interview 
guides  and the questions focused on their areas of familiarity and experience with the 
study units. Again face-to-face interviews were relied upon for this process and voice 
recorders were used to capture the interviews after the informants had consented to this.  
3.6.4.2 Direct physical observations 
Direct physical observation of various phenomena being studied provides for a strong 
validity (Bryman 2016). The major weakness of the observation method relates to its 
difficulty to replicate (Bryman 2016). Various approaches to observation include 
structured, non-interactive, unstructured observation of activities, conversations and other 
forms of communication (Mwanje 2001b). Structured observation was employed to target 
specific issues of interest to the research, which included land utilisation patterns of 
households, working conditions of agrarian labourers (e.g. hours of work, methods used 
in accomplishing tasks, tools and machinery at the disposal of workers), participation of 
individual household members in farm self-employment and recruitment of farm labour 
in compounds and at different rural centres.  
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Transect walks, which entail walking along planned routes within the study areas, were 
deployed to collect information on observable phenomenon that was of interest to the 
study (de Zeeuw & Wilbers 2004). Checklists were developed to guide the transect walks, 
while routes were planned with the assistance of the local extension officers to ensure 
adequate coverage of issues of interest. The information collected from the transect walks 
was recorded in transect diagrams that indicated the places visited in the columns and the 
issues of interest in the row (e.g. land use patterns, infrastructure use and access, sources 
of employment for labourers resident in the compounds) and the details of observations in 
each place were recorded in the cells (de Zeeuw & Wilbers 2004). Field notes were 
recorded in a diary kept by the researcher. Daily reflections on the observations were 
done to identify issues to follow up in the coming days. 
3.6.5 Sampling approaches and representativity 
Selection of the respondents for the quantitative and qualitative surveys was done through 
the application of a combination of probability and non-probability sampling techniques 
respectively. For the qualitative survey, ―the relevance to the research topic rather than 
representativeness‖ (Flick 1998: 41) motivated the selection of respondents. Purposive 
and snowball sampling techniques were thus adopted to identify the key informants and 
the initial targets were used to refer the researcher to other informants.  
The respondents for the farm households‘ survey in the FTLRP areas were selected 
through stratified random sampling techniques. The stratified random sampling technique 
involves the independent selection of samples within the identified stratas that are  
subgroups of the survey population and do not overlap (Mwanje & Gotu 2001). 
Stratification  enables adequate sample sizes for each of the subgroups the research 
intends to examine; namely, the A1 and A2 farm households to be included in the study. 
Stratified random sampling allows for variation in the population to be also shown in the 
selected sample and allows for comparisons between the different strata (Mwanje & Gotu 
2001). 
In each district, the original LSCFs were stratified according to the type of resettlement 
model to form the primary sampling units. Lists of A1 and A2 land beneficiaries, which 
were sourced and used with the permission of the MLRR, acted as the universal sampling 
frame that were used to draw the farm household sample. The overall universal sampling 
frame was composed of 361 original LSCFs that had been resettled under A1 (100 
LSCFs) and A2 (261 LSCFs) schemes that were occupied by 5,259 A1 and 1,124 A2 
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farm households (Table 3.4). Disaggregated by district, the universal sampling frame in 
Goromonzi composed of 182 original LSCFs that were occupied by 1,673 A1 and 850 A2 
farm households, whilst in Kwekwe, 179 original LSCFs were home to 3,586 A1 and 274 
A2 farm households (Table 3.4). 











Household units Total household 
units 
A1 A2 A1 A2 
Goromonzi 39 143 182 1,673 850 2,523 
Kwekwe 61 118 179 3,586 274 3,860 
Total 100 261 361 5,259 1,124 6,383 
Source: Compiled by author from MLRR excel sheets 
The minimum sample sizes were then determined using an internet based sample size 
calculating software, RAOSOF
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 to meet a margin of error of 10 percent and 95 percent 
confidence interval for each strata namely, the A1 and A2 farm households in each 
district (Table 3.5). Initially, the study targeted a margin of error of 5 percent but it was 
realised the minimum sample sizes required were beyond the scope of the budget 
available for the research. The lists of A1 and A2 farm households were entered into the 
statistical software, STATA and a random number generator was applied to select the 
respondents in each of the resettlement schemes in the two districts. The random number 
generator was instructed to select an additional 30 households in each settlement scheme, 
as replacements for households to cater for those that would not be located in the field. 
These sample sizes targeted were adequate for statistical procedures which require at least 
30 observations in each of the strata studied to allow for comparisons between the A1 and 
A2 farm households within and across districts and constitute at least five percent of the 
sample population (Mwanjie & Gottu 2001). Overall, a total of 407 households were 
eventually sampled from the newly resettled households in Goromonzi and Kwekwe 
respectively. 
Table 3.5: Targeted A1 and A2 farm household units sample frame  
District 





A1 A2 Total A1 A2 Total A1 A2 Total 
Goromonzi 1,673 850 2,523 91 87 178 76 74 150 
Kwekwe 3,586 274 3,860 94 72 166 194 63 257 
Total 2,195 575 2,770 185 159 344 270 137 407 
Source: Compiled by author 




** α = 0.05 (at 95% confidence level) 
The variation in the targeted sample sizes and the actual samples achieved mainly related 
to the challenges encountered with the lists of land beneficiaries provided by the MLRR 
in all the schemes in Goromonzi and in the A2 scheme in Kwekwe. The lists were not up 
to date and some of the prospective participants randomly selected in the samples could 
not be located since they were no longer on their farms or were fully resident at homes in 
the urban areas. Consequently, the actual number of households sampled in the newly 
redistributed areas was lower than the targets. Valuable time and resources were thus lost 
as the field workers travelled to the farms of the selected participants and failed to find 
them. In Kwekwe, the study managed to oversample the A1 than the ones initially 
targeted as more field workers could be recruited in this district as the researcher 
managed to negotiate a cheaper wage rate for the administration of the questionnaire 
surveys and the list of beneficiaries for this group of farmers was relatively up to date. 
In the Communal Areas, the farm households were randomly selected from one ward 
closest to the former LSCFs that was purposively selected in order to capture the dynamic 
labour interactions between the two areas. The households located in each of these wards 
constituted the primary sampling frame (Table 3.6). The minimum sample sizes were 
determined using similar procedures used for the newly resettled households to meet a 
margin of error of 10 percent and a 95 percent confidence interval in both Goromonzi and 
Kwekwe districts (Table 3.6). The random number generator in the statistical package, 
STATA was then deployed to randomly select respondents from lists of Communal Area 
farm households in the two districts that were obtained from the AGRITEX . A total of 
163 Communal Area households were sampled during the research. The actual sampled 
households were slightly below the targeted samples due to the failure to locate some of 
the selected prospective participants. 
Table 3.6: Communal Area universal sampling frame and actual samples at ward 
level 
District 
Total no. of 





Goromonzi 768 86 78 
Kwekwe 1,064 89 85 
Total 1,832 175 163 
Source: Compiled by author from AGRITEX excel sheets 
* α = 0.05 (at 95% confidence level) 
 
When the population parameters are largely unknown and it is difficult to derive sampling 
units with a reasonable degree of accuracy, purposive sampling can be applied to select 
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respondents (Mwanji & Gottu 2001; Neuman 2006). After the FTLRP, there has been a 
movement in and out of the former LSCF by the category of farm workers, and their 
population figures could not be established in the absence of large-scale surveys 
conducted by ZIMSTAT, which disaggregate data by districts.
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 The study targeted to 
purposively sample at least 200 new and former farm worker respondents in each district 
to capture the diverse forms of work amongst the full and part-time workers in same 
former LSCFs where the new farm households were sampled. Ultimately, 199 and 208 
farm workers were interviewed in Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts respectively.  
3.7 ANALYTICAL APPROACHES 
This section discusses the data analysis approaches that were used by the study, 
beginning first with the quantitative methods followed by the qualitative techniques. 
3.7.1 Quantitative data analysis 
After the completion of the field work, four data entry clerks were recruited to assist in 
entering the information from questionnaire surveys. Again, the contacts provided by 
AIAS on the data entry clerks that had assisted them were useful. Data entry training in 
the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) computer software was done in two 
days and the clerks were assessed on their understanding of the procedures. Similar to the 
field workers, the data entry clerks were asked to sign confidentiality agreements for non-
disclosure of information accessed during their duties. The entries recorded by the clerks 
were checked to make sure all the data had been correctly processed to ensure the quality 
of the information used to make sense of the new agrarian labour relations.  
Data from the farm household and farm labourer questionnaire surveys was then analysed 
in SPSS by the researcher using the descriptive statistics (means, median, frequency 
distributions), which were generated on the key agrarian labour variables (forms of labour 
utilised, quality of labour, monthly wages, in-kind payments, participation in non-farm 
rural labour and the agency of labour. Cross tabulations were also computed to measure 
the association between labour utilisation and other variables such as landholdings and 
total land areas cultivated. As argued by Greenhoot (2005: 5), descriptive analysis ―is 
essential in understanding the meaning of data...[It] enables important or unexpected 
patterns [to be brought out]....[Descriptive analysis] is as critical for drawing scientific 
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 This problem has also been faced by other researchers studying rural labour outcomes after the FTLRP 
(see Scoones et al. 2010). 
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conclusions as the formal inferential phase...‖. Frequency distribution tables and graphs 
are utilised to illustrate the results. 
Various statistical significance tests, including the Pearson Chi-Square tests, were applied 
to measure the association between labour utilisation within and across the farm 
households, as well as other variables such as gender of farm owner, landholdings and 
land areas cultivated. The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to test statistical 




Two Step Cluster analysis in SPSS was utilised to assess the extent the farm households 
were differentiated on the basis of their labour utilisation patterns. Cluster analysis is a 
statistical tool relied upon to separate the households into a few distinct homogenous 
groups or clusters, which share common socio-economic characteristics (Everitt, Landau, 
Leese & Stahl 2011). The households classified in a particular group should be relatively 
similar to others in its group and should be different from the other households in the 
other clusters (Everitt et al. 2011). Deciding what particular variables to include in the 
classification procedure (Crossa, Bellon & Franco 2002; Moyo et al. 2009) is one of the 
challenges confronting researchers. Since the study sought to explore the differentiation 
of farm households on the basis of labour utilisation, this problem did not largely affect 
the research. Both categorical and continuous variable that indicate the extent of reliance 
of hired in labour on their farming units were thus chosen to classify the households 
drawing from Patnaik (1996), including whether households hire in labour; whether 
households used family labour; whether households hire out farm labour to others; and 
number of labour days in each of these categorical variables.  
The emerging groups of farm households from the cluster analysis were then matched to 
the schematic of peasant classes developed by Patnaik (1996: 236-7; Table 3.7) based on 
the displayed empirical character of the extent to which they relied on the exploitation of 
the labour others. The classes were then defined according to Patnaik‘s schematic. 
Included within the classes conceived by Patnaik (1996) are those primarily exploiting 
others; primarily self-employed and those primarily exploited by others (Table 3.6; see 
also Section 2.4.2). Specifically, those primarily exploiting the labour of others can be 
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 The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test is a general statistical technique that can be applied to test 
whether there is a significant difference in the means of at least two groups assuming that the sample is 
from a normally distributed population (Mwanje & Gota 2001: 123). An overall conclusion about the 
means of a certain population under investigation can then be made.  
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distinguished into the landlords/ capitalist farms who rely exclusively on hired in manual 
labour of others to work on their holdings and the rich peasants who hired in more labour 
than the self-employment invested by family workers. Middle and small peasants 
encompass those who primarily exploit self-employment. Respectively, they use more 
self-employment than hired in labour and; do not hire in labour of others and hire-out 
small amounts of labour that is less than their self-employment. The primary labour 
sellers group included poor peasants whose amount of labour hired out to others is more 
than self-employment, whilst landless labourers, due to the absence of means of 
production, sold only their labour to others.  
Table 3.7: Definition of peasant classes according to labour utilisation 





Use only hired labour 




3. Middle peasant Limited use of hired labour and most 
labour provided by the family 
4. Small peasant Do not hire labour. Use only family 
labour and hire our their labour. 
Primarily exploited 
by others 
5. Poor peasant  Hire out most of their labour and use of 




No use of family labour. Only hire out 
their labour to other farming units.  
Source: Adapted from Patnaik (1996: 236-7) 
The farm household groups generated from the cluster analysis were then cross tabulated 
with various variables (e.g. landholding sizes, land areas cropped, gender of farm 
household head, value of crops and livestock produced, input utilisation, ownership of 
assets and access to capital and marketed volumes of outputs and formal employment 
status) to examine their influences on labour utilisation and differentiation amongst farm 
households. Pearson Chi-Square and comparisons of means tests were depended upon to 
test the statistical significance of relationships between labour utilisation and the variables 
noted above. 
3.7.2 Qualitative data analysis 
Two experienced transcribers were hired to process the recorded interviews and 
confidentiality agreements also applied. Thematic analysis was adopted to analyse 
qualitative data from the key informant, adopting a phased approach as defined by 
Kuckartz (2014). Initially, the transcripts from the recorded interviews were read in order 
to locate interesting text recurring across the interviews with a view of defining additional 
main thematic categories and sub-themes or topics. The core thematic categories were 
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derived from the research questions, to include the forms of labour, participation non-
farm rural labour activities, and quality of labour and agency of labour. Following this, 
the text passages were then coded or assigned to the relevant main thematic categories. A 
second round of coding then grouped the coded text under the sub-themes. The main 
themes and sub-themes constituted the analytical categories (Guest, MacQueen & Namey 
2012; Kuckartz 2014). To provide credibility to the qualitative research and eliminate 
researcher‘s bias as suggested by Shenton (2004), the study as much as possible used 
direct quotations from the interviews to present the perceptions of the participants in the 
discussion of the results and thus permit the readers to link the interpretation of the data 
to what was exactly said by the interviewees.  
The conditions of farm work in the newly redistributed was thoroughly detailed from the 
perceptions and experiences of the agrarian labourers themselves, including their 
interpretation of these conditions. Narrative verbatim was used to illuminate the labour 
management practices, types of employment contracts, working hours, wage and benefits, 
strategies used by employers to control labour and the response of labour to their poor 
socio-economic conditions.  
3.8 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE RESEARCH  
Validity and reliability of research findings are central tenets of the research process and 
are viewed differently in quantitative and qualitative research (Newman 2006; Golafshani 
2003; Mwanje 2001b). Reliability generally refers to possibilities for the research results 
or observations to be repeated or replicated under similar conditions (Golafshani 2003: 
598-99) Reliability enables the acceptance of research findings as transcending one 
researcher‘s own opinion or observations (Bachiochi & Weiner 2004; online version). 
Validity, on the other hand, implies the extent to which the research results represent the 
―actual reality‖ (Neocosmos 2004: 188-9) or ―how truthful the results are‖ (Golafshani 
2003: 599). Data and methodological triangulation were made use to safeguard the 
validity and reliability of the research findings in this study. Quantitative survey 
information was cross checked with data gathered from the qualitative surveys, and 
comparisons were also made between similar data on wage labour collected from farm 
households and farm labourers. Indeed, it is argued that the validity of the findings is 
enhanced if it can be tested by different types of quantitative and qualitative data than 
those reliant on data from one single method (Bachiochi & Weiner 2004).  
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The provision of ―untruthful responses‖ by respondents is a common problem in 
household surveys resulting in biased results (Jha 1996; Munyuki-Hungwe 2011). As 
such, the use of different methods and  sources of data sources helped in uncovering and 
clearing some of the ―untruths‖. For instance, while interviewing LSCFs in the late 
1990s, Rutherford (2001a) observed their over-exaggeration of the conditions of 
employment offered to farm workers during the interviews, which were in turn contested 
in separate interviews with the workers. Engagement in the districts, initially as part of 
the AIAS survey research team since 2005/06 and follow up studies entailing back and 
forth travel to the study districts permitted the researcher to deploy a priori knowledge on 
the transition of various phenomena to probe various responses provided during the field 
research. Problems of recall of time series data (e.g. output harvested in the past seasons, 
quantities of output sold, and number of part-time labourers hired during different 
months) associated with questionnaire surveys (Jha 1996; Nachmias & Nachmias 1992) 
that lead to biases in survey responses were resolved by probing and questioning other 
household members (see section 3.7.2).  
The reliability of key variables assessed was ensured by the adoption of ―clear‖ 
theoretical definitions that have been used to measure different types of agrarian labour in 
SSA by other scholars as suggested by Neuman (2006). This adoption of measures that 
other researchers have utilised to assess the variables, also known as the replication 
strategy (Neuman 2006), ensured the reliability of key variables measured by the study 
namely self-employment, wage employment and non-farm wage employment which were 
drawn from key studies on labour (e.g. Jha 2016; Oya & Pontara 2015; ILO 2015a; 
2015b; Standing 2006). The applicability of these measures/definitions in the local 
Zimbabwean context were examined by pre-testing the questionnaires before the 
implementation of the final household surveys, testing for clarity and level of 
appreciation of the questions by the respondents as Neuman (2006) recommends.  
Four approaches were utilised to check the validity of research, namely construct, internal 
and external validity (Neuman 2006: 193). Construct validity entailed ensuring that the 
measure of the different types of employment captured all aspects in the conceptual 
definitions adopted by the study. Knowledgeable experts in agrarian labour research were 
consulted to verify the adequacy of the measures and/or indicators of the key variables 
utilised. Construct validity was also achieved by the use of multiple sources data on 
agrarian labour to include farm households, farm labourers and key informants (Yin 
2003).  
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Internal validity was established by the identification of casual relationships between 
labour utilisation and various variables identified in the literature that influence the latter 
to include landholdings area, asset endowments, types of crops and livestock produced, 
sale of production (cropped areas, numbers of livestock) and incomes realised (see Emory 
& Cooper 1991; McDaniel & Gates 1991; Miles & Huberman 1994).  
External validity assesses the replicability of the research findings outside of the research 
case studies or generalisability (Christie, Row, Perry & Chonard 2000: 18). The findings 
from the two district case studies examined were compared in order to develop analytic 
generalisations aiming at achieving external validity. Furthermore, the findings from the 
study were corroborated with other key studies on the FTLRP (e.g. Moyo et al. 2009; 
Scoones et al. 2010; Matondi 2012) following the recommendation that ―….researchers 
can determine validity by asking a series of questions and…look for answers in the 
research of others‖ (Golafshani 2003: 599). 
Four criterion were employed to preserve the reliability and validity of qualitative data 
namely; transferability, dependability, conformability and credibility (Guest et al. 2012; 
Suter 2012). Transferability implies that findings can be generalised across different 
contexts. The ―thick descriptions‖ of dynamic socio-economic conditions at both the 
national and local level present during the research  provide the context to enhance the 
transferability of the research (Chapter Five). Indeed, thick descriptions are argued to 
enhance the transferability of qualitative research as they elucidate ―...the actual situations 
that have been investigated and, to an extent, the context that surround them‖ (Shenton 
2004: 69) for other researchers to pursue similar research in different contexts. 
Detailed description of the research process from the design stage to the actual 
implementation in the field has been articulated in this Chapter to enable other scholars 
who wish to replicate the study, including the data collection plans and what was 
eventually achieved in practice. This availed an ―audit trail‖ that can be used for 
verification by other researchers (Guest et al. 2012). Dependability of research, which is 
concerned with the possibilities of other scholars obtaining similar results if the methods 
are applied on the same study units (Guest et al. 2012; Suiter  2012) was thus addressed  
The credibility of the research was bolstered by the use of multiple data sources to 
validate each other. Follow up probes were organised with key informants to clarify 
differences in data provided during the qualitative interviews. At the end of the 
interviews, they were also asked to verify what they would have said in order to rectify 
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any misunderstandings between the researcher and the informants (Shenton 2004). Again, 
prior knowledge gained from involvement in previous studies done by AIAS was useful 
in these clarification processes. After the data analysis, meetings were arranged with 
study participants in the two districts to validate the conclusions reached (Guest et al. 
2012). Direct quotations from the interviews were relied upon in the text of the thesis so 
as avail a link to the interpretations of the data and what the study participants said in 
their own words (Morse & Maddox 2014). Furthermore, debriefing with peers engaged in 
similar research and consultation with agrarian labour experts and the academic 
supervisors to review the findings and the data interpretation enhanced the research 
credibility. 
The researcher‘s bias is a major concern in qualitative research and requires to be 
controlled in favour of objectivity, also referred to as conformability (Suter 2012). 
Triangulation of the qualitative with the quantitative data, as well as reference to other 
studies with similar findings, was thus depended upon to reinforce the study‘s 
conformability (Golfashani 2003). 
3.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Research studies involving human beings as subjects of enquiry or study units raises 
ethical issues with respect to their rights (McGinn 2015). Ethics should be considered in 
all the stages of the research, including in the selection of respondents, data collection, 
processing and interpreting data, and dissemination of the survey results (McNabb 2014). 
Researchers must be cognisant of the ―ethical implications and societal consequences of 
the research they may seek to design and implement [in order] to uphold the wellbeing, 
health values or dignity of the targeted communities‖ (Mwanje 2001b: 62). Before 
embarking on the data collection, the researcher applied and was given ethical clearance 
by the university (Annex 1.1). The study therefore adhered to ethical principles 
throughout the  research from the field work to the writing of the thesis in accordance 
with university‘s Policy on Copyright Infringement and Plagiarism.
45
 The principles of 
non-compulsion of respondents to participate in the study, protection of their privacy, 
confidentiality and ensuring that no physical or mental harm arises from their 
participation were strictly followed during the conducting of the research (McNabb 2014; 
Muzvidziwa 2006).  
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 Available at 
https://www.unisa.ac.za/static/corporate_web/Content/Apply%20for%20admission/Documents/Policy_cop
yright_infringement_plagiarism_16November2005.pdf [Accessed on 12 April 2016]. 
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Approval to undertake the research was solicited from different levels of ―gatekeepers‖ 
who are endowed ―with the formal or informal authority to control access to a site‖ 
(Neuman 2006: 387-388). The researcher was granted permission in writing by the 
relevant government ministries at the national and local level, which encompassed 
MLRR, MAEMI and Ministry of Local Government & Rural Development (MLGRD) to 
conduct the study, which was used to seek approval from local gatekeepers at the district 
level (Annex 1.2). These letters of authority were very helpful in accessing the field sites 
and the study participants and were carried on the person of the researcher and the field 
workers during the entire field work period. 
The respondents selected for both the quantitative and qualitative survey were given 
detailed explanations of the purpose and outcome of the study before they were requested 
to provide written informed consent of their involvement in the study. Respondents were 
made aware that their involvement in the study was voluntary and were free to withdraw 
at any point if they wished. Due effort was made to explain the independence of the study 
from planned government land audit that beneficiaries of land reform fear will repossess 
―unproductive‖ land (MRT 2017: Interview; MPEW 2017: Interview). To minimise 
inconveniences to the participants in their daily routines, appointments were set for 
interviews. 
Throughout this study, the names of the respondents and farm names are protected 
through the use of pseudonyms. However, in some cases original names of the key 
informants that granted their consent for their names to be published are used. These 
included leaders of trade unions and NGOs and some public officials.  
Furthermore, to guarantee the confidentiality, the questionnaire surveys were 
administered at private places selected by the participants where nobody else could hear 
their responses besides the researcher and field workers, usually at their houses. The 
questionnaire did also not collect personal identification information. Confidentiality 
agreements were signed with the field workers and data entry clerks recruited to assist in 
the data collection and processing respectively not to disclose the information accessed 
during the course of their duties to anyone except the researcher. The aggregation of 
responses and presentation of the survey data in tables and charts further protected the 
confidentiality of the study participants.  
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3.10 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has reviewed the methodological approaches and data gathering tools that 
were applied to answer the study‘s research questions. It used an approach of 
understanding agrarian labour relations through a multi-layered analysis cascading from 
the national/macro-level, district level to micro-level (farm households and labourers).  
Mixed methods of data collection were chosen for their capability to provide a more 
complete picture of the new agrarian labour relations. The multiple data sources relied 
upon allowed the validation and verification of information mobilised during the 
research. An overview of the study areas and analytical approaches employed for the data 
analysis were also discussed, alongside the strategies adopted to secure the validity and 






EVOLUTION OF AGRARIAN LABOUR RELATIONS IN ZIMBABWE 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
The previous chapter outlined the research design and methodology adopted by the study 
to answer the research questions posed in Chapter One. This chapter re-examines existing 
literature in order to understand the evolution of agrarian labour relations relative to the 
macro-level changes in land access, land utilisation patterns, economic policies, labour 
laws and various extra-economic measures from 1890 to 1999. Such an assessment 
provided a context upon which the research evaluated the changes arising from the 
extensive land redistribution under the FTLRP. Since the historical conditions and socio-
economic policies were changing both nationally and internationally, in relation to the 
political mode of rule and economic frameworks, a broad periodisation approach since 
1890 is used to analyse the agrarian labour relations (Pamer 1977; Phimister 1986; 
Rukuni 1994; Moyo 2005; Paton 1995) as stated earlier (section 3.3). 
These studies broadly divide the pre-1965 period into two phases; namely, Company Rule 
and Self-Government. The first phase, 1890 to 1923, the British South Africa Company 
(BSAC) established colonial rule in (Southern) Rhodesia, and the second phase, 1924 to 
1965, was the period when Rhodesia was granted self governance by Britian. The post-
1965 period, which followed the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from 
Britain by the Rhodesian Settlers (1965-1979), was characterised by economic 
diversification and import substitution programmes to countervail sanctions imposed by 
the international community. This was followed by the Independence decade (1980 to 
1990), which re-oriented the economic, social and political institutions to serve the 
previously marginalised African population. Next was the neoliberal reforms period 
(1991 to 1996/97) implemented through ESAP at the behest of the International Monetary 
Fund [IMF] and World Bank. This fourth period involved the  state withdrawal from the 
markets and allowing the latter to determine prices on the basis of demand and supply.  
Moyo (2003; 2005; 2013) has also periodised the post independence period based on the 
mode of land redistribution into two broad phases of market driven land reform between 
1980 and 1996 and state driven land redistribution from 1997 onwards. The fifth phase, 
characterised by extenstive land redistribution, alongside the economic turbulence from 
2000, which led to the rapid transformation of agrarian labour relations is detailed in 
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Chapter Five. This chapter argues that the hegemony of the white Settlers in agricultural 
land control between 1890 and 1999 was instrumental in shaping the evolution of 
agrarian labour relations. It shows how the gradual colonial dispossession of land from 
the African peasants alongside other extra-economic measures subordinated blacks to the 
(farm) labour markets. But peasant farming on small plots in marginal areas under 
suppression continued to co-exist with European agriculture. Throughout the whole 
period, the chapter exposes how the dynamic economic and social policies affected 
agrarian labour in different ways, including through shaping the levels of capital, land 
utilisation and agricultural production patterns. The transition to majority rule, it is 
advanced, did not radically transform the agrarian labour relations as land access for the 
land short and/or landless self-employed family labour in the Communal Areas and farm 
wage labourers was impeded by the limited market based land redistribution until 2000.   
4.2 HISTORICAL ROOTS OF AGRARIAN-WAGE LABOUR (1890–1969) 
This section discusses the emergence of agrarian wage labour as a result of the 
peasantry‘s separation from their means of production after the country was colonised in 
1890 until 1969, the immediate period following the UDI from Britain by the European 
Settlers. It will demonstrate that land dispossession together with the changing public 
policies and laws combined to shape the agrarian labour relations outcomes. Specifically, 
the initial policies were centred on development of gold mining were re-examined to 
promote European large-scale commercial agriculture after the envisaged mineral 
resources did not materialise. Altogether, the shifting colonial policies resulted in the 
gradual evolution of wage labour in the LSCFs, mines and beyond, as well as changes in 
the composition of the labour force according to its nationality dimension over time. 
Furthermore, the section also shows that land dispossession was incomplete and the 
peasantry continued to exist side-by-side with European agriculture, but facing 
discriminatory agricultural policies to ensure cheap labour supplies to white industries. 
4.2.1 Land dispossession and evolution of agrarian wage labour 
The origin of agrarian wage labour in Zimbabwe can be traced to the land alienation 
afflicted on the African peasantry by the Settler-colonial regime, which divorced them 
from their means of production. Other extra-economic measures also implemented in 
stages impelled the peasantry into lowly paid  work in (white) owned large farms, mines 
and industries (Palmer 1977; Clarke 1977). Survival outside of the wage economy for the 
local peasants became severely constrained, but not obsolete. However, with widespread 
land alienation from the 1930s, the later also joined the foreign migrants who had been 
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the bedrock of the labour markets (Madimu 2017; Moyana 1984). Labour shortages 
influenced by various factors were a recurrent theme in the evolution of wage labour in 
the European LSCFs and industries (Rubert 1997).  
Prospects of huge gold discoveries or the ―Second Rand‖ motivated the BSAC to colonise 
Rhodesia in 1890. Beginning in the Matebeleland region, African peasants experienced 
land alienation and were transferred to Native Reserves created for their inhabitation 
(Palmer 1977; Phimister 1986). Many African peasants remained on alienated lands now 
converted to private property as tenants since most of the new landowners neither took up 
occupation nor commenced agricultural production (Arrighi 1970; Renne 1978; 
Nyambara 2005). This evolved the dual agrarian structure that lasted until the early 
2000s, with European lands located areas with favourable climatic conditions and the 
Native Reserves in drier and remote parts of the country (Moyo 2011a; 2013; Rukuni 
1994).  
Since 1894, hut and poll taxes were imposed by the Department of Native Affairs to 
induce African peasants into cheap wage labour in the capitalist industries (Arrighi 1970; 
Mackenzie 1970; Phimister 1986; Mhone 2001). Taxation did not resolve the labour 
shortages that had surfaced in the nascent mines in Mashonaland as the peasantry met 
their obligations by expanding commodity production between 1896 and 1908 (Arrighi 
1970; Phimister 1986; van Onselen 1976). Even the forced labour schemes did not 
ameliorate the labour shortages and were eventually discontinued after culminating in the 
1896/7 African rebellions in Matebeleland (Ranger 1967; Steele 1970; van Onselen 
1976).  
Due to their nearness to markets and transportation networks and retention of land in 
prime agro-ecological zones, African peasants in Mashonaland were the source of much 
of the agricultural surplus to meet growing demand in the mines (Vambe 1970). Then 
European agriculture constituted only five percent of the area cultivated and 10 percent of 
the marketed output in Rhodesia (Arrighi 1970: 209). Peasant differentiation was thus 
taking root as some of them near Salisbury (renamed to Harare after independence) were 
hiring wage labour from fellow Africans to produce various commodities required by 
Settler capital (Palmer 1977; Mckenzie 1970). These peasants in Mashonaland preferred 
autonomous production (Palmer 1977; Neocosmos 1993) and considered farm wage 
labour derogatory (Vambe 1970). But proletarianisation was proceeding much faster in 
Matebeleland, since land alienation began there and the peasants preferred temporary 
wage labour on alienated land than relocating to the poor agro-ecological conditions in 
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the reserves (Arrighi 1970; Phimister 1978). Only 13 percent of the able-bodied men 
from Mashonaland were wage labourers then compared to 48 percent in Matebeleland 
(Arrighi 1970: 229).  
Foreign labour recruitment began to be promoted by the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau 
(RNLB) initiated in 1903 by Rhodesia Land Owners and Miners Association (Clarke 
1977; van Onselen 1970; Steele 1973). Migrant workers imported from British Central 
Africa (changed to Nyasaland and now Malawi), Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and 
Portuguese East Africa (now Mozambique) filled the labour supply gaps (Makambe 
1980; Mhone 2001). Nationally, foreign labour was estimated at 75 percent of the 
workforce in 1904 (Mackenzie 1970: 50) and in mines alone they were 69 percent of 
15,000 workers in 1905 (Mackenzie 1974: 11-12). 
Agriculture became the focus of the BSAC after 1908 when the anticipated large gold 
deposits did not materialise (Palmer 1977). The agricultural policy advanced the 
development of European Settler agriculture, while undermining of peasant agricultural 
production through further land alienation and other extra-economic measures (Rukuni 
1994). Policy initiatives included a Land Bank formed in 1912 to offer loans for land 
purchases to white Settlers from Britain and South Africa (Riddell 1979; Hodder-
Williams 1983). The Department of Agriculture was restructured and staffed with skilled 
manpower to service European farmers and the BSAC used its farms near major urban 
centres to train new Settler immigrants (Palmer 1977).  
European agriculture thus grew dramatically between 1904 and 1911, represented by the 
rise in the number of white farmers over 2.4 times.
46
 Absentee landlordism was also 
drastically reduced, as occupation of LSCFs increased from 301 to 2,042 between 1904 
and 1914 (Palmer 1977: 91). Tobacco and maize production were the major focus of 
LSCFs in Mashonaland, while cattle ranching predominated the Matebeleland region 
(Rubert 1997; Hodder-Williams 1983). The production of these commodities increased 
by at least 20 times between 1900 and 1916.
47
  
The enlarging European LSCFs faced competition for labour from the local and foreign 
mines (Steele 1973; Madimu 2017). They also competed for land, labour and markets 
with the peasantry (Arrighi 1970; Paton 1995). Many migrant labourers from Northern 
Rhodesia only accepted farm wage labour in the absence of mine jobs (Steele 1973). 
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 Calculated from Rukuni (1994: 19). 
47
 Calculated from Palmer (1977: 92-95). 
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Mines in the Transvaal, South Africa, which offered higher wages were the final 
destination for most and brief work in Rhodesia served to raise transport fares for the 
onward journey (Phimister 1975; Johnson 1992; Paton 1995).  
From 1908 onwards, Native Reserves in the better agro-ecological zones were alienated 
for European settlement and pushed African peasants to remote areas (Rukuni 1994; 
Palmer 1977). The Private Locations Ordinance of 1908 introduced land rentals on 
alienated land and tied tenants to wage work for three months (Clarke 1977). The ceilings 
on the number of tenants per farm and compulsory cattle dipping and grazing fees 
covered in this law displaced African peasants in Mashonaland to the reserves (Palmer 
1977; Moyana 1984; Mackenzie 1970).  
After being granted self-rule by Britain in 1924, Southern Rhodesia intensified the 
development of European agriculture as part of a broader industrial strategy focused on 
infrastructure investments in white controlled areas, while peasant agriculture remained 
ignored (Phimister 1986; Hanlon et al. 2013; Paton 1995).
48
  
The new Settler government, which took over from the BSAC increased the Department 
of Agriculture‘s expenditure between 1923 and 1929 in order to revitalize European 
farming, which had declined substantially as some LSCFs participated in World War I 
(Palmer 1977: 146). Recovery was also spurred by the arrival of new Settlers and the 
increased demand for agricultural commodities arising from the extension of the mining 
sector (Onselen 1976; Madimu 2017; Phimister 1975).  
As the number of white LSCFs increased from 2,366 to 2,912 between 1921 and 1928 
(Steele 1973: 10), so did the cropped areas and livestock herds grow (CSO 1958; Palmer 
1977). The labour force followed suit and rose from 58,542 to 83,985 workers during the 
same period (Steele 1973: 10). European agriculture could now meet the food 




Within a context of local labour shortages, LSCFs continued to rely on foreign labour that 
came voluntarily or recruited by the RNLB (Steele 1973; Rubert 1997; 1998). After the 
demise of the RNLB in 1933, it was succeeded by the state‘s migrant labour recruitment 
                                                 
48
 The Europeans in Rhodesia had earlier rejected to be part of the Union of South Africa as the fifth 
province during an election in 1922, which in turn culminated in the end of BSAC rule in 1923 (Paton 
1995). 
49
 Self-contained referred to the ability of the white capitalist sectors to meet their requirements 
independently through backward and forward linkages (Arrighi 1970: 207).  
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agency, the Rhodesia Native Labour Supply Commission (RNLSC) in 1946, which 
imported an average of 14,000 workers annually until 1971 (Duncan 1973: 73). The 
entire labour force on some tobacco farms before 1945 were entirely made up of migrant 
workers from Nyasaland (Rubert 1997; Vickery 1989). Overall 62 percent of the labour 
force in the LSCFs were foreign migrants in 1951 (Table 4.2).  
Meanwhile, the African peasantry, which had benefitted from the declined production in 
European farms during the World War I, now faced increased competition from the 
subsidised European farmers and their surplus sales for maize and cattle declined 
substantially (Arrighi 1970). Yet their taxes and prices of the consumer goods were 
surging (Arrighi 1970; Sibanda 1988; Tshuma 1987). The share of the African people 
inhabiting in the reserves thus escalated to 63 percent in 1925, from 55 percent in 1915, 
since many could no longer afford the land rentals, which were also increasing (Palmer 
1977: 149). There, peasants had access to small land sizes of poor quality and in remote 
areas (Arrighi 1970). Although these processes induced the African peasantry into wage 
labour, the demand for farm labour still outstripped the supply as many local peasants 
continued to shun wage labour (Rubert 1997). 
Table 4.1: Division of the country by the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 
Category Land Area (million 
Ha) 
% of total  
European 19.9 51 




Forest Area 0.24 0.06 
Unassigned  7.2 18.4 
Undetermined 0.036 0.09 
Total 39.1  100 
Source: Moyana (1984: 44) 
The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 legally entrenched the racialised dual agrarian 
structure (Table 4.1) and further undermined peasant production by forcing tenants to 
relocate to the Native Reserves (Arrighi 1970). The Act allocated an average of 1000 
acres per head to the 48,000 Europeans in Rhodesia at that time, compared to 29 acres per 
head for the one million Africans (Palmer 1977: 186; Moyana 1984; Machingaidze, 
1991). An estimated 50,000 African peasants had been evicted to the Native Reserves by 
1941 against a target of 100,000 people (Moyana 1984: 51).  
Peasants who had initially been transferred to the unalienated Crown or state lands were 
also displaced to the Native Reserves to pave way for resettlement of World War II 
veterans from 1945 (Phimister 1986). This expanded the European LSCFs from 3,699 to 
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6,255 between 1945 and 1955 (CSO 1958). The 300,000 black tenants still on European 
lands around 1948 were targeted for removal and only 37,000 remained by 1961 (Moyana 
1984[2002]: 93; 96).  
The ―good‖ farming methods promoted by the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951, 
including the separation of residential areas from the arable fields failed to stem the tide 
of environmental degradation in the now overcrowded Native Reserves (Herbst 1990; 
Phimister 1986). Agricultural productivity thus declined and constrained payment of 
colonial taxes (Madimu 2017; Machingaidze 1991). Whereas the reorganisation of land 
settlements exacerbated landlessness in some reserves such as Chilimanzi where 16.7 
percent were estimated to be landless in 1962 (Moyana 1984[2002]: 108).  
Dual pricing of maize and cattle during the Great Depression (1931-1936) cushioned 
European farmers from the international price declines, but hurt the peasantry (Arrighi 
1970; Keyter 1977). The Maize Control Act of 1931 barred African peasants from selling 
their maize directly to the government‘s Grain Marketing Board (GMB), but through 
white traders who later resold to the latter for a profit (Phimister 1986). While white 
farmers received 10 shillings per bag from the GMB, the traders paid three shillings for 
African maize (Herbst 1990). Despite the Maize Control Ammendment Act of 1934 
enabling direct sales to the GMB, peasants with no transport to reach the far away 
markets, continued to be exploited by traders (Arrighi 1970; Herbst 1990). The Cattle 
Levy Act of 1934 increased dramatically the slaughter fees for African owned cattle and 
together with depressed prices sales were compromised (Palmer, 1977). This depressed 
the share of African earnings from surplus sales from a high of 70 percent to 20 percent 
between 1903 and 1932 (Arrighi 1970: 216) and in extreme cases surplus maize sales in 
districts such as Belingwe (now Mberengwa) were reduced to nil by 1934 (Palmer 1977: 
212). Tables had now turned, in 1961, the minority 6,000 white farmers were now 
generating 14.5 percent of Gross National Product (GNP) on five percent of their land 
area compared to 6.5 percent for the five million Africans (Moyana 1984: 63).  
By then, the engagement in labour markets had become ―necessary‖ for African peasants‘ 
social reproduction rather than ―discretionary‖ (Arrighi 1970). Labour supplies now tilted 
towards domestic internal migrants from the Native Reserves, and the share of foreign 
migrant farm workers in the European LSCFs declined from 60 percent in 1956 to 43 
percent in 1969 (Clarke 1977: 31; Figure 4.1). As a result, the RNLSC influence in labour 
recruitment began to wane from the 1950s and by 1960s was only hiring for European 
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farmers and eventually became moribund in 1974 when Malawi stopped labour exports to 
Rhodesia (Clarke 1977; Paton 1995).  
Figure 4.1: Declining shares of foreign workers in LSCFs, 1941-72 
 
Source: Adapted from Clarke (1977:31) 
4.2.2 Forms of agrarian-wage labour in LSCFs  
Labour tenancies supplied most of the labour in the early 1890s since the undercapitalised 
European farmers could not afford to pay wages (Rennie 1978; Arrighi 1970). Increased 
availability of capital boosted land use and livestock herds in European LSCFs, as well as 
utilisation of modern inputs and tractors (Gibbon 2011). Wage labour thus became more 
prevalent after the massive expulsions of African tenants from European LSCFs between 
1930 and 1960 and signaled the demise of labour tenancies (Nyambara 2005).  
Agrarian wage labour, which initially took the form of circular migration, whereby 
workers were given between three to 12 months employment contracts after which they 
would return either to the reserves or their home countries (Clarke 1977). Foreign 
migrants took up longer-term contracts, while locals were engaged for shorter ones as 
they sought to return to the reserves to work on their fields (Johnson 1992).  
As agricultural production capacities continued to be enhanced, including through 
development of irrigation for all-year round farming, labour stabilisation was introduced 
in LSCFs through the provision of on-farm permanent housing to the core workers from 
around the 1930s, while seasonal labour was recruited from the neighbouring Native 
Reserves (Gibbon 2011; Rutherford 2001a; Rubert 1997; Sachikonye 1986; Rennie 
1978). Male permanent workers were encouraged to recruit their families to live with 
them in the farm compounds (Clarke 1977) and availing them for seasonal labour could 
earn a promotion at the workplace (Rutherford 2001a). Thus, from only a few employees 
























































































No. of employees % of total employment
 142 
1972, whereas male juveniles were 10.8 percent of the labour force by 1969 (Clarke 
1977: 28-29).  
Paltry sections of the LSCFs were occupied by farm compounds, which provided housing 
to permanent labour and also accommodated casual workers from the Native Reserves 
(Bush & Cliffe 1984). The self-constructed houses were rudimentary (Rubert 1997). The 
rights of farm workers to agricultural and residential land were constrained on the private 
propertied LSCFs and only lasted until the termination of the employment contract 
(Kanyenze 2001; Rutherford 2001a; Moyo 2011a). For Clarke (1977), this scenario 
enabled LSCFs to reinforce their control over labour beyond the employment 
relationship.  
The Masters and Servants Act of 1899 which accorded overwhelming authority to the 
white farmers legislated farm labour relations (Palmer 1977; Stoneman, 1976; Sibanda 
1988). Absence from work without permission could result in imprisonment and 
employment desertion attracted even up to three months in prison (Rutherford 2001b). 
Employment contracts were based on a ―gentlemen‘s agreement‖, but white farmers 
broke their commitments at will (Clarke 1977; Rubert 1997).  
Since 1910, the ticket system was used to exploit farm workers by requiring the 
completion of a full ticket (equivalent to 30 days work) to earn a monthly wage, but in 
reality the tasks allocated took on average about five to six weeks to finish (Rubert 1997). 
The white LSCFs also delayed the payment of at least one ticket so that they could retain 
labour for a longer period (Arrighi 1970). Wages were so low that it required a full 
month‘s ticket to purchase a pair of khaki trousers in the 1930s and compared poorly to 
those in the mines and industries (Steele 1973; Phimister 1986). Between 1940 and 1970 
real wages were stagnant (Arrighi 1970). Farm wages were also divided between cash 
and food rations (Clarke 1977; Duncan 1973).
50
  
Many white farmers in districts such as Hurungwe avoided paying workers on a regular 
basis (Rutherford 2001a). Agrarian crisis in European farms were also accompanied by 
very low wages, and periods of extreme crises such as the Great Depression in the 1930s, 
LSCFs totally suspended wage payments and converted workers to tenants (Palmer 
1977). Legal routes for workers to claim their dues such as reporting to the police, often 
led to reprisals by the employers (Steele 1973; Mackenzie 1970).  
                                                 
50
 On one farm, the £7 monthly wage was split into £3.75 cash and 4,5 kg of maize, 1.2 kg of peanuts, salt, 
0.6 kg of beans and 0.75 kg of meat in 1953 (Moyana 1984 [2002]: 118). 
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Violence was meted to discipline farm labour transgressions and the use of the sjambok to 
manage farm labour was unexceptional and continued until the dawn of independence 
(Gibbon 2011; Rutherford 2001a; 2001b). State labour officials considered the use of 
violence as part of the measures to increase labour productivity rather than for causing 
harm (Rutherford 2001a; 2001b). Racial abuse and threats of dismissal from work were 
also everyday occurrences (Palmer 1977; Rubert 1997). Labour inspections that were 
present in the mines sector did not exist in the farms (Phimister 1998; Rubert 1997). 
During periods of severe shortages, meat was added to the maize meal and pinch of salt 
food rations in Marandellas districts (now Marondera) to attract labour in the 1920s 
(Steele 1973). Money wages were also increased from a range of 10 to 15 shillings to 
about 20 to 25 shillings between 1923 and 1928 (Steele 1973: 8). Agrarian labour markets 
were also differentiated as European farmers in Mashonaland offered relatively better 
working conditions than the drier Matebeleland (Palmer 1977). Between LSCFs, 
capitalisation levels were uneven, with the more endowed able to attract labour by 
offering higher wages (Rennie 1978; Hanlon et al. 2013). 
Scholars who exposed the existence of labour resistance as far back as the early 1890s 
(Phimister 1976; Rubert 1997) challenged assertions by analysts such as Clarke (1997) of 
white farmers having total control over farm labourers because of the residential labour 
tenancy. Rather than direct confrontation with LSCFs, desertion was the most common 
form of resistance to poor working conditions. Other documented forms of resistance, 
included feigning sickness, injuring livestock and foot dragging. White farmers would 
thus confiscate registration certificates of foreign migrant labour or pay them after 
harvesting to prevent desertions (Rubert 1997).  
Farm labourers developed ―…a highly detailed intelligence system as to good and bad 
employers‖ since the days of BSAC rule (Mckenzie 1970: 54). The bad employers were 
―blacklisted‖ and struggled to mobilise labour without the assistance of the RNLSC or its 
predecessor the RNLB (Madimu 2017; Steele 1973). RNLB recruited workers only 
received wages on their return to home countries and employers took advantage of this to 
offer very poor ―forced labour‖ like working conditions and was shunned by foreign 
labour migrants (Steele 1973). 
4.2.3 Petty commodity production and peasant differentiation  
The development of the African peasantry only began to receive attention of the colonial 
state in the 1950s (Nyambara 2005; Rukuni 1994; Duggan 1980). Financial allocations 
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for the African peasantry from the state always lagged behind that of the minority 
European farmers. For instance, during the 1940/41 fiscal year, African agriculture 
received a budget vote of £14,107 compared to £208,127 for European Agriculture 
(Palmer 1977: 218). Much less was received by African agriculture during World War I 
and II, a paltry
 
one forteith of European Agriculture (Arrighi 1970: 220). Staff allocated 
to Native agricultural development was also inadequate. 
Land alienation, alongside the establishment of reserves during the colonial period was 
incomplete and uneven (Palmer 1977; Ranger 1986). The differentiated responses of the 
African peasantry to land alienation and integration into the capitalist economy resulted 
in differing degrees of proletarianisation of male population within and across the 
districts (Phimister 1986). Retaining land in good agro-ecological zones, as well as the 
sizes of villages, closeness to employment or marketing areas, and the history of 
migration were key in the success of commodity production amongst the peasantry 
(Mamdani 1996b). For instance, the Tonga people in the Zambezi Valley migrated in 
large swathes to seek wage work the mining sector in response to land alienation in the 
1920s because they possessed little or no livestock (Mackenzie 1970). Furthermore, the 
native cereals, which they monocropped did not have a developed market. In contrast, 
their neighbours, the Bashankwe, instead of proletarianisation, quickly diversified their 
production by adding tobacco to native cereals production and integrated into tobacco 
markets. African peasants near mines continued to prosper in agricultural production at 
least until the 1940s when land dispossessions increased, while others forged income 
earning activities in tobacco trading, selling livestock hides and hoe manufacturing from 
scrap metal (Arrighi 1970). Active cattle and grain markets also provided other peasants 
routes to earn cash to pay colonial taxes (Mackenzie 1970).  
Differentiation amongst the peasantry also proceeded apace influenced by success or lack 
of it in the wage labour markets (Arrighi 1970; Ranger 1986; Phimister 1986). Some 
earned higher wages, which they invested in peasant farming and for some the very low 
wages were inadequate even for their subsistence (Mafeje 2003; Neocosmos 1993). For 
the latter, male migration for work generated labour shortages resulting in 
impoverishment of women headed households in the reserves (O‘Laughlin 1998).  
Weinrich (1975: 11) observed in Chilimanzi and Victoria TTLs in the late 1960s that 
―…members of the most successful communities which [he] studied had given up labour 
migration‖. Instead, it was what he termed ―ordinary cultivators‖ that remained tied to 
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wage labour markets. Access to land in the TTLs enabled investments into agricultural 
production, which eventually provided the choice to disengage from the labour markets. 
In Gokwe district, Nyambara (2001) notes that peasant households received an average 
10 acres of land courtesy of the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951, but unequal power 
relations in Gokwe‘s TTLs resulted in powerful groups such as traditional leaders and 
spirit mediums amassing land for themselves, their relatives and friends. This created 
uneven land ownership patterns and by 1980, there were some households who controlled 
as much as 100 acres of land while others (e.g. young households, single women and 
immigrants) were either land short or landless (Nyambara 2001: 256).  
Rather than fully proletarianise the peasantry as Arrighi (1970) had predicted, what 
emerged was a semi-proletarianised labour force that combined petty commodity 
production in the TTLs with wage labour (Moyo & Yeros 2005b; Moyo 2011a). The local 
African peasants also straddled between the LSCFs and the Native Reserves to attend 
family rituals, funerals and weddings in order to retain membership in their villages and 
thus guarantee long-term security in the case of unemployment, infirmity and ill health 
(Chavhunduka 1971; Mackenzie 1970). 
By 1958, underemployment was evident in the reserves as the capitalist industries, mines 
and farms had no capacity to employ all those who required jobs to subsist (Mhone 2001; 
Palmer 1977; Clarke 1977; Mafeje 2003). Thus, the reserve army of the unemployed that 
emerged served as a wage suppression tool (Arrighi 1970). 
The discussion above has highlighted that loss of access to land by the peasantry  because 
of the extensive dispossession alongside the implementation of various economic and 
extra-economic policies was key in evolving the agrarian labour relations. In particular, it 
suboordinated the peasantry into the wage labour markets for their social reproduction. 
While the reverse is also true as maintenance of access to land by some of the peasantry 
enabled them resist proletarianisation since they could survive on the basis of own 
farming at least until land dispossession was ratcheted to expand Settler agriculture in the 
1930s. Clearly, the transformation of the agrarian labour relations is not only influenced 
by land dispossession, but result from the dynamic interactions with other policy 
measures that historically have included taxation and repression of peasant agriculture 
and biased state support to European agriculture. The agrarian and socio-economic 
policies are nevertheless not static, but continously evolving to respond to domestic and 
international dynamics. Policies do not produce uniform outcomes on the different 
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segments of the populace due to their non universal application and the responses to the 
impacts by the affected people. This can be perceived from the incomplete land 
dispossession and the diverse responses from the peasantry that led to differentiation in 
the countryside. Rather than a continuing trajectory of proletarianisation as Arrighi 
(1970) had anticipated, the uneven land alienation, self-employed peasant labour engaged 
in petty commodity production combined with wage labour remained a feature of the 
agrarian relations in a process defined as systemic 20
th
 century semi-proletarianisation 
(Moyo & Yeros 2005a: 26).  
4.3 SHIFTING AGRARIAN LABOUR RELATIONS UNDER CRISES: RAPID 
LSCF LAND USE CHANGES AND CAPITAL INTENSIFICATION, 1970-1979 
Sanctions that visited Rhodesia after the UDI by the ruling Rhodesian National Front 
(RNF) party on 11 November 1965 prompted a variety of economic reforms, including 
the development of an import substitution and economic diversification programme, as 
well as interventions to protect key economic sectors such as agriculture (Phimister 1986; 
Paton 1995; Clarke 1980; Hawkins 1967). Below, the continued transformation of the 
agrarian labour relations under this new dynamic of enhanced state intervention by the 
Rhodesian government to counter the effects of sanctions on European agriculture and 
other industries is uncovered. 
State subsidies for capital investment were channelled to the LSCFs, particularly for 
irrigation investment, to encourage the crop diversification, while intervening in the 
markets through various state marketing boards managed by the Agricultural Marketing 
Authority (AMA) (Rukuni 1994). Large estate irrigation farming in sugarcane in the 
Lowveld was also promoted during this period (Moyo 2011a; Mlambo & Pangeti 2002). 
Peasant agriculture continued to receive minimal state support and its underdevelopment 
was entrenched by spatial segregation policies (Weinrich 1975; Schmidt 1986). The Land 
Tenure Act of 1969 buttressed the ownership of land along racial lines by allocating 15.6 
million hectares to Europeans land and 16.4 million hectares to Tribal Trust Lands 
(formerly Native Reserves) (Moyo 1995: 83). The Native Purchase Areas, where blacks 
could buy freehold land (1.238 million hectares), more or less retained the allocation 
accorded by the Land Apportionment Act of 1930. 
After Britain suspended tobacco trade with Rhodesia (Duncan 1973), new crops were 
promoted from 1967, including sugarcane, soyabeans, and wheat in Mashonaland, and 
emphasis was on cotton and beef in the drier Matebeleland provinces (Muir-Leresche 
2006; 1994). The state, however continued to purchase tobacco for stockpiling to prevent 
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bankruptcy of LSCFs (Hanlon et al. 2013), and offered short-term loans for agricultural 
inputs and living expenses (Phimister 1998).  
The area under irrigation swelled dramatically from 48,688 hectares in 1966 to 151,698 
hectares by 1978 (Table 4.3) as LSCFs received soft loans from the Farm Irrigation Fund 
(FIF) (Rukuni 1994). Producer price subsidies were also offered to white farmers, 
including for irrigated wheat production (Takavarasha 1994). Over 70 percent of cropped 
area under irrigation was located in the LSCF sector between 1970 and 1980 (Rukuni, 
Svendsen, Meinzen-Dick & Makombe 1994). Other capital equipment such as tractors 
also increased from 14,585 in 1965 to 17,443 in 1975 (Table 4.2).  
Table 4.2: Area under irrigation in European LSCFs and number of tractors 
Year  Area under 
irrigation 
hectares 
No. of tractors  
1950 6 183 na 
1951 na 5184 
1960 18 133 12 115 
1969 66 411 14 912 
1970 78 467 na 
1971 92 239 na 
1972 105 060 na 
1973 113 833 16 651 
1974 113 332 16 878 
1975 127 194 17 442 
1976 130 558 17 787 
1977 146 787 17 773 
1978 149 377 17 412 
1979 151 698 16 852 
1980 154 806 16 717 
1981 158 328 16 373 
1982 165 405 16 240 
1983 143 845 15 763 
1984 135 597 15 876 
1985 149 835 Na 
1987 173 036 16 075 
1988 178 547 15 925 
1989 187 491 16 142 
Sources: CSO (1958, 1950, 1961, 1962, 1980, 1983, 1989) 
Over 18,000 jobs were lost between 1964 and 1969 as LSCFs responded to the crisis, 
especially in the tobacco LSCFs (Duncan 1973). The productivity improvements largely 
financed by state subsidies enabled the rise in profits from about 23 percent of the LSCF 
income in 1965 to 32 percent in 1974, whilst the proportion of wages declined 
simultaneous from 30 percent to 23 percent (Loewenson 1992: 41).
51
 
                                                 
51 Most of the major crops grown in the LSCFs experienced substantial increases in productivity during the 
1970s. For instance, maize yield increased from 2,875 kilogrammes per hectare to over 4,314 kilogrammes 
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As the new economic strategy blossomed, demand for farm labour in the rapidly 
capitalising sector increased to reach a peak of 336,797 workers in 1975 (Table 4.5). The 
land under cultivation in the LSCFs increased from 555,593 hectares in 1964 (CSO 1969) 
to 699, 987 hectares in 1974 before easing to 628,406 in 1978 (Table 4.3). Beyond maize 
and tobacco,
52
 commodities produced in the LSCFs now included sugarcane, cotton, 
wheat, soyabeans, coffee, beef, dairy and horticulture (Muir 1994). The LSCFs, however 
reduced the area under maize by over 62,000 hectares during the 1970s (Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3: Area under cultivation in LSCFs, 1970 – 1979 
Year Area under cultivation in Hectares  
  Maize Wheat  Soyabeans Tobacco Cotton Coffee Total  
1970 292010 15322 12208 43259 66226 660 549313 
1971 304017 22005 7777 44667 67739 934 554449 
1972 338016 22303 5724 48462 71173 1488 595300 
1973 315335 21588 8407 49141 84896 1749 605361 
1974 311058 26819 11427 58852 103858 2639 614085 
1975 278170 31419 17898 65691 92493 2979 590595 
1976 257301 33325 24776 66219 64003 3506 566435 
1977 264354 42217 24474 57306 81985 3617 574780 
1978 273144 45135 35218 55540 94144 3911 563500 
1979 229430 34288 40142 60223 838685 3572 542169 
Source: Compiled from CSO (1998:149 – 158) 
The growth in the number of farm labourers mirrored the geographic uneven 
development of farming in European LSCFs. Over 60 percent of the labour was located in 
the two Mashonaland Provinces around 1971, which commanded the intensive land uses 
(Table 4.4). Before then, four Mashonaland districts, namely; Mazoe, Salisbury, 
Goromonzi, Hartley and Lomagundi, produced between 66.7 percent and 72.6 percent of 
the maize output in European LSCFs between 1950 and 1955 (CSO 1958), while 90 
percent of the tobacco output came from eight Mashonaland districts and one Manicaland 
district during the same period (CSO 1958).
53
 
Capital intensification in the LSCFs increased the number of workers, but shifted the 
structure of employment by reducing the share of permanent workers from 92 percent to 
                                                                                                                                                 
per hectare by 1978 (CSO 1998a:151). Whilst, tobacco productivity rose from 1,251 kilogrammes per 
hectare in 1970 to 1,783 kilogrammes per hectare in 1979 (CSO 1998a: 158). 
52
 As a major source of foreign exchange, tobacco survived the divestment by LSCFs to less labour 
demanding but capital intensive commodities in the 1970s (Loewnson 1992; CSO 1998a). Data from these 
two later sources show a surge in the area ploughed to this crop during this period. 
53 The Mashonaland districts included Lomagundi; Mazoe; Salisbury and Goromonzi; Makoni; Marandellas 
and Wedza. 
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75 percent between 1969 and 1974 (Table 4.5). Thereafter, both LSCF agricultural labour 
force and the area under cultivation began to contract (Tables 4.3 & 4.5).  
Table 4.4: Provincial distribution of LSCF permanent labour force, 1971 








87,148 35.2 1, 458 59.8 
Mashonaland 
South 
62,603 25.3 1,738 36.0 
Manicaland 38,603 15.5 859 45.0 
Victoria 25,532 10.3 389 65.6 
Matebeland 19,026 7.7 931 20.4 
Midlands 14,925 6.0 869 17.2 
Totals  247,917 100 6,244 39.2 
Source: Clarke (1977:26) as at 30 September 1971  
Support to the LSCFs was drastically reduced as the Rhodesian government channelled 
resources towards repressing the Independence movement led by Zimbabwe National 
Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People‘s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) 
liberation armies (Hanlon et al. 2013; Lan 1985). Crisis had peaked by 1978, since 40 
percent of LSCFs were technically insolvent (UNDP 1980). Furthermore, only 24 percent 
remitted income taxes to the exchequer in 1977 and 1978 (UNDP 1980). The burden of 
rising input costs and debts undercut the profitability of the LSCFs, but multinational 
companies that supplied inputs posted huge profits (Loewenson 1992; Rukuni 1994). 
By 1979, the total number of LSCFs had declined to 6,113 from 7,116 in 1970 (Table 
4.5). However, the area under the LSCFs remained largely unchanged as the remaining 
LSCFs consolidated land and therefore increased the average farm size from 2,080 
hectares to 2,464 (Table 4.5). 
Domestic internal migrants now supplied the most of the farm labour as the share of 
foreign migrant decreased to 33 percent by 1974 (Figure 4.1). Nevertheless, at the farm 
level, the proportions of foreign and domestic migrants were varied. A study by 
Chavhunduka (1971) showed that locals dominated some farms, while foreign migrants 
majored in others. This was attributed to the influence wielded by the nationality of the 
foremen that mediated access to employment on the European farms, as well as the 
existing communication channels between those already in employment and their villages 
of origin. Since farm jobs were not publicly advertised, potential job seekers received 
information from their relatives. Most foremen were found to favour their kith and kin for 
employment.  
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Conditions of LSCF employment  
 
Agricultural workers were not cushioned from the economic crisis like their employers. 
The low wages were justified by some white farmers who viewed farm workers as 
―backward‖ since they came from TTLs and had therefore limited demands for money 
income beyond acquiring bicycles, clothes and beer (Chavhunduka 1971). Not only were 
food rations provided with the money from wages usually not enough, such perspectives 
also neglected health care and educational costs. Fears by European farmers that wages 
increases would be abused on beer drinking were thus unfounded. The poor living 
conditions in the farm compounds (Clarke 1977; Rubert 1997; 1998) were considered an 
improvement of TTL situation by farmers. Because foreign labour migrants accepted low 
wages than locals, it was common for white farmers to patronise them as ―hard working 
and obedient people‖, while locals were labeled lazy (Chavhunduka 1971: 19).  
Working conditions were not helped by the absence of farm labour trade unions, which 
were existent for white workers since 1934 (Sachikonye 2001; Tandon 2001). Trade 
unionism was also present among black workers in non-agricultural sectors, but they only 
became legal after Industrial Concilliation Act of 1959. Before then, it was constrained by 
legislation such as the Subversive Act of 1950 which criminalised worker mobilisation 
and organisation of strikes (Kanyenze 2001). Yet they organised the massive 1948 labour 
strikes that brought industries to a standstill and resulted in improved wages and working 
conditions for African workers (Raftopolous & Phimister 1997; Yeros 2013a) and later 
contributed to anti-colonial struggles (Freund 1984; Raftopolous 1986; Raftopoulous 
&Yokushini 2001). Efforts by farm workers to unionise in the 1960s were thwarted by 
the resistance of the RNFU and the legislation equating unionisation with political 
disruption (Clarke 1977). 
The resistance of farm workers to the poor working conditions now involved joining the 
liberation struggle in Mozambique and Zambia (Tandon 2001) and providing intelligence 
to the liberation fighters in the LSCFs and Communal Areas (Sadomba 2008). Still, a few 
cases of direct action through work stoppages on LSCFs during this time have been 
documented (Clarke 1977). 
Peasantry and commodity production  
 
Peasants were further suppressed by the spatial segregation policies, which confined the 
blacks to the TTLs and only allowed them in the urban areas if they were in employment 
(Paton 1995; Clarke 1975; Dunlop 1971). Institutions such as the Tribal Trust Land 
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Development Corporation (TILCOR) formed to advance peasant agriculture were 
severely underfunded and had minimal impact on the black rural economy (Rukuni 
1994).  
Moreover, in 1970, the powerful RNFU forced the Chairman of TILCOR not to promote 
local Africans to grow crops that directly competed with LSCFs (Weinrich 1975), 
reminiscent of their campaign against peasant cotton production during the 1920s (Steele 
1973:9). Investment in peasant agriculture was only made to maintain subsistence levels 
and prevent them from becoming stiff competition to white farmers and curtail Africans 
from flooding the cities in search of jobs (Arrighi 1970; Moyana 2002; Duggan 1980). 
State investment was so disproportionate that 675,000 black farmers received only 15 
percent of the ZW$436 million spent on white LSCFs between 1954 and 1964 
(Loewenson 1992: 41).  
Agricultural production in the TTLs was on the decline. Per capita income from the land 
ploughed by peasants had shrunk by about 50 percent between 1958 and 1970 (Weinrich 
1975: 8). A significant amount of maize consumed in the TTLs was now coming from 
LSCFs (Bratton 1979). For the majority of the peasantry, their survival on the basis of 
agriculture remained uncertain. By now the TTLs had become overcrowded and land 
sizes per household were declining due to continuous subdivision to accommodate the 
bulging population. Empirical surveys in Chilimanzi (now Chirumanzu) and Fort Victoria 
(now Masvingo) revealed rates of landlessness of around 47 percent for all men, rising to 
81 percent if only males below the ages of 30 years were considered (Weinrich 1975: 8). 
As the war against colonisation intensified, agricultural production growth was almost 
stagnant in the TTLs (Paton 1995).  
Notwithstanding the repressive character of agrarian labour relations under colonial rule, 
it can be discerned from the literature examined that more often than not, (farm) workers 
and the peasants are the ones adversely affected by economic crises as state policies tend 
to emphasise protection of the interests of capitalist enterprises, including LSCFs. The 
latter are perceived as producing greater economic value to the nation. In particular, 
effects of economic crises are transmitted to workers by LSCFs through low wages and 
shifts in the conditions of employment, and even job losses. In contrast, the labour force 
are excluded from benefitting from the increases in capitalist profits in periods of 
economic booms. In addition to land shortages, it is also apparent that the undermining of 
peasant agriculture by economic crises generates additional edge for the peasantry to 
enter labour markets. This results in the rise in the semi-proletarianisation conditions in 
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the countryside as wage labour is combined with own farming by rural households in 
order to meet their subsistence requirements.  
The analysis above tells us that even under conditions of colonial suppression and control 
of labour through the residential tenancy relationship and repressive legislation such as 
the Masters and Servants Act of 1899, resistance is always an outcome of the exploitation 
of workers in the labour markets. Additionally, this resistance can take place with or 
without the presence of collective worker organisations such as trade unions, which were 
restricted in the LSCFs until 1980.  
4.4 CHANGING AGRARIAN LABOUR POLICY REGIME UNDER LIMITED 
LAND REDISTRIBUTION (1980-1990) 
Zimbabwe evolved from the armed struggles prosecuted by the liberation armies of  
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People‘s Union 
(ZAPU) political parties that secured independence from the British colonialists in 1980. 
At this juncture, the economy was diversified and agriculture (14 percent) lagged behind 
only  manufacturing (25 percent) in the GDP contributions (Muir 1994:43). An estimated 
993,000 of the 7,260,000 national population were in formal employment in 1979 (Muir, 
Blackie, Kinsey & de Swardt 1982: 74) and the LSCFs employed the majority of the 
formal labour force (25 percent) (Moyo & Ngobese 1991: 11).  
The government in 1980 adopted the statist development model it inherited through the 
―growth with equity strategy‖ alongside a socialistic oriented rhetoric (GoZ 1981). The 
strategy entailed redressing the colonial land imbalances, as well as inequities in 
agricultural and labour markets. It mixed market ideology and heavy state intervention in 
all social and economic facets, and reversed various repressive legislature and abolished 
colonial institutions and extra-economic measures that channelled labour to the LSCFs, 
mines and industries.  
Land reform was one of the policy priorities aimed at reversing the unequal agrarian 
structure dominated by a minority LSCFs owning 15.5 million hectares of land divided 
into 6,000 properties, existing alongside about one million black households occupying 
16.4 million hectares in Communal Areas (Utete 2003:18; Moyo 1995; GoZ 1983). The 
land categories were legally reclassified – European lands to LSCFs, TTLs into 
Communal Areas and Native Purchase Areas into SSCFs. Next, the specific changes to 
the labour laws and related policies after the end of colonial rule and their repercussions 
on agrarian labour relations are discussed. 
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4.4.1 Evolving agrarian labour policies, 1980 to1990  
Labour law reforms, especially for the LSCF farm labourers, began with the removal of 
the Master and Servants Act of 1899  from the statutes and introduction of a minimum 
wage of ZW$20 by the 1979 short-lived coalition government of the RNF and black 
political parties (Kanyenze 2001; Gwisai 2006). The farm workers operating under semi-
feudal relations were now formally recognised as ―workers‖ and incorporated into the 
Industrial Concilliation Act of 1959. The extra-economic measures that regulated the 
movement of black workers between the towns and countryside through Pass Laws, 
forced bondage of unemployed labour found in urban areas and the compulsory hut and 
poll taxes also fell away after independence (Loewenson 1992).  
Wage rates policy and working conditions  
 
Economy wide labour strikes in the immediate independence period pressurised the 
government to radically reform the labour regulations to address workers‘ colonial 
grievances (Sachikonye 1986; Kanyenze 2001).
54
 This encompassed the Minimum Wages 
Act of 1980, which gave the Ministry of Labour authority to set the annual minimum 
wages for all employees (Gwisai 2006; Madhuku 2015). However, at least in the 
agricultural sector, the Agricultural Labour Bureau (ALB), which represented the 
Commercial Farmers Union (CFU)
55
 on labour issues, was sometimes consulted on wage 
setting by the GoZ together with the Industrial Board for the Agricultural Industry 
(Rutherford 2001b). Minimum wage determination was bifurcated by categorising farm 
and domestic workers at the same level; and those from Industry and Commerce were 
another category (Saunders 2001; Herbst 1990). Women who were legal minors requiring 
permission of their husbands to enter employment contracts, were upgraded to legal 
majors with the same labour rights as men according to the Legal Age Act of 1982 
(McFadden & Mvududu 2001; Barnes 1992; Ncube 1987).  
Worker retrenchments were controlled through the Employment Act of 1980, which 
required all employers to seek consent from the Minister of Labour, who received advice 
from the tripartite Retrenchment Committee (Gwisai 2006). However, employment 
contracts could be changed from permanent to casual without GoZ approval (Muir et al. 
1982).  
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 Sixteen of the 150 strikes recorded between March 1980 and June 1981 were in the agricultural sector 
(Kanyenze 2001: 91). 
55
 The RNFU was renamed to CFU after independence. 
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Five years after the demise of colonial rule, the three main labour statutes, namely; the 
Industrial Concilliation Act of 1959, Minimum Wages Act of 1980 and the Employment 
Act of 1980, were harmonised and combined to form an elaborate  Labour Relations Act 
of 1985 (Gwisai 2006; Madhuku 2015). This introduced collective bargaining involving 
three layers of negotiation from the shopfloor level to the industry level (National 
Employment Boards and National Employment Councils) and then the national level 
through the tripartite, Wages and Salaries Advisory Board (Kanyenze 2001). Wage 
agreements were then gazetted by the Minister of Labour. After adopting the Investment 
Guidelines in 1989, the state reduced its intervention to resolving wage negotitiation 
deadlocks in favour of workers (Kanyenze 2001).  
Labour rights, which had not been adequately defined since the colonial period, were 
articulated by the Labour Relations Act of 1985, including cataloguing ―…unfair labour 
practices, regulated conditions of employment and also provided for the control of wages 
and salaries..‖ (Kanyenze 2001: 96). The Act also provided for a heirarchical institutional 
framework for handling labour disputes and greviances encompassing Labour Relations 
Officers in the Ministry of Labour, the Labour Relations Board and Labour Relations 
Tribunal. The labour issues not resolved through the state bureaucracy could be escalated 
to High Court and finally to the Supreme Court. Farm workers as food producers fell in 
the category of ―essential services‖ where industrial action was not allowed (Saunders 
2001: 140). Post the Labour Relations Act of 1985, the Department of Labour was no 
longer legally bound to monitor the working conditions on LSCFs as was the case under 
the Industrial Concilliation Act of 1959. 
Unionisation of agricultural workers  
 
Formation of trade unions was promoted by the ―One Industry, One Union‖ policy 
(Tandon 2001). The Zimbabwe Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union (ZAWU) 
emerged in April 1980 as the first legally recognised farm labour trade union linked to the 
apex union, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) (Kanyenze 2001). Internal 
problems and leadership struggles eventually led to the initiation of the General 
Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ) to replace ZAWU 
in 1985 (Kanyenze, 2001; Sachikonye 1986; 1995). At the grassroots, workers 
committees and Works Councils manned by equal representatives of workers and 




Access to social services to farm workers  
 
The state largely considered the provision of social services as the responsibility of 
LSCFs as it was hesistant to invest on ―freehold titled land‖ (FES 1998).
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 There was no 
government policy on how land could be availed to Rural Councils (RCs) to develop 
social services in the LSCFs similar to Communal Areas (Moyo et al. 2000). As such, the 
RCs in the LSCFs focused their activities on road maintenance and neglected the needs of 
farm workers (McIvor 1995; Mugwetsi & Balleis 1994). Farm workers were also 
marginalised in the local government system, which required ownership of property to 
participate in elections and was thus dominated by the LSCFs (Chambati & 
Magaramombe 2008). The farm workers only got universal suffrage for local government 
elections in 1998 after the merger of Rural Councils and District Councils in the 
Communal Areas in 1995 (Magaramombe 2001). 
There was also a growth in NGOs on LSCFs that ran welfare improvement projects for 
farm workers from the mid-1980s which operated under the goodwill of the LSCFs 
(Moyo et al. 2000). NGOs were nonetheless barred on other LSCFs who feared exposure 
of their labour brutality to outsiders (Moyo et al. 2000; Helliker 2006). By the mid 1990s, 
there were about 12 NGOs servicing the interests of farm workers, including the Save the 
Children (United Kingdom) and FCTZ that ran the Farm Worker Health Programme and 
various literacy, hygiene and education programmes (Chambati & Magaramombe 2008: 
215 ; Helliker 2006). These strategies pursued by the NGOs were classified by Moyo et 
al. (2000: 192), as ―welfarist‖. 
Citizenship rights for foreign farm workers  
 
Citizenship rights were extended to foreign migrant farm workers by the Citizenship 
Ammendment Act of 1985. All foreigners domiciled in Rhodesia before 1980 upon 
payment of ZW$1.00 could be granted citizenship and the requisite identity cards (Moyo 
et al. 2000). Various NGOs supported farm workers with the means to register their 
citizenship. However, the registration processes never adequately covered the rural 
constituencies and many remained without identity cards to prove their Zimbabwean 
citizenship and were excluded from benefitting from various national programmes 
(Magaramombe 2001). 
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 This was confirmed by then Minister of Local Government, John Nkomo during a dialogue on farm 
workers in 1998 hosted by the Freidrich, Ebert and Stiftung (FES 1998). 
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Documented citizenship enabled farm workers of foreign origin to acquire land rights in 
the Communal Areas, which were previously denied during the colonial period 
(Nyambara 2005) so as not to interfere with labour supplies. But other foreign migrant 
farm workers did however acquire land rights in the TTLs and were integrated into these 
communities by the traditional leadership (Nyambara 2005). Surveys in the late 1990s 
showed that between 25 to 45 percent of farm workers owned Communal Area land 
(Moyo et al. 2000: 196). Exclusion and discrimination of foreign farm workers, as noted 
below, continued on the basis nationalist discourses that marginalised them as 
―foreigners‖. 
Land reform and access to residential and resettlement land for farm workers  
 
The Land Reform and Resttlement Programme Phase I (LRRP – I) planned to resettle 
162,000 families by 1990 (GoZ 1982: 66), but only 71,000 households had received land 
by 1998 on the 3.6 million hectares redistributed (Makhadho 2006: 171). Most of the 
redistribution occurred in the first three years of independence and thereafter the process 
was reduced to a snail‘s pace (Utete 2003). Therefore, the ownership of land remained 
largely monopolised by white LSCFs until 2000 (Moyo 2001) since only 52,000 families 
had benefitted from land allocation by 1995 (UNDP 1998: 32). Only the willing buyer-
willing seller model could be used by the state to acquire land for redistribution (Kinsey 
1983; Palmer 1991; Masoka 1994) before the legal revisions in 1990. The Constitutional 
Ammendment Bill No. 11 of 1990 enabled compulsory acquisitions of LSCFs that were 
blocked by Section 16 of the Lancaster House Constitution for a duration of 10 years. 
This was then used to ammend the Land Acquisition Act of 1985 in 1992. Yet the process 
remained slow partly due to high land prices and focus on the implementation of ESAP 
from 1991 (GoZ 2001a; Moyo 1995; 1998).  
The land rights of farm workers have historically been on the periphery of land reform 
policy.  LRRP-I ommitted them from the list of beneficiaries and their aspirations for land 
were further dented by the characterisation as  ―foreigners‖ in nationalist discourses who 
could not benefit from land ahead of Zimbabweans (Moyo et al. 2000). Nonetheless, farm 
workers did exhibit agency by occupying LSCFs in the early 1980s, which had been 
discarded by European Settlers during the war of liberation  and received backing from 
ZANU (PF) and were eventually formalised as land beneficiaries by the state‘s 
Department of Resettlement (Chambati 2011; Herbst 1990; Moyo et al. 2000). The 
inception policy document of the second phase of the land reform enunciated in 1998 did 
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however mention them as a category to benefit from the land allocations (GoZ 1998c), 
but were later removed from the list during the FTLRP (GoZ 2001a). 
Plans were also mooted by the GoZ in the early 1980s to provide independent houses to 
farm workers outside the farm compounds in ―common border villages‖ (FES 1998; 
Loewenson 1992). These common border villages were to be established on public land 
would also avail workers other ancillary services such as schools, retail shops and health 
facilities (GoZ 1985; Sachikonye & Zishiri 1998). These plans floundered following 
resistance from the LSCFs (Loewenson 1992) as discussed later (section 4.4.2). 
4.4.2 LSCF production patterns and employment trends under limited land 
redistribution 
Averaging over 2,000 hectares in 1980, the LSCFs now had a diversified commodity 
base, but the monoculture agro-industrial estates and wildlife ranches commanded 
expansive land sizes in excess of 10,000 hectares per unit (Moyo 1998; 2011b; Muir 
1994). The agro-industrial estates were mainly foreign owned and the key commodities 
they produced included sugarcane, tea, coffee and timber in the Eastern Highlands and 
Lowveld (Chambati & Moyo 2004; Mutisi 2003; Sachikonye 2016). Yet tobacco 
remained a key commodity and was employing 34 percent of the labour force in the 1,360 
LSCFs (Muir et al. 1982: 75). 
The LSCFs illegally retrenched their employees in response to the labour protection laws 
such as the Minimum Wages Act of 1980 and incorporation of farm labour into the labour 
relations framework (Amanor- Wilks 1995; Kanyenze 2001; Rutherford 2001b). About 
55,278 jobs were lost in the LSCFs between 1980 and 1983 of which seventy nine 
percent of them were permanent employees (Table 4.5). The number of LSCFs also 
declined from 6,034 in 1980 to 5,481 in 1983 (Table 4.5).
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 Thereafter, annual 
employment figures fell by less than 1,000 employees per annum until 1985 and began to 
increase from 1987 onwards (Table 4.5). Earlier declines affected both forms of 
employment, but between 1984 and 1985, permanent labourers regressed as they were 
converted to casual labour, which was not entitled to pension, leave and housing benefits 
(Sachikonye 1985). Consequently, the share of permanent workers decreased from 73 
percent in 1980 to 69 percent in 1984 (Table 4.5), continuing the casualisation trends that 
commenced in the 1970s.  
                                                 




Table 4.5: Changing LSCF structure and employment in Zimbabwe, 1969-2000 
Sources: Compiled from CSO 1997 CSO (1984) from 1975 onward; CSO (1996) CSO (2001) GoZ (1997); 
Moyo (2011:512); Clarke (1977) up to 1974: 28; CSO (1984) from 1975 onward  na – not available 
 
The LSCFs continued to intensify their diversification into capital intensive land uses 
such as high value export agriculture (Heri 2006). Simultaneously, farm mechanisation, 
irrigable areas and modern input use were expanded, although there were foreign 
currency and import restrictions (Moyo 2000b). Export promotion schemes since the late 
1980s provided LSCFs preferential access to the stated owned Agriculture Finance 
Cooperation (AFC) loans and foreign currency to import inputs (Gibbon 1995). By 1989, 
the area under irrigation had risen by over 32,000 hectares (Table 4.2) and labour saving 
combine harvesters increased from 643 in 1980 to 718 in 1989 (CSO 1990: 118). 
Fertiliser consumption also increased from 400,160 tonnes in 1985/86 to 473,987 tonnes 
in 1989/90 of which over 75 percent was applied in LSCFs (Oni 1997: 68), while 
pesticide usage increased by 1,000 tonnes between 1980 and 1986 (Loewenson 1992: 44).  
Year No. of 
farms 




Permanent % of 
total 
Casual % of 
total 
Total 
1969 na Na na 208,984 81.8 46,471 18.1 225,455 
1970 7116 14,800,000 2080 209,979 87.1 31,095 12.9 241,074 
1971 6762 14,750,000 2181 214,033 86.3 33,884 13.7 247,917 
1972 7048 14,880,000 2112 210,862 74.0 75.651 26.0 286,513 
1973 6937 14,920,000 2181 228,511 75.8 73,001 24.2 301,512 
1974 6938 14,840,000 2112 233,766 74.9 78,147 24.1 311,913 
1975 6821 14,850,000 2178 236,542 70.2 100,255 29.8 336,797 
1976 6682 14,440,000 2161 242,224 72.4 92,140 27.6 334,364 
1977 6480 14,800,000 2285 245,444 74.9 82,049 25.1 327,493 
1978 6337 14,820,000 2339 233,935 81.9 51,594 18.1 285,529 
1979 6113 15,060,000 2464 230,523 80.4 56,302 19.6 286,825 
1980 6034 14,798,302 2452 198,268   73.1  73,023   26.9 271,291 
1981 6124 14,481,714 2365 191,430   74.8 64,437   25.2 255,869 
1982 5915 13,516,357 2285 164,044   74 56,184   26 220,228 
1983 5481 12,346,553 2253 154,738   72 61,275   28 216,013 
1984 5171 12,539,970 2425 150,601   69.9 64,883   30.1 215,484 
1985 5128 12,482,356 2434 147,842   69 66,399   31 214,241 
1986 5129 12,145,668 2368 Na   na na  na na 
1987 4789 11,546,848 2411 150,593    64.3 83,515  35.7 234,108 
1988 5015 11,707,233 2334 150,985   61.9 92,802  38.1 243,787 
1989 5062 11,707,233 2355 149,576   57.1 112,389  42.9 261,955 
1990 4992 11,433,986 2290 151,512   58.8 105,956  41.2 257,468 
1991 5117 11,433,986 2264 156,435   57.8 114,061  42.2 270,496 
1992 5131 11,375,215 2217 160,713   59.3 110,279  40.7 270,992 
1993 5132 11,340,186 2210 157,447   54.2 132,864  45.8 290,311 
1994 5164 11,321,617 2192 164,748   53 146,196  47 310,944 
1995 5198 11,321,617 2183 Na   na na na 313,796 
1996 5185 11,187,348 2178 167,851   50.2 166,670  49.8 334,521 
1997 5146 11,291,152 2196 172,926   51.0 166,086  49 339,012 
1998 na Na na 171,491   52.9 152,798  47.1 324,289 
1999 na Na na 169,257   52.5 153,423  47.5 322,680 
2000 5172 11,238,600 2173 167,459   53.1 146,960  46.7 314,419 
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This translated to the growth of both agricultural and labour productivity.
58
 Between 1980 
and 1990, real labour productivity rose by 1.8 times, but the broadening of the 
productivity wage gap from ZW$76.78 to ZW$160.06 suggests that these gains chiefly 
increased LSCFs profits (Kanyenze 2001: 101-101).
59
 Productivity of two of the major 
crops, wheat and tobacco, increased by at least 1.5 times during this period (CSO 1998: 
153 & 158). 
The share of grain crops in the total area cultivated in the LSCFs continued to decline 
from 57 percent in 1982 to 45 percent in 1990, while industrial crops rose to 33 percent 
from 41 percent and fodder crops‘ share from two percent to 11 percent (CSO 1998a: 
149).
60
 Wheat was the only grain crop whose cultivated area expanded from 32,556 
hectares to 50,071 hectares between 1980 and 1990, while maize cultivated area was 
reduced by over 83,000 hectares (CSO 1998a: 151-153).  
Crisis in international tobacco prices lingered on and the Zimbabwe Tobacco Association 
(ZTA) had to impose a 30 percent production quota between 1980 and 1983 (Muir et al. 
1982). Subsequently, the area under tobacco production slowed down to 45,552 hectares 
in 1983 from 63,783 hectares in 1980, before it began to recover in 1984 to reach 58,639 
hectares in 1990 (CSO 1998a: 158).  
These processes further entrenched the transformation of the LSCF labour force by 
reducing the share of full-time labour to 58.8 percent in 1990 (Table 4.5). Between 1985 
and 1990, the inflation in the number of permanent labour was lacklustre, only rising by 
3,670 jobs compared to an increase of 39,557 casual jobs (Table 4.5).  
The recognition of women as employees in their own right did not boost their levels of 
participation in the farm labour markets, especially in full-time employment. Women‘s 
share of the total LSCF employment, which was 26 percent in 1980, declined to 21 
percent by 1983 (Kanyenze 2001: 101). Moyo and Ngobese (1991: 8) exposed the 
disproportionate effects of retrenchments on male and female workers. The number of 
female casual labourers from a peak of 52,764 in 1980 declined to 39,438 in 1983 . In 
contrast, the number of male casual labourers intially declined from 20,349 to 18,327 
between 1980 and 1982, before recovering to 21,837 jobs in 1983, suggesting the 
replacement of female casual workers with male casual workers. Retrenchments of 
                                                 
58
 Agricultural productivity is  measured in output produced per unit area (kilogrammes per hectare), while 
labour productivity is measured as the value of output per worker. 
59
 Measured at 1980 constant prices. 
60
 Grain crops includes maize, sorghum, wheat, barley, mhunga, rapoko; industrial crops include tobacco, 
coffee, sugar cane, coffee, cotton, groundnuts, soyabeans, sunflower; fodder crops include lucerne, 
legumes, hays and silage. (CSO 1998a: 149). 
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women in the permanent employment was even more drastic with over 50 percent of the 
jobs shed between 1980 and 1983 compared to a 16 percent decline amongst their male 
counterparts. The extent of women‘s discrimination in farm labour markets was such that 
between 1982 and 1990, they only accounted for three percent of permanent farm labour 
force (Kanyenze 2001: 101). Moreover, the few women who made into permanent 
employment were located at the bottom-end, which earned the least wages (Muchena & 
Dzumbira 2001; Slyvester 2000). Therefore, in terms of income security as provided by 
regular income from permanent employment, women continued to lag behind their male 
counterparts.  
4.4.3 Wage rates and working conditions in LSCFs  
The expansionary wage policy adopted by the state did result in the rising of both 
nominal and real wages for farm and mine workers (UNDP 1999; Sachikonye 1986; 
Sibanda 1988). Nominal agricultural wages more than doubled between 1979 and 1984, 
while the real wages did increase by over 34 percent during the same period (Table 4.6) 
after having been stagnant in the last three decades. The rate of wage increases slowed 
down after 1984 due to the conditionalities of the stabilisation agreement the state entered 
into with the IMF to manage the Balance of Payment (BOP) deficit which had set in after 
Global recession and the effects of three consecutive droughts (1982 to 1984) (Kanyenze 
2001). This also froze wages between 1986 and 1987. However, by 1990 farm workers 
were earning 1.2 times in real terms the wages they earned in 1980 (Table 4.6). Because 
of the very low wages that farm workers received during the colonial era, they benefitted 
most from the minimum wage policy, which offered the least paid workers the largest 
annual wage increases (Saunders 2001). Their wages between 1980 and 1990 thus 
remained above the inflation rate, whilst those of Industry and Commerce workers began 
to decline after 1982 and were 14 percent lower in 1990 than they were in 1980 (Table 
4.6).  
Nevertheless, farm workers remained the lowest paid formal employees, with their wages 
2.3 and 1.5 times lower than those of Industry and Commerce workers in 1980 and 1990 
respectively (Table 4.6). Attempts to converge the minimum wages of farm workers with 
those of other industrial workers in 1985 floundered after heavy resistance from the 
LSCFs, agro-industries and multinational companies (Loewenson 1992). Instead of the 
proposed merged minimum wage of ZW$143, farm workers eventually received ZW$75 
(Table 4.6).  
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Wage increases were met with intensive labour deployment by LSCFs (Muir, Blackie, 
Kinsey & de Swardt 1982). Working hours for no extra pay were also increased in some 
LSCFs and the management and supervision practices also shifted to extract higher levels 
of labour productivity (Loewenson 1992). 
Farm worker wages throughout the 1980s were inadequate to meet the minimum 
subsistence requirements as measured by the Poverty Datum Line (PDL) (Table 4.6). But 
the transition to independence however saw the share of farm worker wages in relation to 
the PDL increasing from 29.4 percent in 1979 to 41.8 percent. The farm worker wages 
reached a peak of 55.7 percent of PDL in 1982 before a declining trend set in after the 
adoption of the wage restraint policy (Table 4.6). By 1990, farm wages had slumped to 50 
percent of the PDL (Table 4.6). 
Table 4.6: Nominal and Real Minimum Wages for Agricultural Workers: 1979-1999  



















1979 20.00 21.08 68.07 29.4 na na 
1980 30.00 30.00 71.73 41.8 70.00 70.00 
1981 30.00 26.50 81.12 37.0 85.00 75.00 
1982 50.00 39.90 89.80 55.7 105.00 83.00 
1983 55.00 35.70 110.53 49.8 115.00 75.00 
1984 65.00 35.10 132.84 48.9 125 67.00 
1985 75.00 37.30 144.10 52.1 143 71.00 
1986 85.00 37.00 164.76 51.6 158 65.00 
1987 85.00 32.90 185.27 45.9 158 61.00 
1988 100.00 36.00 199.05 50.2 182 65.00 
1989 116.00 37.00 224.72 51.6 206 61.00 
1990 133.00 36.20 263.74 50.4 na na 
1991 170.00 37.20 327.80 51.9 na na 
1992 185.00 27.87 476.06 38.9 na na 
1993 210.00 25.54 589.75 35.6 na na 
1994 241.50 24.02 721.08 33.5 na na 
1995 289.80 28.52 883.69 32.8 na na 
1996 359.35 24.02 1073.05 33.5 na na 
1997 503.09 28.30 1275.25 39.5 na na 
1998 664.08 28.81 1653.26 40.2 na na 





Source:  *Compiled from Kanyenze (2001:99; 105-106). ** Saunders (2001:138) na – not available 
Child labour continued to be enlisted to work in the LSCFs against the prohibition of 
employment of children below 16 years by the Labour Relations Act of 1985. Due to the 
legal ramifications, the landowners resisted providing information on child labour and 
researchers have largely been unable to measure its extent in the LSCFs (Tandon 2001; 
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UNICEF 1994). Yet at one point in the late 1980s, the Ministry of Youth recruited school 
children to work in the LSCFs to address labour shortages for cotton picking in the 
Lowveld and this move was endorsed by the Ministry of Education, which extended the 
school holidays by an additional week for this purpose (Loewenson 1991: 24). Underpaid 
children were either directly recruited by the LSCFs or mobilised by their mothers to 
assist in the delivery of piecework sometimes in conflict with school attendance 
(Amanor-Wilks 1995; Loewenson 1991; Sachikonye 1989). Schools were not a priority 
for LSCFs, lest they would reduce the farm labour supplies and even some beerhalls in 
LSCFs doubled as classrooms during the day (Loewenson 1991).
61
  
Various studies have documented the improvement of working conditions after 1980, 
including in the reduction of working hours, removal of task work, provision of protective 
clothing and allocation of small subsistence plots for farm workers in the LSCFs 
(Sachikonye 1986; Loewenson 1992; Kanyenze 2001; Gibbon 2011; Rutherford 2001a;b; 
Moyo et al. 2000; Chadya & Mayavo 2002; FES 1998). According to Amanor-Wilks 
(1995; 2001), the changes were only ―slight improvements‖ and not evenly distributed 
across all LSCFs. In fact the endurance of bad working conditions in many LSCFs was 
observed. Labour management practices such as use of physical violence, racism and 
verbal abuse, although noted to have considerably declined since independence, 
continued in many farms (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Tandon 2001). The extent of these 
practices were however not clear since the research did not quantify the share of LSCFs 
nor the number of farm workers involved.
62
 The white farmers continued to resolve 
disputes internally, through instant justice methods that were sometimes in conflict with 
the country‘s laws and interfered with social matters beyond work such as marital affairs. 
Rutherford (2001a: 232) characterised this as some form of ―domestic government‖. 
Therefore, some fragments of the masters-servant relationship (Amanor-Wilks 1995) 
were not extenguished by their legal recognition as workers.  
The effectiveness of the new labour regulations was also constrained by the high illiteracy 
levels among farm workers and location of government offices far away from the farms 
(Rutherford 2001b; 2004b; Kanyenze 2001; Tandon 2001). Moreover, farm workers that 
reported transgressions to the police and sought recourse from the Ministry of Labour 
were often victimised by their employers (Kanyenze 2001). White farmers maintained 
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 Schools and clinics accounted for less than one percent of the money invested annual on buildings in the 
LSCFs (Calculated from CSO 1993). The LSCFs had the least per capita access to social services before 
2000 with for instance registered schools found on less than 10 percent of the LSCFs (CSO 1997: 64). 
62
 The existence of physical violence on farm workers on LSCFs was also corroborated by various press 
reports during the 1980s and 1990s. 
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territorial authority on huge tracts of land, which they deployed to exploit labour (Moyo 
2011a). The government neither set up the requisite infrastructure to handle labour 
greivances nor did it equip the few labour relations officers with adequate skills 
(Sachikonye 2001; Saunders 2001). Lengthy labour dispute resolutions were thus 
frequent, even taking more than three years in some instances (Kanyenze 2001).  
 
Residential labour tenancy and access to agricultural land  
 
The farm compound persisted as an institution tying residency to employment as plans to 
establish independent housing through the ―common border‖ villages did not materialise 
as the LSCFs refused to excise their land for this purpose (Loewenson 1992; Sachikonye 
& Zishiri 1998). For the LSCFs, the villages implied the dissipation of the social control 
of labour enabled by the farm compounds (see Clarke 1977; Rubert 1998) and losing the 
convenience of summoning labour in case of emergencies.  
Fears of eviction from the farm compound constrained the bargaining power of farm 
labour in the employment relationship, especially those of foreign origin with no land ties 
elsewhere (Tandon 2001). Retrenched and retired ―foreign‖ migrant farm workers, after 
losing farm compound residency, trekked to informal settlements emerging the 
peripheries of the LSCFs (Magaramombe 2001; Save the Children Fund & FCTZ 2001; 
Herbst 1990).  
Appalling living conditions were characteristic of many compounds, and the housing 
infrastructure was differentiated by the heirarchy at the workplace (McIvor 1995; Kibble 
& Vanlerbeghe 2000). Seasonal workers lived in overcrowded dormitories, where the 
incidences of respiratory diseases were high (Tandon 2001; USAID 1998). Although the 
interventions of NGOs in LSCFs did serve to improve social service provision (McIvor 
1995), they were limited in scope and did not reach many workers.  
The social segregation of the LSCFs from the Communal Areas also remained intact 
governed by private property and customary rights respectively (Scoones et al. 2010; 
Rutherford 2003; Moyo 2011a). Tresspass laws on LSCF private property was deployed 
to exclude ―outsiders‖ access to natural resources on farms and restrained free movement 
of people and livestock (Moyo 2011a; Chambati 2011), including trade union organisers 
(Kibble & Vanlerbeghe 2000).  
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Collective action and/or agency 
 
Village committees or party cells set up by ZANU (PF) in the farm compounds, more 
than trade unions, led the resistance to poor working conditions in the early 1980s 
(Loewenson 1992; Rutherford 2001a; b). Beyond canvassing for political support, these 
institutions dabbled in the protection of labour rights, including establishing workers 
committees and mobilised workers into trade unions (Kanyenze 2001). Overt struggles by 
farm workers became pervasive and encompassed daily strikes, abseentism and slow 
performance of tasks at least until the mid 1980s (Rutherford 2001a; b). ZANU (PF) was 
instrumental in evolving trade unions and ZAWU was housed at the party offices during 
its formative years (Tandon 2001). Such co-optation by ZANU (PF) lasted until the 
relations ruptured in the mid 1990s (Yeros 2013a). Unions were seen as the ―labour 
wing‖ of the political party and their ―dissent‖ against the state were not permitted 
(Tandon 2001).  
As political party activities waned in LSCFs, so did the mobilisation of farm workers into 
the ranks of GAPWUZ. From a figure of 5,000 in 1985, its membership rose to only 
16,000 or 6.2 percent of the total number of farm workers by 1990 (Kanyenze 2001: 102-
103). Furthermore, part-time workers, which were on the increase, considered union 
membership to compromise their job security (Amanor-Wilks 1995). Leadership 
wrangles and limited organisational skills also implied that many workers remained 
detached from the trade unions due to their non-accountability to the rank and file 
(Tandon 2001; Yeros 2013a; b).  
The legal restriction of labour strikes limited workers options to extract better working 
conditions (Gwisai 2005) and if they occurred they were met by the heavy hand of the 
state (Sachikonye 1995). The role of the GAPWUZ largely became a reactionary one – 
stepping in to resolve reported labour disputes and ensuring workers dismissed from 
employment received their full terminal benefits (Rutherford 2001b). 
At the grassroots level, LSCFs weakened the workers committees by co-opting vocal 
members of the into management (e.g. foremen or senior clerks), which excluded them 
from worker representation at any level as enshrined in the Labour Relations Act of 1985 
(Rutherford 2001b). Many vocal members of workers committees were also retrenched 
and workers became afraid to assume these positions (Amanor-Wilks 1995). Moreover, 
as ESAP approached, the GoZ became averse to the disruption of production by labour, 
and blocked the promotion of labour strikes by workers committees to enforce 
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compliance of labour rights (Kanyenze 2001; Rutherford 2001b). By 1990, the LSCFs 
had regained control of the farm worker labour relations such that  ―....many workers 
…thought farmers had greater authority to terminate employment and carry out ad hoc 
punishments (e.g., hold back wages, assign extra work, and even have workers beaten) 
than they had in the early 1980s‖ (Rutherford 2001b: 214). 
4.4.4 Agrarian labour relations and the peasantry 
Notwithstanding the repression of African agriculture, a differentiated peasantry emerged 
from colonisation (Neocosmos 1993; Cousins et al. 1992). By then, overcrowding was 
endemic (Mehretu 1994) and in as much as 66 percent of the Communal Areas the 
population carrying capacity had been surpassed by more than two times (Moyo 
1995:129). Seventy four percent of the land was situated in the marginal areas of Natural 
Regions IV and V and Natural Region I and II contributed eight and nine percent of the 
Communal Area land respectively (Muir 1994: 45). The remaining 17 percent of the land 
area was found in Natural Region III (Muir 1994: 45). On average, families in these areas 
accessed between 0.2 and five arable hectares and grazing land shared by community 
members (Moyo 2011a: 512), but for over 70 percent arable land sizes were less than 2.5 
hectares (Moyo 1995: 157).  
Agricultural production was focused around three crops; namely maize, cotton and 
groundnuts (Muir 1994; Moyo 2000b), which contributed 45.7 percent, 18.8 percent and 
7.5 percent of the value of agricultural production in Communal Areas between 1982 and 
1993 respectively (FAO 1999: 13). Other food crops produced included sorghum, millet, 
and roundnuts, while cattle and goats were the most common livestock (Muir 1994). 
Auto-consumption was the main pre-occupation of agricultural production, but with 
partial integration into the domestic food markets (Mumbengegwi 1986; Moyo 1986). 
Various policies were initiated to reverse the subjugation of peasant agriculture and 
promote its growth, alongside LSCFs (Rukuni & Eicher 1994; GoZ 1982). Direct access 
to markets for the key peasant commodities were enabled by the expansion of the state 
owned GMB and Cotton Marketing Boards into the Communal Areas (Mariga 1994; 
Mashingaidze 1994; Masuko 1998). AGRITEX also tremendously expanded its services, 
increasing the extension worker to farmer ratio from 1:1000 in 1980 to 1:800-850 in 1990 
(Rukuni 1994: 32; Cliffe 1988: 7).  
State subsidised agricultural loans were also extended to the Communal Areas by the 
AFC (Gibbon 1995), with beneficiaries rising from 18,000 in 1981 to a peak of 76,818 in 
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1986 (Chimedza 1994: 146). At the highpoint, loans from AFC reached only less than 10 
percent of the peasantry (Chimedza 1994: 151) and were biased towards those in 
Mashonaland Provinces.
63
 The LSCFs still appropriated the larger share of the AFC 
loans, 66 percent of the credit value in 1986 (Moyo & Ngobese 1991: 14).  
Together with LSCFs, peasants also benefitted from the producer price subisidies 
continued from the colonial period, initially through pre-planting prices and later on pre-
harvest prices (Takavarasha 1994). Universal input subsidies also enhanced the utilisation 
of hybrid seeds and fertiliser in the Communal Areas (Gibbon 1995). 
This increased state support resulted in maize and cotton production booms (Rukuni & 
Eicher 1994). The area under maize production in Communal Areas increased by over 
100,000 hectares between 1980 and 1985 (CSO 1998a: 151). The peasantry was thus 
accounting for 85 percent of the cropped area and producing 55 percent of the total output 
and had reversed the dominance of LSCFs in maize production.
64
 Excluding the droughts 
between 1982 and 1984, maize productivity also increased rapidly from 667 kilogrammes 
per hectare in 1980 to 1,530 kilogrammes per hectare in 1985 (CSO 1998a: 151). The 
area under cotton production also grew at a faster pace, rising from 15,000 hectares in 
1980 to 130,000 hectares in 1985 (CSO 1998a: 156). At the same time, the contribution 
of peasants to the total cotton ouput subsequently rose from 12,000 kilogrammes (7.4 
percent) to 110,000 kilogrammes (38.6 percent) (CSO 1998a: 156). Altogether, the share 
of the peasantry in the value of sales of the major crops grew steadily from 5.9 percent in 
1980 to 19.3 percent in 1989.
65
 
From 1986, the wheels had come off the peasant production train. The value of output 
generated in the Communal and Old Resettlement Areas declined by 4.8 percent between 
1985 and 1990, and in contrast, LSCFs gained by 1.8 percent (Oni 1997: 7). Productivity 
declines were recorded in maize – from 1394 kilogrammes per hectare to 550 
kilogrammes per hectare between 1985 and 1987 (Oni 1997:12). Cotton and soyabeans 
also registered 11.3 percent and 58.1 percent yield declines between 1985 and 1988 
respectively (Oni 1997: 12). Livestock was less affected and the numbers for cattle and 
goats remained relatively stable (CSO 1998a). Droughts and the decline in fertiliser use 
were blamed for the slowdown in production (Rohrbach, 1989; Mashingaidze 1994; 
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 Between 25 to 39 percent of the peasants surveyed in Mashonaland districts in the 1980s were receiving 
loans compared to none in the low rainfall districts (Stack 1994: 263; see also Cliffe 1988). 
64
 Calculated from CSO (1998: 151). 
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 Additionally land shortages were biting under the weight of demographic 
growth (Moyo 1986; Mehretu 1991; 1994)
67
 and were affecting about 50 percent of the 
households (Moyo 1995: 137). 
Agricultural labour was mostly provided by self-employed family workers, but wage 
labour was also deployed by the peasantry (see Zinyama 1986; Moyo 1995; Adams 
1991a, b) to support mostly weeding and harvesting activities (Worby 1995). For 
instance, in Masvingo Communal Areas, 39 percent and 65 percent of households hiring 
labour, employed permanent and casual workers respectively (Adams 1991a: 302; 311). 
Another survey also showed that 33 percent of the peasant households were hiring two or 
more casual farm workers (Moyo & Ngobese 1991: 41). However, over 90 percent of the 
labour for the major field operations
68
 was provided by the family (Mazambani 1991; 
Moyo 1995; Matshe 1998). Self-employment was also via reciprocal labour arrangements 
in Communal Areas for labour demanding activities such as weeding or harvesting 
(Worby 1995).  
Migration to towns, mines and LSCFs by the young and middle aged males left the self-
employed labour force in the Communal Areas dominated by women, children and 
elderly men (Gaidzanwa 1995; Batezat 1984).
69
 Women were the majority of the full time 
residents in Communal Areas, while for 34 percent of the male household heads, 
residency per annum was under three months (Moyo 1995: 135).
70
 The 34 percent of the 
female headed households were split between de jure heads (16 percent) - single women 
who were separated, divorced or widowed and de facto heads (18 percent) whose 
husbands were migrant labourers. Some men also entered polygamous unions to increase 
labour supplies from their many wives (Batezat 1984; Mvududu & McFadden 2001). 
Therefore, women endured the burden of both providing labour for household agricultural 
production and reproductive roles (Potts 2000; UNICEF 1994). Labour shortages 
characteristic of many migrant households were eased by the hiring of piece workers or 
maricho, mobilising extended family members and from the migrants during their short 
time off-work (Potts & Mutambirwa 1990). Children sometimes at the expense of school 
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 Failure to repay loans was met with the confiscation of collateral tendered by peasants such as scotch 
carts and other farm equipment (Tandon 2001). 
67
 Yet some of the expansion in cropped areas was based on encroaching on grazing lands – as much as 27 
percent of the cropped area increase between 1980 and 1990 (Oni 1997: 61). 
68
 Land preparation, planting, weeding, fertilisation, harvesting and threshing. 
69
 Indeed, shortage of land was cited by migrants (60 percent) to Harare as the major reason for leaving  the 
Communal Areas in the late 1980s (Potts & Mutambirwa 1990). 
70
 Over 90 percent of the wives of migrant labourers surveyed in Harare in 1987 and 1988 provided farm 
labour to the household production in Communal Areas (Potts 2000: 817). 
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attendance were also co-opted to compensate for the missing migrant labour (Bourdillon 
2000). 
Yet not all female labour was homogenous as self-employed farm labour. Some de-facto 
female heads of households were also successful farm managers (Potts 2000), while many 
of them were the least paid pieceworkers (Adams 1991b). Proletarianisation of married 
women beyond the Communal Areas was however limited due to their wider 
reproductive roles and patriarchal institutions that restricted their movement (Gaidzanwa 
1995; Batezat 1984; Makura-Paradza 2010). Besides the wives of male permanent 
workers, 85 percent of the female labour in LSCFs were single women (Adams 1991b: 
170; see also Amanor-Wilks 1995).  
The benefits of the growth of peasant production were unevenly spread. Various anlaysts 
attributed the dramatic expansion of maize production to between 15 and 20 percent of 
peasants in Mashonaland (e.g. Moyo 1986; 1995; Cousins et al. 1992). The two 
Matebeleland provinces South and North, and Masvingo did not share this growth (Stack 
1994). Jackson and Collier (1988) also reached similar conclusions on peasant integration 
to cereal markets. District level analysis revealed even further concentration as six 
districts
71
 out of the 53 districts nationally were the source of 50 percent of the maize 
sales between 1980 and 1988 (Stack 1994: 261). Inorganic fertiliser use was also 
concentrated in the high maize producing regions (Moyo 1995: 140). Meanwhile, cotton 
production was more concentrated within the drier districts of Gokwe and Sanyati 
(Worby 1995; Mariga 1994).  
Inter-household differentiation was also influenced by cattle ownership, use of other farm 
inputs, land sizes owned and use of hired labour. Cattle ownership, an index of draught 
power, was palpable in no more than 45 percent of the peasant producers (Moyo 1995; 
Jackson & Collier 1988; Cliffe 1988). Households utilising farm wage labour (especially 
permanent workers) also had the greatest wage remittances and asset endowments 
including land and cattle (Adams 1991a).
72
 Moyo (1995) also found that land sizes in 
Communal Areas within and across the five agro-ecological regions were highly variable 
and closely associated with cattle and farm equipment ownership. The top 20 percent of 
the maize producers had access to more land, cattle and labour compared to the bottom 40 
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 Five of the districts, namely Hurungwe, Murewa, Guruve, Mazowe and Lomagundi, are in the three 
Mashonaland Provinces, while Gokwe is part of the Midlands Province. 
72
 The quantum of remittance also differed on the basis of the quality of urban wage employment (Cousins 
et al. 1992; Potts 2000) and influenced agricultural production outcomes (Mazambani 1994; Moyo 1986; 
1995; Zinyama 1986). 
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percent (Stack 1994: 264). De jure female headed households were characterised by the 
least land sizes, limited access to farm equipment, draught power and finance to invest in 
production (Gaidzanwa 1995; Potts 2000). The commodification of land in Communal 
Areas also produced different land sizes as peasants who excelled in commodity 
production increased the land owned through informal land purchases (Nyambara 2001; 
Rukuni Commission 1994; Chimhowu & Woodhouse 2008).  
Therefore, the returns from self-employed agricultural labour were positive for a few 
peasants in Mashonaland. In the high rainfall areas of Mashonaland, between seven 
percent and 22 percent of the peasant households were net purchasers of grain and in the 
medium and low rainfall areas of Matebeleland, Midlands and Masvingo, the proportions 
increased to 38 to 96 percent and 48 to 98 percent respectively (Stack 1994: 262). Many 
in these latter provinces were depending on state relief programmes to meet their food 
requirements (Cousins et al. 1992; Jayne, Chisvo & Rukuni 1994; Cliffe 1988).  
Diverse non-farm rural labour activities predominantly in natural resource trading 
augmented self-employed agricultural labour (Bradley & McNamara 1993; Fortmann & 
Nhira 1992). Estimates of rural households involved ranged from 10.7 percent (Jackson 
& Collier 1988: 16) to over 20 percent (Moyo 1995: 209 – 210). According to Moyo 
(1995; 2006), commodification of natural resources was largely due to mounting arable 
land shortages. These activities gained importance in Natural Regions III to V compared 
to Natural Region I and II where crop incomes preponderated (Moyo 1995; Mithöfer & 
Waibel 2003). Women and children were over 90 percent of the labourers in the 
collection and trading mopane worms (Hobane 1994), while men partook in ardous 
activities such as hunting/fishing and gold panning (Mushongah & Scoones 2012).  
In sum, poverty amongst the peasantry was not reversed by the advancement of 
agricultural production. On average, a peasant household of six to seven persons in the 
Communal Areas realised an average annual income of ZW$840 in the late 1990s 
compared to the rural PDL of ZW$2,520 (Oni 1997: 18). 
On the whole, the literature tended to be pre-occupied with the agrarian labour relations 
in the LSCFs to the exclusion of peasant labour processes. Specifically, LSCF wage 
employment trends after the introduction of the farm labour regulations in the early 1980s 
and the retrenchment and casualisation of labour that ensued. However, the super-
exploitation of the workers evident in the LSCFs through the paltry wages and residential 
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labour tenancy was neglected in the analysis. In the Communal Areas, the constraints to 
agricultural growth received wide coverage in the studies outside the LSCFs. 
As the years passed, the importance of the distribution of agricultural landholdings in 
shaping the agrarian labour relations can not be over-emphasised. The inequalities in land 
ownership biased in favour of the LSCFs amidst minimal land redistribution was 
reflected in the dominance of the latter in the agrarian labour markets, as well as the 
formal wage employment nationally. The inadequacy of the majority of the land short 
peasantry to survive on the basis of farming alone regardless of the increased state 
support being channelled to small-scale agriculture further reinforces the crucial role of 
land access. Under conditions of inequitable land distribution, semi-proletarianisation 
remains a dominant livelihood strategy for the peasantry. It can also be gleaned from the 
above that the transition in the nature of capitalist farming, represented during this period 
by the intensification and diversification of land uses to respond to export market 
opportunities in the EU and beyond, affects the structure of the labour force, and 
consequentially the employment conditions especially by displacing full time labour with 
part-time labour. 
State intervention in the labour markets can provide prospects for the protection and 
enhancement of the livelihoods of vulnerable working classes such as farm workers as 
seen through the general rise in real wages after the introduction of minimum wages in 
1980 and the incorporation of rural workers in the labour relations framework. It is also 
apparent, however, that without adequate monitoring of the implementation and an 
expansive manpower infrastructure, progressive labour policies alone are not enough to 
translate to the improvement of labour rights and livelihoods due to the evasion of 
regulations by LSCFs wanting to minimise cost outlays. What is also emerging from the 
assessments above is that the focus of agrarian policies on particular segments of the 
farming units and/or agro-ecological bias produces uneven development in the utilisation 
of wage labour in the LSCFs and self-employed labour in the peasantry. The experiences 
of the Mashonaland province, which benefitted mostly from the agricultural growth 
between 1980 and 1990, demonstrate this phenomenon. 
4.5 NEOLIBERAL REFORMS AND AGRARIAN LABOUR RELATIONS (1991-
1999) 
The neo-liberal Structural Adjustment policy framework adopted by Zimbabwe from 
1991 was based on market ideology for the ―allocation‖ and ―efficient‖ utilisation of 
resources and perpetuated societal inequalities (Moyo 1995; 2000; Masuko 1998; Mhone 
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2001). More emphasis was accorded to the promotion of exports as the vehicle for 
economic growth and national development and less was put on the requirements of the 
domestic market (Chidzero 1994). 
Income redistributive policies such as land reforms were postponed by these World Bank- 
and IMF promoted economic reforms to the detriment of the landless (Moyo 2011a; 
2000b). Instead, ESAP reinforced market based land reforms, which benefitted mostly the 
emerging black elite that managed to buy LSCFs by 2000 (Moyo 2005; 2003). Policy 
transformation with gradual shifts towards dirigisme and heterodox economic policy, 
however started to occur around 1996/7 through the development of Land Reform and 
Resettlement Phase II (LRRP-II) policy involving state compulsory expropriation of 
LSCFs (Yeros 2013b). This replaced the ―willing-buyer-willing seller‖ based land reform 
that had been in place since 1980. The policy shift was put into action by the GoZ 
through the gazetting of over 1,400 for compulsory acquisition in 1997, but less than a 
third were acquired for redistribution between 1998 and 2000 as the remainder were 
removed from the acquisition lists (Moyo 2000a: 25; Chambati & Moyo 2004: 5) due to 
the reversals at the High Court after litigation by the farmers (Utete 2003).  
Agrarian labour policy reforms that escorted ESAP and their implications on the farm 
labour relations are first unearthed below. This is followed by the assessment of the 
consequences of the increased promotion of export agriculture in the LSCFs on labour 
utilisation and what this translated to in terms of the socio-economic conditions of farm 
labour. The examination of the impacts of ESAP on the peasantry in the Communal Areas 
wraps up the discussion. 
4.5.1 Agrarian labour policy reforms under ESAP  
Employment security and the livelihoods of the working classes, including farm workers 
were undermined labour market deregulation and trade liberalisation (Sachikonye 1995; 
UNDP 1998; Kanyenze 2001). The promotion of exports led to the enlargment of new 
land uses and restructured the demand for labour in the LSCFs (Moyo 2000b). Foreign 
currency generation was a key priority (GoZ 1991; Chidzero 1994).  
The labour market interventions by the state in the previous decade shouldered the blame 
for the high unemployment rates in the economy (GoZ 1989). The deregulation of the 
labour market thus sought to leave the determination of prices and incomes to employers 
and employees. Employment security was reversed by Statutory Instrument 404 of 1990, 
which allowed employers to retrench employees without permission from the state 
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(Sachikonye 1995). By way of notice to the Works Council detailing the employees to be 
affected and the justification, employers could proceed with retrenchment. The National 
Employment Council (NEC) received the notice if there was no Works Council. The 
Rentrenchment Committee also got a copy of the notice and would only intervene if the 
employers and the employees failed to resolve this issue within one month. 
Minimum wage setting was replaced by Collective Bargaining between the employers 
and employees. The Labour Relations Ammendment Act of 1992 provided for the 
establishment of NECs, which were mandated to develop industry codes of conduct and 
undertake collective bargaining. The NEC for the Agricultural Industry was established in 
1992 and its Employment Code was gazetted as Statutory Instrument 323 of 1993. It 
included the ALB and GAPWUZ representing employers and employees respectively. 
The determination of wages and working conditions now became an outcome of the 
Collective Bargaining process and the state through the MPSLSW was responsible for 
gazetting the agreed wage rates (Chambati & Moyo 2004; Kanyenze 2001; Amanor-
Wilks 1995). After this, the gazetted wages legally bound all and sundry in the farming 
sector. Only permanent and seasonal labourers enjoyed the protection of the law since 
contract or pieceworkers were excluded and their conditions were negotiated between 
them and employers at the farm level. Seven grades were defined for farm workers in the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement – ranging from grade one (the least skilled general 
hands) to the grade seven (most skilled staff such as machine operators) (GoZ 1993). 
However, GoZ policy also allowed individual farm employers, with employee consent, to 
be exempted from the gazetted collective bargaining agreements, if they could prove their 
inability to pay the agreed wages to the MPSLSW. As per Statutory Instrument 356 of 
1993, the employment codes negotiated at the Works Council was superior to that of the 
NEC. Farm workers were thus severely disadvantaged since their workers committees 
were not capacitated to effectively negotiate with employers (Saunders 2001). The ―One 
Industry-One Union‖ was rescinded by the Labour Relations Ammendment Act of 1992 to 
allow more than one union per industry (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Kanyenze 2001).  
Neo-liberal reforms removed price controls on basic food commodities resulting in the 
spiralling monthly costs for the broader working class. Agricultural input subsidies and 
state marketing were arrested, and had negative impacts on self-employed labour in the 
Communal Areas as discussed later.  
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4.5.2 Export driven LSCF agriculture and agrarian labour relations 
The LSCFs further widened export production during ESAP with horticulture targeting 
mainly European vegetable and flower markets (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Moyo 2000b; Heri 
2006) and wildlife farming as the key sectors (Bond & Cummins 2006). New labour 
demand patterns emerged with the increased capital investment in LSCFs associated with 
these novel land uses.  
Small irrigable land sizes of about 10 hectares per LSCF characterised capital intensive 
horticultural production and the cropped area in this sector increased substantially from 
4,051 hectares in 1987 to an estimated 35,000 hectares by 1995 (Moyo 2000b: 91; 191). 
Investments in greenhouse technology was one of the central drivers of export 
horticulture growth (Heri 2006). But other enterprises such as cut-flowers, were also both 
capital and labour intensive, since they were employing about 27,000 workers, mostly 
women, on about 900 hectares – a labour intensity of 30 workers per hectare (Davies 
2000:ix). The growth of export horticulture production was uneven as the Mashonaland 
Provinces accounted for 60 percent of the 1,600 LSCF grower base by the mid-1990s 
(Moyo 2000b: 91). As the number of growers and land area under horticulture increased, 
so did the foreign exchange receipts in this sector also quadruple to reach a high of US$ 
136 million in 2000 in relation to the levels realised in 1991(GoZ 2001c: 68).  
The large cattle ranches paved way for wildlife farming in the Natural Regions III to IV 
in the Matebeleland Provinces in the 1990s (Bond & Cummins 2006). Apparently, the 
rise of wildlife farming was spurred by the high rates of return on financial investments, 
which were almost double those from cattle farming and the gross earnings from safari 
hunting alone had jumped more than 10 times to US$ 22 million between 1984 and 1998 
(Bond & Cummins 2006: 485). Such growth was reflected in the land areas as thirty one 
percent of LSCF land in 1994 was under wildlife, up from three percent in 1960 (Moyo 
2000b:109), including those in areas suited for intensive farming in Mashonaland 
Provinces who also joined to profit from the high financial returns. Beyond foreign 
currency generation, the adoption of wildlife farming especially in the latter provinces 
were meant to quell suggestions of land underutilisation in the LSCF sector as demands 
for land reform grew louder (Moyo 1999). 
During ESAP, wage employment in the LSCFs grew from 257,468 in 1990 to 334,521 by 
1996, and by 1999 there were 322,680 workers (Table 4.5). This was an exception to the 
massive retrenchment of workers experienced in other sectors of the economy. For 
instance, over 20,000 jobs disappeared in the Manufacturing sector between 1991 and 
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1995, whilst the public service lost over 17,000 jobs (CSO 1998a:53-54). But the 
tendency to casualise labour did not relent (Table 4.5).  
The LSCF labour force remained unevenly distributed and closely mirroring intensive 
land use and agricultural production patterns. The three Mashonaland Provinces (Central, 
East and West) were home to the largest section of the labour force, whilst the least 
shares were in the drier Matebeleland and Midland Provinces
 
(Figure 4.2). Shifts in the 
structure of the labour force were evident in the Mashonaland and Manicaland Provinces 
that dominated the export horticuture grower base. Specifically, there was a glaring  
decline in the proportion of permanent workers, alongside the rise in the casual workforce 
(Figure 4.2). Far less transformation was experienced in the Matebeleland and Midlands 
provinces, which traditionally had low levels of labour.  
Figure 4.2: Spread of the farm workers by province, 1983-2000 
 
Source: Compiled from Chambati & Moyo (2004:44)  
Altogether, the deregulation of the labour markets and the new land uses further increased 
the casualisation of farm labour, which had been underway since the 1970s and 1980s 
when LSCFs shifted away from labour intensive grain crops. Farm workers lost job 
security by becoming casuals who did not receive pensions, medical aid and housing 
benefits (Amanor-Wilks 1995; UNDP 1999; Magaramombe 2004). Non-permanent 
labour, which could be easily rentrenched, allowed LSCFs to adjust to global commodity 
price volatility and advance labour productivity demanded by export production 
(Amanor-Wilks 1995).  
Women expanded their representation in the LSCF work force from 24 percent in 1990 
(Kanyenze 2001: 106) to 31 percent in 2000 (Figure 4.3). This was occassioned by their 
preference in the horticultural sector where certain tasks such as picking flowers were 
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case in this sector in the Global South elsewhere (Maertens & Swinnen 2012). As before, 
over 50 percent of the women were casual workers in the late 1990s, and under 10 
percent of the permanent workers (Figure 4.3). Their share in the permanent workforce 
had only increased by two percent between 1972 and 1996 (Clarke 1977: 28; CSO 2001: 
130). 
Figure 4.3: Gender dimensions of farm wage employment, 1996 – 2000 
 
Source: Compiled from CSO (2001: 128)  
 
The share of foreign migrants continued to dwindle and by 1999, they were estimated to 
be around 10 percent of the LSCF labour force (FCTZ 2000; MPSL&SW 1998; 
Sachikonye 2003). Foreign workers that remained on LSCFs were born in the country 
and were thus citizens by birth, but many confronted impediments to access national 
identity documents to prove Zimbabwean citizenship (Magaramombe 2001; Chambati & 
Moyo 2004). In the labour intensive plantations and LSCFs in the Eastern Highlands, 
Mozambican migrants however remained a key labour source during the 1980s and 1990s 
(Amanor-Wilks 1995).
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 These included voluntary migrants and refugees fleeing civil 
war between the ruling party, FREELIMO and RENAMO insurgents (Amanor-Wilks 
1995). Some war escapees also ended up as wage labourers in the Communal Areas.  
This new wave of migrancy pinnacled after the 1992 devastating drought that afflicted the 
entire Southern Africa region, with estimates of 280,000 peasants from northern Tete 
Province crossing into Zimbabwe (Amanor-Wilks 1995: 52). This enlarged the farm 
labour supply and led to the shrinkage of wages as foreign migrants with fewer survival 
options accepted very low farm wages. Local labourers demanding higher wages were 
being replaced by refugees in the tea estates (Mutisi 2003). Although the LSCFs resisted 
the withdrawal of cheap labour provided by refugees, the joint GoZ and the United 
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 Nationally, the 1992 Population Census revealed there were 164,824 Mozambicans, 38, 203 Malawians 












































































Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) programme from 1995 onwards 
repatriated over 100,000 refugees back to Mozambique after the return of peace 
(Amanor-Wilks 1995). Nonetheless, voluntary circular migration for seasonal work 
continued in the Eastern frontier, but at reduced levels, and LSCFs exploited their illegal 
immigration status to pay severely low wages (Moyo et al. 2000). 
4.5.3 Wages and working conditions in the LSCFs in 1990s  
The collapse of real wages across the board was a key feature of ESAP (Yeros 2013a). 
Despite the adoption of Collective Bargaining, the GoZ did continue to intervene in 
minimum wage setting, but this time in support of (agrarian) capital by issuing warnings 
to workers that annual wage increases should not stifle the economic reforms underway 
(Kanyenze 2001; Yeros 2013a; 2002). In the space of a decade after ESAP was 
implemented, real farm wages were down by over 60 percent (see Table 4.6). Real wages 
only increased in 1995 and then again in 1997 following the farm worker strikes that are 
discussed below. Now the annual wage increases farm workers obtained under Collective 
Bargaining were below the inflation rate.
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 Indeed, the real wage of ZW$16.99 earned 
farm workers had deteroriated to below the wages they earned in 1979 (Table 4.6). Farm 
workers thus remained at the bottom of the wage ladder, earning a third of the lowest paid 
employee in all other sectors around 1999 (Chambati & Magaramombe 2008: 210). 
Regardless of the equal pay legislation provided in Labour Relations Act of 1985, women 
were discriminated in the farm wage labour markets and received the least pay (Amanor-
Wilks 1995, 1996; Rutherford 2001a; 2001b; Sylvester 2000). In fact, some female part-
time workers resorted to prostitution to supplement low wages (Muchena & Dzumbira 
2001). Thus, HIV and AIDS became a concern in the LSCFs (Mutangadura & Jackson 
1999; UNICEF 1994). Wages and working conditions in general also remained 
differentiated regionally with those in Matebeleland and Midlands Provinces receiving 
the lowest wages (Amanor-Wilks 1995), continuing the trends established during the 
colonial times (Palmer 1977). The local peasantry from Communal Areas in these drier 
regions, susceptible to frequent droughts had limited survival options beyond wage 
employment (Moyo & Ngobese 1991). Thus, the threat of unemployment was used to 
impose very bad working conditions.  
Although the new export land use patterns enhanced LSCF profits, their workers earned 
the same wages as those in other agricultural sub-sectors (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Davies 
                                                 
74 The annual inflation rate increased from 15.5 percent in 1990 to 58.5 percent in 1999 (CSO 2002). 
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2000). This was also partly motivated by need to avoid industrial unrest from the other 
workers and also because there was no special category for these workers in the 
Collective Bargaining agreement. Many in the cut-flower sub-sector were classified as 
general hands (Davies 2000). The structure of functional income distribution was 
substantially altered during ESAP as the percentage of profits to GDP increased from 47 
percent to 61 percent between 1987 and 1997 (UNDP 1999: 63). Simultaneously, the 
share of wages declined from 54 percent to 39 percent. 
The levels of labour productivity were comparable to those experienced in the 1980s, 
despite the declines experienced in the 1990s, and could in fact allow wages to be 
increased by at least six times between 1991 and 1997 without undermining LSCF 
profitability (Kanyenze 2001: 107).  
Demands for increased productivity under ESAP was met by the intensification of 
supervision of workers as LSCFs sought to extract maximum labour inputs. By the mid 
1990s, 66 percent of the workers surveyed in agro-industrial estates opined that work had 
become tougher (Sachikonye 1995: 88). Production incentives for workers were also 
instituted by employers to meet productivity targets, but this resulted in the increased 
exploitation of women and children as unpaid LSCF labour as they would assist male 
(permanent) workers to achieve and exceed labour targets (Sachikonye 1995).  
Farm workers‘ wages declined drastically to 23.7 percent of the PDL by 1999 (Table 4.6). 
To compress their wage bills, farmers classified the bulk of the farm workers in the 
lowest grade of employment that earned the minimum wages (Amanor-Wilks, 1995). 
Analysis by Chambati and Moyo (2004: 7) showed that around 2000, close to 82 percent 
of the permanent workers were classified in the unskilled and semi-skilled category 
(grade one) and skilled worker categories (grade three upwards) were occupied by fewer 
than 12 percent. Therefore, the minimum wage coincided with the wage ceiling in most 
instances (Loewenson 1992).  
Far from being the norm, incremental improvements in working conditions were noted in 
export cut-flower enterprises (Davies 2000). The few LSCFs who had enrolled for the 
international labelling programmes for flower exporters were compelled to offer 
permanent written employment contracts. They were also supposed to adhere to a set of 
labour practices such as provision of protective clothing, maternity leave and a 48 hour 
working week. Female seasonal labourers were the major beneficiaries as they were 
converted to permanent employees. Yet, as Davies (2000) observed, LSCFs circumvented 
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some of these regulations by forcing women to commit in writing that they had opted to 
remain seasonal employees. Contradictory legislation was however introduced during this 
time whereby companies including LSCFs could apply for Export Promotion Zone (EPZ) 
status that would set aside the Labour Relations Act of 1985 (Yeros 2013a; Gwisai 2005). 
Blacks that purchased LSCFs after 1980 also did not provide any different working 
conditions to those found in white LSCFs (Tandon 2001). Unionisation was resisted on 
black owned farms as much it was on white LSCFs and living conditions in farm 
compounds were worse off in black LSCFs and state farms such as ARDA (Kanyenze 
2001).  
Poverty levels amongst farm workers  
No doubt, poor people were a large fraction of the farm worker community. The poverty 
survey conducted by the national statistical agency illustrated that over 75 percent of the 
people living on LSCFs were below the PDL compared to 88.3 percent in the Communal 
Areas (CSO 1998b: 119). Although they seemed better off than the peasantry in the 
poverty rates, it is critical to point out that farm workers ranked poorly on most social 
indicators compared to the latter (Tandon 2001) and their narrow asset base, including 
landlessness meant that they depended relied heavily on wage incomes (Kanyenze 2001). 
Poverty levels were also gendered as female headed farm worker households were worst 
affected (CSO 1998b).  The type of farm job held did not substantially influence the 
incidence of poverty as even those higher up the employment ladder were not immune to 
it. As such, by the time FTLRP land allocations unravelled, the livehoods of most farm 
workers were uncertain.  
Food consumption patterns also changed substantially amongst farm workers. Less than 
41 percent of them could still afford basic commodities such as bread, beef and sugar 
around 1994, after receiving their wages and 24 percent had withdrawn children from 
school (Sachikonye 1995: 93). Decontrol of prices of basic commodities hurt farm 
workers more than other rural dwellers given their dependence on unstable food markets 
during ESAP. Moreover, compared to elsewhere price were always higher in the farm 
stores that were monopolised by the LSCFs and long distances to other alternatives 
limited the choices of farm labourers (Potts & Mutambirwa 1995).  
Overcrowding remained a feature of farm compounds with a national sample survey in 
the mid 1990s showing that while there were 21,642 permanent and casual workers 
empoyed on 274 LSCFs, there were 60,180 people resident in the compounds (Tandon 
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2001: 239). A variety of wage augmenting productive activities were also undertaken by 
farm workers within the compound to include food crop production on small plots of land 
(ranging from 0.2 to 0.6 hectares) that were accessed by the senior members of LSCF 
labour force such as foremen and clerks (FCTZ 2001; Rutherford 2001a, Vhurumuku et 
al. 1998). Trading in natural resources such as firewood and alluvial gold was also 
documented among farm workers (FCTZ 2001). Women were mostly involved in poultry 
rearing for sale to the managerial employees (Tandon 2001). Food subsidies provided 
mainly by the grain farmers in Mashonaland West in the late 1990s also served to fill the 
income gaps of farm workers (FCTZ 2002). 
Agency 
 
The national labour centre, ZCTU, was opposed to ESAP and suggested policy 
alternatives to market liberalisation (ZCTU 1996). Increasingly, the trade union organised 
radical actions to express workers dissatisfaction with the economic crises induced by 
structural adjustment policies. This entailed mobilising urban and rural working classes to 
stay away from work and sponsoring food riots to respond to the rise in the cost of living 
amid the decline in real wages (Yeros 2013a). Tensions grew between the union and the 
ZANU (PF) led state and by 1998 their relationship had been severely undermined 
(Tandon 2001). In fact, Tandon (2001: 233) further adds that the subservient role ZCTU 
played as affiliate of the ruling party dealing with labour issues in 1980s had fallen away 
(see also Sachikonye 1995).  
By 1995 and 1996, wages across the board had been eroded and labour strikes were on 
the increase (Yeros 2013a; b; 2002). The estimates of the number of strikes recorded 
annually before 1990 were generally below 50 but had peaked to over 230 in 1997 
(Saunders 2001: 146). According to Yeros (2013a: 395), the number of strikes were as 
high as 236 in 1996 alone. More than 100,000 workers from diverse sectors participated 
in the extensive strikes in 1997 (Saunders 2001: 148). Farm workers numbering about 
40,000 engaged in wild cat strikes for about 10 days in October 1997 without the 
coordination of their main union, GAPWUZ (Saunders 2001: 149). Beginning in Mutoko 
(some 145 kilometres East of Harare) and later spreading to various districts nationally, 
farm workers protested violently by blocking national road highways, burning fields and 
tobacco barns, destroying farming equipment and cars, looting farm stores as well as 
threatening violence on their employers. The impoverished families of farm workers also 
joined the strike and the farmers subsequently succumbed to demands for a 40 percent 
wage increase in 1998 (Rutherford 2001b). However, the prevailing economic conditions 
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implied that farm wages were only equivalent to 39.5 percent of the PDL (Kanyenze 
2001: 106).  
At this stage, the effectiveness of GAPWUZ in mobilising members and representing 
workers was further distracted by the internal leadership fights that persisted throughout 
the 1990s. Since the ―One Industry One Union‖ was now redundant, GAPWUZ then 
splintered into several trade unions (Kanyenze 2001: 104).  
The Manicaland branch of GAPWUZ formed the Zimbabwe Agro-Industry Workers 
Union (ZIAWU) in 1997, after its demands since 1993 for more representation of agro-
industrial workers in the national executive were denied. Another union, the Zimbabwe 
Horticulture, Crocodile, Sugar and Allied Workers also evolved in 1997 led by a former 
Deputy General Secretary, who had lost elections during the 1996 congress. The 
sugarcane multinational companies caused further divisions when they supported their 
workers to form a separate union, the Zimbabwe Sugar Milling Workers Union 
(ZISMIWU) to spite GAPWUZ, which had partly coordinated a labour strike over 
retrenchment packages in 1992 by the plantation workers (Tandon 2001). By 1999, the 
collective voice of farm workers was therefore dispersed in four trade unions, whose 
disunity was displayed when they absconded the 1998 NEC wage negotitiations after 
failing to agree to a common position (Tandon 2001).  
GAPWUZ however retained the largest membership base, but with its financial resources 
from subscription fees reduced by union fragmentation. Increased financial support from 
donors had earlier enabled it to expand its membership, professionalise the bureaucracy 
and develop organisational skills under the tutelage of ZCTU (Yeros 2013a). At its peak 
around 1995, it had managed to recruit about a third of the permanent workers (65,000 
members) (Kibble & Vanlerberghe 2000: 26). Amanor-Wilks (1995: 5) put the 
membership of GAPWUZ at 80,000, while ZISMIWU was representing 15,000 workers 
in the Triangle, Hippo Valley and Mkwasine sugar plantations. However, membership 
fluctuated owing to cyclical instability of the labour force. Circa 1999, GAPWUZ‘s 
membership had dropped to 20,000 or only six percent of the total agricultural 
employment then (Kanyenze 2001: 110). Moreover, its field bureaucracy comprising of 
only 48 officers was severely inadequate to cover the expansive LSCFs nationally 
(Amanor-Wilks 1995: 5). At a rate of 50 percent, workers in agro-industrial estates, 
which had elaborate industrial relations frameworks were more unionised than the other 
LSCFs (Sachikonye 1995: 93). 
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Farm worker trade unionsim also adopted a ―workerist‖ approach, which mainly sought 
to address workplace constraints (Moyo et al. 2000: 190). Their strategies were thus 
excessively focused on improving farm wages, to the neglect of structural causes of their 
predicament rooted in land inequalities. Gaining access to land through the impending 
land reforms was hardly a concern amongst the trade unions that emphasised protection 
of their poorly paid jobs. Following the designation of 1471 LSCFs in 1997 for 
resettlement, this also concerned some analysts (Mtapuri & Waeterloos 1998) and NGOs 
(FES 1998).  
However, the coalescence of ZCTU with other civic movements and (agrarian) capital, 
first within the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in 1998, and later as an 
opposition political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), compromised 
its mandate for worker emancipation (Yeros 2013b). Eventually, its ―regime change‖ 
agenda, Yeros (2013b) argued, supported externally by donors put it into conflict with the 
land occupation movement led by ZANU (PF) aligned war veterans. Most union 
organisers, including from GAPWUZ left their positions and took up posts within the 
newly formed opposition party weakening the labour struggles (Magwaza 2017: 
Interview). 
Beyond exiting to the Communal Areas, either through marriage or informal land 
purchases of musha or rural home as observed earlier (Rutherford 2001a; Vhurumuku et 
al. 1998), farm workers largely did not exhibit any land reform activism after their 
occupation of abandoned farms in the early 1980s (Herbst 1990). However, as ESAP and 
the accompanying economic crisis exposed the limits of wage employment, some farm 
workers began to view their future as land owners in the LRRP-II. Indeed the preference 
surveys sponsored by the MPSL&SW confirmed that the majority of the farm workers 
surveyed (73 percent) wanted to be allocated resettlement land rather than re-employment 
(GoZ 2005: 10).  
Hence some farm workers occuppied LSCFs in 1997/98, alongside peasants from 
Communal Areas and veterans of the liberation struggle agitating for quicker land 
reforms in Mashonaland districts such as Goromonzi (Sadomba & Helliker 2010). This 
followed hard on the heels of the 1998 Land Donors Conference‘s failure to resolve the 
land reform issue. Some farm workers also independently led and organised land 
occupations (Moyo 2001). While others sought to protect their jobs and some had to be 
coerced, persuaded, intimidated or educated by war veterans to participate in occupations 
of LSCFs (Sadomba & Helliker 2010: 213; see also Helliker & Bhatasara 2018).  
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Options for farm workers to access land until 1999 and pursue alternative social 
reproduction as land owners in their own right was blocked by limited land redistribution. 
Close to 30 percent of the rural families were estimated to be landless in the late 1990s 
(UNDP 1998: 53), many of whom were farm workers. Given the unemployment 
problems in the country as a result of the limited absorptive capacity of the mechanised 
LSCFs and urban industries (Moyo & Ngobese 1991), the bargaining power of farm wage 
labour remained low.  
4.5.4 Agrarian labour relations in the Communal Areas under neoliberal reforms 
Food crops remained the focus of most peasants, although a few did take up labour 
intensive export production (Moyo 2000b). Cotton attracted the largest section of 
peasantry producing for the international markets (Mariga 1994). Air cured tobacco was 
another export crop farmed in the Communal Areas and its area planted grew from 3,267 
hectares in 1990 to 6,497 hectares in 1995 (TIMB 1997: 13). Locally consumed 
vegetables were the main horticultural land use activity among peasants and more widely 
visible in Mashonaland East and Central Provinces (Heri 2006). 
During ESAP, the state withdrew agricultural input subsidies and liberalised the 
marketing of previously controlled products such as maize grain and cotton (Takavarasha 
1994; Chidzero 1994). By 1990, the GMB had managed to establish 78 depots and 60 
crop buying inputs in the Communal Areas and two years into ESAP four depots and 51 
crop buying inputs had been closed (Gibbon 1995: 12). Four years later, the GMB had 
been reduced into the ―buyer of last resort‖ and could only purchase grain that private 
traders were unable to absorb (Matanda & Jeche 1998). Together with the drought that 
devastated the country in 1991/92, economic reforms impeded the social reproduction of 
the peasantry (Wekwete 1998).  
The 300 percent increase in the price of fertiliser between 1990 and 1995 led to the fall of 
the share of this input consumed by the peasantry from 24 percent to 22 percent (Oni 
1997: 68). Regional differentiation was also evident as the peasantry in drier areas such as 
Chivi district totally stopping the application of purchased fertilisers (Scoones 1997). The 
capacity to purchase inputs was injured by the decline in remittances as urban workers 
struggled with rentrenchments and increased cost of living (Masuko 1998; UNDP 1999). 
Resultantly, the agricultural productivity of many commodities declined during the 
1990s. The average maize yield for the 1990-1995 was 13.47 percent lower than that 
realised between 1985-1990 period and much larger declines were recorded in cotton 
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seed production, 16.57 percent for the same period (Oni 1997: 68). Overall output volume 
also declined annually between 1990 and 1995 - two percent, 3.3 percent, 6.1 percent and 
4.8 percent for maize, sorghum, groundnuts and soyabeans respectively (Oni 1997: 61). 
Decontrolled prices of vaccines and breeding stock damaged the quality of livestock in 
the Communal Areas, while the ravaging 1991/92 drought decimated stock particularly in 
areas characterised by overgrazing (Scoones et al. 1998).  
Presumably to compensate for yield losses, the total area under cultivation in the 
Communal Areas expanded by over 200,000 hectares between 1990 and 1995 (Oni 
1997:vi). The area under maize remained relatively stable, but cotton, soyabeans, and 
sunflower, which experienced huge producer price increases had their areas under 
cultivation expanded by peasants (Muir 1994). Notwithstanding the areal expansion, the 
number of self-employed agricultural workers in the Communal Areas declined from 2, 
328,222 workers in 1993 (CSO 1998a: 42) to 1,696,128 workers in 1999 (CSO 2000: 45).  
Immediate cash needs after harvest exposed peasants to exploitation by middlemen 
(Matanda & Jeche 1998) who purchased grain at between 50 and 60 percent of the prices 
prevailing on the liberalised maize markets elsewhere (Oni 1997: 61). Real prices also 
fell as the inflation rate escalated and peasants in 1994 were receiving 30 percent less the 
price per tonne of maize they got in 1980 (Oni 1997: 40).  
Economic distress also fuelled the outmigration of Communal Areas residents, mostly 
male youths in search of urban employment (Potts & Mutambirwa 1997; Potts 2000;  
Paradza 2010). Some studies in the Communal Areas revealed that for every seven 
females, there were only four males (Biljmakers, Basset & Sanders 1995: 250). Between 
1992 and 2002, the proportion of the rural to national population contracted from 69 
percent to 65 percent (CSO 2002: 16; CSO 1992: 24). Returns from self-employed farm 
labour had become even more precarious. 
The return of semi-proletariats retrenched from their urban jobs intensified the pressure 
on the and conflicts in the Communal Areas (Oni 1997; Moyo 2000b). Around 1996, 54.7 
percent of the surveyed Communal Area households in Shamwa complained of land 
conflicts (Moyo, Matondi & Marongwe 1998: 171). Most of the land conflicts (36.1 
percent) were related to boundary disputes as a result of encroachment onto their 
neighbour‘s arable fields, ostensibly to increase production. Communal Area residents 
also experienced violence in the LSCFs, when they were caught tresspassing in search of 
firewood and/or grazing their cattle to meet shortages (Marongwe 2001; Matondi 2001). 
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Amidst the deteriorating incomes, education and health costs previously subsidised by the 
state put pressure on the budgets of peasant households (Bijlmakers, Basset & Sanders 
1995). Many women increasingly joined wage labour to fill these income gaps (Ruzvidzo 
1999). Their existing roles as unpaid family labour on the farm and for reproductive roles 
(Mvududu & McFadden 2001) were thus compounded to constitute a ―triple work 
burden‖ for women (Lyon et al. 2017: 328). Since many peasants were net purchasers of 
food (including maize grain), they were not immune to the price increases after the 
decontrol of prices on basic commodities (Potts & Mutambirwa 1998).  
The poverty rates nationally had risen from 40.4 percent in 1990/91 to 63.3 percent in 
1995/96 (CSO 1998b: 36) of which the majority were peasants. Altogether the deepening 
poverty, growing landlessness and massive retrenchment of urban workers after ESAP 
fuelled demands for land redistribution by 1997 (Moyo 2000; Moyo & Yeros 2005b; 
Sadomba 2008, Moyo et al. 2000). 
It is evident from the above that the LSCF labour relations continued to receive the most 
academic attention. Now emphasis had shifted to examining the impacts of land use 
changes, export production and technological advances during ESAP, as well as the 
deregulation of the labour markets. The abuse of farm labour through phyiscal violence, 
racism, unpaid overtime work and marginalisation of women at the workplace began to 
emerge in the studies in the 1990s. The poor socio-economic conditions of farm workers, 
mainly their limited access to health and education, and poor housing only emerged as an 
issue of concern from the mid 1990s. However, the nature of resistance by farm workers 
to their material conditions largely remained silent. Meanwhile, the studies on the 
peasantry sought to uncover mainly the effects of ESAP on agricultural production and 
labour relations were hardly considered worthy of note. 
If state intervention in the labour relations and agrarian markets can uplift the livelihoods 
of the poor peasantry and farm workers, then its withdrawal will result in negative 
consequences to these vulnerable segments of the populace. Neoliberal economic policies 
thus combined with land access constraints to intensify the poverty levels and widen 
inequalities between the rural underclasses and LSCFs. Indeed the precarity of the 
livelihoods of the farm labourers and the peasantry were very vivid in the data provided 
in the literature. Over the long duree, the role of the LSCF model of agriculture in the 
generation of not only secure but quality employment able to meet the subsistence 
requirements of farm workers and their families is also called into question. Yet they 
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monopolise the ownership of agricultural landholdings and moreso in a situation where 
labour intensive land uses are being replaced with the capital intensive land uses, which 
has been a key tenet in the re-organisation of capitalist agriculture since the 1970‘s. 
4.6 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has shown that agrarian labour relations have been evolving since 1890. 
Land alienation undermined the capacity of peasants to live off the land and subordinated 
them  into cheap wage labour in the LSCFs and beyond for their survival. Locals who 
resisted wage labour in the early years of LSCF development as they retained land to 
continue peasant production overtook foreign migrants from present day Malawi, 
Mozambique and Zambia as chief suppliers of labour to LSCFs as land shortages 
intensified after another wave dispossession was instituted by the Rhodesian government 
from the 1930s onwards. Taxation was a key strategy used by the colonial state, together 
with legal and extra-legal mechanisms to generate wage labour. The agrarian labour 
regime was shaped not only by land dispossession but also the various dynamic domestic 
and international economic and social policies. Uneven and incomplete dispossession 
however implied the resilience of a differentiated peasantry, which combined the wage 
economy alongside farming on small plots of land.  
The transition from colonial to majority rule did not radically alter the agrarian labour 
relations as the white LSCFs retained dominance over land ownership and subsequently 
their influence on agrarian labour relations (Moyo 2011a). Hence, the LSCFs 
monopolised the agrarian labour markets and utilised the political power conferred by 
land to repress farm wage labour until 1999. Adverse working conditions were 
commonplace for the ―bonded‖ labour two decades after independence and many workers 
struggled to make a living. Structural adjustment policies reversed the minor gains (farm) 
labour made in the early 1980s. Persistent land shortages and widespread poverty in the 
context of neoliberal reforms translated to uncertainty in the social reproduction of the 
self-employed peasantry. Extensive redistribution of LSCFs during the FTLRP from 2000 
to mostly peasants could therefore be expected to rapidly transform the inequitable 
agrarian (labour) relations undergirded by uneven land distribution. The extent of 
agrarian restructuring imposed by the FTLRP within the dynamic socio-economic 
environment and their ramifications on agrarian labour relations are discussed in the next 
chapter.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CHANGING AGRARIAN STRUCTURE, LABOUR POLICIES AND 
AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT, 2000-2017 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
The previous chapter outlined the evolution of the agrarian labour relations since the 
colonial era structured around peasant land dispossession and the subsequent generation 
of private property on European Settler LSCFs, side-by-side with other extra-economic 
measures. Further, it indicated the changes in the agrarian policies after the attainment of 
independence in 1980 until 1999. The key message emerging from the re-examination of 
the literature was that minimal land redistribution then had led to only minor alterations 
in the agrarian labour regime as the white LSCFs maintained their stranglehold on land 
ownership and in turn their influence on agrarian labour relations. This chapter discusses 
the major institutional and economic changes that contributed to the transformation of the 
agrarian labour relations since 2000. The purpose is to illustrate the extent of agrarian 
restructuring through the FTLRP, changing agrarian (labour) policies and socio-economic 
context between 2000 and 2017 and their implications on the reformation of labour 
relations in rural areas.  
The pace of land redistribution was increased during the FTLRP, which  was 
implemented from 2000 under the LRRP-II that was initiated in 1997/98. It entailed the 
compulsory acquisition of mostly white owned LSCFs by the state for redistribution to 
various population segments, including peasants, war veterans, farm workers and, middle 
and urban working classes. It was intended to redress the racial inequities in land 
ownership inherited from colonialism, decongest the overcrowded Communal Areas, 
reverse rural poverty and indigenise commercial farming (GoZ 2001a: 6-7). Not all land 
was acquired during the FTLRP, as some large scale plantation estates (coffee, sugarcane, 
tea, timber, citrus fruit etc.) were exempted from compulsory acquisition (Utete 2003; 
Moyo 2011b; Scoones et al. 2010; Matondi 2013; Hanlon et al. 2013).
75
 The FTLRP 
coincided with deteriorating economic conditions that began during ESAP, which in turn 
shaped the agricultural production patterns and labour utilisation in the redistributed 
farms. 
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 These included agro-industrial properties involved in value addition of beef, poultry, and milk and 
multiplying seed; landholders possessing Export Processing Zone (EPZ) permits; church and mission 
owned farms; and those  protected by Bilateral Investment and Protection Agreements (BIPPA) (Utete 
2003: 19) 
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The land reform policy did not adequately address what would happen to the retrenched 
farm workers who lived and worked on acquired LSCF private properties with limited 
land tenure rights (see Magaramombe et al. 1998; Sachikonye & Zishiri 1998; Zimbizi 
2000; Moyo et al. 2000; GoZ 2001a). However, various policy measures were instituted 
at different periods during the FTLRP to address their needs. These included the 
retrenchment and re-employment policy on acquired LSCFs; land access and residential 
tenancy reforms; amendment of the citizenship legislation and repatriation policy; social 
services provision; and wage determination policy. How these changes shaped agrarian 
labour relations culminating in a new agrarian employment structure is illuminated 
below. First, the extensive land redistribution occasioned by the FTLRP and the resulting 
diverse agrarian structure are analysed. This is followed by a discussion on the emerging 
agricultural production processes as the socio-economic context shifted. Before 
examining how FTLRP dynamics evolved at the district level leading to differentiated 
local agrarian employment structures, the shifts to the agrarian (labour) relations are 
examined.  
5.2 LAND REDISTRIBUTION AND TENURE REFORM POLICY 
A birfucated approach was adopted to redistrbute the LSCFs acquired during the FTLRP 
through the A1 and A2 models/schemes. The peasantry sector, which already 
incorporated the Communal and Old Resettlement Areas was aimed for extension by the 
A1 model and entailed two sub-models namely; the villagised and self-contained 
models.
76
 In the A2 model which was conceptualised as the commercial farming scheme, 
sub models were categorised according to the physical farm size to include large; 
medium; and small scale. An additional variant of the A2 model was the peri-urban 
whose plots are located within a radius of 40 kilometres from major urban centres.  
The Maximum Farm Sizes policy delineated the land sizes to be parcelled to the 
beneficiaries on the basis of the agro-ecological potential of a particular district (GoZ 
2001a).
77
 Between 5 and 7 arable hectares and grazing land of up to 15 hectares were 
earmarked for parcelling to A1 model recipients in the agro-ecological regions 
commanding good soils and rainfall (I to III) (GoZ 2001a; Sukume et al. 2004). While 
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 In the villagised model, beneficiaries were allocated residential land and arable and grazing land in other 
sections of the former LSCFs. Beneficiaries  resettled in the same former LSCF share grazing land. Whilst, 
on the Self contained plots on the other hand, allocated both the arable and grazing land; and land for the 
homestead within the same subdivision. 
77 Those resettled in the higher potential agro-ecological regions (Natural Regions I to III) suited for 
intensive farming got smaller pieces of land compared to those in the lower potential zones (Natural 
Regions IV to V). 
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those in low potential agro-ecological regions (IV and V) were designated to benefit from 
relatively larger land sizes of about 10 arable hectares and grazing land to the tune of 30 
hectares. The three sub-models of A2 scheme were targeted to receive larger land sizes 
than those in the A1 settlements starting from 20 hectares to as much as 2 000 hectares 
based on the Natural Region the LSCFs were found (see Utete 2003; Sukume & Moyo 
2004; Moyo et al. 2009). Land redistribution was executed alongside the ―One-
Household-One farm policy‖ that was designed to eradicate households accessing 
multiple pieces of agricultural land (GoZ 2001a).  
The sub-division of LSCFs into smaller sized farms implied that a broader base of 
potential employers were generated and/or the agrarian wage labour market was 
diversified. Moreover the downsized farms would imply relatively less labourers in each 
unit compared to the former LSCFs (Chambati 2011). Whilst in the A1 sector, the arable 
land sizes in better agro-ecological regions and six times higher than in the Communal 
Areas would necessitate hired labour to augment family labour supplies.  
Constitutional Amendment No. 17 of 2006 nationalised the freehold property rights in the 
acquired LSCFs. Land reform beneficiaries thus derive their rights through the state in the 
form of perpetual permit tenure or ―use rights‖ and 99 year legally enforceable leases for 
A1 and A2 households respectively. These formal tenures are however yet to be issued to 
most of beneficiaries and temporary land ―offer letters‖ currently indicate their land 
ownership (Moyo 2007). These state tenures have reduced the authority of the new land 
beneficiaries to tie labour to employment in return for residency, as well as the 
exclusionary rights provided by freehold title. The Chapter revisits this issue in more 
detail (Section 5.4.2). This potentially allows wider access to natural resources in these 
areas and unrestrained circulation of people and goods and, thus generate non-farm 
employment opportunities (Mkodzongi 2013b).  
The land short peasants from the Communal Areas were targeted as the main land 
beneficiaries, alongside other groups requiring land for their living and liberation war 
veterans were classified as a special category (GoZ 2001a). Various empirical studies 
have indeed exposed the dominance of the peasantry from Communal Areas in the 
FTLRP land allocations (Moyo et al. 2009; Scoones et al. 2010; Matondi 2012; Murisa 
2010). National survey returns from Moyo et al. (2009: 22) showed that 62.1 percent of 
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the landholders were previously Communal Area peasants.
78
This was followed by 
beneficiaries from the urban areas who accounted for 22.9 percent of the land allocations. 
The urbanites accounted for 35 percent of the beneficiaries in the A2 scheme since they 
were well placed to provide proof of resources to engage in commercial farming and in 
close proximity of the application centres (Moyo et al. 2009). Evidence from three 
districts in Masvingo Province also reflected similar beneficiary patterns (Scoones et al. 
2010). The receipt of land amongst these beneficiaries was spread throughout the 2000s 
with the A1 plot allocations commencing around 2000 and A2 allocations from 2002 
onwards (Moyo & Yeros 2007; Moyo et al. 2009). The pace of redistribution however 
slowed down from 2006 onwards (Moyo et al. 2009; Matondi 2012; Hanlon et al 2013). 
This differentiated access to land by the year of resettlement influenced the setting up of 
farming activities and hence the utilisation of farm labour.  
Similar to the LRRP-I, farm workers were not specified by the FTLRP policy as part of 
the earmarked land recipients, notwithstanding the preference for land allocations 
indicated by the majority of them in a government sponsored survey (GoZ 2005).
79
 
During the Presidential Land Review Committee audits in 2003, enquiries by the 
legislature‘s lands committee  and various advocacy initiatives by NGOs such as FCTZ, 
the land needs of farm workers came to the attention of policy makers (Chambati 2013b). 
The GoZ directed the land allocation committees to expand their accomodation of farm 
workers from about 2002 (Chambati & Moyo 2004) and some districts such as Mazowe 
and Zvimba did reserve some farms only for their resettlement (Matondi 2012; 
Magaramombe 2010). Prior to this, some land allocation committees were already 
considering applications for land by farm workers and regularising those who had 
received informal allocations during the land occupations in the early 2000s. Rather than 
total exclusion from FTLRP land allocations (Alexander 2003; ZHRF & JAG 2007), 
some research indicated that they accounted for about 8.1 percent of the land 
beneficiaries (Moyo et al. 2009: 22).
80
 However the levels of farm worker beneficiaries 
also differed from district to district (Moyo et al. 2009; Scoones et al. 2010; Scoones et 
al. 2018a).  
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 This was one of the largest surveys done during the FTLRP encompassing over 2,000 A1 and A2 land 
beneficiaries in six districts covering six provinces (Goromonzi – Mashonaland East, Zvimba – 
Mashonaland West; Chipinge – Manicaland; Chiredzi – Masvingo and Mangwe – Matebeleland South). 
79
 The Inception Phase Framework Plan of LRRP-II included farm workers as targets for land allocations 
(GoZ 1998c). Many former farm workers (73%) preferred resettlement (GoZ 2005: 16). 
80
 In Masvingo Province, they were seven percent of the land beneficiaries (Scoones et al. 2010).  
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The extensive land redistribution reformed the unequal agrarian structure into one more 
broadly based on the 10 million hectares formerly occupied by 4 500 mainly white 
LSCFs (Moyo 2011a: 512; Table 5.1). Approximately 146 000 A1 farms and 22,000 A2 
farms averaging 330 hectares are part of the new agrarian structure (Moyo 2011a: 512; 
Table 5.1). Thus, the number of farm units on the land previously occupied by 4,500 
LSCFs was multiplied by over 30 times.  
Table 5.1: Agrarian structure: estimated landholdings from 1980 to 2010 
Farm 
categories 
Farms/households (000‘s) Area held (000 ha) Average Farm size 
(ha)* 
1980 2000 2010 1980* 2000* 2010* 1980 2000 2010 
No % No % No  % Ha % ha  % ha % 
Peasantry 700 98 1,125 99 1,321 98 16,400 49 20,067 61 25,826 79 23 18 20 
Middle 
farms 
8.5 1 8.5 1 30.9 2 1,400 4 1,400 4 4,400 13 165 165 142 
Large 
farms 
5.4 1 4.956 0.4 1.371 0.1 13,000 39 8,691.6 27 1,156.9 4 2,407 1,754 844 
Agro-
Estates 
0.296 0.1 0.296 0.02 0.247 0.02 2,567 8 2,567 8 1,494.6 5 8,672 8,672 6,051 
Total 714 100 1,139 100 1,353 100 33,367 100 32,726 100 32,878 100 46.7 28.7 24.3 
Source: Moyo (2011b: 262); *-Peasant farm sizes are inclusive of shared grazing areas. 
The new trimodal agrarian structure, which evolved from the FTLRP is composed of the 
peasantry; small to middle capitalists; large capital and corporate capital/agro-industrial 
estates (Moyo & Yeros 2005b; Moyo 2011a; 2011b). According to the latter research, 
these farm classes are differentiated by the land sizes accessed, forms of land control, 
agricultural and land use patterns, relationship to the markets, access to capital and forms 
of labour applied. The peasantry, comprising of Communal Areas, Old Resettlement and 
A1 resettlement land, are largely dependent on self-employed family labour to chiefly 
produce to secure household food requirements and are partially inserted into the markets 
(Moyo & Yeros 2005; Moyo, 2011a;b; 2013). They are now the dominant category in 
share of the number of farm households (97.6 percent) and agricultural land held (78.6 
percent) (Table 5.1). Close to six million hectares were added to the land owned by the 
peasantry between 2000 and 2010. New A1 peasantries are characterised by superior 
conditions for agricultural production due to the more land they now own in favourable 
agro-ecological locations compared to the old peasantry in the Communal Areas (Hanlon 
et al. 2013; Mkodzongi 2013). It therefore follows that the farm labour requirements of 
the new peasantry would likely outpace those of Communal Area peasants (Chambati 
2017). 
Both the number of farm units and total land owned by small to medium capitalist 
farmers increased tremendously (Moyo 2011a; Moyo & Nyoni 2013). This group that 
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mainly organise their farming through the use of wage labour and their agricultural output 
is destined for the market, includes small and large capitalist farms. The small/middle 
capitalists‘ category own between 30 and 50 hectares of land and comprise 2.6 percent of 
the farm households (Table 5.1). The old SSCFs that were designed in the 1930s to 
accomodate black commercial farmers (Moyana 1984; Riddel & Dickermann 1986) are 
part of this class together with the small and medium A2 farms.  
The large capitalists sector includes the large A2 farms and remaining white and black 
LSCFs and controls more land resources ranging between 150 to 1,500 hectares per farm 
unit. This class represent the smallest section of the new farming units by both the 
numbers and land area held. Land sizes in this sector average 800 hectares and indicate  a 
reduction in the size compared to the former LSCFs which averaged in excess of 2,000 
hectares (Table 5.1). The agro-estates command large landholdings exceeding 8,000 
hectares in some instances in which plantation agriculture (sugarcane, tea, coffee and 
forestry) is dominant.  The employment per farm unit is highest in this sector and the 
production for the export markets and agro-industrial processing feature prominently in 
this sector (Moyo 2014; Hall et al. 2017). Altogether, the growth of the capitalist farm 
sector via the A2 scheme offered possibilities for the broadening of the farm labour 
markets (Chambati 2013a). 
Differences are noticeable in the land tenure relations amongst the farm classes. The 
customary and state permit tenure governing land rights among the peasantry in the 
Communal Areas and A1 schemes respectively, are not legally tradeable and use rights 
are in perpetuity (Moyo 2011a; 2007; Murisa 2014; 2010). Customs mediated by 
traditional leaders inform the land administration in the Communal Areas, while the A1 
land owners have a direct relationship with the state as the ultimate title holder and land 
allocating authority (Moyo 2007; Murisa 2010; 2014). Although the jurisidiction of 
traditional leaders was extended into the new resettlement areas, the law limits their land 
administration roles in these spaces (GoZ 2013a). In contrast, legally tradeable 99 year 
leases confer rights to the A2 farms, while  freehold property remain operational for 
LSCFs that were not acquired during the FTLRP (Matondi 2012; Scoones et al. 2010; 
Scoones 2015b).   
This new agrarian structure had resulted in the loss of about 200,000 formal farm jobs on 
acquired LSCFs countrywide by 2010 of which about 50 percent were part time 
(Chambati 2011: 1052). More jobs continued to be lost as land redistribution proceeded 
and less than 150 LSCFs remained in operation around 2016 (MGA 2017: Interview). 
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Displacements from the farm compounds affected between 30, 000 and 45, 000  to 
destinations including Communal Areas, urban areas and informal settlements (Chambati 
2011: 1052). Others relocated to neighbouring countries and sought work in commercial 
farms in South Africa (Rutherford & Addison 2007; Addison 2013; Bolt 2013) and 
Mozambique (Hammar 2010). However, the extent of former farm worker migration to 
neighbouring countries is not known in the absence of systematic data collection on this.  
Evidence presented by Chambati (2011: 1052) relying on national surveys conducted by 
AIAS showed that close to 67 percent of the former farm workers had stayed put in their 
farm compound residency, but the displacements also varied from district to district. 
These former farm workers continued to sell their labour to farm and non-farm activities 
(see Chapter Six). Nonetheless, it is essential to note that for those who remained, their 
continued residency in the compounds was insecure due to the prolongation of the 
residential labour tenancy in contradiction of government policy, which allows them to 
stay irrespective of their employment status (Chambati 2013a; 2011; Moyo et al. 2009 
see also Section 5.4.4 & Chapter Six).  Land reform did not meet the demand of all those 
who required land (Moyo 2011a; Scoones 2015b), some land short peasants from the 
Communal Areas continue to rely on the (farm) labour markets for their survival.  
Beyond the official FTLRP beneficiaries, farm workers and others negotiate informal 
land access for own production from the new A1 and A2 land beneficiaries and thus 
extending the number of farm households (Moyo et al. 2009; Chambati 2013a; Scoones 
et al. 2014; Scoones et al. 2018a). Since 2015, beneficiaries have been allowed to share 
land with other business partners in the context of the shortages of agricultural finance 
following approval by the MLLR, thus altering their overall control over land (Mazwi, 
Tekwa, Chambati & Mudimu 2018; Chambati 2017).
81
 Most of the joint venture partners 
are former white LSCFs (MPEW 2017: Interview).
82
  
It is discernible from the above discussion that land redistribution extended the number of 
farming units beyond the few LSCFs that dominated the agrarian labour markets due to 
their control over large tracts of agricultural land. Specifically, the number of potential 
                                                 
81
 The Sunday Mail, 4 January 2015, ―Govt okays farming joint ventures‖, [Accessed from 
www.sundaymail.co.zw/govt-okays-farming-joint-ventures on 27 September 2018]. 
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 Media reports suggested that since the ascension of the former Vice President, Emmerson Mnangagwa to 
the Presidency in November 2017, about 600 former LSCFs were back on the farms and were leasing land 
from resettled farmers in response to calls by the latter to come back and contribute to the country‘s 
agricultural production. See ―The return of Zim‘s white farmers‖, Mail & Guardian, 20 April 2018, 




farm wage employers and/or capitalist farms has been widened through the A2 scheme. 
While the parcelling of landholdings to the peasantry previously affected by land 
shortages and working classes in the A1 scheme will not only see the rise of self-
employment but would also be expected to free them up from the economic compulsion 
to partake in the wage labour markets in the LSCFs and elsewhere. The newly acquired 
lands would provide a means of production for them to engage in autonomous social 
reproduction through self-employment.  
The reformation of land tenure from private property to state permits and 99-year 
leaseholds for A1 and A2 landholders respectively had implications on the way farm 
labourers supply labour post 2000. Specifically, the A1 farmers who were allocated most 
of the land nationally have reduced ability to control labour in the old farm compounds, 
which were retained as state land. Consequently, the farm workers resident in these areas 
likely enjoy autonomy in the sell of labour not tied to residential tenancy relationships of 
the past. The situation will somewhat be different in a few A2 farms that received the old 
compounds as part of their land subdivisions and enabling them to link work and 
residency and can evict those they do not employ by way of operation of Gazetted Lands 
(Consequential Provisions) Act of 2006. Yet the land utilisation challenges facing the new 
farmers undermine their capacity to absorb all workforce remaining in former LSCF 
compounds leaving many to work elsewhere. Altogether, the diversified farming structure 
provides the agrarian labour force and/or the remaining landless with a broader choice to 
seek wage work than before where the farm labour market was monopolised by a few 
LSCFs. The agrarian political power concentrated in the minority LSCFs has thus been 
diffused among many smaller employers (Moyo 2011a). 
5.3 CHANGING PRODUCTION PROCESSES IN THE NEW AGRARIAN 
STRUCTURE 
The trajectory of farming has been dynamic in tandem with rapidly changing macro-
economic context since 2000. Early on, numerous court litigations opposing compulsory 
acquisitions, as well the setting up of the land redistribution structures (Provincial and 
District land committees) by the state delayed the resettlement of land beneficiaries 
(World Bank 2006). This introduced lags in agricultural production as the land tended to 
remain unused by both the land beneficiaries and LSCFs who were barred from farming 
after three months when the land was gazetted for acquisition (Moyo & Yeros 2007; 
Utete 2003).  
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Zimbabwe‘s economy that had begun to regress in the mid-1990s due to the impacts of 
ESAP (Bond & Manyanya 2003; Gibbon 1995) persisted to contract after 2000. Between 
2002 and 2008, the economic decline was over 50 percent (World Bank 2012: 25) 
Hyperinflation reached an estimated peak of 231 million percent set in 2007 (Hanke 
2009)
83
 due to the poor macroeconomic management framework hinged on printing of 
money to sustain excessive government expenditures (Kanyenze, Kondo, Chitambara & 
Martens 2011; IMF 2005). 
Non-farm formal employment continued to wane. Overall, the number of formal jobs 
declined from 1,866,179 in 1999 to 1,531,549 in 2012.
84
 Nevertheless, the job declines 
were differentiated. Manufacturing and distribution sectors lost most of the jobs, 171,522 
and 314,954 respectively (see also CZI 2016). Other sectors such as mining and retail 
sector however registered employment gains during this period, 51,869 and 86,321 
respectively. Simultaneously, poorly paid jobs were on the rise in the informal sector and 
were employing 96 percent of the women in employment by 2016 (GoZ 2016: 10). 
Fiscal space was squeezed by international isolation as multilateral and bilateral aid was 
withdrawn over impasse on the FTLRP implementation (Moyo & Yeros 2011; 2013; 
Mamdani 2008). Such funding was critical for supporting the diverse economic sectors 
including agriculture. Together with the dwindling export base, scarce foreign exchange 
affected the supply of fertilisers and agro-chemicals that require substantial imported 
content and were largely in accessible to most farmers (Mudimu 2006).  
The government abandoned the liberalisation framework and reintroduced interventionist 
agricultural policies through the control of input and output markets (World Bank 2006). 
Combined effects of the declining industrial capacity and price controls resulted in 
restricted supplies of essential agricultural inputs such as seed and fertilisers (CZI 2010; 
World Bank 2006). Maize and wheat grain markets were controlled through Statutory 
Instrument 235A of 2001, which reinstituted the GMB as the sole legal buyer. Sub-
economic prices, which followed fuelled the emergence of a black market for both 
outputs and inputs featuring exorbitant prices and thus out of reach for many producers 
(Sukume & Guveya 2009; Moyo et al. 2009). Nevertheless, the grain market was not 
guaranteed, as the GMB was increasingly not able pay for procured output, a challenge, 
                                                 
83 Accessed from https:www.cato.org/Zimbabwe on 18 March 2017. 
84 Calculated from CSO (1999: 62) and ZIMSTAT (2012). 
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which has bedeviled the state institution up to now.
85
 Export commodities such as 
tobacco and horticulture were controlled through the foreign exchange regulations 
between 2006 and 2008, which required exporters to liquidate 60 percent of their foreign 
exchange receipts to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe for the equivalent Zimbabwean 
dollars at the depressed controlled official exchange rates (RBZ 2006).  
The agricultural financing framework also faced difficulties. Private financial institutions, 
which heavily funded the LSCFs drastically reduced their agricultural credit facilities 
citing increased lending risk as they considered their tenure arrangements to be insecure 
(Moyo 2007; Zumbika 2006). As international lenders upgraded the country risk rating, 
private institutions also lost access to offshore credit facilities for onward lending (RBZ 
2008). The resource-constrained state was thus left with the burden to fund the new 
farmers. Although new players emerged to support agriculture, these focused on specific 
crops such as tobacco and soyabeans through mostly contract farming and external 
financing for farmers was largely inadequate (USAID 2014; Binswanger-Mkhize & 
Moyo 2012; Mano 2004). Government agricultural financing schemes reached a few and 
were biased towards the medium and large-scale A2 farmers (Moyo, Chambati & Siziba 
2014; Sukume & Guveya 2009). The hyperinflationary environment attracted capital to 
quick high reward speculative economic activities such as foreign currency trading 
(Chagonda 2011; Mawowa & Matongo 2011) as opposed to the slow returns from 
agriculture. Additionally, two severe droughts in 2001/02 and 2003/04 seasons decimated 
agricultural output and affected the establishment of the new land beneficiaries 
(Manzungu et al. 2018; World Bank 2012; 2006). 
Agrarian labour utilisation patterns were also restructured by shift from the export land 
uses in the former LSCFs towards food production. Maize and small grains dominate the 
cropped areas planted in the redistributed lands, whilst the production of cash and export 
commodities for the domestic and international markets is more visible in the capitalist 
farms (Moyo et al. 2009; Scoones et al. 2010; Pazvakavambwa 2009). The latter include 
horticulture, oilseeds and tobacco. By 2006, overall agricultural production output 
declines were registered in many of the commodities but in a differentiated manner 
(Moyo & Nyoni 2013: 212). Fifty percent plus margins of decline were recorded in food 
production (maize, wheat and small grains) in both Communal Areas and newly resettled 
farms. Beef and commercial dairy production also plummeted by approximately the same 
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 See ―GMB owes farmers $37 million‖ Zimbabwe situation, 6 November 2014: 
http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/zimsit-m-gmb-owes-farmers-37-million/ [Accessed 7 July 2017?  
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margin. Tobacco and oil seeds (soyabeans, groundnuts and sunflower) production 
declined by over 65 percent. Horticulture declined by much less (about 30 percent), and 
plantation crops (sugarcane, tea, coffee, citrus) and cotton production declined the least 
(about 20 percent). Production declines were therefore not uniform across the 
commodities, as well as the among the different farmer classes. Agricultural land use 
patterns were thus generally depressed and subsequently led to weakened demand for 
agricultural labour and the capacity of the new range of producers to pay farm wages. 
The unity government formed by ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations after the 2008 
election stalemate initiated policy shifts towards a market re-liberalisation under aegis of 
the Short Term Economic Recovery Programme (STERP) (GoZ 2009). The Zimbabwean 
Dollar was demonetised and multiple currencies (including United States Dollar, South 
African Rand and British Sterling Pound) were introduced as legal tender for economic 
transactions. Subsequently, inflation rates were stabilised to between 3.1 percent and 3.7 
percent between 2010 and 2013 (ZIMSTAT 2017: 3), while a deflationary environment 
characterised the years 2014 to 2016. The agricultural markets were re-liberalised and the 
uncontrolled prices improved the possibilities for farmer profitability. International 
partners and donors were re-engaged and begun funding the provision of targeted input 
subsidies to peasants for food production in collaboration with the state since the 2009/10 
season (Anseeuw, Kapuya & Saruchera 2012).  
Overall land utilisation improved tremendously and some of the earlier agricultural 
production declines began to be reversed. Tobacco led the recovery spurred by increased 
contract farming finance to all farmer classes as international agrarian capital who had 
gone on strike between 2002 and 2008 returned in their numbers (Moyo & Nyoni 2013; 
Scoones et al. 2016). By 2017, tobacco output – over 80 percent produced under contracts 
– had surpassed the pre-2000 level (TIMB 2016: 5; see also Shonhe 2017; Sakata 2017). 
Food crop production also improved but remained inadequate to meet national 
requirements and imports continued to fill the shortfalls (Sitko et al. 2014).  
ZANU (PF) regained full control of the state after winning the 2013 elections and 
prioritised agriculture in its new Zimbabwe Agenda for Social and Economic 
Transformation (ZIMASSET) economic plan (GoZ 2013). Since 2016, the state launched 
an extensive maize contract farming scheme christened ―Command Agriculture‖ to 
complement the Presidential Inputs Scheme in the context of a ravaging drought in 
2015/16 season. Cereal surpluses were realised for the first time since 2000. A total of 
2,443,119 metric tonnes of cereals (comprising 2,155,526 metric tonnes of maize and 
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287,593 metric tonnes of small grain) were produced in 2016/17 season against national 
requirement of 1,897,376 metric tons (GoZ 2017a: 4).   
Yet some economic constraints have lingered on and were recently reflected by shortage 
of US dollar notes for daily transactions and foreign exchange scarcity to finance critical 
imports. The bond notes introduced in 2016 as a surrogate currency to ease shortages of 
cash notes and promote exports (RBZ 2016) contributed to the return of the country to an 
inflationary environment.
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 Access to agricultural finance remains a key challenge and 
banks are still reluctant to provide loans using the existing tenures as collateral security.
87
 
Moreover, the liquidity challenges, which continue to characterise the banking sector, 
have arrested the lending capacity as savings deposits and offshore credit facilities remain 
very low (GoZ 2014b). Indeed, between 2011/12 and 2013/14 domestic credit growth fell 
from 50 percent to 8.6 percent (GoZ 2014b: 1). No doubt this is one of the reasons that 
has led to an increased policy thrust to attract FDI, including in the agricultural sector 
after President Mnangagwa assumed helm of both the ruling ZANU (PF) party and 
country in November 2017 after the former President Mugabe resigned at the behest of 
the army (GoZ 2018). Under the mantra, ―Zimbabwe is Open for Business‖, the new 
ZANU (PF) regime, which won the 2018 general elections, is set to continue with further 
liberalisation of agrarian markets and the wider economy. Indeed, joint ventures in 
farming with domestic and foreign capital were being actively encouraged to meet 
financing deficits.
88
 Climatic conditions have also been highly variable, with droughts 
experienced in 2011/12; 2013/14; and 2015/16 seasons (Manzungu et al. 2018). Costs of 
agricultural inputs remain expensive due to the antiquated production models still being 
utilised by agro-industry (ZAEO 2014; CZI 2016).  
Altogether, the changing agrarian policy context influenced the trajectory of the new 
agricultural production systems and agrarian labour utilisation. To be sure, the swift 
dynamics in the socio-economic context militated against the effective land utilisation 
with implications on the demand for farm labour by the new range of producers. 
Ultimately, this impinges on the income returns from farming and the capacity of the new 
small-scale capitalist farms to meet their workers‘ wages and benefits obligations. On a 
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 As at August 2018, the inflation rate had peaked to 4.83 percent [Accessed from https://www.rbz.co.zw 
on 28 September 2018]. 
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The Zimbabwe Independent, 12 August 2016, ―Banks reject 99-year leases‖,[Accessed from 
https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/08/12/banks-reject-99-year-leases-2/ on 13 July 2017]. 
88
 The Herald 23 July 2018, ―Go into joint ventures white farmers urged‖ [Accessed from 
https://www.herald.co.zw/go-into-joint-ventures-white -farmers-urged on 27 September 2018]. 
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positive note, the shift from capital intensive exports to labour intensive food production 
land uses provides possibilities for the extension of agricultural employment. 
5.4 POLICIES AFFECTING AGRARIAN LABOUR RELATIONS 
The government to support both former and new farm workers after 2000 instituted 
various policies gradually in relation to the changing dynamics and context during the 
FTLRP. The labour relations, including wage determination for those still in farm 
employment continued to be governed by the existing national labour laws and the 
specific instruments for the agricultural industry, albeit with various changes introduced 
after 2000. Policies on payment of retrenchment packages by former LSCF owners, 
repatriation support for farm workers of migrant and access to residential and agricultural 
land were introduced to cater for those that lost their employment on the compulsorily 
acquired LSCFs (Chambati & Moyo 2004: 7). Beyond this, farm workers also qualified to 
benefit from already existing social welfare services run by the state for vulnerable 
groups.  
5.4.1 Re-employment and retrenchment of farm workers 
The Companies Act (Chapter 24:03) stipulates that after the acquisition of an existing 
business, new owners also assume responsibility over labour. The applicability of this 
legislation was however constrained by the parcelling out of a single former LSCF into 
many smaller-scale farming units. It was not clear who among the many new owners of a 
previous single farming entity would absorb the farm labour force. Moreover, the new 
land beneficiaries were not immediately able to re-hire the majority of the LSCF labour 
force during the establishment phase of their farming operations. In the context of the 
FTLRP, the lags between acquisition and resettlement also meant that farm workers 
would be jobless since the LSCFs were required to cease production activities within 90 
days on receipt of acquisition notice from the state according to the Land Acquisition 
Amendment Act of 2000. In the early years of the FTLRP, retrenched former farm 
workers faced precarious livelihoods and for their survival they competed for part time 
jobs in the remaining LSCFs, while relocation to Communal Areas for those with 
residency there was stifled by limited financial resources (FTCTZ 2001).   
Statutory Instrument No. 6 of 2002 was thus introduced to cushion farm workers who lost 
their jobs on LSCFs compulsorily acquired during the FTRLP to receive retrenchment 
packages from the former farm owners.
 
This legal instrument established an Agricultural 
Compensation Committee (ACC) under the leadership of the MPSLSW and included 
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representatives from GAPWUZ, ALB, NECAIZ and the MLRR. In the event that farmers 
would not have paid retrenchment packages, the money was supposed to be deducted 
from the compensation due to them for land improvements on the acquired LSCFs. The 
MLLR was responsible for the deductions for onward submission to the MPSLSW for 
disbursements to farm workers through its provincial offices.  
5.4.2 Maintenance of farm compound residency  
The land allocation policy in the case of the A2 scheme transferred the custodianship of 
the infrastructure (including farm compounds) to the beneficiaries in whose plot the 
infrastructure falls, whereas in the A1 scheme the infrastructure is treated as state 
property which should be shared by all beneficiaries on that former LSCF (Sukume et al. 
2004). The policy did not however specify the residential rights of the former farm 
workers in the farm compounds. In this situation, some former farm workers were 
displaced from farm compounds in the A1 farms by land beneficiaries who believed it 
was their right to occupy these houses. This also occurred in the context of the animosity 
that developed during the land occupations that in some places involved violent clashes 
between peasants and farm workers in the Mashonaland Provinces. This uneasy 
relationship sometimes resulted in the evictions of farm workers from farm compounds 
by A1 land beneficiaries (Sadomba 2008) as noted earlier. In the A2 farms, land 
beneficiaries interpreted the custodianship of farm compounds to mean access to labour 
resident in these places as well. Displacement in the A2 farms occurred in the context of 
labour resisting the old arrangement linking employment to residency as was the case in 
the former LSCFs. Those former farm workers not amenable to new employment in A2 
farms faced eviction threats or were evicted from the farm compounds (see Chapter Six). 
Indeed, some former farm workers without residential links to the Communal Areas were 
displaced to rural and urban informal settlements such as Dandamera (Mazowe), 
Chihwiti/Gambuli (Makonde), Porta Farm (Zvimba) and Macheke (Murehwa) that 
emerged after the FTLRP (FCTZ 2002).  
The GoZ permitted former farm workers who did not relocate elsewhere after loosing 
their employment to continue staying in their former farm compounds residency 
regardless of their employment status (Chambati 2011; Magaramombe 2010; Matondi 
2012; Scoones et al. 2018a). This change undermined the residential labour tenancy that 
compelled the provision of wage labour in exchange for accommodation in the former 
LSCF compounds (Moyo 2011a). The implication is that labour is not tied to a particular 
employer in whose plot the farm compounds are located but is relatively free to sell their 
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labour power to employers of their choice. This also potentially enhances the bargaining 
power of labour in wage struggles that was weakened by the residential labour tenancy in 
the former LSCFs. Given that farm workers‘ long-term tenure security in the compounds 
has not yet been clarified, it remains a source of contestations and struggles particularly in 
the A2 farms seeking a cheap source of labour amongst landless labourers in a context of 
labour shortages as discussed later (Chapter 6). 
Nevertheless, the Consequential Gazetted Lands Act of 2006, which extinguished the land 
rights of the ―…owners and other lawful occupiers‖ upon the gazetting of an LSCF for 
acquisition, provides an avenue for A2 land beneficiaries in possession of the old farm 
compounds in their land subdivisions to evict farm workers they are not employing from 
the farm compounds. Statutory Instrument 116 of 2014 that regulates agricultural labour 
relations also requires an employee to vacate the residency provided by the employer 
within 72 hours if they are dismissed from work with immediate effect or after the expiry 
of a notice to terminate employment. Therefore, A2 farms in control of farm compounds 
can invoke this provision to evict farm workers. 
5.4.3 Citizenship and repatriation of migrant farm workers  
The citizenship position of farm labourers of foreign origin that was provided for in the 
Citizenship Act of 1985 faced setbacks from the Citizenship Ammendment Act of 2001, 
which required Zimbabweans across the board who could possibly claim citizenship 
elsewhere to forego it by January 2002 according to the regulations of those countries 
(Ridderbos 2009; Chambati & Moyo 2004; Sachikonye 2003;). Failure to do so was to 
result in loss of Zimbabwean citizenship. Some commentators like Raftopolous (2003) 
opined that white Zimbabweans (including LSCFs), some of whom also held British 
citizenship, were the primary targets of this law for their perceived support for the MDC. 
However, this legislative change also affected farm workers tracing their roots to the 
migrant labour supplying countries, which included Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia 
(Chambati & Magaramombe 2008). Beyond being the birth places of their forefathers, 
many of the farm workers neither had connection nor citizenship claim in these countries. 
They could thus not renounce non-existent citizenship. Without identity documents to 
prove their Zimbabwean citizenship, many of them remained stateless until the situation 
was rectified by an amendment of the law in 2004.  
The Citizenship Amendment Act of 2004 required those birthed in the country of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) parentage to renounce their ―foreign 
citizenship‖ through a simplified procedure at the Registrar of Citizenship office to 
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maintain Zimbabwean citizenship (Chambati & Magaramombe 2008). Again, 
Constitutional Amendment Act No. 20 of 2013 explicitly accords all those born in 
Zimbabwe of SADC parents before the 22
nd
 of May 2013 Zimbabwean citizenship (see 
Section 43[2a & b]:25-26). With these legal provisions, the Zimbabwean citizenship of 
farm workers of foreign origin is no longer in doubt. The scarcity of the Registrar 
General‘s offices in rural areas to provide requisite citizenship documents however 
remains a stumbling block for the translation of these rights into reality. Indeed this has 
been a challenge not only for farm workers but affects various segments of the 
Zimbabwean society. In fact in Janaury 2019, the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission 
launched a national enquiry on the challenges being faced by various people in accessing 
identity documents and birth certificates.89 
The MPSLSW partnered the International Organisation of Migration of the United 
Nations (IOM) to undertake farm worker surveys before and during the FTLRP to assess 
the extent of those who wanted to go back to their countries of origin (GoZ 1998b; GoZ 
2005a). This sought to prepare to offer repatriation support to farm workers of migrant 
origin (Magaramombe 2010). However, very few (one percent) preferred to return to their 
countries of origin prior to the FTLRP (GoZ 2005: 10). 
5.4.4 Social Services Policy 
Most NGOs that provided social welfare services to farm workers prior to 2000 no longer 
have active projects in the redistributed lands creating a gap in access to social services. 
The international donors such as the European Union that fund most NGOs did not 
support projects in newly redistributed areas as they were opposed the FTLRP process 
(Moyo et al. 2009). This policy however began to gradually shift around 2009 after the 
inception of the Inclusive government, as donors collaborated with the state on various 
development initiatives including the targeted input subsidy programmes (World Bank 
2014). Few NGOs still provide welfarist services to farm workers in redistributed farms 
(e.g. FCTZ Kunzwana Women‘s Association and Farm Orphan Support Trust [FOST]) 
(Chimbga 2017: Interview; see also Chambati & Magaramombe 2008: 215 - 216) due to 
funding constraints (Moyo et al. 2009) and state perceptions of them being MDC 
supporters who utilise welfarist projects for political campaigning (Helliker 2008). Still, 
others shifted focus to food aid distribution in Communal Areas, which was receiving 
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 The Chronicle 19 January 2019. ―Rights commission to initiate inquiry into ID challenges.[Accessed 
from https://www.chronicle.co.zw/rights-commission-to-initiate-inquiry-into-id-challenges/ on 15 March 
2019] 
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huge financial support from donors between 2002 and 2008 (Magaramombe 2017: 
Interview). Some human rights NGOs however expanded their terrain to new farms to 
address human rights violations faced by farm workers including physical violence and 
evictions from the farm compounds. Some of them were the Zimbabwe Human Rights 
Association (ZIMRIGHTS), Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) and the 
Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) (Chimbga 2017: Interview). 
The state moved into redistributed lands to established satellite clinics and schools 
through conversion of former farm houses and unutilised infrastructure (e.g. tobacco 
barns) in A1 farms to cater for land beneficiaries and farm workers (Utete 2003; Sukume 
et al. 2004; Chibwana 2017). These were initially few and under-resourced in terms of 
staff, equipment, learning materials and sanitation facilities (UNICEF 2002), such that 
these were found on less than 30 percent of the former LSCFs surveyed (Moyo et al. 
2009: 125). As such, the linkages to Communal Areas were crucial in accessing social 
services (Murisa 2014; 2009; Mkodzongi 2013b). Farm workers, in theory, could also 
receive assistance from the state‘s social welfare for vulnerable groups in society. The 
Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM) and Harmonised Social Cash Transfers 
(HSCT) were the key programmes in the state‘s social welfare programme (UNICEF 
2017). The former assists children from poor households between the ages of 6 and 19 
years with school fees payments (GoZ 2005b). While the  latter provides targeted poor 
households with a monthly basic income to meet some of their consumption needs 
(UNICEF 2017).  
Other programmes included drought relief, food deficit mitigation strategy, Child 
Protection Fund, and HIV/AIDS support services that sometimes involve the 
collaboration with other donors such as the World Food Programme (WFP), NGOs and 
farmers. Not only were the fiscal contributions to these social welfare programmes 
limited to cover all the needy groups, farm workers were mainly excluded from the 
community based selection committees, which identified beneficiaries and only a few of 
them make it to the list of recipients (Training and Research Support Centre [TARSC] 
2012; Chambati & Moyo 2004; see also Chapter Six).
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5.4.5 Wage Rates Policy 
Prior to 2004, the wages for the entire agricultural sector were negotiated at once as per 
Statutory Instrument 323 of 1993. Due to the differential agricultural performance of the 
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 For instance in the 2017 national budget, social welfare was allocated US$27.9 million that constituted 
0.7 percent of the total budget (UNICEF 2017: 1). 
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diverse sub-sectors and the capacities to pay wages, there were calls by employers and 
workers to fragment the negotiation of wages by sub-sector (Magwaza 2017: Interview). 
It was argued that the underperforming sectors in the general agro-sector could not keep 
pace with the proposed wage increases in sectors such as tea, coffee, timber, kapenta and 
horticulture, which were doing relatively well. For the purpose of wage negotiation, the 
agricultural sector was then divided into two broad groups namely; the general agriculture 
sector encompassing field crops and livestock production and the agro–industrial sub-
sector including tea, coffee, crocodiles, meat processors and kapenta. The horticultural 
and timber sub-sectors, opted out of the agro-industrial sector in favour of separate 
negotiations at this stage. The kapenta sub-sector followed suit in 2006. Currently, five 
sets of annual wage negotiations/Collective Bargaining agreements are registered with the 
MPSLSW, namely; general agriculture, agro-industry; timber, horticulture and kapenta 
subsectors (Magwaza 2017: Interview). All sectors nonetheless remained bound by 
Statutory Instrument 323 of 1993 governing the working conditions for the entire agro-
industry.  
The representation in the NECAIZ was thus altered. GAPWUZ represents members in all 
the sub-sectors, together with another union, Horticulture GAPWUZ (HGAPWUZ) 
formed as an affiliate of the state sponsored labour centre, Zimbabwe Federation of Trade 
Unions (ZFTU) in 2006 (Magwaza 2017: Interview). On the employers‘ side, the 
Zimbabwe Agricultural Employers Organisation (ZAEO), Zimbabwe Farmers Union 
(ZFU) and Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers Union (ZCFU) participate in all the sub-
sector negotiations.
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 The CFU and the Zimbabwe Tobacco Association (ZTA) only take 
part on the general agriculture negotiations. For the agro-industry wage negotiations, the 
employer membership expanded to include the Zimbabwe Tea Growers Association 
(ZTGA). In the kapenta subsector, the Kapenta Producers Association (KPA) and 
Indigenous Kapenta Producers Association (IKPA) are the additional employer 
representatives and the Kapenta Workers Union of Zimbabwe (KAWUZ) acts on behalf 
of the employees. The voices of farm labourers have thus further disintegrated along 
commodity lines and reinforced the bargaining powers of employers in the negotiations. 
Initially, the ALB resisted the membership of the ZCFU, which now formed the biggest 
base of agricultural wage employers and the ZFU into NECAIZ (Jera 2017: Interview). 
                                                 
91  ZCFU represents black LSCFs and A2 farmers. Before 2000, it was known as the Indigenous 
Commercial Farmers Union (ICFU), while ZFU is a grouping of peasants and mobilised mostly those form 
Communal Areas prior to the FTLRP. Its membership now includes A1 land beneficiaries. ZAEO is the 
employer organisation for these two farm unions. 
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The two farmer unions were however upgraded from being observers between 2003 and 
2005 to full members in 2006 under the banner of ZAEO with the assistance of the 
MPSLSW. The ALB began boycotting NECAIZ meetings after losing traction in the 
Collective Bargaining process (Jera 2017: Interview). Although it was re-accommodated 
from 2008 onwards, its relationship with NECAIZ remained uneasy and even took it to 
the Labour Court after being excluded in the 2010 wage negotiations.
92
 These struggles 
around wages are elaborated in Chapter Six. 
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Table 5.2: Changes in legal provisions on working conditions for farm workers  
Key 
provisions 




 Contract workers 
 Special workers*  
 Independent contractors** 
 Managerial employees*** 
 Special workers*  
 Independent contractors** 
 Managerial employees*** 
Types of 
contracts 
 Written contracts required specifying: a) grade, b) 
wage rates and dates of payment, c) provision of 
accommodation, d) notice period for termination, 
e) hours of work, f) bonus and incentives, g) 
vacation leave, h) benefits during sickness, i) 
industrial holidays; j) terms of probation and, k) 
code of conduct. 
 Written contracts still required. Only 
probation terms omitted in new 
Collective bargaining agreement.  
Hours of 
work 
 Not more than 299 hours per month for herdsmen, 
watchmen, boilermen, firetower attendants, pump 
attendants, guards, irrigation hand, curer, milker 
and caretakers 
 Not exceed 280 hours per month for 
herdsmen, watchmen, boilermen, 
firetower attendants, pump attendants, 
guards, and caretakers 
 Not more than 221 hours per month for all other 
employees (including contract workers) 
 Not exceed 208 hours per month for all 
other employees (including contract 
workers) 
Overtime pay  Payable at 1.5 times of hourly wage rate during 
ordinary hours of work during industrial holidays 
 Payable at 2.5 times of hourly wage 
rate during ordinary hours of work 
during industrial holidays 
 New Year‘s day and Easter Friday not considered 
industrial holidays for overtime purposes 
 New Year‘s day and Easter Friday now 




 Employed for a period of not more than eight 
continuous months per year 
 Employed for a period of not more 
than six continuous months per year 
 If employed for more than eight continuous 
months, seasonal workers become permanent 
 If employed for more than six 
continuous months per year, seasonal 
workers become permanent 
Vacation 
leave 
 Leave days could be accumulated after serving one 
month probation at a rate of one working day per 
month worked 
 Leave days accumulated after a full 
year worked at the rate of one twelfth 
for every year worked 
 A maximum of 12 days of leave could be accrued 
without employer consent 
 A maximum of 90 can now be accrued 
without any risk of forfeiture  
 Cash could be paid in lieu of leave  No cash in lieu of leave 
Maternity 
leave 
 No paid maternity leave for female workers  Three months of maternity leave on 
full pay 
Sick leave   No sick leave during probation  Sick leave provided at all times  
 Not more than 26 working days of sick leave could 
be granted per year on full pay 
 Up to 90 days of sick leave per year on 
full pay 
 Half pay payable during sick leave if first year of 
employment 
 Full pay payable even in first year of 
employment 
 Employer could terminate employment if sick 
leave granted by a medical practitioner exceeds 26 
 Employer can only terminate 
employment if sick leave granted by a 
medical practitioner exceeds 180 days 
(including 90 days on full pay and 90 
days on half pay) 
Special leave  No special leave provided  Special leave of up to 12 days per year 
for attending court cases 
compassionate leave, trade union 
activities and detention by police. 
Gratuity on 
termination 
 Payable only after eight or more years of 
continuous services  
 Payable only after five or more years 
of continuous services 
Source: Compiled by author from Statutory Instruments 323 of 1993 and 116 of 
2014 *disabled, old age, chronic sickness, infirm – only able to do part of the work done by able 
bodied employees **Providing own labour force for work agreed with the farm employers *** 
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The representation of farm worker interests in the Collective Bargaining process also 
suffered as various GAPWUZ organisers entrenched their participation in MDC 
opposition politics (Yeros 2013b). Their energies were thus devoted towards 
mobilising support for the new political party in the numerous elections since 2000 at 
the expense of worker mobilisation.
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 State repression also visited GAPWUZ, 
including raids by the police at its offices. After the production of documentary in 
2009 on alleged human rights abuses faced by farm workers, its leadership was 
summoned by the state security agents for questioning. The then Secretary General 
eventually fled into exile in Canada after allegedly facing death threats from 
operatives of the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO).
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Trade union collective action was further restricted by the Labour Relations 
Amendment Act of 2002, which now required a majority vote of workers before any 
strike action could proceed. Additionally, any collective action originating from the 
grassroots had to be sanctioned by the trade union, thus disempowering worker 
agency from below (Gwisai 2005). However, section 65 of the Constitution 
Ammendment Act No. 20 of 2013, which is yet to be aligned with the Labour 
Relations Act of 1985 provides workers with the right to strike without the need for 
these cumbersome procedures as long as the Minister does not designate the workers 
as providing an ―essential service‖. The recent Labour Relations Ammendment Act 
No. 5 of 2015 also threaten trade unions‘ right to organise as it accorded the Minister 
of Labour jurisdiction to interfere in their operations for purposes of investigating 
alleged corrupt practices. Furthermore, union activities can now be undermined by the 
Minister who was accorded powers to refuse to register Collective Bargaining 
Agreements if they are ―...contrary to public interest‖, which is not defined. This 
added to the already existing powers to micro-manage unions, including through 
determining the number of employees for the secretariat, salaries and allowances of 
staff. 
Statutory Instrument 323 of 1993 was repealed and replaced with Statutory Instrument 
116 of 2014 that introduced rafts of changes to the working conditions of farm 
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 2000 – Constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections; 2002 – Presidential elections; 2005 – 
Parliamentary elections; 2008 – Presidential elections. 
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 The Newsday 23 November 2011, ―Getrude Hambira‘s life altering move‖ [Accessed from 
https://www.newsday.co.zw/2011/12/23/2011-12-23-getrude-hambira-lifealtering-move/  on 26 June 
2017]. 
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workers (Table 5.2). Monthly working hours for workers such as herdsmen were 
reduced from 299 hours to 280 hours, while for the rest of the farm workers they are 
not supposed to exceed 208 hours. The latter brought farm worker working hours in 
line with the rest of the working class. Apparently, the disparities in the working 
hours are blamed on a typing error by GAPWUZ as they claimed the Collective 
Bargaining negotiations agreed one standard workday for farm workers (Magwaza 
2017: Interview). The rate for overtime pay during industrial holidays was also 
increased from 1.5 times the hourly wage rate to 2.5 times and New Year‘s day and 
Easter Friday, which were not considered as industrial holidays before for the 
purposes of overtime payments were reclassified to qualify as such. Female workers 
will now benefit from the introduction of maternity leave with full pay. 
Another positive key change is related to the possibility to accumulate leave days up 
to a maximum of 90 days from the previous 12 days. Sick leave on full pay was 
increased to 90 days and an additional 90 days on half pay. Before, farm employees 
were eligible for full pay for a maximum of 26 days sick leave if they had worked for 
more than one year and for less working time they only received half pay. In addition 
to other compassionate reasons, farm workers can now participate in trade unions 
without affecting their vacation leave by using the 12 days in the recently introduced 
special leave. 
As inflation ravaged, by 2007, the Collective Bargaining agreements also transitioned 
to quarterly determination. They reverted back to annual determinations after the 
introduction of the multiple foreign currencies in 2009. 
The drive to attract FDI also threatens to erode the job security of workers. 
ZIMASSET promotes labour market flexibility in order to remove the rigidities in 
hiring and firing of labour, which have been identified as impediments to FDI by 
various ―Ease of Doing Business‖ surveys sponsored by the World Bank and IMF 
Article IV consultations (IMF 2014; World Bank 2015a). The Labour Relations 
Ammendment Act No. 5 of 2015 thus accorded employers the powers to fire workers 
on notice without following the retrenchment procedures. The Special Economic 
Zones Bill, gazetted in 2016 and aimed at facilitating foreign investment, also had a 
clause suspending the operation of the Labour Relations Act of 1985 and luckily for 
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the workers, the President only assented to the bill after this anomaly was rectified by 
Parliament.  
It is clear that the evolving agrarian and labour policies during the 2000‘s posed 
contradictory outcomes on the material conditions of farm workers. Agrarian labour 
markets remain likely key for their subsistence since both their agricultural and 
residential land rights were not prioritised by the land reform policies. By implication, 
land shortages and/or landlessness will endure as a feature of the net sellers of wage 
labour in the new agrarian structure. To reiterate, the changes in the land tenure 
relations especially in the A1 scheme possibly enhances the autonomy of farm wage 
labour by divorcing the  linkage between residency and employment as stated earlier 
(Section 5.2). Positive outcomes could emerge from the shifts advanced by labour 
unions to the statutory instrument governing farm labour relations, if implemented, to 
reverse decades old inequalities between them and the rest of the working class. Yet 
this could be negated by the revisions in the overall labour legislation to reduce the 
employment security of all workers, including farm labour in line with the labour 
market flexibility thrust. Collective action restrictions in the Labour Relations 
Ammendment Act of 2015 also limit the routes that the generality of workers can 
deploy to redress grievances at the workplaces, not to mention the state repression of 
trade union leaders and organisers. 
5.5 THE NEW AGRARIAN LABOUR REGIME IN GOROMONZI AND 
KWEKWE  
That the FTLRP was not uniformly implemented across all districts nationally is 
widely acknowledged in the literature (Hanlon et al. 2013; Moyo 2013; 2011a; 2011b; 
Matondi 2012; Scoones et al. 2010).
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 It is thus imperative to decipher the extent 
agrarian change at the local level. This section outlines the emergent agrarian 
structures, including the number of farming units and the relative distribution in the 
size of the different land tenure categories that resulted from the FTLRP in the study 
districts based on local specificities.  
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 This section builds and expands on the analysis presented in Chambati (2017). Additionally, the 
discussion on the new agrarian structure in Goromonzi also partly draws on earlier work done by 
author (Chambati 2013a). 
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5.5.1 The agrarian structure at district level 
Goromonzi district  
Similar to the situation nationally, the FTLRP in Goromonzi enlarged the peasantry 
through the A1 resettlement scheme and the small-to-medium capitalist farms via the 
A2 resettlement scheme. Specifically, 1,673 and 849 new peasant and small to large 
capitalist farm units were generated by the land redistribution on land previously 
owned by 200 former LSCFs (Table 5.3). However, the patterns of land ownership 
that emerged in the district contrast the aggregate  national level scenario as more of 
the land was allocated to larger-sized A2 farms than the small-scale A1 farm units. 
According to Chambati (2013b) this situation was attributable to greater demand for 
land by urban middle classes in Goromonzi than in other rural districts because of its 
nearness to Harare and thus major agricultural markets.  
The land now under the control of the peasantry incorporating the new A1 farm units 
and Communal Area households was around 45 percent of the district‘s agricultural 
land compared to 79 percent at the national level (Table 5.3; Moyo 2011a: 512). The 
average land sizes per household (combining arable and grazing land) in the 
Communal Areas (3.72 hectares) were only a sixth of the land accessed by the new 
peasantry in the A1 scheme (Table 5.3). Communal Area peasants formed the 
majority of A1 beneficiaries (57.9 percent), alongside urbanites (36.8 percent) and 
former farm workers (3.9 percent) (Author Farm Household Survey 2017). 
About 19 percent of the land was held by small capitalist farmers, which included the 
old SSCFs in the Eastern part of the district and the new small and medium A2 farms 
(Table 5.3; Figure 5.1). While the large capitalist farms comprised of the large A2  
and remaining LSCFs command 29 percent of the total land in the district, which 
represent about 29 times the share of this group nationally (see Moyo 2011a: 512). 
Small-to-medium A2 farms average landholdings represent about 65 percent of those 
in the SSCFs. The large A2 farms are chiefly found in the Northern parts of the 
district in the Acturus ICA commanding the bulk of the irrigation infrastructure and 
clay soil that can support diverse land use patterns (see Figure 5.1). The majority of  
the A2 land recipients came from towns and cities (79.7 percent) and the remainder 
were previously Communal Area residents (16.2 percent) and former farm workers 
(Author Farm Household Survey 2017). 
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Historically, agro-estates controlled a miniscule of the total agricultural land area in 
the district. Additionally, their average landholdings (1,415.9 hectares) were much 
smaller compared to these found in other rural areas in Zimbabwe in excess of 6,000 
hectares per farm unit (Moyo 2011a: 512). The situation had not changed much as the 
share of land controlled by agro-estates rose from about 5 percent to 8 percent (Table 
5.3).  The agro-industrial estate sector included  state owned farms such as ARDA 
Nijo Estate on 1,024 hectares of land and engaged in the production and processesing 
of horticultural crops, maize and soyabeans.
96
 The other agro-industrial farms include 
meat processor Surrey Abbatoirs, Seed Company of Zimbabwe‘s Rattray Arnold 
Research Station and the export horticulture concern, Utopia (MPEW 2017: 
Interview).  
Beyond the FTLRP land allocations, further redistribution was occurring through 
informal leasing of land by landholders to former LSCFs, farm workers, relatives and 
friends, and agribusiness firms, and through illegal informal land markets (see 
Chapter Six). Non-capitalist labour relations were also observed as some farm 
labourers were offered land in exchange for their labour services (see Chapter Six). 
Cumulatively, these processes served to extend the number of peasant households that 
mainly use family labour to crop the small pieces of land accessed through these 
routes. Private agribusiness firms also accessed land in the new agrarian structure 
through contract farming that involved 10.5 percent, 41.9 percent of the A1 and A2 
farm households respectively (Author Farm Household Survey 2017). None of the 
Communal Area households interviewed were participating in contract farming. 
Within the new agrarian structure, there were still land short and landless people as 
noted earlier, especially in a district like Goromonzi, which prioritised land 
redistribution to the larger-sized A2 farms. Moreover, the close proximity to Harare 
has meant that one of the district‘s Communal Area, Domboshava, has transformed 
into a peri-urban settlement as agricultural land was being converted into residential 
land through ―informal‖ land markets especially in the zones bordering the capital in 
the North-Eastern part (see Figure 5.1). This has further exacerbated land shortages in 
the district‘s Communal Areas. Farm labour markets were thus important for the 
livelihoods of the landless in Communal Areas and former farm workers (see Chapter 
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Six) and suggest the continued operation of the labour reserve system in a district 
such as Goromonzi (Chambati 2013: 194). 
 
 212 
Table 5.3: Emerging agrarian structure in Goromonzi district: estimated landholdings (2012)  
Farm categories 
 Farms/households    Area held (ha)   Average Farm size (ha)  
2000 2012 2000* 2012* 2000 2012 
No % No % ha % ha % 
  
 Peasantry           
 Communal  19,976 98.6 20,975 88.8 78,066.39 31 78,066.39 31.7 3.91 3.72 
 A1    1,673 7.1   32,437.63 13.17  19.39 
 Sub-total  19,976 98.6 22,648 95.9 78,066.39 31 110,504.03 44.87 3.9 11.56 
 Medium           
 Old SSCF  40 0.2 24 0.1 2,068.45 0.8 2,068.45 0.84 86.19 86.19 
 Small A2    778 3.3   43,645.80 17.72  56.1 
 Sub-total  40 0.2 802 3.4 2,068.45 0.8 45,714.25 18.56 86.2 71.3 
 Large scale           
 Large A2    71 0.3   27,206.49 11.05  383.19 
 LSCF  240 1.2 89 0.4 155,437.00 61.8 43,948.05 17.84 647.65 493.8 
 Sub-total  240 1.2 160 0.7 155,437.00 61.8 71,154.54 28.89 647.7 493.8 
 Agro-estates           
 Corporate  4 0.02 4 0.02 3,605.08 1.4 3,605.08 1.46 901.27 901.27 
Parastatal 6 0.03 9 0.04 5,604.70 2.2 7,668.70 3.1 800.65 829.15 
 Institutions  3 0.01 3 0.01 7,637.79 3 7,637.79 3.1 2,545.93 2,545.93 
 Sub-total  8 0.04 16 0.07 12,042.59 4.8 18,911.57 7.67 1,415.95 1,425.45 
 Total  20,253 100 23,626 100 251,619.71 100 246,285.32 100 12.42 10.42 
Source:Adopted from Chambati (2013a: 193) * Peasant farm sizes are inclusive of grazing land.
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Figure 5.1: Goromonzi Agrarian Structure 2015 
 
Source: Compiled by author from MLLR data sheets 
 
Kwekwe district 
Through the A1 scheme, the number of peasant farming units was extended and they 
now own the bulk of the land in Kwekwe (Table 5.4). Simultaneously, the FTLRP 
also  increased the share of land controlled by medium-scale capitalist farms three 
fold via the A2 scheme and reduced the portion of land held by LSCFs and agro-
estates in the district (Table 5.4). 
Over 3,700 farming units were generated on 152 former LSCFs redistributed in 
Kwekwe (Table 5.4). The black LSCFs who owned about 26.8 percent of the 291 
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LSCFs largely retained their land ownership (MLRR land allocation Excel sheets 
2014 ). Compared to Goromonzi which had beneficiaries from diverse ethnic origins, 
land allocations in Kwekwe favoured households whose Communal Area home or 
kumusha was in the district who accounted for 29 percent of the beneficiaries (Author 
Farm Household Survey 2017).
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 Therefore, the influence of ethno-regionalism 
(Moyo 2011a; 2013) in land allocations was more prevalent in Kwekwe compared to 
Goromonzi. However, some national surveys reflect that the marginalisation in land 
allocation according to Communal Area of origin was more pervasive in districts such 
as Mangwe and Zvimba where 49 percent and 39.3 percent of the beneficiaries 
originated from these districts (Moyo et al. 2009: 23). Ethnicity has implications in 
the social organisation of the new resettlement areas (Moyo 2011a; Murisa 2010; 
Munyuki-Hungwe 2011), as well as the inter-household labour cooperation through 
reciprocal and non-reciprocal labour exchanges as discussed later in Chapter Six. 
More broadly, the peasantry in Kwekwe is now comprised of the new A1 farm 
households and the already existing Communal Area and Old Resettlement farm 
households (Table 5.4). In terms of geographical location, the Communal Area 
peasants are found in the South-Western part, which are the driest part of the district 
falling under Natural Region IV (Figure 5.2). While the Old Resettlement areas that 
were established on the former LSCFs during LRRP-I border the Communal Areas 
(Figure 5.2). The new A1 peasantry enjoy better agro-ecological conditions in Natural 
Region III, but they were largely resettled in the drier part of the former LSCFs that 
were mostly used for extensive livestock and game ranching (MRT 2017: Interview).  
The A1 farm households increased the number of peasant households to over 33,801 
by 2014 from 29,066 in 2000 and the proportion of their cumulative land size rose by 
18.7 percent (Table 5.4). Unlike Goromonzi, the percentage of land owned by  
peasant farm households had already been increased by 10.1 percent in Kwekwe 
during LRRP-I in the early 1980s that was mostly implemented in the drier districts 
(see Moyo 1995; 1998).  
Peasants upperhand in control of most of the land and accounting the lion‘s share of 
the total number of farming units in Kwekwe largely reflects the situation at the 
national level (Table 5.1). The land sizes controlled by the diverse types of peasant 
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households are however differentiated, with the least found in the Communal Areas 
(Table 5.4). Specifically, the A1 beneficiaries owned over 3.5 times larger land sizes 
than their counterparts in the Communal Areas.  
Most A1 farm households were characterised by a peasant background and trace their 
origin to Communal Areas (54.9 percent), while the remainder included LSCF former 
farm workers (8.3 percent) and urbanites (35.2 percent) (Author Farm Household 
Survey 2017). The links to current non-farm formal employment were limited to only 
14.1 percent of the A1 landholders.  
The capitalist farmers‘ class in Kwekwe can be disaggregated into medium and large 
capitalist farms. Between 2000 and 2014, the medium capitalist farms comprising the 
SSCFs and small to medium A2 slightly increased their share in the total number of 
farm households and land area controlled by 0.36 percent and 2.71 percent 
respectively (Table 5.4). The average land sizes in this sector were three times more 
than those received by the A1 households in this district.  
Whereas nationally it is the medium capitalist farms that grew dramatically in the 
proportion of land area they control (Table 5.1), in Kwekwe district the large 
capitalist farms have remained dominant within the category of capitalist farms (Table 
5.4). While the SSCFs are located in the dry Natural Region IV surrounded by 
Silobela Communal Areas, the new A2 farms were mostly created in areas with the 
best agro-ecological potential and endowed with dams and rivers that served as a 
source of water for irrigation in the Munyati-Sebakwe ICA (MRT 2017: Interview).  
Attachments to non-farm formal employment in urban areas, also noticed in 
Goromonzi were more common in the A2 farms. The origins of the capitalist farmers 
were similar to those the peasants in the A1 scheme. For instance, 38.1 percent of the 
A2 landholders were town residents, while the largest source of beneficiaries (50.8 
percent) previously inhabited in the Communal Areas (Author Farm Household 
Survey 2017). Non-farm formal employment which entail access to wage-income that 
could be invested in farming was enjoyed by 35.5 percent of the A2 landholders.  
 216 
Figure 5.2: Kwekwe Agrarian Structure 2015 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author from MLLR data sheets 
Industrial processing did not feature much in the farms classified under the agro-
estate sector in Kwekwe (Chambati 2017), but they own large landholdings like the 
other agro-industrial farms in other parts of the country. Rather, they include 
conservancies and farms mostly owned by both private and public institutions such as 
churches (e.g. Apostolic Church), universities (e.g. Midlands State University), 
mining companies and the energy regulator, the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply 
Authority owns a power generation facility in the district (MLRR excel data sheets 
2014). An exception is the Dendairy Company (one of the largest diary company in 
Zimbabwe producing over four million litres of milk per month)
98
 that is involved in 
dairy farming and processing that currently leases about nine LSCFs in the district, 
totalling 2,854.7 hectares (MLRR excel data sheets 2014).  
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 See The Chronicle 13 November 2018. ―Dendairy seeks to double production‖ 
https://www.chronicle.co.zw/dendairy-seeks-to-double-production/ accessed on 19 December 2018. 
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Table 5.4: Emerging agrarian structure in Kwekwe district: estimated landholdings (2014) 
Farm categories   Farms/households   Area held (ha)   Average Farm size (ha)  
 
2000 2014 2000 2014 2000* 2014* 
   No   %   No   %   ha   %   ha   %      
 Peasantry                      
 Communal  27,584 93.6 28,733 83.80 392,536.29 42.44 392,536.29 42.73 14.23 13.66 
Old resettlement 1,482 5.0 1,482 4.32 93,441.00 10.10 93,441.00 10.17 63.05 63.05 
 A1      3,586 10.46     173,519.65 18.89   48.39 
 Sub-total  29,066 98.6 33,801 98.58 485,977.29 52.54 659,496.94 71.79 16.72 19.51 
 Medium                      
 Old SSCF  108 0.4 108 0.31 12,485.33 1.35 12,485.33 1.36 115.60 115.60 
 Small A2      152 0.44     25,267.31 2.75   166.23 
 Sub-total  108 0.4 260 0.76 12,485.33 1.35 37,752.64 4.11 115.60 145.20 
 Large scale                      
 Large A2      114 0.33     61,237.88 6.67   537.17 
LSCF 243 0.82 91 0.27 265192.97 28.67 85345.31 9.29 1091.33 937.86 
 Sub-total  243 0.82 205 0.60 265192.97 28.67 146583.19 15.96 1091.33 715.04 
 Agro-estates                      
 Institutions  19 0.1 9 0.03 42,046.48 4.55 22,308.39 2.43 2212.97 2478.71 
Conservancies 28 0.1 13 0.04 116,880.26 12.64 47,883.57 5.21 4174.30 3683.35 
 Sub-total  47 0.2 22 0.06 158,926.74 17.18 70,191.96 7.64 3381.42 3190.54 
State land          2,442.05 0.26 4,574.05 0.50     
 Total  29,464 100.0 34,288 100 925,024.39 100.00 918,598.79 100.00 31.40 26.79 
Source: Compiled by author from land data records provided by MLRR (2014) 
*Peasant farm sizes are inclusive of shared grazing lands 
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The 13 conservancies that were not redistributed during the FTLRP are mostly 
involved in game farming and tourism through provision of hunting services, wildlife 
viewing and overnight accommodation facilities (Kwekwe Agritex District Annual 
Plan 2016). However, the land use activities in the Kwekwe agro-estates imply that 
they employ limited numbers of farm wage labourers in contrast to large batches of 
labour hired in the sugarcane estates in the lowveld, tea and forestry plantations in the 
Eastern Highlands (see Chambati & Moyo 2004; Mutisi 2003; Scoones et al. 2017). 
Kwekwe redistributed 56.2 percent of the land acquired to peasants, and thus the 
number of land short households in Communal Areas was substantially reduced in 
comparison to Goromonzi that priviledged capitalist farms in land allocations. The 
average landholdings in the Communal Areas in Kwekwe at 13.7 hectares is close to 
the national average of 15 hectares (Table 5.4; Moyo 2011: 512-13). The 1,000 
former farm labourers who were still resident in the former farm compounds had 
limited access to agricultural land. Indeed about 42.3 percent of the farm labourers 
surveyed by the study did not own land for independent agricultural production and 
thus dependent on the wage economy for their survival (Author Farm Labour Survey 
2017).  
5.5.2 New farm labour markets 
The growth of the agricultural production base through the FTLRP led to the increase  
in the agrarian labour force in Zimbabwe, including both self-employed family labour 
and wage labour from the pre-2000 level. Specifically, the labour force increased 
from 1,696,128 workers in 1999 (CSO 2000: 45) to 5,469,655 workers in 2015.
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 This 
has reversed the earlier declines experienced during ESAP as noted earlier (Section 
4.5.4). 
Whereas the wage labour force in the LSCFs constituted 18 percent of the total 
agrarian labour force before 2000, the share of the hired labour in the A1 and A2 farm 
units in the total labour force had declined to 5.2 percent by 2015 (Table 5.5). 
Therefore, self-employed family labour has extended its dominance in the share of the 
total number of agrarian labourers. As expected, most of the self-employed labour 
was found in the peasantry (97 percent). Communal Areas had the lion‘s share of this 
self-employed family labour.  
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As elaborated later, intense competition exists between farm labour and alluvial gold 
mining in a district such as Kwekwe (see also Chigumira 2018). In fact, it has shifted 
the sources of farm wage labour to the neighbouring Communal Areas of Gokwe 
South district. Although not as fierce, agriculture faces competition from other natural 
resource based activities such as thatching grass and firewood trading in Goromonzi 
in attracting labour. Yet the potential farm labour supplies have been reduced as some 
peasants that were short of land and were part-time workers in the LSCFs received 
land, which they farm using labour from their families (Chambati 2013a; 2011; Moyo 
2011a). Certainly, this is partly responsible for the labour shortages that capitalist 
farms sometimes face during peak seasonal periods as explored later (Section 6.6). 
Differences are perceptible on the application of hired labour between the two land 
reform models in Goromonzi and Kwekwe. Permanent labour featured prominently in 
the A2 farms in Goromonzi, while casual labour was the main source of hired labour 
for the A1 and Communal Area farming units (Table 5.6). The situation was 
somewhat different in Kwekwe as the majority of the full-time workers were located 
in the A1 scheme rather than the A2 and LSCFs (Table 5.7). The Kwekwe A2 farms 
instead dominated the use of casual labour (Table 5.7). 
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Table 5.5: New agrarian labour force, 2015* 
Farm Categories Permanent Casual           Self-employed  
  Males Females Total %  Males Females Total %  Males Females Total % 
Peasantry                          
Communal 58339 11428 69767 32 44103 64320 108423 41 1846088 2116915 3963003 79 
Old Resettlement 10243 1147 11390 5 7386 8382 15768 6 211402 214271 425673 9 
A1 29421 3615 33036 15 23794 26380 50174 19 238723 239698 478421 10 
Subtotal 98003 16191 114194 53 75283 99082 174365 67 2296213 2570884 4867097 97 
                          
Capitalist                          
 SSCF 4066 467 4533 2 3438 1913 5351 2 35073 36894 71968 1 
A2 56351 20671 77022 36 25760 34959 60719 23 26844 23083 49927 1 
LSCF 14399 5097 19497 9 10082 11033 21115 8 2022 1846 3869 0 
Subtotal  74817 26235 101052 47 39280 47905 87185 33 63940 61823 125763 3 
                          
Total  172819 42426 215245 100 114563 146987 261550 100 2360153 2632707 4992860 100 
Source: Compiled from ZIMSTAT 2015-a) A2; b) A1;c) LSCF;d) SSCF;e) Old Settlement)Communal Lands *Data as at 30 March 2015  
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Table 5.6: Goromonzi District Agrarian Wage Labour Force 2015 
Model Permanent labour Casual labour 
  
Total    Male Female Sub total 
% of 
sub 




CA 603 186 789 17% 2,689 3,575 6,264 38 7,053 
A1 919 77 996 21% 3,744 4,421 8,165 49 9,161 
Subtotal 1,522 263 1,785 38% 6,433 7,996 14,429 87 16,214 
SSCF 9 0 9 0% 0 26 26 0 35 
A2 1,957 409 2,366 51% 724 1212 1936 12 4,302 
LSCF 348 157 505 11% 105 123 228 1 733 
Total 3,836 829 4,665   7262 9357 16619   21,284 
Source: Compiled by author from unpublished ZIMSTAT data 
Table 5.7: Kwekwe District Agrarian Wage Labour Force 2015 
Model Permanent labour Casual labour 











CA 997 0 997 25% 1,468 762 2,230 10% 3,227 
Old RA 156 24 180 5% 4,365 15322 19,687 85% 19,867 
A1 2,051 99 2,150 55% 332 247 579 3% 2,729 
Subtotal 3,204 123 3,327 85% 6,165 16331 22,496 98% 25,823 
A2 369 93 463 12% 282 221 503 2% 966 
LSCF 110 25 135 3% 46 25 71 0,3% 206 
Total 3,683 241 3,925   6,493 16577 23,070   26,995 
Source: Compiled by author from unpublished ZIMSTAT data 
Part time jobs constituted the bulk of the employment in the new agrarian labour force 
and thus further extended the casualisation of labour trends that took root in the 
LSCFs since the late 1970s (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Kanyenze 2001). At least 78 
percent of the farm wage labourers in both districts were casual workers.  
Circa 1999, the approximately 1,900 workers that formed the Kwekwe LSCF labour 
force respectively (Chambati 2017: 90) were well below the situation after the 
FTLRP. Similar patterns were also evident in Goromonzi, which had about 10,850 
workers around 2000 correspondingly (Chambati 2017: 90). Overall, recorded  
growth in the size of farm workforce in both districts compared to the scenario in the 
former LSCFs is noted. Nonetheless, as the empirical data presented in Chapter Six 
will show, the number of employees per household in the new smaller-scale farms 
was now much lower than those noted in former LSCFs.  
Gender dimensions of the new agrarian labour force have not broken with past trends 
recorded in the former LSCFs (see Chapter Four), nationally and in both districts 
studied. Women lag behind men in their representation in the permanent labour force. 
Specifically, they occupied 17 percent and 6.1 percent of the latter category of 
workers in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively (Table 5.6 & 5.7). In Goromonzi, 
women accounted for 56.3 percent of the total number of casual workers. The same 
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prevailed in the overall situation nationally as women occupied the majority of the 
casual jobs and accounted for the least share in the permanent employment (Table 
5.5). Kwekwe district, which commands 3.6 times more agricultural land area than 
Goromonzi, employed only 1.26 times more labour than the latter in 2015.
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 The 
labour intensity in Kwekwe across all the farming classes was 0.02 workers per 
hectare of agricultural land compared to 0.08 workers in Goromonzi.  Indeed the 
primary data mobilised by this research demonstrated that farm labour utilisation was 
relatively higher in Goromonzi than in Kwekwe.  
The discussion above highlighted that the FTLRP altered the agrarian structures in a 
differentiated manner in Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts, with consequent outcomes 
on the new agrarian labour regime depending on which resettlement was promoted 
more than the other. In turn, this impacted the land uses and orientation of production 
of the emergent farm classes. Although national patterns clearly demonstrate that the 
A1 scheme had the largest number of farming units and land allocated, the situation 
differs at the local level as districts such as Goromonzi gave more land to the A2 
farms. The reverse was true for Kwekwe district. The broad trends gleaned from the 
secondary data also imply that regional unevenness in the distribution of farm labour 
noted in the former LSCFs is set to continue with districts such as Goromonzi located 
in the high agro-ecological potential areas still dominating the incidence of labour 
hiring in and development of farm labour markets than in drier districts such as 
Kwekwe. This suggests that methodological approaches that emphasise the 
examination of the agrarian labour relations at the macro-level alone, while also 
important, risk the danger of missing on the local level differences and thus limit the 
understanding of the evolving trends post-2000 (see also Section 3.5). 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has exposed the extent to which the FTLRP altered the unequal bimodal 
agrarian structure, paving the way for the reconstitution of the agrarian labour 
relations. A diverse agrarian structure emerged comprised of the peasantry, small-to-
middle capitalist farms, large capitalists and agro-estates. These modes of production 
are differentiated by the extent of use of hired labour, access to agrarian resources, 
land tenure relations and orientation of production. More broadly, the new agrarian 
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 Calculated from Tables 5.3 to 5.6. 
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structure has led to the increase in both wage labour and self employment 
opportunities. Land redistribution produced different outcomes regarding the size and 
composition of the new agrarian classes at the district level, which consequently 
affects the scope of the labour markets. The variegated labour utilisation patterns 
across districts are illuminated in Chapter Six. 
Yet the demand and supply of farm (wage) labour has been affected by the evolving  
agrarian (labour) policies and macro-economic environment. Economic decline 
between 2002 and 2008 affected the overall land utilisation patterns and depressed the 
demand for farm labour. As the economy stabilised, the reversal of the regression in 
agricultural output in a differentiated fashion suggest the peaking of farm labour 
demand. Chapter Six, presents the data analysis and interpretation of the findings on 
the precise character of the new agrarian labour regime that emerged following the 
FTLRP on the basis of quantitative and qualitative empirical research in Goromonzi 







DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter highlighted the in-depth structural change in the land ownership 
and land tenure relations resulting from the FTLRP nationally and their ramifications 
for the transformation of agrarian labour relations. Furthermore, the accompanying 
socio-economic changes, including the decline and partial recovery in the economy 
and shifts in the agrarian and (rural) labour policies during the 2000s were analysed. 
The analysis was cascaded to the district level structural changes initiated by land 
reform. This enabled the research to draw insights on the new agrarian labour regime 
and/or markets, and the nature of the changing agrarian economies based on the 
historical and local specificities of each district, including their varied socio-economic 
character, agro-ecological zones and unique mix of farming systems.  
Extending the analysis to the micro-level, this chapter presents the findings on the 
transformation of the agrarian labour relations based on the detailed quantitative and 
qualitative empirical studies conducted in the two districts, as well as from other 
secondary sources. The ultimate objective was to answer the four research questions 
posed in Chapter One (Section 1.2). The results are presented thematically, more 
broadly, reflecting the issues each of the research questions intended to address. It 
begins by identifying the sources and forms of farm labour in the new agrarian 
structure and the on-going processes of the diversification of family labour by rural 
households into other non-farm activities. In doing so, the intention was to test the 
validity of the widely held assumptions in the literature, which associate the absence 
of farm labour markets in rural societies dominated by peasants and/or their 
decimation following land reforms that mainly allocate land to small-scale farmers.  
Also under the microscope was whether the entrance into non-farm activities was 
leading to the decreased relevance of farming and by implication self-employed 
family labour. Instead of focusing only on wage labour, as others have done, the 
chapter provides a complete picture of the new agrarian labour regime by the 
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consideration of the trends in the use and differentiation of labour from within the 
rural families.  
At this stage, the different sources of labour that characterise the rural households will 
be evident. Nonetheless the patterns thus far do not adequately expose the differences 
in extent to which the farm households depend on the exploitation of labour of others 
to organise their agricultural production units. The primary goal of the next section is 
thus to explore the role of the agricultural labour utilisation in class differentiation 
processes, an issue understudied in the scholarship of land reform in Zimbabwe. 
Attention is then diverted towards  the examination of the precise character of the new 
forms of hired-in farm labour being mobilised by the land beneficiaries. An important 
aspect considered was the direction of change in the quality of labour, specifically the 
wages and working conditions compared to the situation in the former LSCFs. 
Beyond the class structures marked by the position of households to the key means of 
production, land, the gender, generational and kinship relations were examined to 
ascertain their influence on the intra-household labour allocations and wider agrarian 
labour markets post-2000. Quite lucidly, the literature reviewed in Chapter Two 
demonstrates that agrarian labour relations were also an outcome of the agency 
displayed by farm labourers in response to their material conditions within and 
without the workplace. To complete the analysis, the research therefore, delved into 
the articulation of different struggles by farm wage labourers in the new farming 
units. Particular attention was paid to how labour resistance is shaped by the shifts in 
the residential labour tenancy relationship or the attendant workers‘ dependency on 
the employers for both residency and employment. The consequential outcomes in the 
new resettlement areas were juxtaposed to the scenario existent in the Communal 
Areas throughout the analysis of the findings,  with a view of understanding the 
changes attributable to the FTLRP. Moreover, this novel way of examining the 
agrarian labour relations enabled the study to fill the data gaps on the scope of the 
farm labour markets in the Communal Areas, and their inter-linkages with the newly 
redistributed areas, which has been left unattended after the year 2000. 
The data analysis in this chapter is frequently presented in tabular and graphical 
formats, and comparing the patterns across the settlement types, which the surveyed 
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farm households and labourers belonged to in the study districts. To remind the 
reader, the rural households interviewed during the research were drawn from the two 
resettlement models promoted by FTLRP; namely the A1 and A2 schemes, as well as 
the Communal Areas (henceforth CA in the data tables). The A1 scheme was meant 
to extend small-scale farming units to those already existing in the Communal Areas, 
but under statutory tenure as opposed to customary tenure obtaining in the latter. In 
Goromonzi, the beneficiaries received an average of about one hectare for their 
homestead, six hectares for cropping, and shared grazing land to the tune of seven to 
15 hectares per household (MPEW 2017: Interview).  
The land sizes redistributed in the A1 scheme in Kwekwe were relatively larger 
averaging about 10 arable hectares and 20 hectares of grazing land per household 
(MRT 2017: Interview). The A2 scheme represents those who received the larger land 
sizes and earmarked by the policy to engage in commercial farming (GoZ 2001a). 
The A2 farm units combine all the land (arable, homestead and grazing) in one plot 
subdivision and averaged about 330 hectares nationally (Moyo et al. 2009: 9). Again, 
those in drier Kwekwe district, which can support extensive farming were allocated 
bigger land sizes than those in Goromonzi (Table 5.3 and Table 5.4). Beneficiaries of 
the FTLRP are usually termed as new farm households in the literature (Scoones et al 
2010; Matondi 2012; Munyuki-Hungwe 2011; Mkodzongi 2013b) and this study 
follows suit (see also Chapter Three).While the Communal Areas represents 
households in those areas where blacks were settled after being dispossessed of prime 
land during the colonial period and are characterised by small arable land sizes (Table 
5.3 and Table 5.4).  
6.2 SOURCES OF FARM LABOUR  
The establishment of whether farm labour markets still exists after the redistribution 
of LSCFs requires an understanding of the different sources of labour being applied 
from within and outside the farming households. This section begins by examining 
the incidence of application of family labour in the new smaller-scale farming units 
foregrounded by the understanding of the demographic character of the sampled 
households, which forms the basis of the labour supplies from this source. Casting the 
research lens beyond the household, the existing inter-household labour cooperation is 
explored next to determine the wider sources of unpaid farm labour. The assessment 
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of the growth and differentiated use of hired in wage labour in the organisation of 
farming wraps up this section.  
6.2.1 Supply of farm labour from within the family   
This section deals with family farm labour supplies and commences by setting out the 
demographic character of the surveyed households and their social organisation in 
order to comprehend the sources of labour from within the families. In particular, the 
family sizes, age-sex distribution, residential status and the structure of the rural 
households (existing as either nuclear or extended units) provided a basis to assess the 
available labour supplies. The actual utilisation of self-employed family labour and its 
attendant gender and generation dynamics extends the analysis. 
6.2.1.1 Demographic character of farming households  
Many of the land beneficiaries have established permanent residential homes on the 
farms that they received during the FTLRP. Unpaid family labour was therefore being 
extracted from the resident population in new resettlement areas, and the already 
existing Communal Areas, including men, women and children. By 2017, the average 
age of the land beneficiaries of the FTLRP was 55 years in both Goromonzi and 
Kwekwe, whilst Communal Area landholders averaged 54 years. Predominantly 
married landholders and their children and/or relatives formed the potential unpaid 
family labour supply base in Goromonzi‘s resettled areas (Table 6.1).  
Table 6.1: Marital status of landholders  
Marital status  
Goromonzi (%) Kwekwe (%) 
A1 A2 
Total 
RA CA A1 A2 
Total 
RA CA 
Monogamous married 72.4 90.5 81.3 55.1 82.5 77.8 81.3 67.1 
Polygamous married 6.6 1.4 4 6.4 1 4.8 1.9 1.2 
Subtotal married  79 91.9 85.3 61.5 83.5 82.6 83.2 68.3 
Single 2.6 2.7 2.7 3.8 4.6 4.8 4.7 2.4 
Divorced/separated 1.3 0 0.7 9 1.5 1.6 1.6 2.4 
Widowed 17.1 5.4 11.3 25.6 10.3 11.1 10.5 27.1 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 N 76 74 150 78 194 63 257 85 
 
In conformity with the trends in most of rural Africa (Tsikata 2015; Tsikata 2009), the 
majority of women landholders (61.7 percent) who controlled land in Goromonzi‘s 
farm units were not married. Specifically, they were widowed (41.9 percent); 
divorced (3.2 percent) or single (12.9 percent). Most male landholders (96.6 percent) 
in contrast were married and the remaining 3.4 percent were widowed. The 
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Communal Areas in this district had a relatively larger share of non-married 
landholders, with 25.6 percent widowed (Table 6.1). Again, most of the female 
landholders in the Communal Areas of Goromonzi were detached from the marital 
institution.  
Table 6.2: Age-Sex Distribution Structure, Goromonzi District 
 Age  
No. of persons and % of total  
Resettled Areas  Communal Areas  
Male  Female  Total  Male  Female  Total  
No.  % No.  % No.  % No.  % No.  % No.  % 
 Goromonzi 
<15 72 8.7 93 11.2 165 19.7 49 15.1 71 21.8 120 36.9 
15 - 64 316 37.8 323 38.6 639 76.4 86 26.5 92 28.4 178 54.7 
>65 17 2 15 1.8 32 3.9 9 2.8 18 5.5 27 8.3 
Total 405 48.5 431 51.6 836 100 144 44.4 181 55.7 325 100 
 Kwekwe  
<15 193 13.6 196 13.9 389 27.5 99 19.9 90 18.11 189 38.1 
15 - 64 524 37 444 31.3 968 68.4 134 26.8 148 29.77 282 56.6 
>65 37 2.6 23 1.6 60 4.2 17 3.4 9 1.81 26 5.2 
Total 754 53 663 47 1417 100 250 50 247 50 497 100 
 
A total population of 836 persons, split between 48.4 percent and 51.6 percent males 
and females, respectively, were located in the surveyed Goromonzi resettled 
households (Table 6.2). After discounting for the economically inactive population 
i.e. those that are considered not capable of providing labour according to ILO 
guidelines because of their tender age (below 15 years old) or the old aged  (above 65 
years old) (CSO 2002d), 76.4 percent were economically active and could thus be 
called upon to provide unpaid farm labour supplies. Compared to the resettled areas, 
the population in the sampled Goromonzi Communal Areas households, totalling 325 
persons, had a slightly higher share of economically inactive persons of 35.2 percent, 
comprising of 26.9 percent who were young people and 8.3 percent who were old 
aged (Table 6.2).  
The organisation of rural families in Kwekwe was no different since most of the 
landholders in the resettled areas were also married (82.3 percent), (Table 6.1). 
Altogether, 1417 persons constituted the sampled Kwekwe resettled households, of 
which 53.2 percent were male and the remainder female (Table 6.2) whilst the 
Communal Area households represented a total population of 497 persons 
differentiated into 50.3 percent males and 49.7 percent females. Most Kwekwe 
Communal Area landholders were also married (68.3 percent), but the incidence of 
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widows comparable to their counterparts in Goromonzi was larger than the situation 
observed in resettled areas (Table 6.2). Not being married as characteristic of most 
female landholders was also replicated in both the resettled and Communal Areas of 
Kwekwe.   
Similar to Goromonzi, the Kwekwe resettled areas had the larger share of the 
potential labour force epitomised by an economically active population of 69.3 
percent compared to 59.8 percent in the Communal Areas. The large potential labour 
force among the resettled households arose from the significantly higher average 
household sizes, specifically in the case of Goromonzi district. Including both 
residents and non-resident members, family sizes averaged 6.08 and 5.05 for the A1 
and A2 households respectively compared to 4.17 in the Communal Areas in 
Goromonzi. In contrast, averaging 5.8 in both the A2 and Communal Area and 5.4 
members in the A1, household sizes did not significantly differ by settlement type in 
Kwekwe. 
Figure 6.1: Structure of families in the rural areas  
 
Goromonzi, Chi-Square=8.240, p=0.015 (significant at p < 0.05) 
Kwekwe , Chi-Square=2.634, p=0.268 (not significant at p < 0.05) 
 
An interesting feature of the unpaid family labour supplies was linked to the structure 
of resettled households. Instead of the traditional family, which is composed of a 
husband, wife and their offspring, also known as nuclear families, ―extended‖ 
families, which include additional relatives alongside the nuclear family (Mvududu & 
McFadden 2001) were dominant in Goromonzi (Figure. 6.1). A larger share of the A2 
households (71.6 percent) were organised as such compared to the A1 households 
(61.8 percent). Dissimilar patterns were witnessed in the Communal Areas in this 
38.2 28.4 33.3 
51.3 
36.1 46 38.5 43.5 
61.8 71.6 66.7 
48.7 

















district as the sampled households were roughly equally divided between the two 
family types (Figure. 6.1). 
Rather than the A2 households, it was the A1 households in Kwekwe that were 
frequently organised as extended family units. Communal Area households there, also 
displayed similar distribution patterns to those of the A2. Earlier work in six districts 
(including Goromonzi and Kwekwe) around 2005/06 observed that 80.1 percent and 
69.6 percent of the A1 and A2 households were structured as nuclear families (Moyo 
et. al. 2009: 25). This suggests that as years have passed by relatives were being co-
opted into the resettled areas perhaps to satisfy enlarged demand for labour as 
agricultural production expanded.  
Women and children left behind were the active contributors of unpaid family farm 
labour as men migrated for employment in LSCFs, mining centres and industries in 
the 1980s and 1990s (Muchena 1994; O‘Laughlin 1998; Potts 2000)
101
 in continuation 
of the colonial migrant labour systems in Southern Africa (Bush & Cliffe 1984; Cross 
& Cliffe 2017). However, the levels of non-residency prevailing in the resettled areas 
as previous studies have also revealed (Moyo et al. 2009; Scoones et al. 2010; 
Matondi 2012; Chigumira 2018) were far less than those seen before 2000 in the 
Communal Areas.  
Table 6.3: Residential status of family members  




A1 % A2 % Subtotal  % CA % A1  % A2 % Subtotal % CA % 
Non-
resident  
51 11 42 11 93 11 3 1 147 14 73 20 220 19 24 4.83 
Resident 411 89 332 89 743 89 322 99 902 86 295 80 927 81 473 95.2 
Total 
Population 
462 100 374 100 836 100 325 100 1049 100 368 100 1147 100 497 100 
N 76 74 150 78 194 63 257 85 
 
At least 82 percent of landholders in the resettled areas across both districts were 
permanently based at their farms together with their families and over 95 percent in 
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 For instance, a trade union survey report in the 1990s suggested that as much as 75 percent of the 
working class had links to countryside and combined wage work in the cities with farming in the 
Communal Areas (Moyo et al. 2009: 29). Several studies by Deborah Potts have also reflected the 
pervasive nature of the semi-proletarian condition among urban workers in Harare in the 1990s (Potts 
2000; Potts 2010).  
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the case of the Communal Areas. Extending to the total population in the sampled A1 
and A2 households in Goromonzi, only 11 percent in each of these sectors did not 
stay full-time in the rural areas (Table 6.3). These ―absentee‖ members were located 
in 31.6 percent of the A1 and 33.8 percent of the A2 households in this district (Table 
6.4). However, this was rare in the Communal Areas of both districts as most family 
members lived together (Table 6.3). Reaching 14 percent and 20 percent of the total 
household members correspondingly, the Kwekwe A1 and A2 farms unveiled greater 
levels of non-residency compared to Goromonzi (Table 6.3). About 31.4 percent, 39.1 
percent and 11.8 percent of the A1, A2 and Communal Area households respectively, 
had this characteristic in Kwekwe (Table 6.4).  
Table 6.4: Scale of non-residency in the rural areas among landholders 
 No. of 
non-
residents 
% Of households  
Goromonzi Kwekwe 
A1 A2 Total RA CA A1 A2 Total RA CA 
0 68.4 66.2 67.3 96.2 68.6 61.9 66.9 88.2 
1 17.1 24.3 20.7 3.8 11.9 11.1 11.7 7.1 
2 2.6 2.7 2.7 0 8.2 6.3 7.8 2.4 
3 9.2 4.1 6.7 0 4.6 4.8 4.7 0 
4-7 2.6 2.8 2.7 0 6.7 15.9 9 2.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 76 74 150 78 194 63 257 85 
 
The family labour supply base was thus not severely impacted since ―absentee‖ 
members were restricted to only one member in most of the households in Goromonzi 
district (Table 6.4). Although Kwekwe had a relatively bigger share of households 
that had two or more non-resident members compared to Goromonzi, still the 
distribution was titled towards those with one ―absentee‖ member.  
Non-residency did not necessarily imply that household members could not be 
recruited into unpaid family labour, as some of them returned ―home‖ during 
weekends and on public holidays to provide labour services. Most of the non-resident 
members (as discussed in section 6.3) were male household heads working in towns 
and cities, while the rest included other family members also tied to wage labour 
markets and students in boarding schools. Migration, which typifies the 
diversification of family labour, will be revisited in section 6.3. Due to its nearness to 
Harare, even some of those who were formally employed were permanent residents in 
Goromonzi‘s resettled areas. Consequently, the majority of the members were 
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available to be enlisted into the unpaid family farm labour, including both the male 
and female members.  
6.2.1.2 Utilisation of family labour in household agricultural production 
There has been a proliferation of the use of unpaid family labour in the resettled areas, 
which were previously bastions of LSCF farm wage labour. Recalling the situation 
that existed in the capitalist LSCFs, family labour was not used to perform manual 
work on the farms, as is the case today (see Chapter Five). Instead, white farmers and 
their families largely provided managerial and supervisory inputs in the operation of 
the farms (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Moyo et al. 2000; Rutherford 2001b). Today, family 
farm labour characterises even some of the A2 farms that the land reform policy 
envisaged to expand black commercial farming and therefore mainly hire in wage 
labour. 
Yet the patterns of unpaid family labour utilisation were differentiated amongst the 
settlement types. The Communal Area households in both districts, as before 2000 
(Adams 1991; Moyo 1995), still largely depend on the backs of their families for farm 
labour supplies, followed by the A1 households (Table 6.5). As expected, the use of 
unpaid family labour was far less important in the A2 households than in the A1 and 
Communal Areas, especially in Goromonzi district. Hence, approximately 60 percent 
of the Goromonzi A2 households mimicked former LSCFs by depending entirely on 
hired in farm wage labour, albeit with reduced absolute numbers of workers per farm 
unit as discussed below. Their counterparts in Kwekwe however imitated patterns of 
family labour use similar to A1 farms in Goromonzi (Table 6.5).  
Table 6.5: Scale of unpaid family labour utilisation 
No. of 
members 
% of households  
Goromonzi Kwekwe 
A1 A2 Total RA CA A1 A2 Total RA CA 
0 17.1 66.2 41.3 1.3 4.6 20.6 8.6 1.2 
1 3.9 0.0 2.0 3.8 4.1 1.6 3.5 0.0 
2 13.2 14.9 14.0 28.2 6.2 11.1 7.4 11.8 
3-5 32.9 18.9 26.0 64.1 63.9 46.0 59.5 62.4 
6-7 27.6 0.0 14.0 2.6 18.0 17.5 17.9 18.8 
8-9 3.9 0.0 2.0 0.0 .5 0.0 .4 3.5 
10-11 1.3 0.0 0.7 0.0 2.6 3.2 2.7 2.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 




p 0.00* 0.00* 
*Significant at p< 0.05 
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In the majority of A1 households in Goromonzi, between three to five and six to 
seven members were providing family farm labour (Table 6.5), whilst the A2 
households in this district, as well as in all the settlement types in Kwekwe, most were 
located in the range of three to five members. Goromonzi A1 households (3.46) 
boasting larger family sizes also had the highest mean number of family farm 
labourers compared with their counterparts in the A2 (2.88) and Communal Areas 
(3.05).
102
 Contradictory configurations materialised in Kwekwe, as no significant 
differences were registered between the settlements.
103
  
Despite the Communal Areas having the highest proportion of households that used 
unpaid family labour, the actual time contributed as measured in labour days were 
less to those of the newly resettled areas, due to their inferior cultivated areas (see 
section 6.4.2) principally in Kwekwe (Table 6.6). In Goromonzi, the A1 households 
had superior family labour days compared to the A2 and Communal Areas. More 
unpaid family labour days were invested by Goromonzi resettled households than 
those of Kwekwe and the same patterns were also correct for the Communal Areas.  




Goromonzi Kwekwe  
A1 A2 Total RA CA A1 A2 Total 
RA 
CA 
Mean 408.71a 327.36b 385.60 240.57b 320.96a 318.88
a 
320.51 196.20b 
Std. Dev. 259.89 203.61 246.84 106.75 201.73 254.85 213.60 94.92 
N 63 25 88 76 184 50 234 83 
*There is significant difference at p< 0.05 if the subscripts accompanying mean values appearing in the 
same row are dissimilar. 
 
Kinship ties were an important source of unpaid family labour given most resettled 
households were structured as extended family units (Table 6.1). Indeed, it was 
mostly landless relatives from their Communal Areas of origin or kumusha that 
resettled households mobilised. Further enquiries regarding the structure of their 
families revealed a recurring a theme of providing ―help to poor relatives‖ with 
clothing, food and accommodation. To this, the research can add to ―increase the 
unpaid family labour supplies‖, which included the relatives. By controlling land, the 
FTLRP beneficiaries were thus able to call on the labour of their kin from the 
Communal and other areas distressed by land shortages as done by other landholders 
                                                 
102 T-test significantly different at p< 0.05.  
103
 T-test significantly not different at p< 0.05. 
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in Zimbabwe‘s Communal Areas (Gaidzanwa 1995; Mvududu & McFadden 2001) 
and many rural dwellers in SSA (Nyantakyi-Frimpong & Kerr 2017: Tsikata 2015; 
2009b; Oya 2013).  
Despite not conforming to a capital-wage labour relation in as far as there is an 
exchange of labour for an agreed wage rate whether in cash or kind, these landless 
relatives embedded in extended family units could be argued to constitute some form 
of landless ―rural proletariat‖ (Mintz 1974: 35) or what could be classified as ―hidden 
wage workers‖. For the relationship between extended family relatives and 
landholders involves the exchange of labour and other basic amenities such as food, 
housing and clothing that could be equated to wages in ―kind‖ (Mintz 1974). Without 
these ―hidden wage workers‖, the labour supply gaps would possibly have to be 
plugged by hiring in wage labour.  
6.2.1.3 Gender and generational dynamics in the family labour supplies  
Both men and women provided unpaid family farm labour supplies to the households. 
Inside Goromonzi‘s A1 and Communal Areas, women were only a slight majority of 
the entire number of the unpaid family labourers  (Table 6.7). Poles apart, men were 
the majority in the A2 scheme in this district, as well as in all settlements in Kwekwe. 
Table 6.7: Gender and generational division of unpaid family labour, Goromonzi 
Age  A1 A2 CA 
Male Female Total %Female Male Female Total %Female Male Female Total %Female 
No. of persons involved in providing unpaid family labour in 2016/17 season 
Minors 12 11 23 47.8 0 2 2 100.0 23 22 45 48.9 
Adult 112 120 232 51.7 35 29 64 45.3 82 93 175 53.1 
Total 124 131 255 51.4 35 31 66 47.0 105 115 220 52.3 
No. of labour days contributed by persons in 2016/17 season 
Minor 481 380 861 44.1 0 26 26 100.0 581 823 1404 58.6 
Adults 11945 11096 23041 48.2 5111 2973 8084 36.8 7255 9464 16719 56.6 
Total 12426 11476 23902 48.0 5111 2999 8110 37.0 7836 10287 18123 56.8 
N 76 74 78 
 
Despite dominating the number of workers in Goromonzi A1 farms, women were 
contributing fewer labour days than men. Altogether, 12,426 labour days originated 
from men compared to 11,467 by women in these households (Table 6.7). Goromonzi 
A2 households deviated from this pattern as the preponderance of the males in the 
unpaid family farm labour force reflected in the bulk of the time contributions, as was 
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also the case in all settlements in Kwekwe (Table 6.7). However, women shouldered 
most of the workload in the district‘s Communal Areas. These trends in the gender 
distribution of the family farm labourers were not far off from the provincial results 
where the study districts lie published by national statistical agency. Mashonaland 
East registered percent shares of female family farm labourers of 50.3 percent, 44.4 
percent and 52.9 percent in the A1, A2 and Communal Areas respectively (ZIMSTAT 
2015a, b, c: 6-7). Within the same settlements in Midlands Province, women 
accounted for 49.1 percent, 38.2 percent and 53.4 percent of the total number of 
family farm labourers (ZIMSTAT 2015a, b, c:6-7). 
Children below the age of 16 years across genders in contravention of the law were 
part of the family farm labourers especially in the A1 and Communal Areas of both 
districts (Table 6.7 and 6.8). Small farms in the Communal Areas had the highest 
rates of child farm workers, accounting for at least 20.4 percent of the unpaid family 
workers and 8.6 percent and 10.7 percent of the total number of family labour days in 
Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively. Seventeen percent of the summation of family 
workers in the Kwekwe A1 farms were children and contributed eight percent of the 
total number of family labour days. There was less exploitation of the labour of 
children in Goromonzi‘s A1 farms than in Kwekwe since they constituted only nine 
percent of the family labourers. A2 farms used the lowest share of children in their 
total number of unpaid family labour force - 3.0 percent and 6.0 percent in 
Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively.  
Table 6.8: Gender and generational division of unpaid family labour, Kwekwe 
Age  A1 A2 CA 
Male Female Total %Female  Male Female Total %Female  Male Female Total %Female  
No. of persons involved in providing unpaid family labour in 2016/17 season 
Minors 58 58 116 50.0 7 6 13 46.2 47 37 84 44.0 
Adult 312 241 553 43.6 95 84 179 46.9 133 130 263 49.4 
Total 370 299 669 44.7 102 90 192 46.9 180 167 347 48.1 
No. of labour days contributed by persons in 2016/17 season 
Minor 2710 1980 4690 42.2 199 306 505 60.6 907 636 1543 41.2 
Adults 30970 22278 53248 41.8 8976 6010 14986 40.1 7215 7116 14331 49.7 
Total 33680 24258 57938 41.9 9175 6316 15491 40.8 8122 7752 15874 48.8 
N 194 63 85 
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Unpaid child labour could therefore be considered as a substitute for expensive farm 
wages, without which the resource constrained small farms would be expected to 
employ wage labour to satisfy the demand. As noted earlier in Chapter Four, child 
labour was also a challenge in both the former LSCF and Communal Areas 
(Loewenson 1991; Bourdillon 2000; Davies 2000). Whereas children of mostly farm 
wage labourers were exploited as underpaid workers in the former LSCFs, now 
resettled areas feature both unpaid and paid child labour in the A1 and A2 farms (see 
section 6.5). So this phenomenon persists to be an issue of concern in both resettled 
and Communal Areas, especially its conflict with school attendance.
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Notwithstanding the participation by both men and women, the field observations 
illuminated the segmentation of the range of farm tasks performed by family 
labourers along gender and generational lines. Land clearing, ploughing, livestock 
herding, cattle dipping and, pest and disease control were tasks that were 
predominantly done by adult men in most of the households surveyed across all the 
settlement types in both districts. Adult women, on the other hand, were frequently 
engaged in planting and weeding. Male children were commonly involved in 
livestock herding, while female children contributed their labour inputs to weeding 
and planting. 
Women, nonetheless, largely performed reproductive labour.
105
 Recent surveys 
indicate that women in Zimbabwe spend as much 49.7 hours per week on 
reproductive labour activities compared to 25.8 hours for men (ZIMSTAT 2016: 48). 
Disparities in rural areas are more likely to be wider since women have to spend more 
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 Overall, 15.8 percent, 16.2 percent and 30.8 percent of the A1, A2 and Communal Area households 
in Goromonzi lacked the money to send all their children of school going age to school in 2017 
respectively. While in Kwekwe 29.4 percent, 9.5 percent and 25.9 percent correspondingly could not 
do so.  For instance in 11 out of the 12 A1 households in Goromonzi who could not afford to send 
children to school were providing unpaid family labour. So the story was also the same in other 
settlements in this districts as 11 out of 12 A2 households and 20 out of 24 Communal Area households 
enlisted their children not attending school into the family labour force. In Kwekwe, 52 out of the 57 
A1 households also did the same, as well as 19 of the 22 Communal Areas households.   
105 For instance, amongst the A1 male landowners in Goromonzi, 24.2 percent reported performing 
household work such as firewood collection, cooking and fetching of water compared to 76.9 percent 
amongst the female landowners. 42.2 percent of the male landowners and 92 percent of the female 
landowners in the Communal Areas noted this. These patterns could not be discerned amongst the A2 
landholders in both districts since most of them also engaged domestic labour. A1 male landholders in 
Kwekwe actively participated in domestic chores than their counterparts as confirmed by 65.2 percent. 
At 78.8 percent involved female landholders were still the main providers of domestic labour. The 
disparities in male and female landowners in domestic labour were wider in the Communal Areas of 
Kwekwe, 38.9 percent and 90 percent respectively. 
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time fetching water and firewood unlike their urban counterparts who have access to 
tapped water and electricity. Women were therefore critical in the maintenance of the 
unpaid farm labour as the key source of reproductive labour (Naidu & Ossome 2016; 
Bhattacharya 2017). The overall burden of work encompassing production and 
reproduction spheres therefore still falls on the back of women. 
Men were omni-present in the decision-making about the allocation of family labour 
either independently or jointly with their spouses. In male-owned resettled farms of 
Goromonzi, 81.5 percent of them did so alone. In addition, male presence was felt in 
the combined efforts of the owners and their wives, and through their sons as 
indicated by 6.1 percent. All in all, men thus influenced this process in 87.7 percent of 
the Goromonzi resettled households compared to 12.5 percent for women divided into 
independent decision-makers (7.7 percent) and together with their husbands (4.6 
percent). Even in female-owned land, men by themselves determined family labour 
allocation in 45.5 percent of the resettled households within the district, while in the 
equivalent share; it was the responsibility of the female landowners. 
In the Kwekwe resettled areas, in 63.0 percent of the households where the land was 
male-owned, these men independently called the shots. Summing up the joint spousal 
decisions (29.7 percent) and those made through their sons (2.1 percent), male voices 
were recorded in 94.8 percent of these households. Women, in contrast, were the 
decision makers independently in 3.6 percent of the male-owned land and alongside 
their husbands in 29.7 percent as noted above. Though women dominated decision 
making on the land they controlled either independently (66.7 percent) or jointly (11.9 
percent), men still single-handedly directed the process in 21.4 percent in these 
households.  
Similar trends were repeated in the Communal Areas of both districts. In 
Goromonzi‘s Communal Areas, the decision regarding the allocation of family labour 
was undertaken by men alone and with their wives‘ participation in 58 percent and 25 
percent of the male controlled lands respectively. On their own, women did so in 17.1 
percent of these households. A different picture was documented in female-owned 
lands as male influence was reduced more than that recorded in the same category in 
the resettled areas in both districts, since their independent role was noted in at least 
84 percent of these households in the Communal Areas of Goromonzi and Kwekwe. 
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Men were only involved in such decisions in 8.0 percent and 4.0 percent of female-
owned lands in two districts, respectively. As seen in the resettled areas, men were 
once more the dominant actors on the land they owned in Kwekwe Communal Areas 
– 49.2 percent alone and 40.7 percent with their wives. Only in 10.2 percent of the 
Communal Area households of this district did women take the lead role without male 
participation.  
By overshadowing women in the mobilisation of agricultural finance and determining 
the agricultural inputs used, men also influenced the quantum of unpaid family labour 
applied, as well as the commodities to which the labour was allocated. For instance, in 
87.7 percent and 64.8 percent of households in male-owned land in Goromonzi and 
Kwekwe districts correspondingly, males were independently responsible for the 
mobilisation of agricultural finance. Whilst, in the female-owned land category, men 
were also responsible for this task in 45.4 percent of the households in Goromonzi‘s 
resettled areas compared to 21.5 percent in Kwekwe. 
Quite the opposite of ―families divided‖ (Murray 1981), the labour contributions by 
both men and women observed in the resettled areas echo the reunification of families 
during the FTLRP represented by married spouses staying together with their 
children, as others have also discovered (Moyo et al. 2009). These tendencies were 
related to the contraction of the urban labour markets that pursued the economic 
decline after 2000 – a process associated with the deindustrialisation experienced in 
the country and consequent contraction of formal employment opportunities in the 
factories (LEDRIZ 2016; Kanyenze et al. 2011; see also Chapter Five).   
Additionally, the findings in the resettled areas, which show that men were as much 
providers of agricultural labour as women, confirm emerging evidence from recent 
studies in Africa. Indeed, the literature has been revisiting the stylised facts about role 
of women in farming in SSA, particularly their labour contribution. According to 
FAO (2011: 11), overall women‘s agricultural labour contribution in selected African 
countries was just above 50 percent. SOFA Team & Doss. (2011: 8) found that the 
labour contributions of women were highly variable ranging from 30 percent in the 
Gambia to as  high as 80 percent in Cameroon. But in most of the countries examined, 
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the labour supplied by women was just over 50 percent.
106
 Another study in six 
African countries, namely; Ethiopia, Malawi, Tanzania, Niger, Nigeria, and Uganda 
estimated the average labour contribution of women at 40 percent (Palacios-Lopez, 
Christiansen & Kilic 2017: 56). Give and take the country variation, these studies and 
the findings presented herein suggest that the contribution of women to agricultural 
labour even when larger than that of males is not as high as the usually cited figures 
of between 60 to 80 percent (FAO 2011: 11).
107
  
Relatively equitable contributions of labour do not however imply that control of 
women‘s labour by men, which is occasioned by skewed access to and control of rural 
land by males (Tsikata 2009), has relented. If anything, the situation observed in the 
study sites resembles what has been typified as ―…the family farms together, the 
decisions, however are made by man‖ (Djurfeldt et al. 2017: 601) in reference to male 
domination in the control of the agrarian labour processes in matrilineal land tenure 
systems in Malawi. The data presented above expose the overly dominant role of men 
in the decisions about the family labour allocation. Subsequently, the control of land 
by women does not automatically convert into the control of organisation of the 
production, including the labour processes. Since men were the major recipients of 
land during the FTLRP (Scoones et al. 2010; Moyo 2011a; Mkodzongi 2013b; 
Chiweshe, Chakona & Helliker 2014), it is fair to conclude that on the majority of the 
land being cultivated today, men control the allocation and application of unpaid 
family labour. No wonder, Moyo lamented the persistence of inequitable gender and 
land relations in aftermath of the FTLRP, ―redistributive land reform‖, he wrote: 
―…did not reverse the regressive agrarian relations evoked by patriarchal power relations. 
…While more women secured their own land than in previous reforms, men and husbands 
still dominate agrarian transactions‖ (Moyo 2011b: 946). 
Many other researchers have also drawn attention to these inequalities highlighting 
the continued hold men have on women‘s labour (Bhatasara & Chiweshe 2017; 
Chingarande 2008; Makura-Paradza 2010; Mutopo 2013; 2011). One may also recall 
here the situation in matrilineal societies in Malawi where land is traditionally vested 
                                                 
106 In Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Zambia, the labour provided by women was just over 50 percent, 
while in Ghana, Tanzania, Niger and Togo their contribution was below 50 percent. Only in Cameroon 
did the contribution of women exceed 60 percent (SOFA & Doss 2011: 8). 
107 In Uganda, women labour contributions were above half in Uganda (56 percent), Malawi (52 
percent) and Tanzania (52 percent). While in Nigeria (37 percent), Ethiopia (29 percent) and Niger (24 
percent) women‘s labour contributions were below that of men (Palacios-Lopez et al. 2017: 56).  
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in women. Various studies there have shown how men are increasingly taking over 
the control of the land and the labour processes (Koopman 1997; Peters 2010; 
Djurfeldt et al. 2017). As a result, the patriarchal relations within the family 
priviledging male authority over a whole range of intra-household decisions are not 
necessarily altered by the control of land by women. 
6.2.2 Inter-household labour relations  
This section discusses the extra-household ―unpaid‖ farm labour that was also being 
mobilised through the cooperation between groups of families to exchange labour, 
locally known as ―humwe‖.
108
 Invitations were sent out to the community for 
interested people to congregate at the plot of the one of the household members to 
perform farm labour tasks. In exchange the host household prepared food or 
traditional beer that was shared amongst the participants after finishing work in the 
fields. Also known as ―work parties‖ (Shiraishi 2009), such labour arrangements 
benefitted households that were able to marshal resources to feed the ―workers‖ 
afterwards. The relationship between the host household and the members of the 
community that come to work on their fields transcends that of an employer and 
employee (Tsikata 2015) since it is not associated with the payment of an agreed 
wage either in cash or kind for the performance of particular farm task.  
Humwe as a source of farm labour was more pronounced in Kwekwe and was of the 
non-reciprocal type. About 39.7 percent, 20.6 percent and 60 percent of the A1, A2 
and Communal Area households respectively reported involvement in labour 
cooperation as either a ―host‖ or ―supplier of labour‖. This practice was not as popular 
in Goromonzi as it was noted in only 2.6 percent of the A1 and 1.3 percent of the 
Communal Area households.  
Table 6.9: Activities involved in non-reciprocal labour exchanges, Kwekwe  
Activity  A1 A2 Subtotal CA 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Land clearing 3 5.0 1 10.0 4 5.7 10 23.8 
Planting  22 33.8 1 11.1 23 31.1 12 28.6 
Weeding  40 59.7 7 70.0 47 61.0 45 93.8 
Harvesting 53 73.6 9 81.8 62 74.7 26 65.0 
N 77 13 90 51 
 
                                                 
108
 This is Shona word literally translating to ―togetherness‖. 
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Labour demanding activities such as harvesting and weeding mostly benefitted from 
humwe labour in Kwekwe (Table 6.9). Both men and women supplied labour to this 
enterprise, so did children below 16 years of age. Specifically, the labour force was 
distributed as follows in the A1 farms – 50 percent were adult men, 35.1 percent adult 
women and the remainder were male children (13 percent) and female children (1.3 
percent). Male adults in the A2 farms were the main participants (78.6 percent) and 
the rest were equally partitioned between female adults, and male and female 
children. Only adults were reported in the Communal Areas of which 52.7 percent 
were women.  
Unequal power relations that sometimes colour the inter-household labour 
cooperation (Tsikata 2015) played out in one case encountered in Goromonzi. There, 
an apostolic church leader drew upon seniority in the church to mobilise labour from 
his followers for his potato fields. None of the rank and file flock had this priviledge 
to summon labour as their church leader did.  
The Zunde raMambo projects managed by traditional leaders represented another 
form of labour cooperation (Worby 1995; Nyambara 2001) observed in both 
districts,
109
 but not between households. The chief avails land and other agricultural 
inputs, and households in that particular locality are obliged to provide labour for 
food production to support marginal community members, including widows and 
child headed households. A1 households rather than the A2 households were the ones 
targeted for labour supplies by the village heads located on their farms who 
coordinate this on the behalf of the chief. Labour supplies to Zunde raMambo were 
however contested as its separation with the chief‘s own household production was 
sometimes blurred. For this reason, this practice has failed to gain traction in the 
resettled areas especially in Goromonzi. The tendencies of unequal power relations 
thus also marked Zunde raMambo labour cooperation. 
Apart from agriculture, both resettled and Communal Areas provide communal labour 
in community projects, which were also led by traditional authorities. Goromonzi A1 
households were not averse to this due to the immediately felt ―perceived‖ benefits. 
Labour cooperation in these projects was geared towards provision of social services 
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 Zunde raMambo refers to a food reserve kept by the traditional leader to serve disadvantaged 
members of the community and wider community during lean agricultural seasons (Worby 1995). 
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and related infrastructure that was deficient in the resettled areas, including 
construction of schools, clinics and maintenance of roads. The beneficiaries of land 
reform were allocated land without the state providing these much needed social 
services (Chibwana 2017; Moyo et al. 2009; Matondi 2012). Their availability today 
was largely an outcome of the application of ―humwe‖ type labour. The primary 
school at ―Vana Vevhu‖ A1 farm in Goromonzi, for instance, was an outcome of such 
labour cooperation. Women were responsible for moulding the bricks and the men 
were largely involved in the construction activities. 
These findings concur with the inverse relationship between the growth of wage 
labour markets and the centrality of labour cooperation in organising farm labour 
alluded to by some analysts in reference to Africa (Berry 1993; Ponte 2000; Mueller 
2011) and Asia (Michie 1981; Murphy 2015). Goromonzi district, which had a 
relatively more developed farm labour market, as discussed below, humwe was not 
widespread as demonstrated in Kwekwe. Furthermore, the commercialisation of 
agriculture that is associated with the hiring of wage labour was also more advanced 
in Goromonzi than in Kwekwe (see section 6.4). Indeed, the rapid escalation of cotton 
production in the South Western Communal Areas of Gokwe visible by 1985 resulted 
in the displacement of humwe with wage labour (Worby 1995). Nonetheless, the 
evidence also reflects that the growth and presence of labour markets among the 
peasantry does not entirely displace non-capitalist labour relations (Amanor 2001). In 
sum, the incidence of labour cooperation was differentiated according to the 
geographical locations, which in turn influenced the land use patterns and integration 
of farm households in the agricultural commodity markets (see section 6.4). 
6.2.3 Employment of farm wage labour  
Critics of redistributive land reforms often cite the disruption of agricultural 
employment as the outcome of the reallocation of land from large capitalist farms to 
the peasantry (de Janvry 1981; Sender & Johnston 2004; Hellum & Derman 2004; 
Sender 2016), implying that farm wage labour markets are expected to disappear 
since it is assumed that the peasantry exclusively relies on family farm labour. The 
field data refutes these assertions. Whereas there has been a growth of the use of 
family farm labour in the newly resettled areas, the hiring in of wage labour was 
prevalent even among the smaller A1 landholdings, let alone in the larger A2 farms. 
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Up to 77.6 percent of the Goromonzi A1 landholders hired in wage labour to 
complement the family labour supplies (Figure. 6.2). The same characterised as much 
as 64.9 percent of the A1 households even in the dry district of Kwekwe. As 
expected, the recruitment of farm wage labour was more pervasive in the A2 scheme, 
94.6 percent in Goromonzi and 88.9 percent in Kwekwe. A portion of the old 
peasantry in the Communal Areas of both districts were also wage employers (Figure 
6.2), thus opposing claims that associate wage labour with large capitalist farming in 
Southern Africa (Barrett et al. 2001; Griffin et al. 2002; Sender & Johnston 2004; 
Barrett et al. 2005). 
Figure 6.2: Hiring in of farm wage labour by rural households 
Goromonzi, Chi-Square=84.367, p=0.000 (significant at p< 0.05) 
Kwekwe, Chi-Square=82.017, p=0.000 (significant at p< 0.05). 
 
That a few of the A2 farmers also exclusively relied on family labour to organise their 
farming activities suggests that the land reform policy implementation did not always 
succeed in the selection and targeting of beneficiaries in this model. As stated earlier 
(Chapter Five), the A2 model was earmarked to diversify commercial farming and 
thus the beneficiaries were expected to hire in wage labour. Under-resourced farmers 
thus also made it onto the A2 beneficiary lists. 
Differentiation was vivid in the use of permanent and casual forms of farm labour. 
The former was more widespread in the A2 scheme than in the smaller scale A1 and 
Communal Areas. A1 households hired in mostly part-time labour and in fact 
permanent labour was absent in 23 of the 59 Goromonzi A1 households (39.0 
percent) that hired in wage labour (Table 6.10). Likewise, this was recorded in 49 of 
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households hired full-time workers and this was restricted to only four of the 16 
households in their Kwekwe equivalents. Occurring in 92.9 percent and 76.8 percent 
of the Goromonzi and Kwekwe A2 households respectively, the use of permanent 
sharply contrasted with the small-scale landholdings.  




A1 A2 Total RA CA A1 A2 Total RA CA 
0 39 7.1 21.7 100 56.3 23.2 46.2 75 
1 37.3 10 22.5 0 29.4 10.7 23.6 25 
2 13.6 8.6 10.9 0 9.5 25 14.3 0 
3-4 10.2 18.6 14.7 0 4.8 30.4 12.6 0 
5-6 0 14.3 7.8 0 0 5.4 1.6 0 
7-8 0 8.6 4.7 0 0 0 0 0 
9+ 0 32.9 17.8 0 0 5.4 1.6 0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 59 70 129 21 126 56 182 85 
Chi square 113.459 65.454 
p 0.00* 0.00* 
*Significant at p<0.05 
 
When permanent labour was used in the A1 farms, the majority hired only one worker 
(Table 6.10) and none engaged more than four across both districts. The Goromonzi 
A2 farms were distributed in the various categories of the range of permanent workers 
hired in and up to a third employed nine or more workers (Table 6.10). Most of the 
Kwekwe A2 households were clustered between one and four permanent workers. 
That the average number of permanent workers in the smaller A1 and Communal 
Areas lagged behind those noted  in the bigger A2 farms should not be unanticipated. 
Specifically, for every one permanent worker in an A1 farm in Goromonzi, 8.42 
workers were employed in an A2 farm household. Kwekwe did not register these 
wide differences since for every one permanent worker in an A1 household, two were 
found in the A2.  
Casual or part-time farm labour was the more popular form of hired in wage labour in 
A1 farms as it was perceived in 99 percent and 84.9 percent of the labour market 
participants in Goromonzi and Kwekwe, respectively (Table 6.11). Such high levels 
of use were also observed in the A2 households. The A2 households nevertheless, 
hired larger number of casual workers than the A1, as much as 2.84 times in 
Goromonzi. Only limited to 1.4 times, Kwekwe experienced much less 
disproportionality in the use of this labour form. Once again the Communal Areas had 
the least number of the casual workers hired in.  
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0 1.7 7.1 4.7 0 15.1 16.1 15.4 25 
1 1.7 0 0.8 14.3 2.4 0 1.6 6.3 
2 10.2 1.4 5.4 42.9 10.3 7.1 9.3 12.5 
3-4 10.2 0 4.7 33.3 24.6 14.3 21.4 37.5 
5-6 11.9 7.1 9.3 9.5 22.2 21.4 22 12.5 
7-8 8.5 2.9 5.4 0 7.1 14.3 9.3 6.3 
9+ 55.9 81.4 69.8 0 18.3 26.8 20.9 0 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 




p 0.00* 0.225** 
*Significant at p <0.05 **Not significant at p<0.05 
 
Due to the more common use of casual rather than permanent labour, the 
casualisation of farm labour that took root in the LSCFs in 1970s and intensified after 
1980 have thus not abated in the new farming units (see Chapter Four and Five). Yet 
this was also in sync with the wider tendencies not only in the national labour 
markets, but globally as part-time work has increasingly become the ―new normal‖ as 
employers prefer ―flexible‖ employees easy to dispose when not needed (ILO 2015a; 
2015b; Jha 2016). Moreover, this type of employment serves the profit maximisation 
of domestic and international capitalist firms as costs associated with full-time work 
such as pensions and other forms of social security fall away in part-time work.  

















Casual  232.4a 371.7 565.4b 695.5 21.3c 16.6 78.4a 161.3 182.4b 314.1 9.9c 16.2 
Permanent 163.2a 280.0 1864.4b 1553.9 0.0c 0.0 79.9a 160.8 480.4b 1100.3 28.1c 50.5 
Total hired  395.6a 474.9 2429.8b 1902.8 21.3c 16.6 158.3a 218.3 662.8b 1330.6 38.1c 47.0 
N 59.00 70.00 21.00 126.00 56.00 16.00 
*There is significant difference at p< 0.05 if the subscripts accompanying mean values appearing in the 
same row are dissimilar. 
 
Beyond the absolute number of workers hired in, the field research also enquired on 
the actual number of labour days contributed by both permanent and casual labour.
110
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 According to ILO Hours of Work (Industry) Convention 1919 (No. 1), the standard workday is 
designated as eight hours and weekly working hours should not exceed 48 hours. Zimbabwe Labour 
Laws follow the same standard, including the Statutory Instrument No. 116 of 2014 covering the 
working conditions of farm workers.  
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Permanent workers in A2 farms in Goromonzi put in an average of 565.4 labour days, 
compared to 480.4 in Kwekwe in the same category. The inferior number of full-time 
workers also converted to fewer labour days in the A1 compared to A2 households - 
163.2 in Goromonzi and 79.9 in Kwekwe. Overall, the total number of labour days 
hired in was higher in the A2 farms than the rest of settlements (Table 6.12). 
Communal Areas had the least number of labour days hired in. No variation was 
detected in the utilisation of wage labour between male and female land beneficiaries 
in FTLRP areas.  
Both permanent and family labour were involved in the performance of the full range 
of farm tasks. Variations were however apparent in the use of casual labour. In 
particular, the data uncovered the concentration of its use in four activities namely; 
ploughing, planting, weeding and harvesting (Table 6.13). Not less than 90 percent of 
the resettled households in Goromonzi had hired casual labour for these activities 
except in ploughing. Weeding and harvesting drew a substantial proportion of 
households in Kwekwe resettled households comparable to those in Goromonzi. 
Within the Communal Areas, weeding was commonly reported in Goromonzi, while 
land clearing of out bushes that sprouted in their fields during the dry season impelled 
casual labour engagement in Kwekwe.  
Table 6.13: Farm labour tasks where casual labour was utilised 
 Activity 
Goromonzi (%) Kwekwe (%) 
A1 A2 
Total 
RA CA A1 A2 
Total 
RA  CA 
Land clearing 11.9 53.8 33.9 0 13 42.9 22.3 80 
Ploughing 54.2 70.8 62.9 60 20.4 26.5 22.3 0 
Planting 94.9 93.8 94.4 55 19.4 36.7 24.8 0 
Weeding 93.2 100 96.8 100 86.1 75.5 82.8 40 
Harvesting 96.6 100 98.4 50 59.3 81.6 66.2 0 
Pest & disease control 62.7 87.7 75.8 5 6.5 18.4 10.2 0 
Marketing 0 3.1 1.6 0 3.7 2 3.2 0 
Livestock herding 3.4 3.1 3.2 15 5.6 14.3 8.3 0 
Farm repairs 16.9 4.6 10.5 10 5.6 16.3 8.9 0 
Farm security 3.4 1.5 2.4 0 3.7 6.1 4.5 0 
Cattle dipping 5.1 0 2.4 5 3.7 6.1 4.5 0 
N 59 65 124 20 108 49 157 10 
 
The number of tasks in which casual labour was used also elucidated inequalities 
between the resettled and Communal Area households. Table 6.13 shows that nine out 
of the 10 tasks investigated were using casual labour albeit reported by differentiated 
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shares of the resettled households. The Communal Areas of Kwekwe lagged behind in 
the number of tasks indicated and was in point limited to land clearing and weeding. 
While in Goromonzi Communal Areas, the scenario approximated that seen in the 
resettled areas, but with lower shares of households recorded except for weeding. A 
key difference between the resettled areas of Goromonzi and Kwekwe related to the 
proportions of households using casual labour outside of weeding and harvesting 
(Table 6.13). The concentration of the use of casual labour in these two activities 
structures the recruitment peaks and troughs during the agricultural season (section 
6.5.2). 
These variations expressed in the patterns of labour use also stretched to the 
distribution of work between hired in and family labour across the main farm tasks. 
The share of hired labour time was significantly larger in the A2 households matched 
to the A1 and Communal Areas across the spectrum of farm tasks in the respective 
districts (Table 6.14). Weeding, for instance, in the Communal Areas in both districts 
and the A1 farms in Kwekwe, less than 20 percent of the work was done by hired in 
labour. The opposite was true in the remaining settlement types as hired in labour did 
most of the work and its share was more pronounced in the A2 farms of Goromonzi.  
Table 6.14: Shares of labour contributed by hired labour to different activities 
Activity 




RA CA A1 A2 
Total 
RA CA 
Land clearing 24 65 44 4 18 59 28 9 
Ploughing 52 80 66 11 24 52 31 0 
Planting 50 85 68 6 20 51 27 0 
Weeding 53 87 70 17 38 66 45 7 
Harvesting 55 85 70 4 29 64 37 0 
Marketing 6 19 12 0 5 17 8 0 
Pest/disease control 41 80 60 0 16 53 25 0 
Fertiliser application 47 84 65 2 17 58 27 0 
N 76 74 150 78 194 63 357 85 
 
The gender composition of the farm wage labour force in the surveyed households 
displayed an imbalance between men and women (Table 6.15). Over 68 percent of the 
permanent workers in the resettled households of Goromonzi were men and as much 
as 84 percent in Kwekwe. Women‘s presence was higher in the casual labour 
component. Men occupied most of the casual jobs that were largely offered in the 
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Communal Areas in Goromonzi, but in contrast women held the slightly predominant 
position in Kwekwe.  
The evidence presented herein substantiates the latest statistics published in the 2014 
National Labour Force Surveys. According to this report, women held only 18.3 
percent of the permanent jobs in the agricultural sector and their share in casual 
labour force was 39.7 percent (ZIMSTAT 2016: 40). Though still underrepresented, 
the emerging picture from this study and the national figures was that of substantial 
improvement in the accommodation of women in permanent work. Their share had 
remained disappointingly stuck below 10 percent of the permanent workforce in the 
LSCFs since the 1970s and roughly equally divided with men in the casual labour 
force (Clarke 1977; Amanor-Wilks 1995; Muchena & Dzumbira 2001) (see Chapter 
Five).  
Table 6.15: Gender distribution of farm labourers hired by households 
Type of workers Goromonzi Kwekwe 




CA % of 
Total 





Male permanent  46 312 358 68 0 0 72 135 207 84 4 
Female permanent 10 160 170 32 0 0 8 31 39 16 0 
Total Permanent 56 472 528 100 0 0 80 166 246 100 4 
Male casual  269 907 1176 42 33 59 264 220 484 46 22 
Female casual 402 1229 1631 58 23 41 384 180 564 54 22 
Total casual workers 671 2136 2807 100 56 100 648 400 1048 100 44 
N 59 70 129  21  126 56 182  16 
 
These recruitment patterns nonetheless were still far from equitable gender 
distribution in the labour markets and echoes tendencies prevailing in many parts of 
SSA (Torvikey et al. 2016; Tsikata 2016; 2015; Oya 2013; 2010). Women were 
therefore mostly integrated in the farm labour markets as part-time workers. Even 
after land reform, the restriction of women to the margins of part-time farm work has 
thus not abated.  However, it is also argued that women opt for part-time work in 
order to prevent conflict with patriarchal structures, which overly burden them with 
reproductive labour roles (SOFA & Doss 2011; Tsikata 2016).  
6.2.4 Summary of main findings  
The FTLRP has resulted in the widening of the farm labour sources beyond the 
predominant exploitation of wage labour that formed the fulcrum of the organisation 
of production in the former LSCFs (Loewenson 1992; Amanor-Wilks 1995; 
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Rutherford 2001a). The many smaller-scale farming units arising from the FTLRP 
utilise sources of labour that were substantially different from those used in the 
LSCFs. More specifically, the new labour sources were reflected by the enlarged use 
of self-employed or unpaid labour from within the families of the differentiated A1 
and A2 resettled households. The exclusive reliance of family labour by a few A2 
farmers implies that some challenges were experienced in the selection and targeting 
of beneficiaries in this scheme that was meant to diversify commercial farming and 
thus hire in wage labour. To be sure, the hiring in and hiring out of wage still persists 
among the new farming units in direct opposition to suggestions by some 
commentators. Extra-household labour through cooperative labour arrangements 
existed side-by-side with unpaid family and wage labour (Tsikata 2015). 
Despite both men and women sharing the burden of agricultural work as unpaid 
family labourers, inequitable gender relations in agrarian labour persist through male 
control of the labour process, including the allocation of women and children‘s 
labour. Reproductive labour compounds the demands on women‘s time and overall 
thus contribute more labour to the maintenance of the households more than men 
(Gaidzanwa 1995; Doss et al. 2014; Naidu & Ossome 2016).  
These findings reproduce a significant association between the settlement type (also 
representing the land size owned) and incidence of hiring in wage labour. The larger 
the land size, the more likely was it for households to hire in labour. The development 
of farm labour markets, similar to the trends obtaining in the former LSCFs, were 
uneven among the regions on account of the agro-ecological conditions and land use 
patterns. Districts located in better agro-ecological zones such as Goromonzi continue 
to dominate in the utilisation of hired in labour more than drier districts such as 
Kwekwe. To recapitulate,  most LSCF workers prior to the FTLRP were concentrated 
in the high agro-ecological potential districts in the Mashonaland Provinces (CSO 
2001; Chambati & Moyo 2004). Women as before continue to be neglected to the 
margins of farm labour markets as part-time workers. 
6.3 DIVERSIFICATION OF FAMILY LABOUR  
Historically, proletarianisation of peasant labour in countries such as Zimbabwe, 
which experienced Settler colonisation has been associated with the loss of land and 
erosion of survival options beyond the capital-wage labour relation (Arrighi 1970; 
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Clarke 1977; Palmer 1977; Moyo 2011). Access to land would therefore be expected 
to lessen the compulsion to seek wage employment. Nonetheless, various scholars 
have reminded us that proletarianisation is not contingent upon land access and 
people enter the wage economy for various reasons including to harness resource for 
farming, spread their risks, including to secure the location of social reproduction for 
the family, the young, old, ill and or to meet other household needs that are not easily 
met from farming under the current neoliberal economic conditions (Boltvinik 2016; 
O‘Laughlin 2002; Moyo & Yeros 2005b; Shivji 2017; 2009). Indeed, land alone is not 
sufficient without other resources such as finance, seeds, fertilisers, and machinery to 
make it productive and consequently make a living (Cousins 2009).  
The surveyed households behaved no differently to other rural households elsewhere 
in as far as allocation of their family labour beyond farming (Yeros 2013a; Scoones 
2015a). Beyond land for farming, the FTLRP also widened access to other related 
natural resources that were being traded by land recipients and farm workers 
(Mkodzongi 2013b). These resources were previously monopolised by LSCFs which 
excluded other segments of the population on the strength of the freehold property 
rights (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Moyo 1995). Moreover, since the state tenures enable 
the free movement of people unlike in the past where trespass laws were heavily 
enforced by the LSCFs (Kanyenze 2001; Tandon 2001), they permitted land 
beneficiaries and others to engage in variegated trading of goods and services. Natural 
resource trading in Communal Areas continues as before, but due to the 
environmental degradation that arose from the overcrowding in these areas (Bojo 
1993; Mehretu 1994) access tends to constrained in comparison to the resettled areas.  
Agricultural based social reproduction was thus either combined with urban/rural 
(formal) wage employment or non-farm rural based income earning activities such as 
natural resource trading, as well as other entrepreneurial activities in the urban and 
rural areas.  
6.3.1 Hiring out of family labour in local farm wage labour markets  
Strictly speaking, family labour hired out to other farming units falls under the realm 
of agricultural activities (see Chapter Two). Nonetheless, it was one source of wage 
employment that rural households allocated their family labour towards. Some 
members from within some households were thus straddling between providing 
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unpaid family farm labour and local farm labour markets. For women, reproductive 
labour adds to these forms of labour to compose their ―triple work burden‖ (Lyon et 
al. 2017: 328). 
Varied patterns of incorporation into the farm labour markets as sellers of labour 
power could be delineated across the two districts examined. Amongst the resettled 
households, the results demonstrate that only a minority sold farm labour to other 
households in Goromonzi compared to Kwekwe (Figure 6.3). There was significant 
association between the settlement type and hiring out of farm labour in Goromonzi. 
So it was the Communal Area households which controlled the least landholdings that 
were most active in hiring out farm wage labour, signifying that land shortages were 
still propelling participation in the local labour markets in this district. These patterns 
of association with the settlement did not evolve in Kwekwe. Still, the engagement in 
farm labour markets was frequently registered in A1 and Communal Area households 
compared to the A2.  
Figure 6.3: Hiring out of farm labour to other farm households  
 
Goromonzi, Chi-Square=62.058, p=0.000 (significant at p<0.05) 
Kwekwe, Chi-Square=5.009, p=0.082 (not significant at p<0.05). 
Gold panning, in which a substantial proportion of the households are involved in 
Kwekwe, as discussed below, provides more rewarding income earnings compared to 
farm labour markets partly explains these trends. Moreover, the demand for hired in 
labour was relatively lower in this locality than in Goromonzi on account of the agro-
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To balance with their unpaid family farm labour roles, the majority of households 
were inserted into local farm labour markets as part-time workers. The average 
number of labour days sold by A1 and A2 households, 2.8 and 0.92 respectively, was 
fewer than 15.2 days characterising the Communal Areas in Goromonzi.
111
 The A1 
were the peak of households in Kwekwe with 8.1 labour days, which was 11.6 and 1.9 
times more than those enumerated in the A2 and Communal Areas respectively.
112
 
These levels of hiring out farm labour were only a small fraction when compared to 
those of land short and/or landless farm labourers who largely depend on selling wage 
labour for their sustenance (section 6.5), further reinforcing the relationship between 
access to land and hiring out labour. 
Table 6.16: Gender distribution of household members hired out  
Gender Goromonzi Kwekwe 
A1 A2 Subtotal CA  A1 A2 Subtotal CA 
No.  No. % No. % No. No. % No.  % 
Male 2 1 3 50 22 51 24 3 27 69 8 53 
Female 2 1 3 50 21 49 11 1 12 31 7 47 
Subtotal 4 2 6 100 43 100 35 4 39 100 15 100 
 
Both male and female members of the household sold farm labour to other farm units. 
Actually, the wage labourers from within the farming households in Goromonzi 
district were roughly divided equally between males and females (Table 6.16). 
Disparate tendencies were observed in Kwekwe as males dominated part-time wage 
labour from the surveyed households and women were more visible in the Communal 
Area.  
Identical to past trends, imbalance in access to land, though not the only factor (Jha 
1996; 2016; Patnaik 1996; Cousins 2009; Moyo 2014) continue to shape the supply 
side in farm labour markets indicated by the preponderance of the land short 
Communal Area households as the main participants. Land reform did not satisfy all 
the land hunger as there were still many rural people in the Communal Areas and 
among former farm workers that were still land short (Moyo 2011c; Munyuki-
                                                 
111
 Means were significantly different across the settlement types in Goromonzi. One-Way ANOVA 
test, F=14.724, 2 d.f., p=0.000 (significant at p<0.05). 
112
 Means were not significantly different across the settlement type in Kwekwe. One-way ANOVA 
tests, F=0.882, 2 d.f., p=0.440 (not significant at p<0.05). 
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Hungwe 2011; Scoones et al. 2018a).
113
 Since landlessness and/or land shortages are 
not completely resolved by land reforms (Bush 2002; de Janvry 1981; Tabak 2000), 
those remaining with limited access to land constitute the majority of farm labour 
market participants  (Cousins 2009). This issue will be revisited in section 6.5, when 
the character of the ―new‖ wage labourers is explicated.  
6.3.2 Non-farm rural income earning activities and labour relations  
Nothing short of the character of rural landscapes seen in other parts of Africa, the 
gathering and trading of natural resources (Shackleton et al. 2001; Moyo 2008; Moyo 
2014), together with other rural entrepreneurship and/or business initiatives was 
identified in the sampled farming units and farm workers. Clearly, the exploitation of 
natural resources was key for many of the rural households‘ everyday needs, 
including accessing firewood, medicines, fruits and thatching grass (Moyo 1995; Bojo 
1993; Mehretu 1994).
114
 The focus here is on the trading of the same for cash income 
generation since the later is classified under farming activities (see Chapter Two).   
Figure 6.4: Participation in non-farm rural income earning activities  
 
Goromonzi, Chi-Square=9.096, p=0.011 (significant at p<0.05). 
Kwekwe, Chi-Square=14.025, p=0.001 (significant at p< 0.05). 
Figure 6.4 illustrates the significant association between the involvement of 
household in non-farm activities and the settlement type. Communal Area households 
were the ones mostly drawn to such activities more than it did the resettled 
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 One press report estimated that there were over 500,000 on the waiting lists for land allocations 
around 2015. See The Sunday Mail 24 August 2018. ―Land reform: the work that lies ahead‖ accessed 
from https://www.sundaymail.co.zw/land-reform-the-work-that-lies-ahead on 4 December 2018. 
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 For instance, firewood was a critical source of energy for cooking and heating for most of the rural 
households except the Goromonzi A2. Less than 30 percent of them had access to electricity compared 
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households in both districts, ostensibly because of the greater need to complement 
farming activities since they still face land shortages and poor agro-ecological 
conditions, which in turn limit the returns from farming (section 6.4.6).  
Natural resource trading activities were differentiated by the occurrence of a 
particular resource in a locality. Alluvial gold, existing in abundance in all settlements 
in Kwekwe, was the most common activity amongst both the landholders and the 
farm workers (Table 6.17 and 6.18). But in Goromonzi, the harvesting and trading of 
thatching grass that was used to roof pole and dagga houses held sway among 
landholders. River sand trading and brick moulding were also popular among farm 
workers in this district. Non-farm activities attracted more casual farm labouers than 
their permanent colleagues (Table 6.18). 
Table 6.17: Non-farm rural income activities rural households are engaged 
Non-farm activities Goromonzi Kwekwe 
A1 A2 Subtotal CA A1 A2 Subtotal  CA 
Gold panning 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.2 31.6 37.6 20.4 
Thatching grass 21.7 0.0 14.7 0.0 2.7 5.3 3.2 2.0 
Wood carving 4.3 0.0 2.9 0.0 2.7 0.0 2.2 2.0 
Tailoring 4.3 0.0 2.9 0.0 5.4 10.5 6.5 0.0 
Basketry 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 2.7 0.0 2.2 0.0 
Building 13.0 9.1 11.8 17.9 8.1 5.3 7.5 28.6 
Brickmaking 13.0 0.0 8.8 21.4 1.4 0.0 1.1 32.7 
Clothes vending 8.7 27.3 14.7 17.9 9.5 0.0 7.5 12.2 
Carpentry 13.0 9.1 11.8 7.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 
Transport provision 8.7 18.2 11.8 0.0 5.4 26.3 9.7 0.0 
Small retail shop 8.7 18.2 11.8 7.1 10.8 15.8 11.8 4.1 
Retail shop 0.0 9.1 2.9 0.0 2.7 10.5 4.3 4.1 
Motor mechanics 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 5.3 4.3 2.0 
Other activities 13.0 0.0 8.8 35.7 12.2 15.8 12.9 28.6 
N 23 11 34 28 74 19 93 49 
 
There were variances between the non-farm activities undertaken by the households 
across the settlement types in both districts. Fewer A1 and Communal Area 
households transcended natural resource trading in their non-farm activities (Table 
6.7). Yet these activities were also fraught with many challenges.
115
 The A2 
households were the ones mostly connected to activities that required investment of 
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 The access to some of the natural resources such as alluvial gold and firewood are regulated by the 
state and requiring permits for their exploitation. Consequently, they sometimes entail skirmishes with 
the police and the Environmental Management Agency (EMA). Moreover informal gold mining is also 
a risky enterprise involving going underground in unsecured disused media and mine shafts reports of 
people being trapped and losing their lives are common. Violence is also common among groups 
competing to access alluvial gold (Mawowa 2013; Mkodzongi 2013b).  
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capital such as transport provision, clothes vending and operation of retail shops. This 
tendency unveiled by the larger farmers was not at odds with other documented 
observations (Reardon 1997; Hazell et al. 2007; Nagler & Naudé 2017), which have 
associated capital intensive non-farm activities to the rich class of African farmers.  
Table 6.18: New non-farm livelihoods pursued by farm labourers 
Non-farm labour  
Goromonzi  Kwekwe  
P S PWD Total P S PWD Total 
Gold panning 2.1 0 0 1 4.3 20 18.3 11.8 
Firewood selling 1 0 2.6 1.5 1.1 0 2.8 1.5 
Riversand selling 3 0 14.1 7.1 0 6.7 2.8 2.1 
Wildlife 
harvesting 
1 0 1.3 1 0 3.3 0 0.5 
Wood carving 0 0 1.3 0.5 0 0 0 0 
Tailoring 4 0 3.8 3.6 0 3.3 2.8 1.5 
Baskerty 3 0 1.3 2 0 0 1.4 0.5 
Brick moulding 3 5 19.2 9.6 1.1 0 7 3.1 
Pottery 5.1 0 2.6 3.6 0 0 0 0 
Beer brewing 0 0 2.6 1 0 0 0 0 
Carpentry 1 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 
Handyman 14.1 0 25.6 17.3 1.1 6.7 2.8 2.6 
Thatching grass 4 5 11.5 7.1 0 6.7 14.1 6.2 
N 99 20 77 195 94 29 68 191 
*P-permanent S-seasonal PWD – pieceworkers 
 
Averaging between 1.3 and 2.5 persons, relatively fewer members were thus allocated 
to non-farm labour activities compared to farming. Women were not left out as others 
have intimated (Hartnack 2016), but were as much part of the non-farm labour force 
as men in Goromonzi resettled areas (Table 6.19). Males were the slight majority in 
the Communal Areas in this district. There were however striking differences in the 
gender distribution of non-farm family labour force in Kwekwe as women were 
underrepresented than in Goromonzi. As matter of fact, the gender distribution 
patterns in this district repeated those of hiring out farm labour. Who was involved in 
what activity was also gendered, as women were predominantly involved in activities 
such as clothes vending, tailoring, basketry and trading of thatching grass. The reverse 
was true for labour intensive activities such as alluvial gold mining, building, 
brickmaking and transport provision, which were largely the preserve of men. 
The nature of gold mining, which was widespread in Kwekwe, conflicts with the 
reproductive roles of women since it sometimes requires temporary absence from the 
households for prolonged periods while ―digging‖ for the elusive mineral. Moreover, 
it put women in the face of violence and sexual assault that characterise the mining 
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sites (Mawowa 2013; Mkodzongi 2013b). Male household heads also feared allowing 
their wives and daughters interacting with so many men that predominate these sites 
as it widens the possibilities of extra-marital relationships (EF 2017: Interview).  
Table 6.19: Number of family members providing labour to non-farm activities  
Gender Goromonzi Kwekwe  
A1 A2 Subtotal CA A1 A2 Subtotal CA 
No. of persons No. of 
persons 
% No. of 
persons 
% No. of 
persons 
 No. of 
persons 
% No. of 
persons 
% 
Male 25 4 29 49.2 20 54.1 80 36 116 71.2 65 65.7 
Female 23 7 30 50.8 17 45.9 35 12 47 28.8 34 34.3 
Total  48 11 59 100 37 100 115 48 163 100 99 100 
N 23 10 33  28  74  92  49  
 
Besides being predicated on the utilisation of only unpaid family labourers (Owusu et 
al. 2011), non-farm activities entailed wage labour relations, albeit observed in a 
limited number of households. Eight A1 households involved in non-farm activities 
employed wage labour for harvesting thatching grass, while four of the 11 A2 
households did the same for their building and small retail shop enterprises in 
Goromonzi. This was counted in four A2 gold miners, two small retail shop operators 




6.3.3 Professional employment in towns and cities  
In many parts of SSA, there has been a growing trend by the urban middle classes to 
invest in commercial farming on the basis of wage income from the towns and cities 
(Hall et al. 2017; Moyo 2014; Jayne, Chamberlin, Traub, Sitko, Muyanga, Yeboah, & 
Kachule 2016).  According to the latter studies, this has given rise to the so-called 
―middle farms‖, whose financing differ markedly from those of the peasantry (largely 
dependent on state subsidies and remittances) and large capitalist farms (financed 
from domestic and international credit). In Zimbabwe, the bidding of land by the 
―middle classes‖ employed in relatively secure and well paid civil service and private 
sector jobs during the FTLRP, especially in the A2 scheme, expressed this tendency. 
Declining conditions of work and retrenchments that coloured the urban labour 
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 Hiring in wage labour in non-farm activities corroborates some recent research linking gold mining 
and farming in resettled areas (Chigumira 2018: 9). The study shows the existence of diverse forms of 
wage labour utilised by what are referred to as ―farm-miners‖ , including full time and piece rate type 
of work remunerated either in cash or in the share of the gold mined.  
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markets since the late 1990s also motivated the urban working classes to seek land 
(Yeros 2013b; Yeros 2002; Sadomba 2008).  
Moyo et al. (2009: 22) observed in their six district study that 19.5 percent and 34.8 
percent of the land recipients in the A1 and A2 schemes respectively had their roots in 
the urban areas. In another study in Masvingo, urban roots were counted in 18.9 
percent and 43.8 percent of the landholders of the corresponding schemes (Scoones et 
al. 2011: 976).  





Total A1 A2 Total 
CA 57.9 16.2 37.3 54.9 50.8 53.9 
LSCFs 3.9 1.4 2.7 8.3 4.8 7.4 
Urban  36.8 79.7 58 35.2 38.1 35.9 
Other* 1.3 2.7 2 1.5 6.4 2.8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 76 74 150 193 63 256 
*mining centres and rural growth points  
This study‘s findings reconfirm the results of these earlier studies. Of the 76 A1 
households interviewed in Goromonzi, 36.8 percent had come from urban area in 
contrast to 79.7 percent in the A2 sector (Table 6.20). Returns from the Kwekwe 
sample portrayed similar features especially in the A1 scheme. However, the 
overwhelming majority of the resettled households had a rural background from the 
Communal Areas, Old Resettlement and LSCFs, except in the A2 scheme of 
Goromonzi as the earlier studies cited above also showed (Table 6.20).  
Wage employment in the towns and cities was maintained by some of the land 
beneficiaries (Table 6.21), while others also delinked from the same (section 6.3.4). 
The majority of the Goromonzi Communal Area landholders had the least share that 
held a formal job. Overall, urban employment was more common in Goromonzi 
compared to Kwekwe. The results did not reflect disparities between male and female 
landholders in formal employment patterns in the resettled areas. If anything, female 
landholders had a slightly higher share among their lot who were employed – 38.7 
percent and 23.9 percent in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively, compared to 35.7 
percent and 18.4 percent among males. Past trends of male dominated migration to 
urban employment (Cousins et al. 1992; O‘Laughlin 1998; Potts 2000; Potts 2012), 
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were however simulated in the Communal Areas as it encompassed none of women 
landholders in Goromonzi and only 11.5 percent in Kwekwe.  
The A2 landholders in both districts held qualitatively better managerial jobs in the 
private and public sectors with higher wages and benefits than the A1 landholders 
(Table 6.21). The majority of A1 landholders were in the lower rung of the 
employment ladder as junior workers in the civil and private sectors, as well as 
regular commissioned members of the uniformed forces (police or army).  
Table 6.21: Professional employment of landholders 
Current job % of landholders  
Goromonzi Kwekwe 
A1 A2 Total 
RA 
CA A1 A2 Total 
RA 
CA 
% % % % % % % % 
None 71.1 56.8 64.0 92.3 85.9 64.5 80.6 83.5 
Pvt. sector managerial 3.9 20.3 12.0 1.3 0.5 9.7 2.8 0.0 
Civil service managerial 7.9 18.9 13.3 0.0 2.1 19.4 6.3 4.7 
Uniformed forces 5.3 1.4 3.3 1.3 2.1 1.6 2.0 1.2 
Pvt. sector semi-skilled 2.6 1.4 2.0 3.8 5.2 1.6 4.3 5.9 
Civil service semi-skilled 9.2 0.0 4.7 1.3 2.6 3.2 2.8 1.2 
Farm worker 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 
Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.4 3.5 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 76 74 150 78 191 62 253 85 
Chi-Square 34.423 32.049 
p 0.00* 0.01* 
*Significant at p<0.05  
 
Considering the household in its entirely beyond the head, 57.3 percent of the farm 
units featured at least one individual in formal employment in Goromonzi. Differing 
patterns were evident as this characteristic was established in 66.2 percent of the A2 
farms compared to 48.7 percent among the A1 landholders in this district. Fewer 
shares of households reported employment links in Kwekwe - 29.9 percent and 46 
percent in the A1 and A2 schemes respectively. In fact, one of the major sources of 
employment in this district, namely the steel processing plant, ZISCOSTEEL, has 
been dysfunctional over the last 15 years and formal gold mining, the other dominant 
economic activity is capital intensive and does not absorb much labour from Kwekwe 
and its surrounds (MRT 2017: Interview).  
No significant variation was perceptible on the number of wage employees per 
household across the settlement types, although the A2 farms commanded slightly 
higher averages of 2.1 and 1.8 members in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively 
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compared to 1.78 and 1.4 members in the A1 scheme. Averaging 1.76 persons, the 
number of wage employees in Kwekwe Communal Areas was comparable to those of 
the resettled areas, while a figure of 1.4 persons was recorded among the Goromonzi 
Communal Areas households. Except in the A1 households of Kwekwe (35.8 
percent), the share of female formal employees was 42 percent or more in the 
remaining settlements in both district.  
Table 6.22: Gender composition of formal wage employees within households 
Settlement Goromonzi Kwekwe 
No. of persons  
Male Female Total %Female Male Female Total %Female 
A1 37 29 66 43.9 43 24 67 35.8 
A2 43 55 98 56.1 28 27 55 49.1 
Subtotal 80 84 164 51.2 71 51 122 41.8 
CA 17 13 30 43.3 24 21 45 46.7 
 
After coalescing all the (wage) labour activities (including farm, non-farm and 
formal), which took place beyond the household, women‘s proportion of the labourers 
in Goromonzi were higher than in Kwekwe across all the settlement types (Table 
6.23). Overall, the evidence signify a departure from the past when wage labourers 
were synonymous with men (O‘Laughlin 1998; Potts 2000). At present, the labour 
markets in both town and country were populated by both sexes.  
Table 6.23: Participation in all wage labour beyond the household by gender 
Settlement 
  
No. and % of persons 
Goromonzi  Kwekwe  
Male Female 
% 
Female Male Female 
% 
Female 
A1 70 66 48.5 147 70 32.3 
A2 48 63 56.8 67 40 37.4 
Subtotal 118 129 52.2 214 110 34.0 
CA 59 51 46.4 97 62 39.0 
 
Yet the differential levels of women‘s insertion into the labour markets across the 
districts and within the settlement type point towards more ―resistance to the 
proletarianisation‖ of women (Oya 2013: 204) in Kwekwe compared to Goromonzi. 
The scenario in Kwekwe echoes findings from studies conducted in Mozambique 
(Oya & Sender 2008) and Tanzania (Mueller 2011), which illustrate that many of the 
labour market participants in rural areas were men because women were blocked from 
leaving the household by way of operation of patriarchal relations. As such, men 
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wielded control over women‘s involvement in wider labour markets in addition to 
their unpaid labour (Tsikata 2009).  
Stated differently, women in Goromonzi seemed to have more ―bargaining power‖ to 
depart the household for the labour market than their counterparts in Kwekwe 
(Bryceson 1980; Torvikey et al. 2016). Therefore, one could argue that women in 
these households were increasingly capable of negotiating their way out of the 
household into the labour markets unlike their counterparts in the A1 and Communal 
Areas of Kwekwe. The greater presence of women in labour markets could be 
attributed to limited financial returns from farming (section 6.4.6) which demands 
combined efforts to meet needs such as education and health, and acquire expensive 
agricultural inputs, which are increasingly obtained from the markets after state 
subsidies were scaled down after ESAP (Mkandawire & Soludo 1999).  
6.3.4 Summing up: re-peasantisation and perpetual semi-proletarianisation 
In this section, a synthesis is provided on how the rural labour processes articulated 
above represent the reconstitution of the surveyed households through the processes 
of semi-proletarianisation and re-peasantisation. It is advanced that semi-
proletarianisation through the combination of farming and other forms of wage labour 
in rural social reproduction strategies has continued in the context of the FTLRP. The 
discussion below illustrates that the latter, has been ongoing side-by-side to the re-
peasantisation processes represented by the bidding of land by urbanites and 
subsequent withdrawal from the urban labour markets and centering their social 
reproduction around family labour based farming. 
6.3.4.1 Perpetual semi-proletarianisation  
Altogether, numerous combinations of farming, formal wage employment, hiring out 
of farm labour and non-farm rural labour activities manifested themselves in the rural 
households and were spread across all the settlement types in both districts (Table 
6.24). Formal wage employment was frequently undertaken together with farming in 
the resettled areas. Goromonzi A2 households led the pack, followed by those in the 
same tenure category in Kwekwe. This was least encountered in the Communal 
Areas. Instead the hiring out of farm labour in the local markets featured more 
prominently in the Goromonzi Communal Areas, while non-farm rural labour 
activities dictated the pace in the Kwekwe. Formal wage employment and non-farm 
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rural labour was the second highest combination of activities reported in Goromonzi 
resettled areas of Goromonzi. The same position in Kwekwe was occupied by non-
farm rural labour. Local rural labour markets incorporating both farming and non-
farming were indicated by at least 10 percent of the Communal Area households. 
Many of the other combinations were cited by less than two percent of the resettled 
and Communal Area households in both study areas (Table 6.24). 
Cumulatively, these processes were akin to the semi-proletarianisation of rural labour 
(Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Moyo 2011a), which has continued after land reform and 
widely embrace a substantial number of the households. But not all the households 
expressed the semi-proletarian character. Besides Goromonzi A2 households, at least 
a third of the rest allocated family labour to farming alone (Table 6.24).  
Table 6.24: Overall combinations of farming and other (wage) labour activities  
  
Activities 
Goromonzi (%) Kwekwe (%) 
A1 A2 Subtotal CA A1 A2 Subtotal CA 
FE*  30.3 54.1 42 3.8 18 33.3 21.8 15.3 
NF** 9.2 2.7 6 17.9 21.1 17.5 20.2 40 
HOF*** 0 1.4 0.7 25.6 5.7 1.6 4.7 3.5 
FE & NF 17.1 12.2 14.7 1.3 9.3 11.1 9.7 7.1 
FE & HOF  0 0 0 1.3 0.5 1.6 0.8 1.2 
FE, NF & 
HOF  1.3 0 0.7 0 0.5 0 0.4 0 
HOF & NF 2.6 0 1.3 16.7 7.2 1.6 5.8 10.6 
F****  39.5 29.7 34.7 33.3 37.6 33.3 36.6 22.4 
Subtotal 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 76 74 150 78 194 63 257 85 
Chi-
Square 110.543 29.583 
p 0.000***** 0.009***** 
*FE – formal employment, **NF – non-farm activities ***HOF – hiring out farm labour ****F – 
farming  
*****Significant at p<0.05 
It is however not true that diversification of family labour resources into non-farm 
income earning activities by these households has led to the total displacement of self-
employed labour farming activities as advanced by the de-agrarianisation thesis 
(Bryceson 1999; Bryceson 2002; Bryceson 2000; Riggs 2006). The larger number of 
the household members were allocated to farming activities instead of non-farm 
activities and in effect provided their labour supplies in both activities, thus forming a 
continuum in the social reproduction of the rural households. All the households 
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interviewed across all the settlement models in both districts had cropped their land in 
the 2015/16 and 2016/17 seasons. 
That non-farm incomes were increasingly occupying a significant share of the total 
household income was nonetheless correct, particularly for the small and poor 
peasants (section 6.4.6). But this has not reversed the ubiquity of the continued 
application of unpaid family farm labour on the small peasant plots in the A1 and 
Communal Areas even in the low potential agro-ecological district such as Kwekwe. 
There food production took place every season despite the low returns and high 
probabilities of crop failure (section 6.4.6). Certainly, this was related to the agrarian 
conditions faced by this class of farmers, with the least access to finance which in turn 
transformed into poor financial returns from farming inadequate to meet all their 
subsistence needs (section 6.4.6). In other words, the small and poor peasantries who 
coincidentally failed to achieve adequate financial returns from farming also had the 
largest share non-farm income and participants in natural resource trading. The 
findings, indicating a close association between the class status and non-farm rural 
income earning activities, imply that agrarian distress and/or risk aversion was major 
driver of diversification of labour resources in the sampled households (see Shivji 
2017 Moyo & Yeros 2005a).  
While integration in agricultural output markets was concentrated in the capitalist 
farms in the A2 sector, for many peasants in the A1 and Communal Areas application 
of family labour for own production was key for auto-consumption (section 6.4.6). 
These trends also submit that the classification of rural areas in Africa as littered with 
―fragmented classes of labour‖ that are ―directly or indirectly” dependent on the wage 
economy for their sustenance (Bernstein 2014: S97-98; see also Bernstein 2007; 
2002) could be misplaced as self-employed family labour remains key for organising 
social reproduction. Consequently, the conclusion that the sampled rural households 
were still more ―primarily agriculturalists‖, despite the diversified labour activities 
witnessed today (Shackleton et al. 2001: 34) can hardly be escaped. 
Rain-fed farming predominates, since irrigation facilities were unevenly distributed 
amongst the surveyed households.
117
 Slack time between seasons thus availed 
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 The average share of irrigated area to the total area cropped in the 2016/17 season, for instance was 
8.48 percent, 27.1 percent and 13.51 percent among the A1, A2 and Communal Areas of Goromonzi 
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opportunities for the sampled households to enter non-farm labour markets (Boltvinik 
2016), beyond the poor conditions of agricultural production emphasised by the de-
agrarianisation theorists. That non-farm rural activities attracted a substantial section 
of the households in the dry season should not therefore be unexpected (Table 6.25). 
Nearly 57 percent of the Goromonzi A1 farmers were engaged in these activities in 
the dry season, while the remainder were engaged throughout the year. The 
Goromonzi Communal Area households mirrored these patterns, so did the Kwekwe 
A1 and Communal areas.  
Table 6.25: Time when non-farm rural income activities are done 
Time % of households 
Goromonzi Kwekwe 
A1 A2 Total 
RA 






43.5 90.0 57.6 42.9 36.5 77.8 44.6 55.1 
Rainy 
season 
0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 1.4 0.0 1.1 2.0 
Dry 
season 
56.5 10.0 42.4 60.7 67.6 33.3 60.9 59.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N 23 10 33 28 74 18 92 49 
Divergent patterns were noticeable from the A2 households in Goromonzi and 
Kwekwe through the dominance of all year round activities. Moreover, this was 
possible because of the dependency on hired in labour for farming activities, the 
allocation of labour throughout the whole year to non-farm rural activities does not 
conflict with their farming as it would in the A1 and Communal Areas. 
6.4.3.2 Land reform and re-peasantisation 
After colonial land dispossession, peasants were left with minimal room to craft their 
livelihoods outside of the capital-wage labour relation (Palmer 1977; Bush & Cliffe 
1984; Neocosmos 1993), and this absence of alternatives for social reproduction 
undermined their ―bargaining power‖ in the labour markets for better working 
conditions (Arrighi 1970). The latter also known as ―market based bargaining power‖ 
(Silver 2003: 13) for it increases if workers have alternative non-wage forms of labour 
                                                                                                                                           
respectively. The shares were lower in Kwekwe - 3.15 percent, 15.9 percent and 9.17 percent 
correspondingly. The access to irrigation was skewed towards the A2 farm households, since they are 
the ones who mostly inherited the infrastructure left over by the former LSCFs (Binswanger-Mkhize & 
Moyo 2012).  
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to centre their livelihoods upon. Turning this around, it could therefore be equally 
argued that land reform by enlarging land access has provided the peasantry with an 
alternative social reproduction path outside the capital-wage labour relation. 
Furthermore, it has thus restored the peasantry‘s ability to withdraw from the labour 
markets and increased their ―market based bargaining power‖ in the same.  
Beneath the flows of urbanites to rural areas (Table 6.20), the data revealed 
interesting patterns of delinking from the labour markets by some landholders after 
getting access to land during the FTLRP akin to the process of ―re-peasantisation‖ 
(Moyo & Yeros 2005; Moyo 2011a; Moyo et al. 2013; van der Ploeg 2013; van den 
Berg et al. 2016; see also Chapter Two). This was more widely recognised amongst 
the Kwekwe A1 landholders. Out of the 86 landholders who were formally employed 
by the year 2000, 79 had subsequently left their jobs after receiving land allocations. 
On a reduced scale, 22 of the 44 A1 landholders in Goromonzi followed suit. The A2 
landholders also exited the formal labour markets in a similar fashion – enumerated in 
29 of the 51 Kwekwe landholders and 28 of the 59 Goromonzi landholders. 
Considering the average age of the landholders was around 55 years, most of them 
were thus below the retirement age of 65 years in most occupations in Zimbabwe as 
enshrined in the labour statutes. Since over 17 years has lapsed since the FTLRP 
unravelled, many land beneficiaries would have received land in their early 40‘s and 
had thus at least 20 years of work life left in them. 
Even within the Communal Areas, as the economic decline proceeded apace, 23 of 
the 28 landholders in Goromonzi had also discontinued employment, and six of the 20 
landholders in Kwekwe did the same. These patterns were of course influenced by the 
hyperinflation that had made wages worthless by 2008 (Kanyenze et al. 2011; Yeros 
2013b), as well as retrenchments that persisted in the 2000s as institutions faltered 
under the weight of economic decline (Muchichwa 2016). It was also equally true that 
some of the disengagements from formal employment were voluntary as access to 
FTLRP land provided an alternative route to subsist (Moyo et al. 2009; Chigumira 
2018).  
The dynamic relationships that landholders had with the labour markets challenge 
widely held assumptions of the tendencies of labour to permanently divest away from 
farming towards other non-farm based activities, including wage employment 
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espoused in the de-agrarianisation thesis (Bryceson 1997; 2000; Riggs 2006). Instead 
of the movement of labour from ―farm to factory‖ as the only route perceived by these 
studies drawing on Lewisian dual models of economic transformation (see also World 
Bank 2013), the field research demonstrates that the reverse is equally true, when 
urban labour markets become unstable, access to land provides an escape route. 
Rather than being ―permanent‖ or causing total severing of links with the countryside 
(Petras & Veltmeyer 2001), rural-urban migration can indeed be overturned. The 
trajectories of semi-proletarianisation and repeasantisation, which can take place 
concurrently (Moyo & Yeros 2005b) as the data shows cannot be foreclosed 
(O‘Laughlin 2002), influenced as they are by the socio-economic conditions obtaining 
in both town and country. 
6.4 AGRICULTURAL LABOUR AND CLASS DIFFERENTIATION 
The previous section outlined the different sources of farm labour which were being 
utilised by the A1, A2 and Communal Area landholders. It was discerned that the 
organisation of production around the use of family was on the rise following the 
FTLRP, while hired in wage labour still exists and applied in variegated combinations 
in the diverse farming units. Additionally, the labour from within the families of some 
of the landholders was also hired out to other farming units and beyond. The purpose 
of this section is to interrogate to what extent the use of labour amongst the farm 
households was fuelling class differentiation, if any, and how this translates into the 
various production relations.  
Various criteria have been employed to gauge the incipient class differentiation in the 
resettled areas in the aftermath of the FTLRP. Moyo (2011a) estimated the broad 
agrarian class structure based on land sizes at the national level (see Chapter Five). A 
tri-modal agrarian structure embracing the peasantry, small-to-middle and large 
capitalist farms was thus conceived, differentiated by capital endowments, farm 
labour utilisation and other socio-economic characteristics (gender, educational 
levels, employment etc.) as noted earlier (Chapter Five). However, the latter did not 
examine the precise dynamics of how this class differentiation, especially the 
trajectories of agricultural production and labour relations, are articulated at the local 
level due to micro-level data limitations. Yet, land reform as the patterns emerging 
from the two districts exemplify (see Chapter Five) was not uniformly implemented 
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nationally and the diverse socio-economic characteristics and agro-ecological 
specificities at the local level suggest variation in rural class formation.  
Moyo et al. (2009) used data from a 2089-sample household survey to attempt a 
multivariate classification of land reform beneficiaries. An array of socio-economic 
factors set apart the five classes of farmers delineated by the latter study, including 
size of the landholdings, access to capital, gender, marriage, commodities produced, 
linkage to urban wage employment and forms of labour utilised. Their analysis, as the 
researchers acknowledged, was weakened by income and farming outputs data 
constraints. Quite crucially, labour relations entailed in each of these groups were not 
discussed in depth beyond the broad use of either permanent and/or casual labour. 
The analysis did not pay attention to the family farm labour relations characterising 
the groups within and without their agricultural production units. 
Others have also applied livelihoods diversification strategies of the farm households 
to classify rural households in resettled areas (Scoones et al. 2010; Scoones et al. 
2011; Scoones 2015b). The various farm classes are therefore indicated by the extent 
to which households combine farming and the diverse local and extra-local off-farm 
activities. That too is incomplete to understanding of the application of the different 
combinations of the forms of hired in labour and family labour within and without the 
agricultural production units and the subsequent production relations generated. 
Overall, inadequate research attention has been paid to how farm labour utilisation 
influences the differentiation witnessed in the countryside today. More specifically, 
there is limited understanding of the in-depth variations of the production relations 
between family labour based forms of organisation of agricultural production units 
and those dependent on the use of hired in labour. Yet, farm labour utilisation is a key 
proxy of class formation, distinguishing households into capitalist farms and 
differentiated peasantries according to the extent to which they exploit the labour of 
others in their farming units (Patnaik 1996; Jha 1996; Moyo 2014). In turn, the 
production relations in capitalist and peasant households are substantially different in 
terms of the asset endowments, land uses, farm production technologies and income 
returns from farming.  
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Against this background, a set of labour variables from the farm household survey 
data, which indicate the character of farm labour utilisation, were deployed to group 
the households into distinct groups using two-stage cluster analysis in the SPSS (see 
Chapter Three). The categorical variables used in the classification included whether 
households hired in wage labour, hired out wage labour and involvement of family 
labour in the household‘s farming unit. Additionally, the continuous variables used 
measured the total number of labour days hired in from both permanent and casual 
labourers employed by the households. Taken together, these variables indicate the 
extent to which the farm households relied on the labour of others from outside their 
families to organise their agricultural production.  
The statistical analysis generated four groups of farm households, which were 
classified as rich peasants-to-capitalist, middle peasants, small peasants and poor 
peasantry approximating the character of differentiated classes defined by Patnaik 
(1996; see also Table 3.7). This enabled the cross-tabulation of the farm classes 
detected from the cluster analysis and various production relations, including land 
use, input utilisation, structure of agricultural productive asset endowments and 
returns to labour. Before discussing these results, the character of the farm classes are 
elaborated below.  
6.4.1 Emerging farmer classes according to labour utilisation  
Overall, the households from the survey sample were distributed as follows; rich 
peasants-to-capitalist farms (16.3 percent); middle peasants (41.2 percent), small 
peasants (27.7 percent) and poor peasants (14.7 percent) (Table 6.26). The labour 
utilisation trends inherent in these classes of farm households are discussed in what 
follows.  
Table 6.26: Distribution of farmer classes by settlement type  
 Farmer class 
  
A1  A2  CA  Total  
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
rich peasants-
to-capitalist 24 8.9 68 49.6 1 0.6 93 16.3 
middle 
peasant 150 55.6 56 40.9 29 17.8 235 41.2 
small peasants 63 23.3 9 6.6 86 52.8 158 27.7 
poor peasants 33 12.2 4 2.9 47 28.8 84 14.7 
Total 270 100 137 100 163 100 570 100.0 
Chi-Square 259.122 
p 0.000* 
*Significant at p< 0.05) 
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“Rich peasants-to-capitalist farms”  
This group of rich peasants-to-capitalist farms was marked by their dependency on 
hired in labour for their agricultural enterprises (Table 6.27). By its definition, it was a 
mixture of households that exclusively relied on hired in farm wage labour, 
constituting the capitalist farms, and those which still depended on wage labour but 
also contributed family labour to their production units. To be specific, the rich 
peasants accounted for only 8.6 percent in this class category. Yet family labour 
contributions were a pale shadow in comparison to the contributions of hired labour. 
The quantum of wage workers recruited by this class set it apart from the remaining 
classes of households. The inputs of hired workers in terms of mean labour days in 
the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms were significantly higher than all the other 
groups.  












Permanent  1532.38a 148.72b 0c 2.7c 311.44 
Casual  545.06a 93.27b 0c 15.35c 129.58 
Total hired labour 2077.44a 241.98b 0c 18.05c 441.03 
No. of permanent 
workers 5.84a 1.00b 0.0c 0.02c 
1.37 
No. casual 
workers 24.84a 6.45b 0c 1.46c 
6.93 
Family  38.06a 301.81b 277.73b 296.15b 251.36 
Family hired out  0a 0a 0a 40.9b 6.02 
N 93 236 158 84 571 
*There is significant difference at p< 0.05 if the subscripts accompanying mean values appearing in the 
same row are dissimilar. 
 
Compared to the middle peasants, which follow after it in terms of the quantum of 
labour days hired in, the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms were characterised by at 
least 10 times more labour days hired in both permanent and casual labour. This class 
of farmers hired out no family labour to other farm households.  
“Middle peasant farms” 
Still hiring in farm wage labour, the middle peasant farms had a substantial 
contribution of family labour into their farming units (Table 6.27). In fact, the family 
labour inputs were slightly higher than the total number of labour days hired in from 
permanent and casual labour. Furthermore, the use of family labour, constituted a 
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point of difference with the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms and was significantly 
higher in the middle peasant farms than the later. All the households in this class 
utilised family labour in varying degrees on their farms. On average, middle peasant 
farms hired one permanent worker and 6.45 casual labourers during the 2016/17 
season observed. The hired in labour differentiates it from the small and poor peasant 
households, as there was no significant difference with the latter in the application of 
family labour. Similar to the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms, this class category was 
not immersed into farm labour markets as sellers of labour to other farm households. 
“Small peasant farms” 
This class category neither hired in nor hired out of farm wage labour (Table 6.27). 
Family labour was solely exploited in the agricultural production units. Except for the 
rich peasant-to-capitalist farms, the number of family labour days utilised by the small 
peasant farms were not significantly different with the other class categories. 
“Poor peasant farms” 
The group characterised as ―poor peasant farms‖ does not fit in neatly into the 
classical conceptions of those whose labour is primarily exploited by others (Patnaik 
1996; Moyo & Yeros 2005). Contradicting tendencies of labour hiring in and hiring 
out were simultaneous observed in this class (Table 6.27). Yet a key feature of this 
class category was that all the households sold farm labour to other households, which 
is associated with the poor peasantry (Patnaik 1996; Oya & Pontara 2015; Jha 2015). 
This distinguished it from the rest of the classes discerned that did not hire out farm 
labour (Table 6.27). Nonetheless, the number of permanent and casual labour days 
hired in by 31 percent in this group, were so low compared to the labour hiring classes 
of rich peasants-to-capitalist and the middle peasant farms and were not statistically 
significantly different from those of the small peasant households (Table 6.27).  
The patterns of hiring in and out of farm wage labour discussed above (Section 6.2) 
demonstrated a strong relationship precisely with the settlement type and district 
and/or agro-ecological location of the farm households. Consequently, the classes of 
farm households identified from the two-stage cluster analysis were also significantly 
associated with the settlement type. The A2 farm households, which were most active, 
in the recruitment of hired in labour, dominated the rich peasants-to-capitalist class 
category, while the majority of those in the A1 were located in the middle peasant 
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class (Table 6.26). Divergent patterns characterised the Communal Area farm 
households, with the majority of them located in the small and poor peasant class 
categories reflecting their dependency on the exploitation of the labour from within 
their families. This reinforces the possibilities provided by enlarged land access 
through the FTLRP as the new peasantries from the A1 scheme were better 
represented in the labour hiring classes than the old peasantry from the Communal 
Areas (Table 6.26). Therefore, the land tenure cum the land size is a strong 
determinant of labour use in the rural areas. 








  No % No. % No. % 
Rich peasants-to-capitalist 68 29.7 25 7.3 93 16.3 
Middle peasant 76 33.2 160 46.8 236 41.3 
Small peasants 47 20.5 111 32.5 158 27.7 
Poor peasants 38 16.6 46 13.5 84 14.7 
Total 229 100 342 100 571 100 
Chi-Square 56.309   
p 0.00*   
*Significant at p<0.05. 
By district, the farm households, located in Goromonzi, had the highest share of the 
rich peasants-to-capitalist farms compared to those in Kwekwe (Table 6.28). The 
latter district, had most of the landholders falling in the middle and small peasant 
class categories. Again, this provided further evidence of the unevenness in the 
development of farm labour markets according to the agro-ecological patterns, which 
in turn impact on the land uses and agricultural production (see Section 6.2). 
Table 6.29: Distribution of farmer classes by gender of land owner  
Farmer class  
Male  Female  Total  
No % No % No % 
Rich peasants-to-capitalist 77 17.4 16 12.4 93 16.3 
Middle peasant 196 44.3 40 31 236 41.3 
Small peasants 102 23.1 56 43.4 158 27.7 
Poor peasants 67 15.2 17 13.2 84 14.7 
Total 442 100 129 100 571 100 
Chi-Square 21.028   
p 0.00*   
*Significant at p< 0.05. 
Although both male and female landholders were represented in all the farm classes, 
the disadvantaged position of the latter was apparent in their low shares in the labour 
hiring classes compared to the former (Table 6.29). The largest proportion of women 
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was located in the small peasant class category, which neither hired in nor hired out 
farm wage labour. In contrast, the middle peasantry housed the majority of the male 
landholders (Table 6.29). Capitalist farmers, like in the former LSCFs, were mainly 
male landholders as females remain marginalised in accessing resources including 
land and finance to make the transition (Gaidzanwa 1994; Rugube et al. 2003). 
Although the FTLRP made significant strides in availing land to more women in their 
own right than previously existing in the Communal Areas, LSCFs and Old 
Resettlement Areas (Mutopo 2013; 2011; Chingarande 2008), these findings 
demonstrate that agricultural subsidy policies underserved them by not availing 
finance and other productive resources to fully utilise their land resources. As will be 
seen below, the class status of farm households deduced according to the labour 
utilisation trends were also reflected through the domination of the labour hiring 
classes in the production relations.  
6.4.2 Land use, agricultural production and labour use  
As should be clear by now, land sizes were crucial in the determination of labour 
hiring patterns but by no means the only factor as various inputs are required to make 
it productive (Cousins 2009). The arable land owned by the rich peasant-to-capitalist 
farms was nonetheless significantly higher compared to the rest of the classes (Table 
6.30). Middle peasants owned the second largest arable land, which was significantly 
higher than that of the small peasantry but statistically not different from those of the 
poor peasantry. Small and poor peasants did not reflect any variation in the arable 
land sizes owned.  




capitalist  middle peasant 
small 
peasants poor peasants Total 
Arable (Ha) 43.57a 10.97b 4.58c 5.36b,c 13.68 
Cropped (Ha) 23.26a 4.59b 1.80c 2.23b,c 6.51 
Percent utilisation 60.18a 59.16a 45.20b 47.21b 53.71 
N 93 236 158 84 571 
*There is significant difference at p< 0.05 if the subscripts accompanying mean values appearing in the 
same row are dissimilar. 
 
The larger arable land sizes owned by the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms translated 
to larger land areas cropped when juxtaposed against the other farm classes (Table 
6.30). The labour hiring classes had superior land utilisation rates, measured as the 
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percentage of the total area cropped in the 2016/17 season over the total arable land 
owned matched to those in the small and poor peasantry (Table 6.30). 
The different classes produced a diverse range of food and cash and/or export crop 
commodities. Maize production was pervasive across all the farmer classes (Table 
6.31). Put differently, the cultivation of this staple crop was not associated with the 
class status of the farm households. However, not unexpectedly, the production of the 
other food and cash crops exhibited a significant association with the class status. 
Rich peasants-to-capitalist farms as theoretically assigned to ―capitalist farms‖ were 
dominant in the production of cash crops (Moyo 2014; Torvikey et al. 2017; Hall et 
al. 2017) represented here by wheat, tobacco, soyabean and sugarbeans to some 
extent.  
Indeed, the share of the farm households involved in the production of these crops 
reduced significantly from the labour hiring classes to the family labour dependent 
categories of small and poor peasants. These commodities were also demanding in 
terms of the expensive input requirements and therefore also point to the variation in 
the access to financial resource as discussed below (section 6.4.4).  
Table 6.31: Crop commodities produced  
Crop 












Maize 94.6 98.3 93.7 95.2 96 6.042 0.11 
Wheat 5.4 1.7 0 0 1.6 12.554 0.006* 
Cotton 0 0 1.3 0 0.4 5.246 0.155 
Tobacco 39.8 7.2 0.6 0 9.6 122.393 0.00* 
Groundnuts 34.4 53 42.4 46.4 46.1 10.466 0.015* 
Millet 0 1.3 0.6 3.6 1.2 5.433 0.143 
Sorghum 2.2 18.2 26.6 17.9 17.9 23.856 0.00* 
Rapoko 0 1.3 3.2 0 1.4 6.106 0.107 
Sunflower 1.1 5.9 3.2 4.8 4.2 4.5 0.212 
Soyabeans 34.4 5.9 0.6 1.2 8.4 101.621 0.00* 
Sweetpotatoes 7.5 8.5 3.8 9.5 7.2 4.015 0.26 
Sugarbeans 23.7 16.5 2.5 4.8 12.1 33.914 0.00* 
Cowpeas 3.2 7.6 8.2 15.5 8.2 9.036 0.029* 
Roundnuts 1.1 26.3 19.6 33.3 21.4 33.617 0.00* 
N 93 236 158 84 571     
*significant at 0.05 level  
Food crops, which are primarily grown for own consumption, on the other hand, were 
more prominent outside the rich peasant-to-capitalist farms, including groundnuts, 
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sorghum, cowpeas and roundnuts (Table 6.31). Excluding groundnuts, less than five 
percent of the rich peasant-to-capitalist farms produced these commodities more 
commonly located in the other classes. Additionally, compared to the cash crops 
dominated the labour hiring classes, the formal markets for the food crops (outside of 
maize) are relatively underdeveloped and trading mostly occurs through the informal 
markets (see Sitko, Moyo, Butamaucho & Meyer 2012).
118
  
As highlighted in Section 6.4.5, the level of integration into different commodity 
markets was differentiated and again closely related to the class status. Quite 
crucially, these crops were also not prioritised by the seed industry that develops high 
yielding seed varieties for the other ―commercialised‖ crops and were largely 
produced using seed retained by the farmers (see section 6.4.3). The crop diversity 
index was significantly higher in the rich peasants-to-capitalist (0.41) and the poor 
peasants (0.42) compared to the middle (0.32) and small peasants (0.28).119 










peasants Total Chi-Square p 
Cattle 80.6 77.5 56.3 47.6 67.8 42.465 0.00* 
Goats 50.5 62.7 57 64.3 59.4 5.322 0.15 
Sheep 8.6 6.8 0.6 1.2 4.6 13.973 0.003* 
Donkeys 0 5.9 1.9 2.4 3.3 9.415 0.024* 
Pigs 1.1 0.4 0.6 0 0.5 1.063 0.786 
Rabbits 1.1 3.4 2.5 0 2.3 3.921 0.27 
Free 
range 
chicken 83.9 87.7 79.7 82.1 84.1 4.776 0.189 
Broiler 
chicken 4.3 6.4 1.9 1.2 4 6.929 0.074 
Layers 
chicken 0 1.3 1.3 0 0.9 2.266 0.519 
Turkey 0 8.5 5.1 4.8 5.6 9.397 0.024* 
Guinea 
fowls 1.1 6.4 10.8 3.6 6.3 10.677 0.014* 
N 93 236 158 84 571     
*significant at 0.05 level 
                                                 
118
 Estimates provided by the World Bank (2015b:14) showed that less than 12 percent of the small 
grains produced, for instance, were traded on both the formal and informal markets  
119
 The index provides an indication of the diversity of crop production within agricultural production 
units and its measurement is obtained as follows CDIi= 1 -  (aij/Ai)
2  
where CDIi = crop diversity 
index; aij= area cropped to j
th 
crop in the ith location; 
j=1
Ai  = total area cropped for all crops 
(Shahidullah et al. 2006 cited in Chambati 2017:107). The production of a single crop returns a CDIi    
of zero and with production of multiple crops the index approaches one. 
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Likewise, production of particular types of livestock was also coloured by the class 
dynamics. The share of households owning cattle, the most important livestock in 
rural areas in terms of its income value and wider socio-cultural functions (Sibanda & 
Khombe 2006), declined substantially in the small and poor peasantries to the levels 
observed in the rich peasants-to-capitalist and middle peasant farms (Table 6.32). 
Accordingly, the average number of cattle owned declined from 21 in the rich 
peasants-to-capitalist farms to three among the poor peasantries. Sheep production 
was largely confined to the labour hiring classes. Dissimilar patterns were noted with 
respect to donkeys, which are primarily kept for providing traction power in the 
farming systems of the peasantries. None of the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms kept 
this animal, but was seen in the remaining classes although at limited proportions of 
less than six percent of the households (Table 6.32). Patterns in turkeys and guinea 
fowls production also exhibited analogous trends to the production of donkeys and 
were not found in the capitalist class. Again, these types of livestock together with 
free-range chicken are principally produced to provide food for the farming families, 
notwithstanding their thin formal markets.   
6.4.3 Capital intensity and labour utilisation  
The relationship between capital intensity (indicated by the extent of use of modern 
inputs and machinery, production of cash/export commodities, as well as use of other 
capital demanding technologies such as irrigation) and labour utilisation preoccupies 
the discussion that follows. In general, the results discussed below indicate significant 
association between these two broad variables. Specifically, as the use of hired in 
labour declined, so did the application of the various capital intensive agricultural 
inputs. 
6.4.3.1 Input utilisation  
Inequalities were also apparent in the utilisation of various modern production 
technologies in the differentiated farming classes. Contingent upon access to capital, 
the application of productivity enhancing inputs such as high yielding variety (HYV) 
seeds, inorganic fertilisers and agro-chemicals were concentrated in the hired in 
labour dependent class (Table 6.33). Reduced percentage shares of the use of these 
inputs was evident as the dependence of hired in labour declined. The small and poor 
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peasants, in particular, had the lowest proportion of households that applied modern 
inputs to their farms.  
 
Table 6.33: Crop input utilisation 
Input  
% of households  
 Chi-









HYVs 94.6 96.6 93.7 88.1 94.2 8.378 0.039* 
Fertiliser 89.2 83.9 58.9 70.2 75.8 43.776 0.00* 
Manure 2.2 16.5 12 11.9 12.3 12.846 0.005* 
Pesticide 68.8 22.9 3.2 2.4 21.9 171.001 0.00* 
Herbicide  78.5 30.5 7.6 4.8 28.2 172.742 0.00* 
N 93 236 158 84 571     
*Significant at p< 0.05 level 
Stark differences were seen in herbicide and pesticide use. Herbicide use in crop 
production, which was reported by 78.5 percent of the rich peasants-to-capitalist 
farms, recorded a massive drop to 30.5 percent of the middle peasants (Table 6.33). 
These trends persisted in the small and poor peasantry since only 7.6 percent and 4.8 
percent deployed this input respectively (Table 6.33). Although not as unevenly 
distributed like in the other input categories, the utilisation of inorganic fertiliser was 
still frequently visible in the rich peasants-to-capitalist and middle peasant farms than 
it was in the remaining classes. To the contrary, manure use way more associated with 
the family labour based farm classes (Table 6.33). Instead of being purchased on the 
market, manure was harvested from their animals and applied to the fields as a 
―substitute‖ to the expensive inorganic fertilisers. Not only did the rich peasants-to-
capitalist farms have noticeably larger proportions amongst their lot who applied 
these modern technologies, the quantities applied were also superior and showed up in 
the consequent agricultural labour productivity (section 6.4.6).  
Table 6.34: Areas cropped under HYV, irrigation and cash crops  
Farmer class  
% of total area cropped  




Capitalist 83.21a 28.78a 29.2a 93 
Middle peasant 68.18b 7.08b 9.41b 236 
Small peasants 71.63b 7.35b 6.62b 158 
Poor peasants 57.18c 7.61b 8.15b 84 
Total 69.86 10.68 11.6 571 
*There is significant difference at p< 0.05 if the subscripts accompanying mean values appearing in the 
same column are dissimilar. 
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Notwithstanding the high adoption rates of HYV seeds in Zimbabwe (Table 6.34; see 
also Mashingaidze 2006), small grains (rapoko and millets) and pulses (cow peas and 
roundnuts) seeds lack this technology and rely on seed retained by farmers from the 
previous season. The production of these crops, which was frequently reported by 
small and poor peasants, also reflected on the percent shares of the area cropped under 
improved seed varieties to the total area cultivated in the season observed (Table 
6.34). A gradual decline was noticeable on the average percent area planted to HYVs, 
from the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms to the poor peasantries (Table 6.34). 
Irrigation, another capital intensive technology, featured more prominently in the rich 
peasants-to-capitalist farmers. In fact this class, significantly commanded up to four 
times the percent share of land cultivated under irrigation to the total area under crops 
during the 2016/17 season (Table 6.34). No significant differences were observed 
among the remaining classes of agricultural producers.  
6.4.3.2 Structures of agricultural productive assets 
The agricultural productive asset owned by the sampled farm households also 
displayed the expected tendencies, which characterise capitalist and peasant farms in 
so far as the deployment of capital and labour intensive technologies in the 
organisation of production. For the peasantries, productive asset ownership was 
skewed towards labour intensive animal drawn machinery rather than modern 
machinery (Table 6.35).  
The opposite was true for the hired in labour reliant class, who had higher percent 
shares owning the capital intensive modern machinery such as tractors, motor 
vehicles and water pumps compared to animal drawn assets. The ownership of 
various farm buildings and infrastructures was also not immune to the class status. In 
general, the proportion of farm households possessing these assets were lowest in the 
poor peasants and highest in the rich peasants-to-capitalist category. Once more, the 
disparities in ownership between the capitalist and peasant classes were wide for 




Table 6.35: Ownership of productive agricultural assets  
Asset 











Scotch cart 31.2 64 39.2 34.5 47.5 45.639 0.000* 
Plough 51.6 82.2 65.8 51.2 68.1 44.698 0.000* 
Planter 8.6 3.4 1.9 2.4 3.7 8.232 0.041* 
Ridger 5.4 5.9 1.3 0 3.7 9.945 0.019* 
Cultivator 20.4 36.9 19.6 16.7 26.4 22.814 0.000* 
Ripper 7.5 2.1 1.3 1.2 2.6 10.789 0.013* 
Harrow 34.4 39.4 20.9 19 30.5 21.6 0.000* 
Modern machinery 
Motor vehicle 79.6 38.6 7.6 3.6 31.5 177.181 0.000* 
Generator 62.4 29.2 12 8.3 26.8 92.873 0.000* 
Tractor 52.7 9.7 0.6 1.2 13 163.887 0.000* 
Water pump 60.2 27.1 11.4 4.8 24.9 96.36 0.000* 
Combine 
harvester 1.1 0 0 0 0.2 5.149 0.161 
Farm building and infrastructure 
Borehole 47.3 15.7 1.9 2.4 15.1 107.637 0.000* 
Deep well 54.8 33.1 24.7 29.8 33.8 24.937 0.000* 
Cattle pens 69.9 58.1 43.7 31 52 34.691 0.000* 
Pigsties 4.3 3.4 3.2 1.2 3.2 1.505 0.681 
Poultry runs 82.8 72.9 65.2 73.8 72.5 9.27 0.026* 
Tobacco barns 40.9 11.9 0 1.2 11.7 106.201 0.000* 
Greenhouse 4.3 0.4 0 0 0.9 15.265 0.002* 
N 93 236 158 84 571     
*Significant at p < 0.05 
 
Given these ownership patterns, it should thus be anticipated that values of the 
different types of assets of the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms would significantly 
outpace those of the rest of the farm classes (Table 6.36). A configuration of falling 
values of assets was lucid as one moved from the rich peasants-to-capitalist to the 
poor peasantry (Table 6.36).  











Modern machinery 13681.44a 4697.50b 522.91c 217.14c 4346.49 
Animal drawn 1523.99a 1038.79a,b 365.11b 326.62b,c 826.64 
Farm buildings 5698.65a 2337.63b 162.64c 165.02c 1963.6 
Livestock  11151.58a 5742.42b 2149.03c 1470.14c 5000.61 
Modern machinery per Ha 932.55a 856.07a 458.03a,b 76.84b 643.27 
Household 6126.59a 2361.93b 624.19c 576.10c 2231.53 
N 93 236 158 84 571 
*There is significant difference at p< 0.05 if the subscripts accompanying mean values appearing in the 
same row are dissimilar. 
 
More pointedly, there was a sharp decline in the asset values between the middle and 
small peasant classes. The values of capital intensive modern machinery, 
nevertheless, best exemplifies the dissimilarities between the classes on the opposite 
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poles. Indeed, within the hired in labour dependent class, the value of modern 
machinery was in excess of 62 times that of the poor peasantry (Table 6.36). 
Yet it was on the structure of the agricultural productive assets or the shares of the 
values of the different asset type in the total value of asset that the qualitative 
differences between capitalist farms and the peasantry manifested vividly. Livestock 
appropriated over 63 percent of the total value of assets for the small and poor 
peasantries, while modern machinery accounted for the least percent share (Table 
6.37). 
Modern machinery, constituted the largest percent share of the productive assets of 
the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms as expected (Table 6.37). Still with livestock 
assets dominant, the percent share of modern machinery in middle peasants was 
second to that of the latter class and significantly different to those observed in small 
and poor peasantries (Table 6.37). While the percent share of farm buildings exhibited 
no significant difference across the classes, small and poor peasants had significantly 
higher percent shares of the ox-drawn machinery than the other two classes.  
Table 6.37: Structure of productive farm assets  
Asset type  










Modern machinery  41.1a 20.59b 7.04c 3.16c 17.62 
Animal drawn 
machinery  5.75a 11a 13.8b 12.8b 11.19 
Farm buildings  17.29a 13.14a 12.55a 15.98a 14.07 
Livestock  33.7a 54b 63.44c 65.67c 55.02 
N 93 236 158 84 571 
*There is significant difference at p< 0.05 if the subscripts accompanying mean values appearing in the 
same row are dissimilar. 
 
6.4.4 Access to financial resources  
Evidently, it was the access to financial resources, which originated the variances in 
the production relations of the farm classes considered above. After 2000, farmers 
accessed financial resources to invest into their agricultural production units from a 
variety of sources, including personal savings from wage income, state subsidy 
programmes, reinvestment of farm profits and private credit (Moyo et al. 2009; Moyo 
& Nyoni 2013; Scoones et al. 2010; Scoones 2015; Shonhe 2017; Hanlon et al. 2013). 
Because state support and private credit were limited (Mazwi & Muchetu 2015; 
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Binswanger-Mhkize & Moyo 2012), self-mobilised financial resources have been 
crucial in propelling production for most of the post-land reform years.  
Consequently, it should not be unforeseen that current and past formal wage 
employment connections of the landholders were closely associated with class status 
of the farm households (Figure 6.5). Close to 55 percent of the rich peasant-to-
capitalist were currently employed in non-farm professional jobs and the proportion 
tumbled to 21.4 percent among the middle peasants. Further declines were recorded in 
the small and poor peasants. The same pattern was also replicated in terms of previous 
professional employment amongst those who were not holding a current formal job. 
Rich peasants-to-capitalist farmers were more likely to have been previously 
employed than poor peasants (Figure 6.5).  
Figure 6.5: Previous and current formal professional non-farm employment 
 
Current formal professional non-farm employment, Chi-Square=62.077, p=0.000* 
Previous formal professional non-farm employment, Chi-Square=45.326, p=0.000*  
*Significant at p< 0.05 
 
The positions held by the landholders from the different farm classes were 
qualitatively different and thus the wage incomes earned. Certainly, managerial jobs, 
which earn higher wage incomes, were pervasive amongst the rich peasants-to-
capitalist farmers than all the other classes (Figure 6.6). Small and poor peasants were 
predominantly in self-employed and semi-skilled jobs, while the majority of middle 
peasants held managerial jobs.  
The differentiation of production relations of semi-proletarian households on the basis 
of the quality of jobs held in the urban labour markets exposed in the Communal 
Areas in the 1990s, which in turn influenced the disposable income to invest in own 





















characterised FTLRP land beneficiaries. As seen here, the studies cited above 
demonstrated that semi-proletarians in the Communal Areas who held qualitatively 
better jobs were characterised by hiring in of farm wage labour, superior agricultural 
production outcomes and asset structures than their counterparts in lower level formal 
employment or not connected to the urban labour markets. Recent studies in Africa 
have also illuminated the influence of formal employment in the transformation 
underway in the countryside today. Jayne et al. (2015) associate the growing middle 
capitalist farms in Ghana and Zambia with investments underwritten by urban wage 
income and/or pensions. In similar vein, Hall et al. (2017) illustrate how the diversity 
of scale in the middle capitalist coffee farms was contingent upon off-farm incomes 
and/or urban wage incomes that enabled recruitment of hired in labour.  
Figure 6.6: Current types of jobs held landholders  
 
Chi-Square=61.74, p=0.00 (significant at p<0.05). 
The state land tenures offered to the land beneficiaries have not been acceptable to 
private financial institutions as collateral (Moyo 2007), and to access loans from 
banks other forms of assets were being mortgaged, including houses owned in towns 
or securitisation through wage income. It was not until February 2018 that an 
agreement between the Bankers Association of Zimbabwe (BAZ) and the state had 
been reached for lending to proceed on the basis of the 99-year leases issued to A2 
farming units was reported in the media.
120
 Together with wage employment, urban 
connections and/or urban assets have therefore been key in enlisting for agricultural 
credit facilities with various private financial institutions. Again, the rich peasants-to-
capitalist farms exhibited the strongest linkage to urban areas (Figure. 6.7). Certainly, 
the class status was associated with the origin of the land beneficiaries, with declining 
proportions of urbanites and simultaneous rise of those who came from the 
                                                 
120 See ―99-year leases now bankable, transferable‖, The Herald 8 February 2018, Harare, 
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Communal Areas as the dependency on wage labour decreased amongst the farm 
classes (Figure 6.7).  
Figure 6.7: Origin of FTLRP beneficiaries by class status  
 
Chi-Square=97.248, p=0.00 (significant at p<0.05). 
Then it also followed that rich peasants-to-capitalist farms had the majority who 
accessed agricultural credit from banks between 2015 and 2017 (Figure 6.8). The now 
familiar pattern of reduction in the percent share in the remaining farm classes was 
also replicated here. Access to another source of agricultural credit through contract 
farming schemes offered by private agribusiness companies portrayed similar trends 
in the distribution of beneficiaries amongst the farm classes (Figure 6.8). Though 
present in both the peasantry (cotton, tea and horticulture) and the LSCFs (sugarcane 
and horticulture) (Masakure 2003; Sachikonye 2016; World Bank 2012; Scoones 
2014) prior to the FTLRP, post-2000, contract farming has experienced exponential 
growth in tobacco farming, which as seen above, featured prominently in the rich 
peasants-to-capitalist farmers.121 Not as widespread, the other crops that integrated 
some of the sampled farm households into private contract farming included 
soyabeans, sorghum and wheat. The urban connections of the capitalist class, were 
important not only in accessing the private domestic and international agribusiness 
companies who were mostly located in the major urban centres to negotiate contracts, 
but also in terms of possessing urban assets that some of the companies required as 
collateral (Mazwi & Muchetu 2015; Sakata 2017).  
                                                 
121
 The tobacco produced under contract farming increased from nil in 2003 to 82 percent of the sales 
in 2016 (TIMB 2016: 5). By 2016, the 47,644 tobacco growers under contract farming schemes 
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Figure 6.8: Access to agricultural credit and contract farming  
 
Access to agricultural credit, Chi-Square= 138.576, p=0.00*  
Participation in state contract farming, Chi-Square=118.332, p=0.00* 
Participation in private contract farming, Chi-Square=151.850, p=0.00* 
*Significant at p<0.05 
State policy and political connections were most prevalent amongst the group of rich 
peasants-to-capitalist farms (Moyo & Yeros 2005b; Moyo 2011a; Scoones 2015b) 
since they also out-competed the peasantry in the extraction of state subsidies such as 
the extensive maize contract farming programme titled ―Special Maize Import 
Substitution Programme‖, or ―Command Agriculture‖ initiated in 2015.
122
 As Figure 
6.8 illustrates, the beneficiaries of the state maize contract farming scheme were once 
again lopsided in favour of hired in labour dependent class. The other subsidy 
programe, which targets mostly peasants, distributes far less the amount of inputs than 
the Command Agriculture Programe.
123
 
6.4.5 Agricultural commodity market integration  
Not producing solely for the market, but also to satisfy household consumption, is a 
key character of the peasantry that distinguishes it with capitalist farms whose 
primary purpose of production is geared for the market (Boltvinik 2016; Moyo 2014; 
Hall et al. 2017). Overall, the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms exhibited the highest 
                                                 
122
 The programme distributed 6,319 metric tonnes of maize seed, 10.1 million litres of diesel, 50,150 
metric tonnes of basal fertilizer and 31,465 metric tonnes of ammonium nitrate at low interest rate of 
four percent per annum to be paid off on delivery of targeted amounts of grain to the state run, Grain 
Marketing Board (Chemura 2017). The interest rates credit availed by commercial financial institutions 
were ranging between 12 to 18 percent per annum. Data on the herbicides and machinery distributed 
could not be ascertained. Altogether, the Command Agriculture targeted the production of 400,000 
hectares of maize nationally in the 2016/17 season. The programme was being enlarged to cover other 
commodities such as wheat, soyabean and livestock from 2017 onwards.  
123
 For instance, the Presidential Input Scheme for 2017/18 season, while targeting over 1.8 million  
households, its proposed budget was less than half that of the Command Agriculture scheme (GoZ 
2017b). Specifically, the proposed budget for the latter was $334.7 million compared to $153 million 
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incidence of integration into the output markets for the crops produced. Except for 
groundnuts and sweet potatoes, at least 90 percent of the rich peasants-to-capitalist 
farms had marketed part of the output produced (Table 6.38). Such parallels could not 
be drawn from small and poor peasantries. Maize and groundnuts, which were grown 
by the largest segments in these classes, market participation was limited to below 42 
percent and 30 percent respectively (Table 6.38). Beyond the cash crops such as 
tobacco and soyabeans the middle peasants were more connected to the markets than 
their counterparts in the small and poor peasants. However, dissimilarities were not 
witnessed in the participation in the livestock output markets between the farming 
classes.  
These findings suggest that small and poor peasants prioritised food supplies to the 
household and only ventured into the commodity markets when surpluses dependent 
upon the season were realised. Yet ―subsistence farming‖ was not the predominant 
phenomenon observed among the sampled households (see Mafeje 2003; World Bank 
2012; Chigumira 2018; Hanlon et al. 2013).  
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Table 6.38: Participation in field crops commodity markets  
Crop 




peasant small peasants poor peasants Total Chi-
Square p 
 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Maize 88 89.8 232 73.3 148 38.5 80 41.3 548 61.9 90.47 0.00* 
Wheat 5 100 4 100 0 0 0 0 9 100 ** 
 Cotton 0 0 0 0 2 50 0 0 2 50 ** 
 Tobacco 37 97.3 17 94.1 1 100 0 0 55 94.5 17.883 0.00* 
Groundnuts 32 15.6 125 37.6 67 20.9 39 28.2 263 29.3 9.357 0.025* 
Millet 0 0 3 33.7 1 100 3 33.3 7 28.6 0.467 0.792 
Sorghum 2 0 43 25.6 42 14.3 15 20 102 19.6 2.217 0.529 
Rapoko 0 0 3 100 5 100 0 0 8 100 ** 
 Sunflower 1 100 14 21.4 5 100 4 50 24 20.8 3.645 0.302 
Soyabeans 32 100 14 85.7 1 0 1 100 48 93.8 18.74 0.00* 
Sweet potatoes 7 42.9 20 40 6 66.7 8 50 41 46.3 1.397 0.706 
Sugarbeans 22 90.9 39 64.1 4 75 4 100 69 69.6 14.482 0.02* 
Cow peas 3 100 18 22.2 13 7.7 13 23.1 47 23.4 11.623 0.009* 
Roundnuts 1 0 62 29 31 19.4 28 28.6 122 26.2 1.444 0.695 








After considering the wide range of crops and livestock outputs produced by surveyed 
households, as much as 65.2 percent and 70.2 percent of the small and poor peasants had 
at least sold part of their output either in the formal or informal domestic markets 
respectively. The rich peasants-to-capitalists farmers exemplified the tenets attendant to 
capitalist farming since 95.7 percent were immersed into the commodity markets, 
followed by the middle peasants at 84.7 percent.  
Figure 6.9: Value of marketed output over value of production*  
 
*Includes imputed values of production for non-market participants. At p< 0.05 the percent of marketed 
output for capitalist-rich peasant farms was significantly different to all classes, while that of middle 
peasants was significantly higher than small and poor peasants. No difference was noted between small and 
poor peasants.  
 
The relationship between the value of marketed output and value of production as 
measure of the extent of integration into various commodity markets further elucidates 
the varying degrees in the purpose of production amongst the farming classes. Not 
unexpectedly, the rich peasant-to-capitalist farms had significantly the highest share of 
both crop and livestock outputs that were traded on the markets (Figure 6.9). Over two 
thirds of the output produced in this class was sold on the market. The percentage share 
of marketed output dropped substantially in the middle peasant class to almost half of that 
observed in latter group. As for the small and poor peasantries, further declines were 
recorded in the percent share of the value of output that households disposed in the 
commodity markets.  
6.4.6 Agricultural labour productivity and farm incomes  
Altogether, the variation in the production relations produced differentiated outcomes in 















labour hiring class obtained a significantly larger value of output per farming unit 
matched to the family labour based farms. The patterns were replicated in both crops and 
livestock output. Inequalities were more pronounced in crop farming where the value of 
output in the capitalist farms was over 10 times that of middle peasants, which followed 
after it (Table 6.39). Despite the capitalist farms still prevailing in the value of livestock 
output produced, the gap with the middle peasants was much narrower to that registered 
in crop farming. After accounting for the differences in land sizes, the value of output per 
hectare of cultivated land, still the variation persisted between the labour hiring class and 
family labour dependent classes. The value of output per farm unit was not significantly 
different between the middle peasants and the small peasants, but the opposite was true 
for the value of output per hectare of cropped land  (Table 6.39).  
Table 6.39: Value of output per farm unit and total area cropped (US$) 










Crops 70023.56a 6539.4b 1353.87b 2335.56b 14825.9 
Livestock 11151.58a 5742.42b 2149.03b 1470.14b 5000.61 
All output 81175.14a 12281.82b 3502.9c 3805.7c 19826.51 
Crops per Ha 2808.48a 1194.01b 677.9c 697.5c 1235.08 
All output per Ha  4034.96a 2596.56b 1780.89c 1557.78c 2446.89 
Labour 
productivity* 32.85a 12.28b 5.08c 3.22c 12.13 
N 93 236 158 84 571 
*Value of output per Labour Day. There is significant difference at p< 0.05 if the subscripts accompanying 
mean values appearing in the same row are dissimilar. 
Between the opposing poles of the farm classes, differences in agricultural labour 
productivity were more than 10 times (Table 6.39). The rich peasants-to-capitalist farms 
were characterised by significantly larger levels of agricultural labour productivity than 
the other farm classes. Middle peasants achieved higher productivity levels, which was 
significantly distinct from their counterparts in the small and poor peasant classes. 
However, the productivity in the latter two family labour-based farms was not 
significantly different. 
To assess the returns to labour among the different farm classes, two measures were 
employed, namely farm labour income and farm labour surplus. The former measures the 
net of the gross value of production after deducting all the input costs (including wages), 
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while the latter is net of the farm labour income after subtracting the imputed wages of 
unpaid labour contributed by the family labour (Patnaik 1996). The farm labour income 
across all the farming classes was positive and again a declining trend was apparent as 
the organisation of farming units transformed from being hired in labour reliant to the 
family based forms of labour (Table 6.40). Poor peasants derived the least farm labour 
income from their enterprises in the season observed compared to the rest of the farm 
classes and was in fact more than 30 times less than that enjoyed by the capitalist class 
(Table 6.40).  
Table 6.40: Farm labour income and surplus 






capitalist 62528.09a 62343.86a 93 
middle peasant 9860.9b 8400.15b 236 
small peasants 3219.68b 1875.48b 158 
poor peasants 2369.93b 931.81b 84 
Total 15522.28 14305.4 571 
*Imputed cost of family labour calculated using average sample daily wage rate of US$4.84. There is 
significant difference at p< 0.05 if the subscripts accompanying mean values appearing in the same column 
are dissimilar. 
After deducting the imputed wages for work contributed by unpaid family workers, all 
households recorded a positive farm labour surplus. This implies that family labour 
invested by the peasant classes was able to generate a return, which was more than the 
daily wage rate earned by casual labourers, which averaged US$4.84 per day for the 
survey sample. Table 6.40 indicates that among the family labour based farm classes, the 
middle peasants enjoyed a farm labour surplus close to ten-fold than that of the poor 
peasants. The farm labour income generated by all the farming classes exceeded the FPL 
for a household of five persons generated by the national statistical agency, which 
totalled US$2,004.62 in 2017 (ZIMSTAT 2018: 3). Nonetheless, the farm labour income 
was inadequate for the small and poor peasantry to meet their subsistence requirements 
beyond food according to the PDL standard. During 2017, the PDL summed up to 
US$6,113.61 for household of five persons (ZIMSTAT 2018: 5). In contrast, from 
farming alone, the capitalist and middle peasant farm classes were able to surpass both 
the FPL and PDL (Table 6.40).  
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Table 6.41: Total incomes from all sources in relation to poverty lines  
 Class  
 Source of income (US$)  
Deviation from poverty 
lines    
Non-farm Farm Total income FPL PDL N 
capitalist 6346.7a 62528.09a 68874.79a 66902.25a 62860.99a 93 
middle  5287.98a 9860.9b 15148.89b 13176.35b 9135.09b 236 
small  1667.94b 3223.04b 4890.98c 2918.44c -1122.82c 158 
poor 891.58b 2518.08b 3391.49c 1418.95c -2622.31c 84 
Total 3811.97 15544.78 19359.23 17386.69 13345.43 571 
*There is significant difference at p< 0.05 if the subscripts accompanying mean values appearing in the 
same column are dissimilar. 
Even the wider income sources beyond own farming to encompass wages from farm 
labour markets and non-farm incomes did not reverse the deviations from the PDL for the 
poor and small peasantry. Data presented in Table 6.41 illustrates that only the rich 
peasants-to-capitalist and middle peasant classes were able to subsist above the PDL 
during 2017.  
Table 6.42: Shares of different sources of household income 











Farm  93.14a 64.50b 56.19b 58.28b 65.96 
Formal employment  1.31a 19.99a 10.38a 9.44a 12.74 
Remittance 2.91a 6.98a,c 18.27b 12.52b,c 10.26 
Natural resource trading 0.36a 1.81a 3.22a 3.49a 2.21 
Other non farm income 2.29a 6.72a,b 11.55b 8.55a,b 7.61 
Total non-farm income 6.86a 35.50b 43.42
b
 34.31b 32.85 
Farm wage labour 0.00a 0.00a 0.00a 7.32b 1.08 
N 93 236 158 84 571 
*There is significant difference at p< 0.05 if the subscripts accompanying mean values appearing in the 
same row are dissimilar. 
The rich peasants-to-capitalist and middle peasantry were the ones who significantly 
commanded higher levels of non-farm income in comparison the small and poor 
peasantry (Table 6.41). Yet non-farm incomes were more important to the previous class 
categories under circumstances were farming stopped well short of meeting their 
subsistence requirements through the lens of the PDL. Tellingly, the shares of non-farm 
income were significantly higher in the family labour based farming units than the labour 
hiring in dependent class (Table 6.42). These included incomes from formal employment, 
 
 289 
remittances, natural resource trading, petty trading and farm wages that were limited to 
the poor peasantry.  
The findings imply that the small and poor peasantries struggle to meet their subsistence 
requirements from farming, let alone, capacity to expand their farming activities on 
account of the reinvestment of surpluses. Such possibilities were however present in the 
rich peasants-to-capitalist and middle peasant farms, which recorded positive incomes in 
relation to the poverty lines. An examination of the trends since receiving land allocations 
through the FTLRP shows that it was indeed the rich peasants-to-capitalist farms, which 
have been accumulating productive agricultural assets, especially scale increasing 
modern machinery, at faster rate through the re-investment of farm surpluses.
124
 For 
instance, the proportion of tractor owners in this class between year of settlement and 
2017, grew from 26.9 percent to 52.7 percent, so did the installation of electric powered 
boreholes from 34.4 percent to 47.3 percent. In comparison, among the middle peasants 
the share of tractor owners only grew from 4.2 percent to 9.7 percent, while no change 
was registered amongst the poor peasantry. Investments in boreholes, which enable all 
year round farming through irrigation was limited to 15.7 percent, 1.9 percent and 2.4 
percent of the middle, small and poor peasants, up from 6.8 percent, 1.3 percent and 1.2 
percent respectively.    
Altogether, the results on the land utilisation patterns, access to financial resources and 
other farming technologies reflect the deficiencies in the agricultural support framework 
to all farm classes and more so for female landowners. Indeed the FTLRP was not 
accompanied by a coherent post-settlement support policy to improve the production 
capacities of the land recipients. Yet this seemed particularly crucial in a context were 
private bank lending to agriculture had declined dramatically (World Bank 2012) and 
other sources of self-financing through savings from wage employment were on the wane 
due to the institution closures and job retrenchments persisted during the 2000‘s 
(LEDRIZ 2016). The state subsidy schemes, which emerged during the land reform 
tended to be reactive to droughts and food shortages and were limited in scale to cover 
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 The trends in the productive asset patterns of Communal Area landholders was tracked by the farm 
household survey from the year 2000 to coincide with the period the FTLRP was initiated. 
 
 290 
the expanded base of farmers (World Bank 2014). In fact, the report notes the bias of the 
schemes towards serving a few male A2 farmers. These limited state support patterns 
thus also conditioned the existing levels of demand for farm labour in the new agrarian 
structure.  
6.4.7 Summary of main findings  
This section has analysed the differentiation of farm households arising from the use of 
both family and hired in labour in the organisation of agricultural production. The 
statistical clustering procedure applied distinguished four groups of households that 
contained hired in labour dependent and family labour based farming units. To be sure, 
the groups identified contained farm households unveiling capitalist and peasant 
characteristics in so far as their reliance of hired in labour in their farming. After cross 
tabulating the farm classes with various production relations, the empirical data 
confirmed the theoretical propositions advanced by various scholars (Patnaik 1996; Jha 
1996; 2015; Moyo 2014; Boltvinik 2016), which suggest the use of hired in wage labour 
was a key indicator of class formation in rural areas. Substantial disparities were 
therefore observed between farm households classified as capitalist and peasants, not 
only in the use of hired in labour, but in the wider production relations embedded in the 
classes. As seen above, the application of the different factors of production declined as 
the utilisation of hired in labour fell among the farm classes, so did the agricultural labour 
productivity and income returns from farming. Yet the role of labour utilisation in 
fuelling class differentiation has received limited attention in the scholarship of land 
reform in Zimbabwe.  
Seventeen years since the FLTRP began,  this research confirms what other scholars have 
also found that a social differentiation process was unravelling in newly redistributed 
areas (Moyo & Nyoni 2013; Moyo et al. 2009; Scoones 2014; Scoones et al. 2010; 
Mkodzongi 2013; Mazwi & Muchetu 2015; Chigumira 2018; Shonhe 2017). The labour 
hiring in dependent class, i.e. the rich peasants-to-capitalist farm households, was 
associated with the production of cash and/or export crops utilising modern farm 
technologies (e.g. power driven machinery and productivity enhancing inputs such as 
fertilisers and HYV seeds) and commanded better access to financial resources (Hall et 
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al. 2017; Oya 2015; 2009). In contrast, the relatively ―worse off‖ peasant households 
produce mainly food crops utilising labour intensive technologies such ox-drawn ploughs 
and their investment in productivity enhancing inputs is limited by access to economic 
resources. The output produced by this class of farmers is consumed by household and 
surpluses are sold in local and national markets.  
Access to agricultural finance, standing in sharp contrast, between the opposite poles of 
the farm classes was driving the differentiation. Because of the limited availability of 
agricultural credit and state support, differentiation at the point of FTLRP land allocation 
especially, which is mirrored by incomes from past savings and current employment was 
propelling the imbalances witnessed in the countryside today. This perhaps suggests the 
need to relook at the semi-proletarianisation thesis in relation to its assigned ―functional 
dualism‖ (Moyo & Yeros 2005a: 20; see also Zhan & Scully 2018; Neocosmos 1993; 
Bush & Cliffe 1984) and the research returns to this issue in the concluding chapter 
(Section 7.3.2).  
The FTLRP policy implied differentiation of the production relations at the onset by 
designating the A1 model to expanding peasant production together with the Communal 
Area and the A2 scheme to amplify the share of black commercial agricultural producers 
(GoZ 2001a). The evidential base presented here and by others (Moyo et al. 2009; 
Scoones et al. 2010; Shonhe 2017) suggests that pursuing analysis juxtaposing the A1 
against the A2 schemes conceals the differentiated production relations as some of the A1 
farming units exhibit the same character of production regarding the utilisation of hired in 
labour and the orientation of production as those in the A2 model and vice versa. Hence, 
it also not correct to assume homogeneity in the land beneficiaries either by model or 
generally as some commentators have done.  
Analysing the class formation at the local level brought a sharper focus to the broad 
macro-level analysis of national agrarian class structure estimated by Moyo (2011a; 
2013) on the basis of the landholdings. Specifically, it exposed the differentiated 
dynamics, which are informed by the specificities of particular locality that in turn impact 
on the evolving farm classes post-2000. This was palpable in the distribution of farm 
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households from the two districts among the classes. The disproportionate development 
in the farm labour markets between the diverse agro-ecological zones and subsequent 
differences in the land use patterns in the two districts (section 6.2) reflected in the rural 
class formation trajectories. Very few of the farm households surveyed in Kwekwe 
exhibited capitalist tendencies in as far their dependency on wage labour on their farms. 
As a matter of fact, most of them were bundled in middle and small peasant class 
categories. Somewhat the opposite, Goromonzi district in a qualitatively better agro-
ecological zone, contributed the most farming units in the rich peasant-to-capitalist class. 
Since the Communal Area landholders constitute the majority in the small and poor 
peasantry, the data revealed the influence of the qualitatively better agro-ecological 
location and the larger land sizes of the new peasantry from the A1 scheme, most of 
whom were located in the middle peasant class in the use of farm labour. The subsequent 
income returns to farming were significantly better for the new peasantry located in the 
middle peasant class category and enabled the middle peasantry to escape the endemic 
poverty that characterise the small and poor peasantry from the Communal Areas. Recent 
poverty surveys confirm these patterns in both Goromonzi and Kwekwe; resettlement 
areas have been shown to have lower levels of the incidence of poverty compared to 
Communal Areas.
125
 The same could be said of women, the majority of whom were also 
found in the small and poor peasants. Actually, these results corroborate evidence from 
the nationwide large-scale surveys that have signposted the unrelenting inequities, seen 
before in the former LSCFs and Communal Areas (Gaidzanwa 1995; Rugube et al. 2003; 
Mvududu & McFadden 2001), regarding the skewed access to agricultural productive 
assets in favour of men (see ZIMSTAT 2016).  
Enmeshed within the new agrarian structure were the landless ―proletariats‖ and/or land 
short semi-proletariats who supply different forms of labour to the new farming units. 
Combined with the section 6.2, the discussion thus far has indeed demonstrated that farm 
wage labour markets were not extinguished as some literature suggests in the event of 
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 In Goromonzi, wards in resettlement areas were characterised by poverty prevalence rate of between 61 
and 72 percent, while in Communal Areas the rate was between 73 and 84 percent (ZIMSTAT 2015f: 65). 
Similar patterns were displayed in Kwekwe with the poverty prevalence rate in resettlement areas equaling 
those in the same land tenure category in Goromonzi, while for the Communal Areas; the rates were as 
high as 85 to 96 percent ( ZIMSTAT 2015f: 165). 
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land reform targeting the peasantry (Sender & Johnston 2003; Sender 2016; de Janvry 
1981). Instead differentiated farm labour markets endure, embracing the broad forms of 
hired labour beyond those found in large-scale capitalist farms. The foregoing section 
discusses the multi-coloured dimensions of wage labour in the new farms.  
6.5 CHANGING PATTERNS OF AGRARIAN WAGE LABOUR RELATIONS 
To appreciate the complete transformation of agrarian labour relations, it was imperative 
to analyse the expression of permanent and casual labour after redistributive land reforms 
taking into account the extent of formality, nature of employment contracts and the 
organisation and mobilisation of farm work in transformed agrarian structure.
126
 The 
quality of labour was also considered from the optic of the wages earned, the working 
conditions and the division of labour along gender, kinship, commodities and skills 
dimensions. The labour management practices, including the procurement of labour 
supplies and the continued role, if any, of the residential tenancy relations in stabilising 
the new labour force is also important. These research issues are pursued next, starting 
first with the examination of the demographic and socio-economic character of the new 
agrarian labour force.  
6.5.1 The new agrarian wage labour force: who are the workers? 
The new agrarian labour force was comprised of former and new farm workers. Former 
farm workers, to repeat, include those that were previously employed in the redistributed 
LSCFs and now worked in the new farming units. They remained in the old farm 
compounds after some of their colleagues were displaced during the land occupations or 
trekked back to the Communal and other areas (Sachikonye 2003; IDMC 2008; 
Magaramombe 2010; Scoones et al. 2018a). The new farm workers, in contrast, lacked 
any previous employment connection to the LSCFs and were being imported mainly from 
various Communal Areas. All-in-all, new farm workers accounted for 74.4 percent and 
76 percent of the interviewees in Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts correspondingly.  
Demographic patterns of farm labour households  
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Some components in this section build and further develop the analysis presented in Chambati (2017)  
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Over 70 percent of the farm labourers interviewed across both districts were married 
(Table 6.43). Corroborating previous studies, which have shown that it was mostly single 
women not attached to men and thus ―free‖ from patriarchal relations who ventured into 
the rural labour markets (Adams 1991; Muchena & Dzumbira 2001), women in the 
sample had a bigger share of those not married than men. Again confirming the trends 
identified in the literature (Elson 1999; Sender et al. 2006; SOFA Team & Doss 2011; 
ILO 2015a), these women mostly accessed casual jobs as the recruitment patterns of 
landholders also demonstrated (section 6.2.4). 
Table 6.43: Marital status of farm workers by gender  
 Marital status 
Goromonzi  Kwekwe  
Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Monogamously married 69.7 59.3 66.8 73.6 60 70.7 
Polygamously married 2.1 3.7 2.5 0.6 4.4 1.4 
Single 17.9 3.7 14.1 18.4 4.4 15.4 
Divorced/separated 4.8 20.4 9 4.9 24.4 9.1 
Widowed 5.5 13 7.5 2.5 6.7 3.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 145 54 199 163 45 208 
Chi-Square 20.118  25.375  
p 0.00*  0.00*  
 *Significant at p<0.05  
 
New farm workers averaged 30 years old in both districts, compared to 45 and 46 years 
among the Goromonzi and Kwekwe former farm workers respectively. Aggregated with 
their families, the Goromonzi farm workers surveyed represented a total population of 
about 950 persons split into 56.1 percent males and 43.9 percent females (Figure 6.10). 
An economically active population of 64.2 percent was responsible for taking of the 
economically inactive population that were too young to work (34.5 percent) or too old to 
work (1.3 percent). With a total population of 972 persons, Kwekwe farm worker 
households closely resembled these demographic features. The average family sizes in 
these households were 4.6 in Goromonzi and 4.16 in Kwekwe.  
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Figure 6.10: Age-sex distribution in farm labour households 
 
 
Educational levels  
The majority of the farm workers had not completed secondary education that is required 
to proceed to Advanced Level high school and/or a chance in the urban formal jobs 
market, at least at the bottom-end (Table 6.44). Kwekwe had higher proportions of farm 
workers who had not met this standard compared to Goromonzi and in fact most who had 
never been to school were in this district. The educational levels were significantly 
associated with the work history of the farm workers. Significantly former farm workers 
were less educated than the new farm workers (Table 6.44).  
Table 6.44: Level of education of farm workers by history of LSCF work 
 Level of education 
Goromonzi (%) Kwekwe (%) 
Former New Total Former New Total 
No formal education 0 0.7 0.5 14 4.4 6.7 
Some primary education 32.1 12.3 17.6 30 15.2 18.8 
Completed primary education 24.5 17.1 19.1 30 23.4 25 
Some secondary education 22.6 32.2 29.6 16 31.6 27.9 
Completed secondary education 20.8 37 32.7 10 25.3 21.6 
College education 0 0.7 0.5 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 53 146 199 50 158 208 
Chi-Square 14.796  17.721  
p 0.011*  0.001*  
*Significant at p<0.05 
These findings were not surprising given the empirically established limited number of 
schools in LSCF areas before 2000 (see Chapter Four; Nyagura & Mupawaenda 1994; 
Mclvor 1995; Amanor-Wilks 2001; Magaramombe 2001; Waeterloos & Rutherford 
2004). Actually it has been argued that LSCF owners were not interested in investing in 
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to other sectors (Loewenson 1991; Loewenson 1992). So, intergenerational dynamics 
imbued farm work as children dropped out of school after primary education and joined 
their parents in the labour force. Stories were abound from former farm workers during 
the field research which echoed these trends as shown by the case of Weeru Phiri (Box 
6.1). 
Box 6.1: Limited access to education relegates generations to farm work 
―I was born on Komuredhi Farm in 1975, when my father was employed here as permanent worker‖ 
recounted Weeru Phiri a former farm worker in Goromonzi. His father was also born on the farm from 
a foreign migrant labourer from Zambia who came to Zimbabwe in the 1940s. After finishing Form 
One in 1991, Weeru‘s parents could not afford to continue paying his school fees and he dropped out 
of school. Soon he was employed on the farm as a seasonal labourer on an eight month contract to 
become the third generation of Phiri‘s employed on Komuredhi Farm. After two consecutive seasons 
as a seasonal labourer, Weeru was promoted into permanent employment, a job held until the farm was 
acquired for land redistribution in 2001.  
Source: Weeru Phiri (2017: Interview) 
Access to education for children of farm workers remains a challenge up to today 
(Section 6.5.8). Armed with relatively better educational levels, new farm workers‘ 
learning capacity to acquire new agricultural skills compares favourably to that of former 
farm workers. Overall, farm work therefore largely remains employment for the least 
educated in Zimbabwe (Loewenson 1992; McIvor 1994; Magaramombe 2000) and more 
so in the context of the loose industrial job markets that have prevailed since the late 
1990s (Mhone 1996; Gibbon 1998).
127
  
Access to and ownership of land 
Underlining the importance of land in structuring (farm) labour market participation, 
about 60 percent of the surveyed farm workers did not own this means of production. The 
Communal Area and the resettled areas provided routes to land ownership for farm 
workers. In the former ownership was registered in 38.7 percent in Goromonzi and to 
25.2 percent in Kwekwe (Table 6.45) and their arable land sizes averaged 1.48 hectares 
and 2.78 hectares in the two districts respectively. As the data from the farm household 
surveys also revealed (Table 6.20), Kwekwe had a higher share (13 percent) that had 
received FTLRP land allocations than Goromonzi (5 percent). The average arable land 
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size owned by farm workers was 5.4 and 5.3 hectares in the resettled areas in the 
corresponding districts.  
Table 6.45: Access to land in different farm categories  
 % of households 
Land type Goromonzi Kwekwe Total  
 P 
 






FTLRP 2 0 10.1 5 4.9 19.4 21.6 13 3.4 11.8 15.7 9.1 
N 100 20 79 199 103 31 74 208 203 51 153 407 
Beneficiaries 23 5 10.1 16.1 16.5 6.7 20.3 16.4 19.7 6 15 16.3 
N 100 29 79 199 103 30 74 207 203 50 153 406 
Unused in RA 1 0 3.8 2 0 0 1.4 0.5 0.5 0 2.6 1.2 
N 98 20 79 197 103 30 73 206 201 50 152 403 
Compound 27.3 25 39.2 31.8 5.8 12.9 11 8.7 16.3 17.6 25.7 20 
N 99 20 79 198 103 31 73 207 202 51 152 405 
CA 41 50 32.9 38.7 35.3 23.3 12.2 25.2 38.1 34 22.9 31.9 
N 100 29 75 199 100 30 74 204 202 51 153 405 
*P – permanent workers; S – seasonal workers and PWD – piece/daily workers. 
Notwithstanding that many other farm workers also accessed land informally in the 
compounds, occupied unused resettled lands and leased from land beneficiaries (Table 
6.45; see also section 6.6.5), 33.4 percent were still landless. Permanent workers (36.9 
percent) more than casual labourers (29.9 percent) were separated from the means of 
production. Neither of the genders was shielded from landlessness and as matter of fact it 
was plain to see in 34.4 percent and 30.3 percent of the male and female workers 
correspondingly. That few farm workers benefitted from the FTLRP land allocations 
exhibits their limited prioritisation as category of beneficiaries targeted to receive land 
since they were earmarked to continue with their role as wage labourers. As indicated 
earlier (Chapter Five), the land reform emphasised peasants from Communal Areas as the 
targeted land recipients. Although they were included in the inception policy document 
for the LRRP-II, farm workers fell of the list of beneficiary categories in the FTLRP 
policy (Chapter Four & Five). 
Citizenship  
Former farm workers have faced many challenges due to their assumed identity as 
―foreigners‖ due to the colonial labour migrant systems that brought labour from present 
day Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia (Moyo et al. 2000; Rutherford 2001a; Daimon 
2014), including being left out in the FTLRP land allocations. This occurred despite the 
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fact that many former farm workers at present were born in the country and qualified for 
citizenship according to Citizenship Amendment Act of 1996 and the recently entrenched 
provisions in the 2013 Constitution (see also Chapter Five).
128
  
Table 6.46: Country of birth of father of farm workers by history of work 
 Country 
Goromonzi  Kwekwe  
Former  New Total Former New Total 
Zimbabwe 58.5 87 79.4 82 93 90.4 
Mozambique 13.2 5.5 7.5 10 1.3 3.4 
Zambia 7.5 0.7 2.5 2 1.9 1.9 
Malawi 20.8 6.2 10.1 6 3.8 4.3 
Other 0 0.7 0.5 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 53 146 199 50 158 208 
Chi-Square 22.945  9.549  
p 0.000*  0.023*  
*Significant at p<0.05 
. 
This research confirms the configurations recognised in previous studies (Kanyenze 
2001; Sachikonye 2003), since as much as 97 percent of the labour survey respondents in 
both districts were born in Zimbabwe. The few that were not birthed in the country had 
migrated from the same migrant sending countries of the past. However, about 20.6 
percent and 9.6 percent of the workers were of ―foreign migrant‖ origin since their 
fathers were born in Malawi and Mozambique (Table 6.46). Not surprisingly, it was 
amongst the former farm workers that foreign migrant origins were widespread than 
among the new farm workers. The descendants of migrant farm workers connect with 
their historical roots by practicing their cultural and/or religions such as nyau ceremonies 
in the farm compounds and beyond (Chambati 2013b; Daimon 2014). Quite importantly, 
citizenship and its associated identities, as seen later (section 6.6), affected farm worker 
agency in varied ways, including in the formation of labour supply groups and 
negotiating access to land.  
Previous occupations of farm workers  
Diverse previous occupations are found in the new agrarian labour force ranging from 
unpaid family to wage farm workers (Table 6.47). Goromonzi had a relatively larger 
proportion of former farm workers compared to Kwekwe. Others were also unemployed, 
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 Section 43 (2a &b) of the Zimbabwean Constitution accords citizenship to all those born of SADC 
parentage before 1985 (GoZ 2013:25-26). 
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shifting from urban employment and school leavers. The remainder mostly associated 
with Kwekwe were retrenched mine workers given the district‘s long history of mining.  
Analogous to the tendencies elsewhere (Li Murray 2011; Selwyn 2014; Hall et al. 2017), 
the new farm labour markets in the resettled areas were painted by migration dynamics 
and/or importation of labour from varied places throughout the country. Local 
recruitment nonetheless, chiefly routed labour supplies to Communal Area households in 
both districts.  
Table 6.47: Previous occupations of farm workers  
 Previous occupation  
Goromonzi  Kwekwe  
P S PWD Total P S PWD Total 
Permanent farm worker 32 0 34.2 29.6 21.4 16.1 13.5 17.8 
Casual farm worker 6 10 11.4 8.5 4.9 12.9 9.5 7.7 
Subtotal farm workers  38 10 45.6 38.1 26.3 29 23 25.5 
Unpaid family farm worker 3 0 8.9 5 13.6 9.7 21.6 15.9 
Unemployed 26 50 22.8 27.1 23.3 19.4 27 24 
Self-employed (non-agric) 2 0 6.3 3.5 4.9 6.5 5.4 5.3 
Urban employment 9 5 5.1 7 11.7 16.1 9.5 11.5 
Mine worker 3 0 0 1.5 6.8 12.9 5.4 7.2 
Student 19 35 11.4 17.6 13.6 3.2 5.4 9.1 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 3.2 2.7 1.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 100 20 79 199 103 31 74 208 
Chi-Square 29.298  17.481  
p 0.010**  0.355***  
*P-Permanent, S – Seasonal, PWD – Piece/Contract Workers 
**Significant at p<0.05 ***Not significant at p<0.05 
Excluding former farm workers who were already resident in the LSCFs prior to the 
FTLRP, over 57.6 percent of the Goromonzi workers came from rural areas, namely 
Communal Areas, Old Resettlement Areas and SSCFs (Figure 6.11). The children of 
former farm workers who were not in LSCF employment before 2000, composed the 
remaining workforce. Kwekwe workers frequently reported originating from other rural 
areas outside the LSCFs more than those from Goromonzi (Figure 6.11).  
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Figure 6.11: Origin of new farm workers 
 
Chi-Square=23.337,  p=0.000 (Significant at p<0.05). N=295. 
These previous occupational patterns and residential roots of the farm workers suggest 
that the ―new‖ agrarian labour force largely retains its rural character through the 
recruitment of mainly Communal Area residents (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Moyo et al. 2000; 
Kanyenze 2001). Nonetheless, the ―new‖ agrarian labour force has also been ―partially 
urbanised‖ (Tabak 2000) by the inclusion of urban areas as a source of labour. About 18 
percent of the workers in Goromonzi traced their roots to the urban areas compared to 16 
percent in Kwekwe. If mining towns were added, then those who had urban roots 
escalated to 20.5 percent in the latter district. Nowadays, it is not unusual to encounter 
job adverts looking for farm workers in the urban townships.
129
 Temporary migration by 
some poor urban residents for farm work from nearby Mbizo Township into Kwekwe 
resettled areas was indeed observed during the field research. The same patterns were 
visible in Epworth and Ruwa townships nearby Goromonzi new farms. Furthermore, 
these shifting recruitment patterns were also due to the urban roots of the capitalist 
farmers in the A2 scheme. The new farm labour markets were thus insightful of the 
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 During the field research in Kwekwe in December 2017, l saw a job advert looking for farm workers 
placed by an A2 farmer at one of the shopping centres in Redcliff Town. 
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 Between 2009 and 2014, the number of manufacturing jobs declined from 135,500 to 92,700 (GoZ 
























6.5.2 Character of farm wage labour in resettlement areas 
The farm wage labour found in the resettled farms today does not necessarily 
approximate the LSCF type work. Yet this does not mean they do not constitute wage 
work, as others have opined (Magaramombe 2010; Ridderbos 2009). The expression of 
the different forms permanent and casual labour (incorporating seasonal and piece/daily 
work) in new agrarian structure are dealt with in this section. 
6.5.2.1 Permanent labour  
Permanent labour entails continuous employment with the same single employer with no 
specific end date. This type of employment was predominantly hired in by the larger 
capitalist A2 farms, and principally absent in the old peasantries in the Communal Areas 
(section 6.2 & 6.4). At law, the labour rights and conditions of permanent employees 
were protected by the Collective Bargaining agreements between the farm worker trade 
unions and employer organisations under the supervision of the NECAIZ. Box 6.2 
summarises the basic features of the conditions of permanent labour as envisaged by the 
current Collective Bargaining Agreement, Statutory Instrument 116 of 2014.  
Box 6.2: Selected features of permanent labour according Statutory Instrument 116 
of 2014 
Issue of employment  Legal requirement 
1. Type of contract  Written  
2. Hours of Work Not exceed 208 hours per month (translating to 8 hours per day) 
Additional work beyond legislated time should accrue overtime pay for workers  
or days off should be granted in lieu of extra hours contributed 
3. Rest days One day off each week 
4. Task work Quantum of work should be such that an average employee can complete during the workday 
5. Grading All employees should be allocated a grade 
6. Payment of wages Two days of the end of week for weekly paid employees 
Last four days of the month for monthly paid employees 
Written composition of the wage 
7. Benefits  Allowances for housing, light and fuel 
Source: GoZ (2014)  
Variation was apparent in the character of permanent employment within the settlement 
patterns and across the districts, but in general tended towards informality. The absence 
of written contracts specifying the conditions of employment, which was widely 
recounted by the permanent workers, illustrates this phenomenon (Figure 6.12). It was 
                                                                                                                                                 
The industrial capacity utilisation which had delined from 35.8 percent in 2005 to 18.7 percent in 2007 
recovered to 57 percent in 2017 before flounding to a trough of 34.3 percent in 2015 (CZI 2015: 13-14). 
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ingrained in Kwekwe regardless of the settlement of employment for the permanent 
workers. The reverse was true in Goromonzi as a written contract was more likely to be 
present for a worker employed in the A2 scheme than it was for the A1 (Figure 6.12).  
Figure 6.12: Types of employment contracts for permanent workers 
 
Chi-Square=8.875, p=0.03*, N=96 - Goromonzi 
Chi-Square=0.282, p=0.595** , N=100 - Kwekwe 
*Significant at p<0.05 **Not significant at p<0.05 
Arising out of this were thus possibilities for employers to alter the conditions of 
employment, including undefined wage payment dates and working hours as discussed 
below. Statutory Instrument 323 of 1993 and its successor Statutory Instrument 116 of 
2014 requires employers to: ―…to inform every employee, in writing, upon engagement, 
of the nature of his or her contract…..‖ (GoZ 2014: 1021). Thus, the specifics of the 
employment contracts were not only grey areas for many of the permanent workers, but 
their absence also meant the employers were violating the law. 
All the permanent workers had been in employment for at least one year and the average 
period with their current employer was five years. About 26 percent and 29 percent of the 
full-time wage labour in Goromonzi and Kwekwe had an employment record that 
exceeded five years in their present jobs respectively. Across both districts, women had 
significantly spent more time as permanent employees compared to men - eight years in 
Goromonzi and nine years in Kwekwe. Their male counterparts had spent four and five 
years at the same place of employment in the respective districts. About 56.4 percent of 
the permanent workers had not changed jobs since commencement of employment in the 
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were sourced from the Communal Areas (Table 6.79), this emerging stabilisation of the 
workforce (Gibbon & Riisgaard 2014) could be attributed to the prolongation of the 
residential labour tenancy relationship by the farm employers on these labourers (Section 
6.5.5). Tellingly, the residential alternatives of these imported permanent workers within 
the resettled areas were limited. 
A 26-day working month characterised most of the permanent workers, entailing a work 
week spanning from Monday to Saturday in both the A1 and A2 farms (Table 6.48). 
Sunday was offered to the workers as their rest day in accordance with the law. Yet a few 
of the workers were given more than four days off work. Absence of rest days 
represented a disturbing trend described by 6.4 percent and 23.2 percent of the workers in 
Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively. Livestock herders in Kwekwe were most affected 
by this deprivation since their employers wanted cattle to graze daily. 
Table 6.48: Length of working month for permanent workers  
 No. of 
rest days 
 No. of 
workdays 
Goromonzi (%) Kwekwe (%) 
A1 A2 Total A1 A2 Total 
0 30 12.2 6.4 9.4 22.6 23.9 23.2 
2 28 4.1 6.4 5.2 0 0 0 
3 27 0 0 0 3.8 2.2 3 
4 26 81.6 85.1 83.3 66 69.6 67.7 
6-8 22-24 2 2.1 2.1 7.5 4.3 6.1 
Total   100 100 100 100 100 100 
N   49 47 96 53 46 99 
Chi-Square 1.159  0.686  
p 0.763*  0.873*  
*Not significant p<0.05 
 
Long working hours faced by some permanent farm workers however negated the rest 
days offered by to their employers. The standard work day of eight hours was enjoyed by 
56.7 percent and only 27.2 percent in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively (Table 6.49). 
The capitalist A2 farms subjected their employees to long working hours more than the 
A1 farms. In separate interviews, the A1 and A2 farm households also professed these 
tendencies, 91.0 percent and 90 percent of Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively. This 
included 8.1 percent and 7.5 percent in the corresponding districts that had workdays in 
excess of 10 hours.  
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Table 6.49: Length of workday for permanent workers  
No. of hours Goromonzi Kwekwe 
A1 A2 Total A1 A2 Total 
5-8  63 50 56.7 31.5 22.4 27.2 
8.1-10  26.1 38.6 32.2 66.7 67.3 67 
10.1 – 12 10.9 11.4 11.1 1.9 10.2 5.8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 46 44 90 54 49 103 
Chi-Square 1.779  3.849  
p 0.411*  0.146*  
*Not significant at p<0.05 
 
Until recently, labour statutes unfairly imposed long working hours for farm workers, 
compared to those of the rest of the working class. Still, the white LSCFs enforced 
additional work hours for the same wage (e.g. Amanor-Wilks 1995; Tandon 2001; 
Kanyenze 2001). GAPWUZ, the farm worker trade union managed to lobby employers to 
reduce the working hours from 8.5 to the standard 8.0 during the 2013 collective 
bargaining exercise (GoZ 2014a).
 131
 Even on the old standards of working hours, as 
much as 88 percent of the A1 and A2 farm employers fell short. Since below 50 percent 
of those working beyond eight hours in both districts received overtime pay or extra time 
off as required by the law, new farm employers like they predecessors in the LSCFs were 
extracting unpaid labour from the permanent workers (Box 6.2; see Loewenson 1992; 
Amanor-Wilks 1992; Rutherford 2001a). 
Although monthly wage payments predominated (over 95 percent) in both districts, 2.1 
percent of A1 permanent workers in Goromonzi were being paid once per year and an 
equivalent 4.3 percent A2 workers in Kwekwe received wages quarterly and twice per 
year. Another two percent of the A1 permanent workers in the same district also noted 
being paid twice per year. Poor and ―absentee‖ farmers were associated with this pattern 
of wage payments. These unusual frequencies of wage payments that some farm workers 
faced were also consistent with what Scoones et al. (2010) found in Masvingo Province.  
By many accounts, permanent labour that currently exists on the A1 and A2 farms 
diverges from the provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement governing their 
                                                 
131
 Prior to gazetting of Statutory Instrument 116 of 2014, the previous Statutory Instrument 323 of 1993 
entrenched the working hours to 221 hours per month, which translated to 8.5 hours for all the permanent 
workers except for a category of workers that were not supposed to total more than 299 hours per month or 
11.5 hours per day. Those on 11.5 hour workdays included herdsmen, watchmen, boilermen, firetower 
attendants, pump attendants, guards, irrigation hand, curer, milker and caretakers.  
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conditions of employment (Box 6.2). The gap between the law and practice as shall be 
seen later was also obvious in the wages and benefits received by permanent farm 
workers (section 6.5.7).  
6.5.2.2 Casual labour  
Casual labour was distinct from the permanent variant apropos the continuity of 
employment and the multiplicity of employers it entailed. Empirically, casual labour was 
characterised by working for many employers with the time of employment limited to a 
particular task in the case of piece rate and/or the completion of an agreed amount of time 
of work. The latter, which shall be called time rated work can be further distinguished 
into two variants according to the duration of time a worker was engaged by a single 
employer. One type was similar to daily labour, where workers were hired for a specific 
time duration per day (normally denoted in hours) and wages were calculated daily. 
Throughout the agricultural season, the casual labour not engaged in the long-term type 
of seasonal labour interchange between piece rate and daily type of work. Henceforth, 
these workers were broadly classified by the study as piece/daily labourers (PWD). The 
other type were seasonal labourers that were employed for a longer duration and 
according to the law the duration of employment ranges from three months up to a 
maximum of six months within a given calendar year (GoZ 2014). Altogether, these 
different forms of casual labour also fall under the broad category of what is termed 
contract workers by the law (GoZ 2014). 
Seasonal labour similar to permanent labour has its employment conditions protected by 
law and also negotiated through the collective bargaining agreements. In contrast, piece 
rate and daily type work were not shielded by the law and the conditions of employment 
were deferred to local level negotiations between the employers and employees. Since 
piece rate and daily type work now constitute the largest section of the farm workforce 
nowadays, the labour rights of many farm workers were not safeguarded by the Statutory 






Table 6.50: Types of contracts offered to casual labourers  
 Type of contract 
Goromonzi  Kwekwe  
S PWD Total S PWD Total 
Verbal 73.7 82.3 80.6 87.1 93 91.2 
Written 26.3 17.7 19.4 12.9 7 8.8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 19 79 98 31 71 102 
Chi-Square 0.724  0.921  
p 0.395**  0.337**  
*S – seasonal labourers PWD – piece/daily workers. 
**Not significant at p<0.05 
 
Again, for both seasonal and piece/daily workers, contracts of employment were also oral 
(Table 6.50). Seasonal labour, which approximates permanent labour when they are 
actively employed, had the highest share with written contracts and this was more 
common in Goromonzi.  
In the Communal Areas, piece rate work, in continuation of past trends was the pervasive 
form of hired in wage labour (Adams 1991a; Matshe 1998). Almost half of the former 
LSCF labour force were seasonal labourers, but at present this was the least visible form 
of labour. It was commonly employed by the larger capitalist A2 farms and remaining 
LSCFs. However, in the case of Kwekwe, some A1 farms were also a source of 
employment for the seasonal labourers. Piece/daily work was employed in all the 
different settlement patterns.  
Colloquially, piece rates were also known as maricho, drawing parallels to other 
derogatory terminologies such as ganho-ganho in Mozambique (Perez Nino 2016) and 
ganyu-ganyu in Malawi (Kerr 2005; Oya 2013) to describe this type of work that chiefly 
attracts poor rural households (see also Chapter Two). While quantum of tasks that was 
allocated under piece rates was known as mugwazo. For various reasons, the landholders 
classified the different types of farm tasks into piece or time rated daily work for the 
purposes of engaging casual labour. More broadly, sensitive tasks, which were also 
difficult to supervise such as planting, fertiliser application, chemical spraying and maize 
threshing were set on the basis of timed rated daily work.
132
This was meant to prevent 
                                                 
132 Depending on the agro-ecological region, the maize plant population can range anything between 
36,000 and 60,000 per hectare according the recommendations of one of the largest input companies, Seed 




workers from not performing their duties diligently since they might rush to complete the 
task, if it was classified as mugwazo and move on to other jobs. For instance, if a worker 
were to be given the task of fertiliser application as a mugwazo, meaning they should 
perform this on a given area of land in order to finish the task in the shortest possible time 
some plants might not be fertilised with devastating consequences on the anticipated 
output and productivity. On the other hand, tasks such as land clearing and weeding, 
which were relatively easier to verify and supervise were issued out to hired in labour on 
the basis of mugwazo.  
Piece rated work was also differentiated according to the quantity of work for a specific 
task across the various commodities produced by the A1 and A2 landholders, so were the 
wages paid. The mugwazo for weeding in maize for instance was 450 square metres per 
person, while in tobacco the area was 600 square metres for the same task. By way of 
another example, 0.25 hectares and 0.33 hectares were the piece rates for digging holes 
for planting maize and tobacco respectively. Although both men and women were 
engaged in the range of tasks performed under mugwazo and time rated daily work, some 
of the tasks were gender segregated. Apparently, women were preferred for planting, 
fertiliser application and winnowing of maize because they were ―…patient and could 
handle delicate tasks unlike men‖ (MPEW 2017: Interview). At another A2 farm in 
Kwekwe involved in chicken broiler production, on noticing all the women piece workers 
who had been hired to slaughter and dress the chickens, an enquiry also returned the same 
answer about ―women‘s patience‖. Men were targeted for tasks such as land clearing and 
carrying harvest from the fields considered to require their ―muscular strength‖. 
Shifting between many employers during the agricultural season and across seasons, 
piece/daily workers were very mobile. The same employer between seasons was found in 
only 27.6 percent and 24.3 in Goromonzi and Kwekwe correspondingly. Contrast this 
with 63.2 percent and 64.5 percent of the seasonal workers who returned to their previous 
employers from last season in the respective districts. To reach their employers, 
piece/daily workers were traversing distances of between 0.79 kilometres and 3.98 
kilometres from their places of residence in Goromonzi. The radius between the nearest 
and furthest employers in Kwekwe was 1.83 kilometres and 6.0 kilometres. 
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Cumulatively, the piece/daily workers spoken to had worked an average of 133.2 days 
during the 2016/17 season in Goromonzi, while their seasonal counterparts clocked 156.2 
days. The labour days for part-time workers were lower in Kwekwe - 139.5 and 80.9 days 
respectively.  
Depending on the fortunes in alluvial gold mining, piece/daily workers in Kwekwe also 
moved between farm wage and non-farm jobs even in the midst of the agricultural 
season. When gold ―rikaputika‖ as discoveries were referred to in the local lingua franca, 
a rush to those areas ensued attracting different people including the piece/daily workers 
who abandoned farm jobs for a chance to strike ―instant riches‖ (PLB 2018: 
Interview).
133
 Kwekwe piece/daily workers could thus fit what Breman (1996) termed 
―footloose labour‖ that is constantly in motion to search for work across diverse sectors. 
Beyond the conflicts over land use, which erupted when discoveries lie in the lands 
owned by resettled farmers (Chigumira 2018; Mawowa 2013; Moyo et al. 2009), gold 
mining because of the potential income returns, outcompeted farming in attracting labour.  
Akin to permanent workers, all the seasonal labourers and 77.8 percent in Goromonzi and 
Kwekwe respectively received their wages on a monthly basis (Table 6.51). Daily 
payments or after the completion of their mugwazo were the most common for 
Goromonzi piece/daily workers (Table 6.51). Weekly runs prevailed in Kwekwe as some 
employers waited for the labour days to accumulate before acquitting the wage payments. 
Table 6.51: Frequency of wage payments to casual labourers 
 Frequency 
Goromonzi  Kwekwe  
S PWD Total S PWD Total 
Daily 0 58.2 48.5 0 12.7 9.8 
Weekly 0 20.3 16.5 22.2 50.9 41.5 
Monthly 100 21.5 35.1 77.8 34.5 47.6 
At the end of season 0 0 0 0 1.8 1.2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 18 79 97 27 55 82 
Chi-Square 34.282  11.546  
p 0.00*  0.009*  
*Significant at p<0.05  
                                                 
133  Media headlines such ―Gold rush fever among poor Zimbabweans leave a trail of destruction‖ 
[www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-mining-landrights-idUSKBN17J1CJ – accessed 18 July 2017] or 
―Illegal gold panners descend on Kwekwe‖, The Chronicle 6 January 2012 are not uncommon in reference 
to the situation when new ―discoveries‖ of gold were made in Kwekwe. See also ―Gold rush at Kwekwe‘s 
Dandrum Mine‖, The Herald, 21 July 2016. 
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Mugwazo offered by employers was overwhelming for 34 percent and 55.7 percent of 
piece/daily workers in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively to complete on their own in 
a single day. Seasonal labourers in Kwekwe (43.9 percent) also faced similar challenges. 
To avoid work spilling over the next day and thus contribute more labour days for a task 
expected to be completed the same day, family members were enlisted to help (Table 
6.52), evocative of the scenario Adams (1991b) recited of women being called upon to 
assist their male relatives employed in the sugarcane estates in Chiredzi to complete their 
mugwazo and thus curtail excessive working hours. Parrallels could drawn with the ticket 
system in the LSCFs that was designed to ensure workers contributed in excess of 45 
days  of work but only received a wage for a month (Arrighi 1970; Rubert 1997; Chapter 
Four).  
Enlisting help from the family enabled quicker transition to new jobs, as well as widen 
the wages earned during the season. The family members helping piece workers, which 
others have called the ―uninvited‖ labourers (Torvikey et al. 2016: 86), facilitate the 
indirect exploitation of whole families through the engagement of one worker. Again, the 
farm employers through this avenue were also indirectly recruiting child labour as they 
constituted 17.9 percent and 22.7 percent of the ―uninvited‖ labourers in the two districts 
respectively. If the number of people contributing to the completion of a task were taken 
into account, then the piece wage rates in new farms were even more paltry than they 
seem.    
Table 6.52: Strategies utilised to complete mugwazo by casual labourers 
 Strategy  
Goromonzi  Kwekwe  
S PWC Total S PWC Total 
Work individually and 
complete work 100.0 59.2 67.0 46.2 44.0 44.6 
Work with family 0.0 21.1 17.0 15.4 33.3 28.7 
Work individually and roll 
over work to next day 0.0 19.7 16.0 38.5 22.7 26.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 18 76 94 26 75 101 
 
The seasonal nature of farming structured the hiring of casual workers (Section 6.4.2 & 
6.53). It began rising with the pounding of the first rains in October and the incremental 
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trends persist until the last month of the year before slowing down between January and 
March (Figure 6.13). Thereafter the hiring begins to increase during the harvesting season 
between April and May. Limited farm employment opportunities existed for part-time 
farm labourers between June and September, which represent the dry season in the 
country. The demand patterns in the Communal Area were a complete replica of the 
situation described in the resettled areas. 
Figure 6.13: Seasonality of casual labour hiring in resettled areas 
 
*One-way ANOVA, the average number of labour days was significantly different across the model types 
at p<0.05.  
The superior number of labour days recruited by the Goromonzi farm households also 
draws attention to the inequalities in the labour demand patterns and consequently the 
development of the farm labour markets between the two districts. Even the Goromonzi 
A1 farms outpaced the Kwekwe A2 farms for most of the months during the season in the 
number of the casual labour days hired in (Figure 6.13). With this structure of uneven 
demand for casual during the season, opportunities were thus abound for piece/daily 
workers to enter into non-farm wage labour markets, alongside the landholders (section 
6.3.2). 
These results partly reflect the inadequate enforcement of the existing statutory 
instruments governing the working conditions of (permanent) farm workers by the state 
NECAIZ and the MPSLSW. As will be shown later (Section 6.6.3), the NECAIZ was 
underresourced and its presence in the newly resettled areas was limited like that of the 




















































































adequately performed its role to promote the understanding of the labour relations 
amongst the new set of farm employers as dictated by the Labour Ammendment Act of 
2015. Moreover, the labour regulations for farm workers now fall short of covering all 
the different categories of workers that characterise the new agrarian structure. 
Specifically, they now exclude the piece/daily workers who were the most common form 
of hired in labour and thus at present the majority of the agrarian labourers are not 
protected by the farm labour laws. 
6.5.3 Kinship ties and the new agrarian labour markets  
In the absence of developed labour market information, family and kinship networks 
contribute immensely to the recruitment of (farm) labour in SSA (Mano et al. 2011), 
including Zimbabwe. The former farm workers recommended their family and/or 
relatives for LSCF jobs and the farm compounds represented webs of related households 
tied by kinship, marriage and village of origin within and without Zimbabwe (Rutherford 
2001a). According to research by the previous scholar, permanent employees were 
conduits for the recruitment of additional workers from their immediate family and 
relatives and in fact put them in good stead for job promotion. Recollections by former 
farm workers of how their LSCF employment was facilitated by their relatives were not 
unusual during field visits to the old farm compounds and this continues to today. Thirty 
one percent of the permanent workers in Goromonzi worked alongside other members 
from their family, whilst in Kwekwe; this was limited to 10.2 percent. Both adult males 
and females, and children members of the permanent worker households were involved 
in these labour supply arrangements. The 30 permanent workers in Goromonzi worked 
for the same employer together with 27 female adults, 8 male adults and one child from 
their families. The family members that accompanied the 10 Kwekwe permanent workers 
were disaggregated into 18 adults divided equally by gender and two children. More 
permanent workers employed in the A2 scheme (67.5 percent), which had many of the 
capitalist farms (section 6.4.1) reported this practice more than the family labour 
dependent A1 peasant farms (30 percent). 
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In the piece/daily forms of farm labour, information on job opportunities was exchanged 
with fellow kin and friends in old farm compounds before anyone else. The labour supply 
groups formed by piece/daily workers were also infused with kinship ties (section 6.6.2).  
A new trend in the redistributed LSCFs, but well established in the Communal Areas 
relates to the recruitment of extended family relatives into the wage labour force by the 
new farm employers. Beyond the managerial hierarchies of the white male owner, spouse 
and children, familial linkages in the former LSCFs did not extend to the rank and file of 
the black farm labour force (Loewenson 1992; Tandon 2001).  




A1 A2 Total A1 A2 Total 
Not related 73.5 95.7 84.4 84.9 87.2 86 
Distant relative  22.4 4.3 13.5 13.2 10.6 12 
Same totem 0 0 0 0 2.1 1 
Same kumusha  4.1 0 2.1 1.9 0 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 49 47 96 53 47 100 
Chi-Square 9.562  2.927  
p 0.023*  0.570*  
*Significant at p<0.05  **Not significant at p<0.05 
 
At least 13 percent of the permanent workers surveyed were related to their farm 
employers and the incidence was dissimilar across the districts (Table 6.53). These 
―worker-relatives‖ were not only distant relatives from the extended family of the farm 
employers bound by blood ties, but also included other relations that command currency 
within the African context (Mkodzongi 2013b; Mutopo 2014) such as sharing the same 
totem or originating from the same village in the Communal Area (Table 6.53). Worker-
relatives were more common in Goromonzi than Kwekwe and associated with A1 
permanent workers. No major differences were captured between A1 and A2 permanent 
workers in Kwekwe. Accordingly, the operation of kinship networks in the farm labour 
markets that previously involved mainly employees now also encompasses the employers 
as well.  
Labour conflicts involving relatives at least in theory are expected to have wider 
ramifications that transcend the workplace into the wider familial relationships of the 
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employer and extended kin and thus favour ―worker-relatives‖ over ―non-relative-
workers‖. Two opposite poles were uncovered regarding the experiences of payment of 
wages between these two categories of permanent workers. ―Worker-relatives‖ were 
sometimes the ones more affected by the problem of unpaid wages more than the ―non-
relative worker‖. The former would be considered to understand the challenges of the 
employer regarding financial resource constraints more than a ―mutorwa‖ as one A1 
farmer from Goromonzi informed the research (JK 2017: Interview).
134
 This farmer only 
paid his relative AK his wages after the sell of tobacco at the auction floor. At the time of 
the survey, in Goromonzi four of the nine ―worker-relatives‖ were owed unpaid wages 
compared to 13 out of the 72 ―non-relative-workers‖. Thus, worker-relatives in this case 
enabled the constitution of a ―disciplined labour force‖ to propel capital accumulation 
(Tsikata 2015). The dynamics were however different in Kwekwe where 2 out 12 of the 
―worker-relatives‖ had arrears on the wage payments compared to 20 out 68 ―non-
relative workers‖. 
6.5.4 Division of labour and organisation of farm work 
Wide-ranging agricultural production systems in the former LSCFs and the large 
workforces (Muir 1994; 2007; Gibbon 2011) were accompanied by detailed managerial 
hierarchies in the organisation and division of work especially in the Mashonaland 
Provinces (Amanor-Wilks 2000; Loewenson 1992; Rutherford 2001a). From the owner 
to the least ranked position, these managerial positions were synonymous with males. At 
the top was the farm manager assisted by various administration officers responsible for 
farm record keeping. The production side depending on the enterprise diversification 
were led by section foremen and beneath them were supervisors and leaders of labour 
gangs. Mixed farming of diverse commodities led to segmentation of labour along 
commodity lines and by the late 1990s had extended to commodity based collective 
bargaining (Magwaza 2017: Interview). Such organisation of work was undone by the 
downsizing of the farms and subsequent land use changes that accompanied the FTLRP. 
                                                 
134
 Mutorwa is a Shona word that refers to someone whom you not related to by blood ties. 
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6.5.4.1 Labour management practices  
Farm management structures were restricted to a small segment of the capitalist A2 
farms. All of the Communal Area and A1 farms that hired in farm wage labour surveyed 
in both districts were directly owner managed and only 15 percent of Kwekwe A2 farms 
hired managers. Contrasting tendencies were perceptible in the Goromonzi A2 farms 
where 64.5 percent recruited farm managers. The farm managers were accountable to the 
LSCF owners and responsible for managing the entire farm operations, including 
supervising lower level managers and other tasks such as land use planning, farm 
budgeting, commodity marketing, maintenance of farm assets and labour scheduling. 
Now these responsibilities converge on the owners in the small peasant farms and were 
not as elaborate as they were in the capitalist farms.  
Table 6.54: Work done by permanent workers  
Work done Goromonzi  Kwekwe  
  Male Female Total Male Female Total 
General hand 62.6 75 63.6 78.7 66.7 78 
Tractor driver 7.7 0 7.1 6.4 0 6 
Skilled work  7.7 25 9.1 3.2 0 3 
Supervisor 8.8 0 8.1 1.1 0 1 
Foreman 3.3 0 3 3.2 0 3 
Security 9.9 0 9.1 6.4 16.7 7 
Other  0 0 0 1.1 16.7 2 
Subtotal 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 91 8 99 94 6 100 
 
Only a few the farm managers in the A2 farms had formally undertaken courses in 
agriculture, signifying a departure with the hiring patterns in the former LSCFs. The 
latter mostly recruited managers trained in the public and private agricultural colleges and 
dotted around the country (Rukuni 1994). Sixty percent of the managers hired in A2 
farms in Goromonzi had no prior formal training in agriculture. Qualifications possessed 
by the rest included certificate (28.6 percent), Master Farmer certificate (7.2 percent) and 
diploma (4.8 percent). Similarly in Kwekwe, qualified managers had obtained certificates 
(14.3 percent) and diplomas (28.6 percent) and the majority had no formal training.  
The positions occupied by permanent workers varied from skilled workers (e.g. 
machinery operators) to general hands, but the latter enveloped most of them. The 
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Goromonzi A2 farms had the more elaborate skill segmentation of the labour force. 
Although differentiation of the permanent farm workforce was visible on the new farms, 
it was nowhere near the grading system demanded by Statutory Instrument 116 of 2014. 
The nine grades specified by this legal instrument also correspond to different wage 
rates.
135
 Practices discriminating against women moving up the employment ladder 
survived the FTLRP. If women made it to the permanent workforce, they were always at 
the lower rung (Table 6.55). None of the few women in the permanent workforce in 
Goromonzi held any leadership position, while this was confined to only one of the five 
female permanent workers in Kwekwe. Farm managers were nearly universally men, so 
were the foremen and supervisors. Representation of women relatively increased in the 
administrative category of clerks, salespersons and accountants. 
Table 6.55: Work hierarchies on the new farming units  
Managerial post  
Goromonzi Kwekwe Goromonzi Kwekwe  
Existence of management  % of male occupants  
Manager 38.4 17 97.4 76.5 
Foreman 40.4 27 100 96.3 
Supervisor 35.4 13 94.3 92.3 
Clerk 28.3 11 78.6 72.7 
Accountant 12.1 8 84.6 100 
Salesperson 15.2 7 80 85.7 
Driver 43.4 19 100 100 
Security 39.8 20 100 90 
N 99 100 39 20 
 
Lower level managerial workers such as foremen and supervisors (Gibbon 2011), have 
been substituted by the owners themselves in the allocation of labour tasks to permanent 
employees in all A1 and Kwekwe A2 farms. Hence the employers themselves have 
become the direct faces of the exploitation of the workers in the farms rather the foremen 
and supervisors within the LSCFs. Using their wider powers to recommend people for 
recruitment, for instance, these junior managers were known for harassing other workers 
and sexually abusing women in exchange for jobs and/or promotion (Muchena & 
Dzumbira 2001; Adams 1991b; Amanor-Wilks 1995).  
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Absence of these types of workers in many of the new farms could therefore be argued to 
have eradicated an additional layer of worker repression and the avenues to negotiate 
conditions of employment. Goromonzi A2 farms unveiled contradictory tendencies since 
the managers, supervisors and foremen performed these roles (Table 6.56). 
Table 6.56: Person allocating daily tasks to permanent workers  
Person  Goromonzi  Kwekwe  
  A1 A2 Total A1 A2 Total 
Employer 75 34 53.8 82.4 53.3 68.8 
Manager 15.9 31.9 24.2 2 26.7 13.5 
Supervisor 4.5 23.4 14.3 2 2.2 2.1 
Foreman 0 10.6 5.5 7.8 15.6 11.5 
Worker 4.5 0 2.2 5.9 2.2 4.2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 44 47 91 51 45 96 
Chi-square 21.963  15.721  
P 0.00*  0.003*  
*Significant at p<0.05 
 
Various machinery and agricultural chemicals, including pesticides, herbicides and 
livestock drugs were being utilised in both A1 and A2 farms (section 6.4.3). Yet, not all 
permanent workers received protective gear from farmers as mandated by the Hazardous 
and Substances and Articles Act (Chapter 322) and the National Social Security Act 
(Chapter 17:04). This disparately affected the A1 (39.8 percent) and A2 (14.2 percent) 
Goromonzi permanent employees. Kwekwe farms also did not shield permanent workers 
from possible injuries arising from contact with harmful chemicals - 42.5 percent and 
26.2 percent of the A1 and A2 permanent workers were not receiving protective clothing 
respectively. Piece/daily workers were also vulnerable as none were provided with the 
same. Lingering on from the former LSCFs, this problem was an issue of concern raised 
by the farm worker trade union (Magwaza 2017: Interview). It should not come as a 
surprise that out of the 408,257 workplace accidents captured by the 2014 Labour Force 
Survey, 275,542 were in the agricultural sector (ZIMSTAT 2015g: 258). Furthermore, 
31.8 percent and 27.7 percent of injuries reported by men and women respectively were 
due to absence of protective clothing (ZIMSTAT 2015g: 259).  
The physical violence and racism that coloured the labour relations in the former LSCFs 
(Amanor-Wilks 1995; Rutherford 2001a; Moyo et al. 2000) have waned in the new 
farming units. Farm workers were asked to report if they had suffered any form of abuse 
 
 317 
in the last five years. A miniscule section of the permanent workers across both districts 
(less than one percent) and none of the casual workers had faced physical violence at 
work. Verbal abuse however hangs on and 18.4 percent and 9 percent of the Goromonzi 
and Kwekwe permanent work force highlighted it respectively. Because of the 
contestations on their supply of labour to the new farms,  piece/daily workers experienced 
more levels of verbal abuse by their employers compared to the permanent workers 
especially in Goromonzi. Neither gender was immune to this type of abuse. Specifically, 
40.5 percent of the male piece/daily workers and 7.1 percent of their female counterparts 
faced this problem in this district. In Kwekwe, 32.7 percent and 9.1 percent of the male 
and female piece/daily workers reported verbal abuse accordingly. Another form of abuse 
that farm workers indicated during the interviews related to humiliation in front of their 
colleagues, 9.2 percent and 7.0 percent in the corresponding districts.  
Table 6.57: Credit received by permanent farm workers 
Type of credit 
Goromonzi Kwekwe 
A1 A2 Total A1 A2 Total 
Cash loan 8.2 12.8 10.4 7.5 14.9 11 
Groceries from shop 7.1 11.4 9.3 0 0 0 
Agricultural produce 25.5 43.2 34.1 0 19 9.8 
N 49 47 96 53 47 100 
 
Existing at the margins, but evoking practices in the old LSCFs, credit in lieu of wages 
was being used to tie labour to the farms (Loewenson 1992). In the former LSCFs, 
ubiquitous farm shops and bars in the compounds went beyond facilitating credit 
relations to include discouraging access to alternative services located far away and thus 
remain available to attend to emergencies during their off days.
136
 The receipt of direct 
cash loans from employers was indicated by 10.4 percent and 11 percent of the 
Goromonzi and Kwekwe permanent workers respectively.  Purchases of agricultural 
output from the farms on credit was reported by about 20 percent of the permanent 
workers. A1 and A2 permanent workers from Goromonzi more commonly described the 
purchase of agricultural produce than those in Kwekwe (Table 6.57). Other goods and 
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 Besides bars, many farm compounds also had football pitches to entertain the workers during their off 
days (see also Figure 6.22 and 6.23), while cultural activities such as nyau dances were also permitted in 
the farm compounds (Loewenson 1992; Amanor-Wilks 1995). 
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services were also accessed on credit by a few farm workers whose employers had on-
farm shops. Specifically, such facilities were noted by 7.1 percent and 11.4 percent of the 
A1 and A2 permanent workers in Goromonzi. As the HRW (2018) also found, the goods 
in the shops owned by some of the new farm employers were overpriced, thus limiting 
the stretch of the wages of permanent farm workers. The farm employers therefore 
indirectly reduced their wage outlays through the charging of above ―market‖ prices 
and/or recaptured the wages in the credit relations.  
6.5.4.2 Organisation of farm work 
Apart from the delivery of piece rate tasks, mugwazo as it did in the former LSCFs 
(Rutherford 2001a; Mutisi 2003), undertook the same role for permanent and seasonal 
labour forces. It is recognised in Statutory Instrument 116 of 2014: 1016 as ―task work‖ 
and permissible as way of allocating work to farm employees. Ostensibly to prevent work 
overload, the statute defines task work as an ―… amount of work which an employer can 
expect to be completed by an average employee during the day‖ (GoZ 2014: 1009). In the 
absence of any guideline of sorts, the prerogative of what constitutes this kind of work 
becomes the employer‘s discretion. A remnant of the colonial labour practices (Clarke 
1977), mugwazo is still only legally permissible in the agricultural sector and entrenches 
inequities between farm labour relations and others.
137
 As seen earlier, a number of piece 
workers were struggling to acquit mugwazo on their own and had to call on the labour 
from their families (section 6.5.2). Before, the work of Rutherford (2001a) shed light on 
the abuse of this system in tobacco LSCFs in Hurungwe district as quantum of work was 
unilaterally increased in relation to the pressure to meet market delivery targets for 
instance. To its credit, the legal statute governing the labour relations of farm workers 
outlaws the ticket system, which only recorded a day‘s work after the completion of the 
task.  
Mugwazo was reported to be the predominant mechanism of task allocation by 
Goromonzi permanent workers (Table 6.58). Kwekwe permanent workers were mainly 
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 Task work or mugwazo is legally banned in all other industrial sectors and persists as remnant of the 
colonial practices in the LSCFs. This also represents the uneven treatment of farm labour relations to the 
rest of the working classes. 
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livestock herders or ―vakomana vemombe‖ and mugwazo was inapplicable to their 
work.
138
 Work was reportedly organized through specific start and end time in the farms 
that did not deploy mugwazo.  
Table 6.58: Issuance of daily work targets for permanent workers 
 Daily 
targets 
Goromonzi  Kwekwe  
A1 A2 Total A1 A2 Total 
Yes 49 55.3 52.1 9.6 14.9 12.1 
No 51 44.7 47.9 90.4 85.1 87.9 
Subtotal 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 49 47 96 52 47 99 
Chi-Square 0.386  0.646  
p 0.534*  0.422*  
*Not significant at p<0.05  
 
Outcomes from mugwazo work can both be positive and negative in terms of the hours 
spent at work by the permanent workers, dependent as it is on the completion of the task 
allocated. The task for the day determined whether workers would ―chaisa‖ early or 
finish late and workdays were thus not defined in terms of a specific number of hours.
139
 
Overall, the permanent workers employed on farms in Goromonzi, which organised work 
on mugwazo reported shorter working hours falling within the standard eight hour mark 
(68.9 percent) compared to those with defined start and end times (47.9 percent).
140
 The 
flow of work for those not on mugwazo was such that 42.1 percent were working more 
than eight hours per day in this district.  
Instead of division of the permanent workforce by the enterprise sections as done on the 
former LSCFs (Loewenson 1992; Gibbon & Risgaard 2014), work was primarily 
organised through the interchange of workers between the different commodities 
produced in many of the A1 and A2 farming units. In Goromonzi, 75.5 percent and 59.6 
percent of the A1 and A2 permanent workers operated on such basis respectively (Table 
6.59). While in Kwekwe the same was reported by 90.6 percent and 59.6 percent of the 
                                                 
138
―Vakomana wemombe” is vernacular Shona, which literally translates to, ―cattle boys‖, was used by A1 
and A2 landholders to refer to male permanent workers hired in Kwekwe as livestock herders. 
139
 ―Chaisa” is a Shona term used across the working class, including farm workers, to refer to the 
completion of the work day. 
140
 The length of workday was associated at p<0.05 to the dominant method of work allocation. Chi-
Square=7.807,  p=0.020.  
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A1 and A2 permanent workers correspondingly. The remaining permanent labourers  
reported being grouped in various divisions on the farm (Table 6.59). While not 
widespread, this practice nevertheless was still visible, especially in the A2 farms, and to 
a lesser extent in the A1 farms (Table 6.59).  
Table 6.59: Assignment of permanent workers to specific enterprises/section 
Enterprise/ 
Section 
Goromonzi  Kwekwe  
A1 A2 Total A1 A2 Total 
Not assigned 75.5 59.6 67.7 90.6 59.6 76 
Field crops 2.0 10.6 6.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Horticulture 0.0 2.1 1.0 1.9 2.1 2.0 
Livestock 14.3 8.5 11.5 1.9 8.5 5.0 
Engineering 2.0 8.5 5.2 0.0 2.1 1.0 
Transport 2.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 10.6 5.0 
Irrigation 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.3 2.0 
Security 4.1 12.8 8.3 1.9 8.5 5.0 
Oher 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 4.3 3.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 49 47 96 53 47 100 
Chi-Square 10.810  17.363  
p 0.094*  0.015**  
*Not significant at p<0.05  **Significant at p<0.05  
 
The few women permanent workers working on the farms that were characterised by 
commodity segmentation in the two districts were assigned to field crops, while 
livestock, irrigation, engineering and transport sections were occupied by men. This was 
different from the segmentation of labour along commodity lines that intersected with 
feminisation of labour in particular enterprises such as horticulture, not only in 
Zimbabwe‘s LSCFs (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Davies 2000), but expanding in leaps and 
bounds in the large farms evolving in former non-Settler countries such as Ghana and 
Ethiopia (Barrientos 2014; Maertens & Swinnen 2009; SOFA Team & Doss 2011). The 
production of a few commodities by the range of farmers partly explains the relatively 
underdeveloped commodity-wise segmentation of labour (see section 6.4.2).  
6.5.5 Transition of the residential labour tenancy system 
The residential labour tenancy through the on-farm accommodation tied to employment 
guaranteed farm labour supplies and entrenched control over workers by LSCFs since the 
colonial era in former-Settler countries (Speirenburg 2019; Arrighi 1970; Clarke 1977; 
Sachikonye & Zishiri 1999; Tandon 2001). After land redistribution and the consequent 
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nationalisation of freehold tenure in the former LSCFs, farm workers in old farm 
compounds were experiencing this relationship in diverse ways due to the policy 
variations between the A1 and A2 schemes. Old farm compounds in the A1 scheme were 
not redistributed to the new landholders but were retained as state land (Sukume et al. 
2004) as noted earlier (Chapter Five) and the former farm workers were permitted to 
continue their residency and selling labour, albeit without any formal tenure stipulated. 
Certainly, the infrastructure in the old farm compounds in the A1 schemes was now state 
property and importantly the farm workers living in these areas do not ―belong‖ to any 
particular farmer in the sense discussed by Rutherford (2003). There is a separation 
between their residency and employment and farm workers criss-cross many former 
LSCFs in search of jobs. More recently, the state reinforced tenure security of farm 
workers during the evaluation of the various infrastructures inherited from the former 
LSCFs by the new landholders for the purpose of implementing the land rentals policy. 
The A1 land beneficiaries were informed they had no the right to evict the former farm 
workers from the compounds (MGA 2018: Interview). By levying a rental of US$10 per 
room per month in the houses under brick and asbestos for occupants that were not 
originally living in the farm compound before 2000, the state legitimated the residential 
rights of former farm workers who were exempted from these new charges. Unlike the 
former LSCFs, the new A1 landholders lack the power derived from policy to control the 
labour supplies of farm workers living in the old compounds. If anything, the power to 
prolong the tying of employment to access to housing on the farms was also diffused 
among the multitudes of farmers who received land on the same former LSCF (see also 
Moyo 2011a; 2013; Scoones et al. 2018a).   
A2 farmers, on the other hand, have rights on the farm compound if it falls in the 
subdivision they were allocated (Sukume et al. 2004). According to the Gazetted Land 
(Consequential Provisions) Act of 2006:3, A2 farmers are empowered to evict former 
farm workers from the old farm compounds, including for refusal to work for them via 
Section 3(3), which states that:  
―..If a former owner or occupier [includes farm workers living in farm compound] of Gazetted 
land who is not lawfully authorized to occupy, hold or use that land does not cease to occupy, 
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hold, or use that land after [45 days of gazetting]….shall be guilty of an offence and liable to fine 
not exceeding level seven or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years…‖ . 
The former farm workers in these A2 farms can therefore be subjected to the residential 
labour tenancy relations through the operation of the law as the precedent set by the 
Constitutional Court in 2016 suggests (see Section 6.6.6). The A2 farmers can therefore 
use the force of the law to evict former farm workers who refuse to work for them. Yet 
the downsized farms, especially in Goromonzi, imply that most of the A2 subdivisions 
were not able to hire all the workers in the farm compounds and the other A2 
beneficiaries within the same old LSCF have restricted powers to enforce residential 
labour tenancy in the compound that does not lie in their plot.  
Section 21(4) of the Statutory 116 of 2014: 1022 also reinforces the residential labour 
tenancy relationship since it directs employees who are dismissed from employment to 
―…vacate the property of his or her employer immediately on the payment of monies due 
to him or her from the employer to employee within seventy two hours…‖ or within 30 
days in the case of retrenchment .
141
 The workers residing on A2 farm compounds were 
the ones mostly confronted with need to secure their accommodation by selling wage 
labour.  
Table 6.60: Residency for Farm Workers 
 Type of residency Goromonzi (%) Kwekwe (%) 
P S PWD Total P S PWD Total 
Old A1 compound  18 50 35.4 28.1 2.9 12.9 4.1 4.8 
Old A2 compound  23 0 24.1 21.1 21.4 45.2 28.4 27.4 
LSCF compound 4 5 5.1 4.5 0 0 0 0 
New A2 compound 13 10 2.5 8.5 12.6 3.2 2.7 7.7 
New A1 compound 2 0 0 1 14.6 12.9 9.5 12.5 
A1 homestead 28 0 3.8 15.6 32 6.5 13.5 21.6 
A2 homestead 7 0 8.9 7 6.8 9.7 0 4.8 
Own A1 plot 1 0 7.6 3.5 1.9 9.7 21.6 10.1 
Own CA home 4 35 11.4 10.1 0 0 0 0 
Same house as employer 0 0 0 0 7.8 0 8.1 6.7 
Other 0 0 1.3 0.5 0 0 12.2 4.3 
N 100 20 79 199 103 31 73 208 
 
                                                 
141
 In addition, this statute sanctions the behaviour of farm workers in the farm compound beyond the work 
relations and ―disorderly behaviour‖, albeit not defined, can attract instant dismissal from work (Statutory 
116 of 2014: 1050). However, ―minor domestic‖ and ―personal issues‖, still not defined are excluded from 




Altogether, 12 types of residency for farm workers were discernible from the farms 
studied (Table 6.60). The degree of dependency on the employer for both work and 
residency varied between the different types of farm labourers. 
Over 67 percent of piece/daily worker lived in houses that were not ―owned‖ by their 
employers and/or not tied to labour supplies in the farming units and were thus relatively 
less encumbered by residential labour tenancy (Table 6.61).
142
 Totally different relations 
faced the permanent workers and to a lesser extent the seasonal labourers. The newly 
acquired autonomy of piece/daily workers in the new labour markets was manifest in 
their shifts between employers and fashioning diverse social reproduction strategies, 
including being the main actors in the trading of natural resources more than the other 
groups of workers (see Table 6.18). 
Table 6.61: Residency linkages to employment in the resettled areas 
 Goromonzi (%) Kwekwe (%)  
Linked P S PWC Total P S PWC Total 
Yes 83 50 32.9 59.8 92.2 58.1 32.4 65.9 
No 17 50 67.1 40.2 7.8 41.9 67.6 34.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 100 20 79 199 103 31 74 208 
Chi-
Square 46.948  69.480  
p 0.000  0.000  
*Significant at p<0.05  
 
It was mostly those farm workers living in the old compounds on A2 farms, new farm 
compounds and homesteads of landholders (75 percent) who experienced the linkage of 
their residential and employment rights. This could be attributed to the higher 
dependency on hired farm labour in A2 farms than those in A1 farms. Indeed, lower 
levels of such linkages were reported by those staying on old compounds on A1 farms 
(40.9 percent).  
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This disconnection between residency and employment were also evident in a complaint made by the 
farm accountant at Hurudza A2 farm in Goromonzi in the press. He lamented that farm labourers were 
enjoying free housing in the farm compound yet they were working in Harare and not on the farm. See 
―Workers toil for nothing at Chapfika farm‖, The Newsday 5 January 2013, 




Evidently, the new compounds being constructed on the plot subdivisions of mostly the 
A2 farms to provide residency for the smaller-sized permanent workforces (Section 
6.2.3) reflect their limited control over labour supplies in the old compounds. They 
represent the desire of the new small-scale capitalist farmers to re-assert their control 
over workers as individual farm owners and extend the operation of the residential labour 
tenancy. New farm compounds were recorded in 55 percent of the A2 capitalist farms in 
Goromonzi and were absent in the A1 scheme. The relatively lower demand for wage 
labour compared to Goromonzi reflected in the investment in new farm compounds that 
were limited to 10.2 percent and 17.9 percent of the A1 and A2 land recipients in 
Kwekwe respectively. Rather than in the new compounds, all permanent labour hiring A1 
landholders and 13.3 percent of A2 farms in Goromonzi were providing accommodation 
at their homesteads also tied to employment. A1 households (85.7 percent) also 
dominated this avenue paralleled to A2 (66.7 percent) in Kwekwe. 
Public tenures have weakened the new landholders‘ capacity to link residency and 
employment of farm workers living in old compounds (Moyo 2011a). The partial 
disentanglement of the residential labour tenancy was nonetheless subject to contestations 
as piece/daily workers resident in both the A1 and A2 old farm compounds were 
sometimes pressurised to supply labour on the farms they live by the new farmers or be 
visited by evictions (see Section 6.6.6). Farm workers responded to eviction threats by 
violently confronting landholders, particularly in Goromonzi A1 farms (Section 6.6.6). 
The opportunity to clarify the land tenure security of farm workers was not taken up by 
the FLTRP policy. As discussed later (Section 6.6.6), the struggles over labour supplies 
from the old compounds were an outcome of this gap in the policy to accommodate the 
residential requirements of farm workers by assuming automatic re-absorption into wage 
labour by the new farming units. 
6.5.6 Agrarian wages and other forms of in-kind payments 
The monetary wages received by farm workers has received wide scholarly and media 





 Quite correctly, many have pointed out that the measly wages remunerated to 
farm workers were inadequate to meet their social reproduction needs (Scoones et al. 
2010; Scoones et al. 2018a; Hanlon et al. 2013; Sachikonye 2003; Magaramombe 2010). 
Yet limitations are abound in the analysis of the factors leading to the low wage 
outcomes, as well as the insufficient consideration of the ―social wages‖, which now 
constitute their remuneration.  
Agrarian wages and indeed the working conditions of farm workers need to be 
comprehended in tandem with the wider economic situation in the country and beyond 
(Silver 2003; Bharadawaj 1989), as well as in their historical context (Chambati & Moyo 
2004).  
Figure 6.14: Real and nominal minimum wages of farm workers, 1979-2016 
Source: Compiled from various sources *Kanyenze (2001) for data from 1979 to 2000; 
LEDRIZ Excel database of wages from 2001 to 2016. Data missing for the hyperinflationary period, 2002 
to 2008. 
Chapter Five chronicled the trajectory of wages and exposed how they could not meet 
farm labour‘s social reproduction needs and the high poverty levels afflicting this 
segment of society. It is therefore not correct to associate the low wages in the farms at 
the current conjecture to the redistribution and subsequent division of LSCFs into 
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 See, for example, ―Farm workers grapple with poor wages‖, The Financial Gazette, 7 November 2013, 














































































smaller-scale farm units under the A1 and A2 schemes. The low wages visible now 
represent a continuum of the decline of real wages of farm workers that had set in motion 
by 1985 and gathered pace after implementation of ESAP (Kanyenze 2001; Figure 6.14) 
and much earlier for the many sections of the working classes (Saunders 2001).  
To set the record straight, it is not only farm workers who have faced the challenge of 
poor wages. In actual fact, the Zimbabwe economy descended into hyperinflationary 
mode by 2008 and relatively stabilised from 2009 after the demonitisation of the 
Zimbabwean dollar and uptake of multiple foreign currencies for trading (see Chapter 
Five). Yet the wages of the broader working classes remain below the PDL as the 
situation before the hyperinflationary phase. Around 2005, farm wages constituted an 
estimated 10 percent of the PDL and urban commercial sector workers then were only 
able to meet 33 percent of the food basket calculated by the Consumer Council of 
Zimbabwe (Moyo et al. 2009: 109; see also Figure 6.15). Documented comparisons of 
the minimum wages in different sectors between 2011 and 2016 have also shown that this 
has persisted to be case for many industrial workers, as well as civil service workers 
(Chakanya 2016).  
Figure 6.15: Percent share of nominal minimum farm wages to PDL  
Source: Compiled from various sources *Kanyenze (2001) for data from 1979 to 2000; 
LEDRIZ Excel database of wages from 2001 to 2016. Data is missing for the hyperinflationary period, 
2002 to 2008. PDL represent minimum consumption needs for a family of five. 
It is, however, inadequate to examine the farm labourers‘ socio-economic position in 
relation to the PDL using only the monetary wage. The evidential base suggests a wider 

























































































informal land access and natural resource trading. Proceeding in this direction in what 
follows this section examines the broader structure of farm worker wages.  
6.5.6.1 Formation of agrarian labour wages  
State minimum wage setting was replaced by collective bargaining after the deregulation 
of the labour relations in 1991 managed by the National Employment Councils. Now the 
state only ratifies and gazettes the Collective Bargaining agreements between employers 
and trade unions to make them legally binding to all industry participants. As noted 
earlier, wage negotiations for full-time and seasonal labourers were supposed to be 
guided Statutory Instrument 116 of 2014. Whilst, the wages of piece/daily workers, 
which are not included in this law were an outcome of local level discussions between the 
employers and employees. Quarterly wage negotiations responded to inflationary 
pressures between 2000 and 2008, until they reverted to annual runs in 2009. 
The ALB, which dealt with labour relations for the CFU, was overly influential in the 
Collective Bargaining as the repression of farm wages up until 2000 signals (Kanyenze 
2001; Rutherford 2001b). Not diverging from this path, the new employer representatives 
namely, the ZFU, ZCFU and ZAEO continue to eclipse farm worker trade unions in the 
wage determination processes. Between 2009 and 2017, gazetted monthly minimum 
wages rose from US$32 to US$ 72 (Figure 6.16). With the balance of power tilted in their 
favour, employers have foiled trade union demands for annual increments seen in the 
wage freezes between 2011 and 2012 and then again 2014 and 2017 (Figure 6.16).  
Figure 6.16: Minimum wages of permanent and seasonal farm workers 
 
Source: Various NECAIZ collective bargaining agreements 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017













The demands for wage increases by workers were met by threats of retrenchments by the 
employers (Magwaza 2017: Interview). ―…If the workers complain about low wages at 
the farms.‖ Mr. Magwaza added, ―…employers tell them that there are many people who 
are waiting at the gate for that job…‖. The high unemployment rate in Zimbabwe and/or 
the size of surplus labour have thus been central in the formation of farm wages (Jha 
1996: 230).  
Various position papers by ZAEO reflect their aversion to wage increases, fingering the 
unfavourable macroeconomic conditions and escalation of input costs as impairing their 
ability to cope with ever-rising wage bills (ZAEO 2015; 2014). ZAEO in fact viewed 
farm worker minimum wages as enough to meet their costs of living. For instance in 
2013, they calculated a basket of goods at US$56.49 for a family of four, which was 
below the prevailing minimum wage of US$65 then (Table 6.62). Despite facing a 
relatively high input cost structure, they advanced, the farm wages in Zimbabwe were 
competitive to the experiences obtaining in other Southern African countries of 
Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. The basket of goods did not only miss 
other critical sources of proteins such as meat and fish, it condemned farm workers to a 
monotonous carbohydrate filled diet. Crucially, the omission of education, clothing and 
health costs painted a dismal picture of their understanding of the social reproduction of 
farm workers and their families.  
Table 6.62: Basic monthly basket of groceries 
Item Quantities Price (US$) 
Maize Meal 5x 10 kgs 29.00 
Cooking Oil 2 litres 3.79 
Salt 1 kg 0.50 
Sugarbeans 4x 500g 4.80 
Sugar 2x2kg 4.30 
Tea 100bags 1.95 
Powdered milk 1kg 4.75 
Peanut Butter 375 ml 1.87 
Assorted Vegetables 4kgs 4.00 
Green Soap 1 bar 1.53 
Total  56.49 
Source: ZAEO (2014: 9) 
Numerous farm employers were, however, divorced from the farmer associations that 
negotiate on their behalf with farm worker trade unions in the collective bargaining 
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process. The current membership of the ZCFU, which represents the capitalist A2 
farmers on the CBA was limited.
144
 A few have been shown to identify with local farmer 
groups that were not linked to the national associations (Chiweshe 2012;  Munyuki-
Hungwe 2011; Murisa 2010; 2011; 2013). The farm workers were also not part of the 
trade unions (section 6.6.1). Against this background it should not be unexpected that 
most of the surveyed farmers were reliant on local level negotiations to determine wages 
rather than the formal collective bargaining process. 
Cited by over 97 percent of the Goromonzi A1 and A2 households, wages of permanent 
workers were based on local level negotiations in the context of the prevailing rates in 
surrounding farms. Kwekwe A1 farms were no different - up to 95.7 percent mentioned 
this route. Kwekwe A2 farms were the ones which frequently adhered to gazetted 
minimum wages (25 percent), but still the majority among them decided wages at the 
farm level. Over 90 percent of the permanent farm workers confirmed this method of 
wage setting. Only in a few instances, did A1 and A2 permanent employees in 
Goromonzi, mainly those endowed with scarce skills such as tobacco curing and grading 
indicate setting their wages, 6.1 percent and 8.5 percent respectively. Most employees 
negotiated wages individually (75.3 percent) and thus their collective voice was divided 
to the advantage of the employers. 
6.5.6.2 Monetary farm wages  
Cash and kind were combined in the payment of farm wages. Between 2015 and 2017, 
the actual wages received by permanent workers were significantly uneven between the 
A1 and A2 schemes in the two districts and grew at a snail‘s pace (Table 6.63). Higher 
wages were symptomatic of the A2 capitalist farms compared to the A1 farms and 
Kwekwe farms in general paid more than their corresponding counterparts in Goromonzi. 
Across the three years investigated, the majority of the farmers fell behind the minimum 
wage especially in Goromonzi, but again unevenly distributed and featuring more in the 
                                                 
144
 Indeed, the Chief Executive Officer of NECAIZ complained that the farmer organisations had limited 
membership and were not represented at all in some subsectors and thus had no mandate in the Collective 
Bargaining process (Jera 2017: Interview).  
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A1 than the A2 farms (Table 6.63).
145
 Linkages to the collective bargaining process were 
mirrored in the larger proportions of Kwekwe farm households that equaled or surpassed 
the minimum wage (Table 6.63).  
Table 6.63: Mean farm wages of permanent workers *  
 Year 




















2017 63 3.8 70 25.8 68 71 32.7 87 57.5 78 
2016 60 3.8 69 24.2 66 64 29.2 80 41 71 
2015 57 3.8 66 21 63 49 14.6 71 27.5 59 
N 26  62  88 49  40  89 
*Wages significantly different between A1 and A2 households in each district. Min - Minimun 
 
Throwing light to this somewhat gloomy scenario, the evidence suggests absence of 
gender discrimination in the payment of wages for permanent. The few women 
permanent workers were earning an average of US$84 per month compared to US$79 
amongst their male counterparts in Goromonzi, while in Kwekwe males wage averaged 
US$86 to US$70 for the female permanent workers. Skilled permanent workers 
nonetheless earned higher wages than the unskilled general hands (Table 6.64). 
Table 6.64: Differentiation of wages of farm workers by skill levels (US$) 
 Skill level  






General hand 73 63 81 78 
Tractor driver 97 7 74 6 
Skilled work*  94 9 112 3 
Supervisor 104 8 120 1 
Foreman 118 3 183 3 
Farm security 64 9 86 7 
Total 80 99 86 98 
*irrigation, repairs, tobacco grading, mechanic 
 
Around 2009, daily wage rates ranged between US$1.00 to US$1.50 per day in both 
districts. They had increased to an average of US$4 in both districts by 2017 in tandem 
with rise in the wages of permanent workers and differences were not noticeable across 
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 This has been a persistent problem since 2000. Around 2012, the then General Secretary of GAPWUZ, 
Gift Muti was quoted in the press claiming that more than half of the new farmers were not meeting the 
minimum wage. See ―New farmers fail to pay workers‖, The Newsday 21 March 2012, Harare 
(www.newsday.co.zw/2012/03/21/2012-03-21-new-farmers-fail-to-pay-workers/[Accessed 17 June 2016]). 
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the resettlement models. But, piece wage rates varied according to the crops grown and 
nature of the tasks. Labour demanding activities such as weeding a 0.25 hectares in maize 
field commanded a wage of US$5, while digging holes for planting the same land area 
was paid US$3.00 (NYT 2017: Interview). While a piece rate wage of US$5.00 was 
being paid for weeding a 0.06 hectares of land in a commodity like tobacco that was 
destined for the international markets, so was the daily-based work. Male part-time 
workers realised a relatively higher monthly income during the peak seasonal period than 
female part-time workers in Goromonzi, US$64 and US$57 per month respectively. The 
opposite was however true in Kwekwe with women earning US$73 per month compared 
to US$65 for men. 
Table 6.65: Challenges faced by permanent workers in receiving wages 
 
Goromonzi  Kwekwe  
Challenge A1 A2 Subtotal A1 A2 Subtotal 
None 77.6 76.6 77.1 67.9 70.2 69 
Not paid on time 16.3 12.8 14.6 20.8 12.8 24.6 
Split payments 4.1 2.1 3.1 5.7 4.3 7.2 
Irregular 
payments 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.7 8.5 10.1 
Not paid at all 2.0 8.5 5.2 0.0 4.3 2.9 
Subtotal 22.4 23.4 22.9 32.1 29.8 44.9 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 49 47 96 53 47 69 
Chi-Square 2.432  3.597  
p 0.488*  0.463*  
*Not significant at p<0.05  
 
Compounding the low wage problem was accumulation of arrears, irregular pay dates, 
part payments and worryingly non-payments at all by the A1 and A2 households (Table 
6.65).
146
 The latter affected 8.5 percent and 4.3 percent of the A2 permanent workers that 
they were not receiving their wages at all in Goromonzi and Kwekwe correspondingly. 
Actually, at the time of the survey, wage arrears were pointed by 14.3 percent and 14.9 
percent of the A1 and A2 permanent workers in Goromonzi respectively. This was 
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 Such deficits in the new farm labour relations were also confirmed by various press reports. For 
instance, in a case brought before the Bindura Labour Court against Pasango A2 Farm in 2012, 150 farm 
workers deposed an affidavit claiming they were owed over two years of wages amounting to US$107, 
250. See ―Workers at Masawi farm offered $13 wages‖, The Newsday, 27 April 2012, 
Harare,(www.newsday.co.zw/2012/04/27/2012/04/27/workers-at-masawi-farm-offered-13-
wages/[Accessed 17 June 2016].  
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experienced by 18.9 percent of the A1 and 23.4 percent of A2 permanent workers in 
Kwekwe.  
Many farm employers thus flouted Statutory 116 of 2014, which stipulates that 
permanent and seasonal workers must be paid their dues during the last four days of the 
month. The wage payment problems seemed more acute for the piece/daily workers 
particularly in Goromonzi (Table 6.66) and as much as 30.4 percent were yet to be paid 
work done during the survey. Conflicting trends emerged in Kwekwe nearly resembling 
the situation described by permanent workers (Table 6.66). 
Table 6.66: Challenges faced by casual labourers in receiving wages 
 Challenge 
Goromonzi  Kwekwe  
S PWD Total S PWD Total 
None 94.7 50.6 60.2 77.4 78.9 78.4 
Not paid on time 5.3 26.6 22.4 3.2 15.5 11.8 
Not paid fully at once 0.0 15.2 12.2 16.1 2.8 6.9 
Irregular payments 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 2.8 2.9 
Not paid at all 0.0 6.3 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Subtotal 5.3 48.1 39.8 22.6 21.1 21.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 19 79 98 31 71 102 
Chi-Square 12.541  8.533  
p 0.006*  0.036*  
*Significant at p<0.05  
 
Towards the end of the first quarter of 2016, the severe shortage of cash notes in the 
economy had sprung up to worsen the wage problems not only for farm workers, but the 
wider populace (RBZ 2016). For many years, farm workers had been receiving their 
wages in cash and this under-banked community were now required to open bank 
accounts and/or mobile money accounts. They were parting with up to 10 percent of their 
wages to charges levied by the ―cash traders‖ in order to access cash notes from their 
mobile money accounts (PLB 2018: Interview), while for piece/daily work, kind 
payments (mostly maize grain) displaced in 2009 after ―dollarisation‖ were making a 
comeback (BLG 2017: Interview; NYT 2017: Interview). Likewise, piece/daily workers 
were also loosing value through barter deals with urban traders referred to as 
―makoronyera‖ in Goromonzi and ―gandanzara‖ in Kwekwe
147
 who frequent the 
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 Makoronyera or gandanzara in the local lingua generally refers to people who survive on hustling 
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resettled areas to exchange grain with farmers and farm workers paid in kind with various 
goods and services, including clothes and food items.
148
  
Poor wages were etched in the minds of permanent and casual workers and over 82 
percent in Goromonzi ranked them as the foremost challenge in their social reproduction, 
while 74.2 percent and 62.1 percent of the permanent and seasonal workers in Kwekwe 
communicated the same. Perhaps pointing to their diverse social reproduction strategies, 
50 percent of the piece/daily workers said low wages was their biggest challenges.  
6.5.6.3 Farm employment benefits  
In addition to the monetary wages, permanent workers were entitled to statutory 
allowances in the form of housing, light, transport and fuel. Excluding transport, which 
was supposed to be reimbursed on a cost basis to non-resident employees, between 2009 
and 2011, the allowances were pegged at US$4.00, US$1.50 and US$2.00 respectively 
(GoZ 2011a). From 2012 onwards, the corresponding allowances were increased to 
US$35, US$8.00 and US$10 (GoZ 2012b). Housing was accorded in the old farm 
compounds that some of the A2 landholders now control, at their homesteads as well as 
in the new farm compounds that some of them have built (section 6.5.5). No rental 
payments were being charged for accommodation, except for only one permanent worker 
from Kwekwe, against the provisions of the law. Not all permanent workers were 
provided accommodation directly by their employers since some were living in the old 
farm compounds on other farms rent-free.  
More than half of the piece/daily workers surveyed (59.5 percent) in Goromonzi also 
continued to enjoy free accommodation in the old LSCF compounds under diluted 
residential tenancy relationships (see Section 6.5.6) and a lesser share (32.5 percent) in 
Kwekwe which did not have this infrastructure on all former LSCFs.  
Notwithstanding the queries on the mode of supply in the collective bargaining process 
(Jera 2017: Interview), fuel provision in the form of firewood reached many permanent 
farm workers (Table 6.67). In place of collecting on their own on the farm they were 
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 For instance a two kilogramme pack of sugar, which was retailing for less than US$2.00 in major 
supermarkets in urban centres was being exchanged for a bucket of maize that was pegged at the equivalent 
of US$5.00 in the farm labour markets. 
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employed, GAPWUZ has been insisting that the employers deliver the firewood at farm 
workers doorsteps. Then the additional unpaid labour the workers incur on behalf of the 
employers during collection would be eradicated. Employers on the other hand, claim 
that since the firewood was being collected on the lands belonging to them, it thus 
qualified as provision. This impasse was yet to be resolved at the time of writing. 
However, non-universality of paid annual leave infringed on the labour rights of 
permanent workers (Table 6.67).  
Table 6.67: In-kind payments received by permanent farm wage labourers 
Benefit  
Goromonzi  Kwekwe  
Model type where permanent workers were employed 
A1 A2 Subtotal A1 A2 Subtotal 
Housing 77.6 91.5 84.4 100 93.6 97 
Firewood 75.5 97.9 86.5 75.5 57.4 67 
Hospital fees 42.9 51.1 46.9 50.9 27.7 40 
Grazing land 2 4.3 3.1 5.7 0 3 
Annual leave 38.8 53.2 45.8 37.7 31.9 35 
Protective clothing 61.2 85.1 72.9 58.5 63.8 61 
Funeral assistance  4.1 25.5 14.6 26.4 19.1 23 
School fees 0 6.5 3.2 3.8 8.5 6 
Attendance bonus 12.2 14.9 13.5 1.9 12.8 7 
Production bonus  6.1 12.8 9.4 11.3 21.3 16 
N 49 47 96 53 47 84 
 
The employment benefits nonetheless exceeded the dictates of the law. Incentives such as 
work attendance and production bonuses were also evolving, though covering a few 
permanent workers and expressed more times by those employed in the capitalist farms 
in the A2 scheme (Table 6.67). The other non-statutory benefits disclosed related to 
assistance with hospital fees that was acknowledged by at least 40 percent and funeral 
costs, which characterised a reduced share of permanent workers in both districts (Table 
6.67). Lastly, the educational costs of the children of farm workers received the least 
attention and in this respect the new farm employers traced in the footsteps of their LSCF 
forerunners (Loewenson 1992; Mugwetsi & Balleis 1994). 
6.5.6.4 Other forms of in-kind payments received by agrarian labourers 
Permanent and casual workers were also receiving other social wages such as land access 
in the farm compounds and parcelled out from the employers allocations as part of their 
employment benefits in the new farming units. Additionally, the wage structure for some 
 
 335 
permanent labourers included subsidy payments in the form of monthly food rations and 
meals provided during working hours. Maize grain was the most popular item revealed 
by 48.4 percent of the workers in Goromonzi and 65.0 percent in Kwekwe, followed by 
cooking oil (Table 6.68). Quantities of maize grain ranged from 10 to 50 kilogrammes 
and on average most received 20 kilogrammes. Other food items such as sugarbeans and 
beef were generally restricted to less than 36 percent, except for dried fish received by 
41.5 percent in Kwekwe.  
Table 6.68: Provision of monthly foodstuffs to permanent workers 
Foodstuffs 
  
Goromonzi  Kwekwe  
A1 A2 Subtotal A1 A2 Subtotal 
Maize grain 49 47.8 48.4 69.8 59.6 65 
Oil 34.7 30.4 32.6 54.7 21.3 39 
Beans 12.2 17.4 14.7 32.1 12.8 23 
Soap 30.6 30.4 30.5 35.8 10.6 24 
Beef 12.2 4.3 8.4 20.8 6.4 14 
Dried fish 20.4 8.7 14.7 41.5 12.8 28 
N 49 46 95 53 47 72 
 
Meals at work were also offered to at least 40.8 percent of the A1 and A2 permanent 
workers in Goromonzi (Table 6.69). The majority of the A2 permanent workers (27.7 
percent) ate once at work compared to twice for those in the A1 farms (20.4 percent) in 
this district. In Kwekwe, 28 percent cited this benefit. 
Table 6.69: Provision of workplace meals to permanent workers  
Meals given 
  
Goromonzi  Kwekwe  
A1 A2 Subtotal A1 A2 Subtotal 
No meals 59.2 59.6 59.4 64.2 80.9 72 
One meal 12.2 27.7 19.8 5.7 14.9 10.0 
Two meals 20.4 12.8 16.7 9.4 2.1 6.0 
Three meals  8.2 0.0 4.2 20.8 2.1 12.0 
Subtotal 40.8 40.4 40.6 35.8 19.1 28.0 
N 49 47 96 53 47 100 
Chi-Square  7.558  12.507  
p 0.056*  0.006**  
*Not significant at p<0.05  **Significant at p<0.05  
 
The piece/daily workers also received food at work and in actual fact this covered more 
of them than the permanent workers (Table 6.70). Beyond incentivising the workforce, 
meals at work also served as instrument of labour control. Delays at work were curtailed 
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by the supply of either breakfast and/or lunch by the employers since this avoided 
workers returning to their homes to eat. Therefore, labour remained relatively at the 
disposal of the employer during the workday. Cumulatively, the food items limited the 
exposure of at least a segment of the farm worker population to unstable food markets in 
the context of the low wages earned.  
Table 6.70: Provision of workplace meals to casual workers  
Meals  
Goromonzi  Kwekwe  
S PWC Total S PWC Total 
No meal 5.3 31.6 26.5 61.3 42.3 48 
One meal 26.3 50.6 45.9 9.7 28.2 22.5 
Two meals 68.4 17.7 27.6 22.6 25.4 24.5 
Three meals 0 0 0 6.5 4.2 4.9 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 19 79 98 31 71 102 
Chi-Square 20.280  5.186  
p 0.00*  0.159**  
*Significant at p<0.05  **Not significant at p<0.05  
 
Through ―redistribution within redistribution‖, some permanent workers were engaging 
in independent food production on lands excised from their employers allocations (see 
Table 6.45). The farm compounds were not just places of residency, but also zones of 
agricultural production activities and other enterprises. For 27.3 percent, 25 percent and 
31.8 percent of the permanent, seasonal and piece/daily workers also informally accessed 
small pieces of arable land in Goromonzi in these areas respectively (see Table 6.45). 
New agricultural land uses have found their way in old compound to include tobacco and 
even cattle rearing that were not permitted in the former LSCFs (section 6.6.6). This was 
nonetheless restricted to less than 13 percent of the different types of farm workers in 
Kwekwe. Not emphasised in the literature narrowly zooming on FTLRP formal 
allocations, this informal land access favoured more of the A1 permanent workers and its 
incidence more common in Goromonzi (see Table 6.45). These small plots contributed to 
partially meeting some of the food requirements of the farm workers (see section 6.6.5).  
Well short of being acts of benevolence, the non-statutory benefits and social wages were 
a result of the competition for labour and the struggles waged by farm workers to 
advance their socio-economic conditions. The manifestation of these struggles in the rural 
areas is explained in depth in section 6.6.  
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Taking this wider view of the wage structure, farm workers were not as poorly 
remunerated as the emphasis on monetary wages insinuates. Yet this does not in any way 
mean this fully rolled back the shortfalls of the monetary wages to meet their subsistence 
requirements. Again, the poor farm working conditions point to the limitations of the 
state to implement the existing labour laws and policies. To ascertain this, the next 
section assesses the material conditions of farm workers.   
6.5.7 Socio-economic conditions of farm workers  
Analysing the socio-economic conditions in 2006, earlier research by Chambati (2011) 
indicated that farm wage labourers suffered precarious living conditions within the new 
agrarian structure. Several other commentators also arrived at similar conclusions 
(Hartnack 2009; Scoones et al. 2010; Magaramombe 2010; Chakanya 2016; LEIDRIZ 
2018). The inadequacy of their farm labour and non-farm incomes to meet their social 
reproduction costs, including food, clothing, education and health was vivid and that land 
beneficiaries had better socio-economic indicators.  
Then, 53 percent of the surveyed farm labourers employed in the new farms were able to 
consume three meals per day (breakfast, lunch and dinner), while the remaining 4.3 
percent and 42.6 percent got by with one and two meals respectively (Chambati 2011: 
1061).
149
 Contrast this with 75 percent of landholders who visited the food table three 
times a day (Chambati 2011: 1061). As if food shortages were not enough, nutritional 
deficiencies were apparent in farm worker diets filled with carbohydrates and lacking in 
proteins. Repeated consumption of the staple sadza and leafy vegetables was the order of 
the day.
150
 Tandon (2001), had earlier complained of the contradiction embodying farm 
workers as the food producers through their wage labour efforts in LSCFs, yet they could 
hardly have enough to eat themselves, let alone afford clothing and educational costs.  
Farm workers did not fare better either in fulfilling the educational needs for their school 
going age children. In fact, only 22.2 percent of the school going age children were 
                                                 
149
 This research was based on a nationwide survey data that interviewed 761 farm workers in 2006 in six 
districts namely; Chiredzi, Goromonzi, Chipinge, Kwekwe, Mangwe and Zvimba done by the African 
Institute for Agrarian Studies, where the researcher is employed. 
150
 Sadza is the main food consumed in the country and is cooked frequently with maize meal. It is 
commonly eaten during lunch and dinner.  
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attending school in their households compared to 77 percent in the resettled households 
(Chambati 2011:1061). Instead, the children were channelled to the farm labour markets. 
Specifically, 30.9 percent and 15.8 percent of them were employed as permanent and 
casual labourers respectively (Chambati 2011: 1061).  
Fast forward, 12 years later, the evidence from this study demonstrates that nothing much 
has changed in the key socio-economic indicators such as access to food and education. 
Although the macroeconomic outlook improved after 2009, its benefits have eluded farm 
workers and many working classes, as poverty reigns havoc with incomes well below the 
PDL (LEDRIZ 2016).  
6.5.7.1 Food consumption patterns 
The number of daily meals taken was not even amongst the different types of farm 
workers studied and across the districts (Figure 6.17). Food shortages afflicted more of 
the families of irregular wage earning piece/daily workers than those of permanent and 
seasonal labourers in Goromonzi. Kwekwe had a larger proportion of the farm worker 
households that failed to eat three meals per day compared to Goromonzi and for 6.0 
percent one meal was all they could manage. Consumption patterns in Kwekwe were less 
balanced between the different forms of farm workers, but as seen in Goromonzi, the 
piece/daily workers ate fewer meals than the permanent and seasonal labourers (Figure 
6.17).  
Figure 6.17: Number of meals consumed by farm labour households in 2017  
 
Goromonzi, Chi-Square=15.261, p=0.004* 
Kwekwe, Chi-Square=1.585, p=0.811**  
*Significant at p<0.05  **Not significant at p<0.05 
 
P S PW Total P S PW Total
Goromonzi Kwekwe
1 1 0 0 0.5 6.8 3.2 5.4 5.8
2 32 0 44.3 33.7 44.7 48.4 52.7 48.1











As the earlier research revealed, the food consumption patterns of the A1 and A2 
landholders were better off to those of farm workers (Figure 6.18). A mixed bag however 
emerged from the Communal Areas, with those from Goromonzi struggling with meeting 
all the meals like the farm worker households, if not worse as only 41 percent did so. 
Kwekwe Communal Areas in contrast did not parade this deficiency (Figure 6.18).   
Figure 6.18: Number of meals consumed by household in 2017 
 
Goromonzi, Chi-Square=33.211 p=0.000*  
Kwekwe, Chi-Square=10.038, 4 d.f., p=0.040*  
*Significant at p< 0.05 
 
The number of meals alone conceals the quality and nutritional intake of the households. 
Further investigations were thus embarked to assess the consumption of different food 
items that are required by the human body utilising the food consumption score (FCS) 
(World Food Programme [WFP] 2008).
151
 The FCS also revealed the shakiness of the 
consumption trends of the farm workers in Goromonzi. Table 6.71 illustrates that in fact, 
7.0 percent of the Goromonzi workers returned a poor food consumption score compared 
to 4.3 percent in Kwekwe.  
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 The food consumption score (FCS) is an index that was designed by the World Food Programme of the 
United Nations to measure the acceptability of the food consumption of households (WFP 2008). It assigns 
weights to the different food items based on their nutritional importance, namely cereals and tubers (a1), 
pulses (a2), fruits (a3), vegetables (a4), proteins (a5), milk (a6), sugar (a7) and cooking oil (a8) that nourish 
the human body. Proteins and milk command the highest weights. The FCS is obtained by the summation 
of the weight of each food item multiplied by the number of days (xi) that was consumed for all the food 
categories over the last seven preceding the survey. The FCS = a1x1+a2x2+a3x3+a4x4+a5x5+a6x6+a7x7+a8x8. 
The FCS delineates households into three distinct groups, namely poor food consumption, borderline and 
acceptable consumption based on the score.  The ranges of the FCS for the three categories in places such 
as Zimbabwe where sugar and oil are part of the daily diets are: (i) poor consumption: 0 to 28; borderline: 
28.5 to 42 and acceptable: > 42.  
 
A1 A2 CA A1 A2 CA
Goromonzi Kwekwe
1 0 0 1.3 0 1.6 1.2
2 30.7 15.1 57.7 25.3 25.4 11.8
















P S PWD Total P S PWD Total  
Poor  7 10 6.3 7 2.9 9.7 4.1 4.3 
Borderline  40 30 44.3 40.7 21.4 16.1 18.9 19.7 
Acceptable 53 60 49.4 52.3 75.7 74.2 77 76 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 100 20 79 199 103 31 74 208 
Chi-Square 1.499    2.932    
p 0.827    0.519    
*Not significant at p<0.05  
 
Close to 41 percent and 19.7 percent of the workers fell in the borderline food 
consumption group in the two districts respectively. Unexpectedly, three quarters of the 
farm labourers in Kwekwe had acceptable food scores compared to just half of those in 
Goromonzi. The poor and borderline food consumption scores signify the infrequent 
consumption of milk and proteins (WFP 2008). Hence, a large proportion of the 
Goromonzi farm workers had diets missing these critical nutrients than in Kwekwe and 
carbohydrates predominated their consumption patterns.  




Goromonzi  Kwekwe  
A1 A2 Total CA A1 A2 Total CA 
Poor 3.9 1.4 2.7 29.5 2.1 0 1.6 2.4 
Borderline 13.2 5.4 9.3 41 17 6.3 14.4 14.1 
Acceptable 82.9 93.2 88 29.5 80.9 93.7 84 83.5 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 76 74 150 78 194 63 257 85 
Chi-Square 84.483 6.079 
p 0.00* 0.193** 
*Significant at p<0.05  **Not significant at p<0.05  
 
Continually, land beneficiary households had healthier food consumption scores than the 
farm workers. Most of them had acceptable food consumption scores (Table 6.72). The 
unavailability of adequate meals also translated to poor and borderline food consumption 
scores for the Goromonzi Communal Areas (Table 6.72). The same could not be said of 
Kwekwe since over 83 percent enjoyed balanced diets. 
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It is plain to see from these results that land access distinguished households‘ capacities 
to achieve their food requirements and/or obtain incomes to acquire the same. As seen 
before (Section 6.4), most of the landed households were managing to attain incomes at 
least above the FPL. The land short households especially in Goromonzi Communal 
Areas and the farm workers were the ones most challenged with food shortages expressed 
both in the less than expected daily meals consumed and the nutritional gaps reflected by 
the food consumption scores. Kwekwe land short households, it seems, made up the 
limitations from the agricultural incomes from the non-farm labour markets, particularly 
in the high returns alluvial gold mining.  
6.5.7.2 Access to education 
Post-land reform, many new schooling facilities have been constructed in the resettled 
areas and thus widening access for both the land beneficiary and farm worker households 
(Moyo et al. 2009; Chibwana 2017). Yet the availability of money to pay school fees was 
impeding educational access for farm workers‘ children. All groups of farm workers were 
affected by this problem and was thus not related to the type of employment (Table 6.73). 
Overall, non-school attendance was counted in 25.4 percent and 25.8 percent who had 
school going age children in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively (Table 6.73). Now 
compare this with over 90 percent of resettled households who were managing to keep 
their children in school. The high rate of school attendance was also noted by 98.1 
percent in Goromonzi Communal Area households, and 86.1 percent in Kwekwe. 
Table 6.73: Farm labourers who afforded to send children to school  
  
Afforded 
Goromonzi  Kwekwe  
P S PWD Total P S PWD Total 
Yes 69.1 87.5 74.5 72.5 69.5 78.9 78.3 74.2 
No 30.9 12.5 25.5 27.5 30.5 21.1 21.7 25.8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 68 8 55 131 59 19 46 124 
Chi-
Square 2.269  0.062  
p 0.322*  0.969*  




As Weeru Phiri before them encountered (Box 6.1), some of the children of farm workers 
whose educational careers were being hindered by lack of school fees were finding their 
way into the labour markets, as well as unpaid farm labour on the family plots of land. 
Four of the 31 households in Goromonzi indicated that their children were selling farm 
labour in the resettled areas while they were not in school. In 11 of the 38 households in 
Kwekwe, the children had transitioned to providing unpaid farm labour for the family‘s 
own production.  
Nevertheless, state social security programmes such as the BEAM, which pays for school 
fees for vulnerable households rarely covers the farm worker community. The selection 
of beneficiaries in this programme was decentralised to the school level and in the 
resettled areas the A1 landholders to the exclusion of farm workers dominated the 
committees. The children who tend to benefit were from the resettled households and 
farm workers‘ children rarely made it onto the beneficiary lists and their marginalisation 
was exacerbated by constrained fiscal space to cater for the demand.
152
 Similar to land 
allocation policies, gaps in the social protection policies in covering the vulnerable group 
of farm workers and their families were also evident. Concerns over educational access 
for farm workers‘ children have indeed raised eyebrows in the media and civil society as 
well.
153
 A recent report by the Human Rights Watch focusing on the tobacco sector in the 
Mashonaland Provinces chronicled how the dreams of children of farm workers were 
being shattered as they moved on to farm labour markets after their parents failed to raise 
school fees (HRW 2018). It also points to the rise in the number of children who have to 
work to raise money for school fees alike the ―earn and learn‖ programmes in the tea 
estates in Manicaland Province in the 1980s and 1990s (Loewenson 1991; Mutisi 2003). 
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 An official in the MPSLSW was quoted in the press noting that the children of farm workers were being 
excluded from the BEAM programmes due to the emphasis on urban children as beneficiaries. See 
―Zimbabwe‘s lost generation: child labour on the rise‖, The Standard 20 March 2011, Harare, 
(www.thestandard.co.zw/2011/03/20/zimbabwes-lost-generation-child-labour -on-the-rise/.Accessed 13 
March 2014). 
153
 Apparently, an independent evaluation of the BEAM programme noted a disturbing trend on large 
plantation estates in the Lowveld regarding the use of child labour (TARSC 2012). There the management 
of the plantation estates were blocking the children of farm workers from benefitting from BEAM in order 
for the children to continue supplying labour to the estates in exchange for education the private school run 
by the agribusiness companies.  
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There, the children had to pick tea in the morning to earn their school fees and then attend 
classes in the afternoon (see also Chapter Four). 
These findings continue to expose the inadequacy and precariousness of farm wage 
employment to meet the basic requirements,  similar to the scenario documented in the 
former LSCFs. The small capitalist farms that resulted from the A2 scheme have 
therefore seen the perpetuation of the super-exploitation of farm labour perceived in the 
low wages that were below the cost of social reproduction.  
6.5.8 Summary of main findings  
The contemporary agrarian wage labour relations were marked ―continuity and change‖ 
of the predispositions evident in the former LSCFs. It was also clear from the findings 
that the nature of capitalist agriculture has been transformed in as far as the use of 
radically different forms of hired in labour within the new agrarian structure. Yet the 
exploitation of labour, which characterises capitalism expressed in the poor wages not 
enough to meet basic subsistence requirements of workers (Patnaik 1996) was omni-
present and inequalities of the past were being replicated in different shades and scales.  
Informal farm wage jobs predominate the new farming units despite whether it was full- 
or part-time employment. By all accounts, permanent and seasonal work fell short of the 
standards entrenched in the labour laws. Many operate without contracts of employment 
reduced in writing. Long working hours that were neither compensated via overtime pay 
nor additional rest days were experienced by a large section of the permanent workers. 
Practices such as mugwazo or task work, legal only in the agricultural sectors, not only 
continue to reinforce the unevenness of farm labour relations to the wider working class 
but subject workers to undefined times in terms of the work day. Moreover, this unfair 
practice opened up exploitation of whole families for the wages of a single person as 
workers sought help to acquit the onerous quantum of work. Advances in women‘s 
representation in the farm labour force were apparent, in particular in the full-time labour. 
Yet inequitable gender relations remain alive, as men still overshadow women in the 
regular wage permanent work. Confirming the patterns in the literature (Tsikata 2015; 
2009; SOFA Team & Doss 2011; Naidu & Ossome 2016), if women made to the full-
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time work their mobility was restricted as many were stuck in the lowest ranked jobs. At 
the expense of their education but for the profitability of the new capitalist farms, the 
exploitation of children for low wages in the new capitalist farms has not abated.  
A consequent outcome of the shift in the forms of labour reflected by the proliferation of 
piece/daily work types of employment in the new capitalist farms has been that the 
majority of the agricultural workers now fall outside the protection of the law. As a 
matter of fact the law defers their conditions of employment to local level negotiation and 
thus exposes them to the whims of capitalist farmers. Not that the law was serving the 
few permanent and seasonal labour that it embraces as seen by the gaps in the labour 
rights and reality experienced by the workers. As will become more lucid in the next 
section, both the state and the farm worker trade unions were overstretched to ensure the 
enforcement of labour rights for farm workers (Section 6.6).  
Super-exploitation of farm labourers endures underpinned by the payment of wages well 
below the cost of social reproduction. Underpayments, non-payments, part-payments and 
irregular payment dates enlarged the problems of low wages. However, the wage 
structure in the new agrarian structure exceeded the monetary wages emphasised in the 
literature to include ―social wages‖ such as informal access to land and subsidies such as 
monthly food rations. The workers who benefitted were clearly better off than their 
colleagues who exclusively depended on the labour market for survival. Regular wage 
earners in Goromonzi had superior socio-economic indicators than those in irregular and 
seasonal jobs. Yet the differences were not so obvious in Kwekwe as the piece/daily 
workers recovered lost ground from non-farm labour markets, especially in high income 
alluvial gold mining, an option not largely available to their counterparts in the other 
district. Substantial sections of the workforce remain mired in poverty, unable to provide 
adequate food for their households and more so keep children in school.  
Although the low wages were characteristic in the wider economy, it will not be disputed 
too much that farm work remains one of the worst forms of wage labour. Inequalities in 
land access still remain central in compelling people to the farm labour markets (Cousins 
2009; Jha 2016; Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Moyo 2011a) as many of the workers today like 
in the past were landless and originated from the land short Communal Areas. 
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Furthermore the low levels of education of many of the farm workers suggest their origin 
from poor families. Differentiation thus proceeds apace indicated here by the gaps 
between the landholders and farm workers and the other land short Communal Areas in 
key social economic indicators such as food consumption and access to education.  
Not all backward agrarian labour relations and/or labour management practices 
associated with the LSCF employment have remained imprinted in the new farming 
units. Bearing in mind that wages alone do not influence the quality of farm labour. The 
FTLRP unraveled the freehold property rights on acquired farms and the restricted access 
to these areas by the public, civil society, media and trade unions via the trespass laws 
(Amanor-Wilks 1995; 2000). With trespass laws fully enforced, the abuse of farm labour 
could be ―hidden‖ within the protected fences of the LSCFs, which were spatially 
separated from other population segments by huge distances (Tandon 2001). 
Additionally, this permitted the resolution of labour disputes through extra-legal 
mechanisms through what Rutherford (2001a) called the ―domestic government‖. The 
state tenures offering unrestricted movement in these areas have therefore opened up 
access to the labour relations of the new capitalist farms to wider media and public 
scrutiny.  
It is perhaps reasonable to suggest that the significant decline the inhumane practices 
such as physical violence, racism and verbal abuse that pervaded the former LSCFs‘ 
workspace, observed post-2000 was partly a result of this.  
A segment of the capitalist A2 farms mimicks the hierarchical structuring of the labour 
force, including the hiring of managers, foremen, supervisors and so forth to intermediate 
the day to day work schedule especially in Goromonzi. Nonetheless, the management 
structures were not elaborate as those seen in the LSCFs, partly on account of the reduced 
workforce and agricultural operations that characterise many of the downsized farms. 
Simultaneously, another layer of repression has therefore found its way out of the farm 
labour relations. The foremen and supervisors that were delegated labour ―disciplining‖ 
responsibilities were known for perpetrating abuses on fellow workers, including sexual 
harassment of women in exchange for jobs (Chakanya 2016; Muchena & Dzumbira 
 
 346 
2000). Instead of the multiple layers of exploitation, farm workers increasingly have to 
engage directly with the owners in whom most of the managerial tasks now converge.  
Another substantial shift relates to the partial dismantling of the residential tenancy 
(Moyo 2011a; 2013) that enables the now largest section of the agrarian labour force to 
vote with their feet in the new labour markets. Untied to a single employer, piece/daily 
workers were more autonomous in searching for jobs and could combine their farm wage 
with other non-farm employment. Modes of ―belonging to the farm(er)‖ (Rutherford 
2003: 191; 2001a), were now few and far between. If anything, the social reproduction 
strategies of the larger part of the farm labour force, the piece/daily workers, included 
struggles to access land and related natural resources. New A1 and A2 landholders have 
lost the stranglehold of farm compounds and accordingly the control of labour that it 
affords (Selwyn 2014; Tandon 2001; Loewenson 1992). Instead, some scholars see ―new 
forms of conditional belonging‖ that overly assigns the new landholders the power to 
control labour that they do not have (Rutherford 2018; Hartnack 2016). These scholars 
have failed to see the link between the diversified sources of farm labour by the new 
landholders, including the construction of new independent farm compounds as a result 
of the inability to automatically convert people resident in the old farm compounds to 
labour supplies at ease as the former LSCFs did. Quite crucially, ―labour shortages‖, 
which have been a recurring problem for new farmers throughout the 2000, as a sign of 
the increased autonomy of former farm workers has been missed by these analysts 
(section 6.6). Worth emphasising is that ―labour shortages‖ are unanticipated within a 
―loose‖ labour market with high unemployment levels obtaining in Zimbabwe at this 
juncture.  
Existing on the margins of the new agrarian structure, farm workers were thus waging 
resistance not only in the labour market, but to access land to fulfill their aspirations to 
become ―peasants‖. Their dual struggles thus exhibiting semi-proletarian tendencies 
(Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Mueller 2011) were aimed at advancing and protecting their 
material conditions and articulated through direct actions at the workplace and beyond. 
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6.6 AGENCY OF AGRARIAN LABOURERS  
The data presented in the previous section illustrates that farm workers were confronted 
with various challenges in their livelihoods. Within the labour markets, low wages and 
poor working conditions loomed large. So did the insecure residential rights in the old 
farm compounds in A2 farms through evictions and/or threats for refusal to supply 
labour. Beyond the workplace, land shortages for own independent production 
undermined their access to food and other necessities for their subsistence. Consequently 
they wage varied resistances to advance their material conditions. 
Rather than being purely proletarian, their struggles exhibited semi-proletarian politics 
(Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Mueller 2011; Shivji 2017), incorporating both ―workerist‖ and 
―transformative‖ type responses (Moyo et al. 2000:190). The former address their 
conditions as ―wage labourers‖ and the latter seeks their transition towards more 
autonomous land based social reproduction. The resistance drew on their ―structural 
power‖ and ―associational power‖ from collective organisations such as trade unions and 
political parties (Silver, 2003:13; also see Chapter Two).  
The political and economic power derived from monopoly control of land and spatial 
segregation of LSCFs were undermined by the FTLRP (Moyo 2011a). The new land 
ownership patterns and tenure reforms have dispersed the political power to many smaller 
scale farming units (Chambati 2011). Specifically, the undermining of the residential 
labour tenancy and its attendant exploitative relations enabled farm workers to mobilise 
resistance against poor socio-economic conditions in the new agrarian structure (Moyo 
2011a; 2013; Scoones et al. 2018a). 
Residential labour tenancy impinged on self-organisation, while trespass laws covering 
freehold properties meant rural trade unionism could not flourish (Kanyenze 2001). Even 
their social life, including who visited them in the farm compound and the requirements 
to declare sources of income on purchases of personal assets (Scoones et al. 2018a) were 
under the eagle eye of the former LSCFs. The farm workers were able to self-organise 
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The section commences with an assessment of the role of trade unions in defending 
labour rights. It proceeds by analysing the agency of independent workers in reacting to 
the  poor working conditions within and without the farm compounds, as well their 
utilisation of state policy and alliance with other external agents such as NGOs. The 
contribution of ―associational power‖ derived from their participation in political parties 
extends the analysis. Last but not least, land struggles precede the discussion on the 
responses crafted by peasant and capitalist farms to labour resistance.  
6.6.1 Farm worker trade unions and resistance: “associational power” 
While trade unions are often inferred to provide ―associational power‖, which in turn 
workers draw upon to defend their labour rights (Silver 2003), this section demonstrates 
that this was very limited in the case of the farm workers studied in two districts. 
Information gathered from the leadership of the main farm worker trade union, 
GAPWUZ revealed the decline in the mobilisation and organisational capacity of trade 
unions after 2000 (Magwaza 2017: Interview). Retrenchments of farm workers from 
LSCFs acquired for resettlement decimated their membership base to 26,000 (of which 
14 percent were women) from over 150,000 in 1999. But then again, membership figures 
are difficult to verify since the union did not maintain an up to date statistical database
155
. 
It is quite possible for unions to overstate the membership base to show their political 
strength. Much lower membership figures of 7,000 were reported by another study in 
2014 based on data from the national labour centre, ZCTU (Danish Trade Union Council 
[DTUC] 2014:4). Nonetheless, declining union density or membership also pervades the 
wider working class due to the extensive retrenchments, which accompanied ESAP in the 
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 See Selwyn 2014 for Brazil and Wilderman 2014 for South Africa (see Chapter Two). The possibilities 
to organise expand in the absence of residential labour tenancy relationships if the experiences of De 
Doorns in the Western Cape in South Africa are anything to go by. There seasonal workers not dependent 
on on-farm residency, but living in rural informal settlements were crucial in organising wildcat strike, 
which resulted in  minimum wage increases in 2012/13 in LSCFs (Wieldman 2014).    
155
 The number of members provided for 1999 was close to half of all the farm workers. But various studies 
have shown that union density was low (Rutherford 2001a) and did not exceed a third of the LSCF 
workforce (Kibble & Vanlerbheghe 2000). 
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1990s and continued throughout the 2000s (Yeros 2013a; b), such that only 7.2 percent of 
all wage workers nationally belonged to a trade union in 2014 (DTUC 2014: 14).  
The farm worker survey results showed that only two male permanent workers out of the 
194 respondents knew about trade union operations in their area in Goromonzi, while this 
was limited to only one worker in Kwekwe. However, none were trade union members 
among the sampled labourers. Circa 2005/06, an estimated 9.6 percent and one percent of 
them were bona fide union members in the two study areas respectively (Moyo et al. 
2009: 157), implying a loss in the membership base. 
Existing membership in the remaining LSCFs also raise concerns about the absence of 
GAPWUZ at the local level. A long standing member of the union since its inception in 
the mid 1980s in Goromonzi for instance, despite religiously contributing the US$1.00 
monthly membership subscriptions had not seen any union officials in over two years 
(Asani 2017: Interview). 
The main trade union claimed the increased casualisation in the new farms (section 6.2.4) 
converting to irregular wages to sustain subscriptions was depriving them of potential 
members. Actually, the enlisting of members was concentrated in Mashonaland West, 
Harare, Manicaland (tea and timber sectors) and Mashonaland East (mainly in Macheke) 
to the exclusion of low labour force zones such Midlands. Permanent workers in the 
remaining LSCFs, plantations and agro-industrial enterprises rather than those in the A2 
capitalist farms were being targeted. This recruitment strategy received a boost with the 
return of some former white commercial farmers who were leasing farms from new 
beneficiaries and were involved in all year round irrigated agricultural production and 
hired formal labour that was desired in the union rank and file.
156
 But in the overall 
scheme, since they now dominate (Section 6.2.3), the informal piece/daily workers 
present a larger base the union could reach out to.  
Multiple livelihood strategies also imply that for a substantial section of workers, farm 
labour was only one of the sources of income. Narrowly centred ―workerist‖ approaches 
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 At the time of the interview, GAPWUZ had just recruited members from a former white farmer who is 
leasing 11 farms in Headlands (and 3 farms in Hwedza).  
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of trade unions (Moyo et al. 2000) were therefore deficient in representing their wider 
multi-occupational identities. The union for instance, still does not address their 
residential and agricultural land rights.  
Simultaneously, trade union structures at the farm level such as workers committees have 
also dissipated. Furthermore, the few members employed currently do not support the 
establishment of such committees (section 6.2.3). Only 11 percent of the permanent 
workers in Goromonzi possessed these structures at their farms juxtaposed against 8.7 
percent in Kwekwe. This was reported by 11.1 percent and 16.7 percent of the seasonal 
labourers in the corresponding districts. 
Internal and external constraints converged to shape the declining influence and 
membership base of GAPWUZ. Its organisational capacity has dwindled post-2000, with 
the number of union organisers down to 20 in 2017 from 42 in 1999. The number of its 
decentralised offices also declined from 30 to 20 during the same period, and did not 
include the study districts. In fact the union organisers in Ruwa (bordering Goromonzi on 
the Western periphery) and Macheke in Marondera district some 93 kilometres away in 
the Eastern direction were expected to recruit workers and attend to labour disputes in 
Goromonzi. The Kwekwe office, which was closed down in 2013 was merged to the 
Gweru office – some 60 kilometres to the South West of the district.  
Staffing in the secretariat was also not spared, as the workers declined from a peak of 60 
(including the 42 area organisers) in 1999 to 32 in 2017. Following the resignation of the 
union‘s lawyer in 1997 to pursue full time opposition politics, the post was still vacant by 
2017. Mobility was also a key challenge since only six of the union organisers have 
motorbikes, which limit their reach to the workers and altogether the union only had three 
motor vehicles that were allocated to its three geographic regions of operation.  
As union membership plummeted, so did the financial viability of the union given its 
dependency on membership subscriptions.
157
 Yet as union officials admitted, land reform 
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 The reduced membership subscriptions were being deployed to cover salaries of the union‘s 
bureaucracy, and other administrative costs at the main and local offices, while a few worker education and 
training programmes receive financial backing from the German trade union NGO, Freidrich Ebert and 
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had escalated the costs of workers mobilisation since few workers are now employed per 
farm unit. The cause of trade unions has also been setback by the loss of some 
experienced organisers who relocated to the Communal and other areas during the land 
reform (Magaramombe 2010; Hartnack 2009).  
Matters were not helped by the fragmentation of the farm worker trade unions (Chapter 
Five). In 2015, there was a battle for the same membership at Tanganda Tea Estate in 
Manicaland Province between GAPWUZ and HGAPWUZ leading to double deductions 
on workers‘ salaries for membership subscriptions as both unions pressurised the 
company to remit dues. Another relatively new union, PAAWUZ registered in 2014 has 
been on an aggressive membership drive, but still targeting the same base in the 
remaining LSCFs as GAPWUZ and HGAPWUZ (Jera 2017: Interview). It has been de-
campaigning the latter two unions by highlighting the miniscule four percent wage 
increase negotiated by GAPWUZ at the collective bargaining sessions in 2017 for 
―general agriculture sector‖ workers.
158
 
Affiliation to ZCTU, which founded the MDC (Yeros 2002), compounds GAPWUZ‘s 
problems to expand its membership base and monitor labour conditions in the resettled 
areas. The MDC was against the FTLRP and received substantial financial support from 
the former LSCFs, and some of them occupied key positions in the party (Sadomba 2013; 
2008).
159
 As part of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA),
160
 the union actively 
campaigned for the ―NO VOTE‖ during the referendum to approve a new Constitution in 
2000 and some of its various organisers also became important figures in the MDC.
161
 
Moreover, GAPWUZ opposed land reform as the MDC did and produced various 
documentations in 2009 alleging gross human rights violations suffered by farm workers 
                                                                                                                                                 
Stiftung (FES) and technical support from ZCTU, the Zimbabwe Labour Centre and LEDRIZ, the research 
arm of trade union centre. 
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 See ―PAAWUZ, GAPWUZ fight over workers‘ salaries‖, The Newsday 5 June 2017, Harare, 
www.newsday.co.zw/2017/06/05/paawuz-gapwuz-fight-over-workers-salaries/ [Accessed 29 April 2018]. 
159
 e.g. the late treasurer, Roy Bennet and Ian Kay, a former Member of Parliament for Marondera 
constituency 
160
 The NCA grouped many civic organisations , which led the campaign against the proposed new 
constitution eventually coalesced into the MDC (Yeros 2013a; 2013b). 
161
 e.g Douglas Mwonzora, the current Secretary General of the MDC led by the late Morgan Tsvangirai 
and now Nelson Chamisa was previously employed as the Union‘s legal advisor until 1997. 
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in collaboration with a grouping of former white commercial farmers known as Justice 
for Agriculture, which had broken ranks with CFU over policy differences (see JAG & 
GAPWUZ 2008). In fact, the documentation led to state repression against the union 
several times and eventually to the fleeing of the then General Secretary of GAPWUZ, 
Getrude Hambira into exile to Canada as noted earlier (Chapter Five).
162
 Altogether, the 
union‘s functionality was negatively impacted. 
Despite the rebranding exercises that GAPWUZ has been undertaking since 2013, 
through various educational programmes to dissociate from the MDC, the perceived 
linkage to opposition politics continues to impede its mandate. Recent public statements 
by the leadership of ZCTU offering to lead the designing of the 2018 General elections 
manifesto of the MDC Alliance
163
 negates the union‘s separation from party politics
.164
  
Union organisers continued to face hurdles as the A2 farmers, with the support of local 
ZANU (PF) structures, pointed to GAPWUZ‘s alliance to the MDC to deligitimise their 
labour mobilisation efforts and restrict their activities:  
―We are still associated with MDC and when we try to engage workers as per our mandate we are 
suspected of trying to canvass support for the opposition. Farmers are taking advantage of this 
―tag‖ to hide violations of labour rights by denying us access to workers. At some point we are 
requested to first clear with the ZANU (PF) district chairman for us to interact with workers 
because we are considered MDC sympathisers. ZANU (PF) functionaries who are part of workers 
committee alert party officials when we try to seek appointments to visit the farms. At one 
instance in 2016, we had to enlist the assistance of the chief in Banket, Zvimba District in order to 
address a workers meeting. The union had been denied permission by A2 farmers to address 
workers who were claiming we intended to hold an unsanctioned political rally not cleared by the 
police as required under the Public Order and Security Act of 2002” (Magwaza 2017: Interview).  
 
The experience of a GAPWUZ union official who tried to confront A2 farmers over non-
payment of wages in 2011 was also telling in this respect: ―When we engage them on 
these issues, they say we are MDC activists‖.
165
 Thus, in place of trespass laws that were 
used by the former LSCFs to bar union organisers (Kanyenze 2001; Tandon 2001), 
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 See ―Getrude Hambira‘s life altering move‖, The Newsday, 23 December 2011, Harare 
[www.newsday.co.zw/2011/12/23/2011-12-23-getrude-hambiras-life-altering-move/ [Accessed 3 July 
2017].  
163
 The MDC alliance is a coalition of MDC party led by Morgan Tsvangirai before his passing and other 
opposition parties) 
164
 Newsday, 8 August 2017, ―ZCTU pledges to craft MDC Alliance ―winning‖ manifesto [accessed from 
www.newsday.co.zw/2017/08/08/zctu-pledges-craft-mdc-alliance-winning-manifesto/ on 8 August 2017]. 
165
The Standard, 1 October 2011, ―ZANU PF chefs exploiting farm workers‖ [accessed from 
www.thestandard.co.zw/2011/10/01/zanu-pf-chefs-exploiting-farm-workers/ on 15 June 2017] 
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GAPWUZ ―alliance‖ to MDC was now being used to conceal labour rights violations. 
Alike the former LSCFs (Loewenson 1992; Amanor-Wilks 1995; Kanyenze 2001), new 
capitalist farmers also threaten to victimise workers linked to unions. A case in point was 
when GAPWUZ mobilised 47 members at an A2 farm in 2014 in Goromonzi, and the 
owner refused to deduct the membership subscriptions for their salaries. In the words of 
the union leader, the A2 farmer charged; ―If any of workers were interested, they should 
pay their membership subscriptions directly to the union not through his salary payroll‖ 
(Magwaza 2017: Interview), and the membership bid collapsed.  
At Bemba Farm (Pvt) Ltd (A2 scheme) in Marondera, by way of another example, one 
worker mobilising others to join GAPWUZ in January 2011 was fired from work.
166
 
Under case number HCC 155/11, the owner approached the High Court in Harare seeking 
relief against trade union officials to cease interacting with his workers regarding the 
resolution of a dispute on the classification of the farm as either ―general agriculture‖ or 
―agro-industrial‖. The court upheld the right of workers to belong to labour unions as 
guaranteed by Section 65 of Constitution of Zimbabwe Ammendment Act No. 20 of 2013 
and the labour laws and the employer was ordered to provide the union unfettered access 
to the workers.  
Additionally, some analysts (Chambati & Moyo 2004) trace GAPWUZ‘s uneasy 
relationship with the new capitalist farms to its earlier collaboration with the LSCFs to 
negotiate wage increases in advance at the NECAIZ in the early 2000s before the A2 
farmers were incorporated into the collective bargaining process (see also section 6.5.6). 
Since 2000, GAPWUZ has not promoted radical action such as general strikes to redress 
poor working conditions due to the cumbersome procedures required by the law (Chapter 
Five). ―It is almost impossible to have a legal strike nowadays‖ the leader of the union 
opined (Magwaza 2017: Interview). Without being sanctioned by the Minister of Labour, 
the threat of dismissal hovers over the head of the workers. The union was therefore 
afraid of jeopardising members‘ jobs through ―illegal strikes‖ and the pressure that 
emanated from the workers to get them reinstated to their positions. Indeed, state labour 
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 See The Standard 26 February 2011, ―Farm workers accuse employers of abuse‖ [Accessed from 
www.thestandard.co.zw/2011/02/26/farm-workers-accuse-employers -of-abuse on 12 May 2017]. 
 
 354 
relations officials have stopped farm level strikes not approved by the Minister in their 
tracks.
167
 Planned strikes were also thwarted by police brutality invoking the Public 
Order and Security Act of 2002, which requires the advance authority for a public 
gathering and occasional arrests of union leaders, is not uncommon.  
The onslaught on the ―right to strike‖ represents proliferating tendencies under 
neoliberalism, which has been prioritising the flexibility of labour markets in favour of 
employers and for production and productivity to proceed unhindered (Jha 2015) in the 
context of attracting FDI and rank favourably in the World Bank promoted ―ease of doing 
business‖ initiatives (World Bank 2015a). No wonder in some industries, to circumvent 
the drawn out procedures required to prosecute an industrial action, male workers were 
now using their wives to protest on their behalf and thus shield themselves from 
repercussions of ―illegal‖ collective action. The wives of mine workers at Hwange 
Colliery who have been engaged in sustained protest at the company‘s premises since 
2013 over their husbands‘ unpaid salaries represent this strategy.
168
 Even the wives have 
faced the full force of police brutality on occasions. Attempts by mine workers to strike 
had earlier led to the suspension of 520 workers for breaching the company‘s code of 
conduct.  
Legal action in the courts of law now represents GAPWUZ main strategy to resolve 
labour disputes that cannot be settled by the NECAIZ arbitration, notwithstanding the 
delays encountered at the Labour Court.
169
 The union noted many pending cases at the 
Labour Court, but they could not provide precise figures due to poor record keeping. 
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 Attempts by farm workers at the farm level to engage in industrial action have led them being declared 
illegal by the authorities. For instance, farm workers were ordered to go back to work by the Chinhoyi 
Provincial Labour Office after downing tools without giving the 14 day notice of their intention as required 
by the law. They were pressing for the payment of their outstanding salaries. See ―Zhuwawo wins case 
against farm workers‖, The Standard, 12 May 2012, Harare, 
www.thestandard.co.zw/2012/05/12/zhuwawo-wins-case-against-farm-workers/[Accessed 14 May 2012]. 
168
 See Colliery workers‘ spouses fume over paltry salaries, The Newsday 8 February 2018, Harare, 
https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/02/colliery-workers-spouses-fume-paltry-salaries/ [Accessed on 7 May 
2018]. 
169
 The Minister of Justice and Legal Affairs was reported in the press bemoaning the delays in the 
conclusion of labour cases at the Labour Court. The court was understaffed in 2013 with a total of 14 
judges in service as opposed to the total establishment of 19 judges resulting in cases dragging on for years 
to the disadvantage of workers. See The Herald 13 March 2013, ―Deal with labour cases urgently‖ 
[Accessed from http://www.herald.co.zw/deal-with-labour-cases-urgently/ on 11 August 2017]. 
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Costly legal fees were straining the unions‘ reduced budgets. The deadlock over the 2017 
wages in the tea sector, for instance, which spilled into the Supreme Court, setback 
GAPWUZ over US$30,000 in legal fees even before the case was finalised. This strategy 
was based on the cases reported to the union area organisers by workers in remaining 
LSCFs rather than from proactive monitoring of labour conditions. On average, at each of 
their 20 area offices, the union was receiving about three cases of alleged labour rights 
transgressions monthly.  
GAPWUZ has clearly been on the back foot in the collective bargaining negotiations 
with employer organisations, if the sluggish rise in wages between 2009 and 2017 is 
anything to go by (see section 6.5.6). Rival unions such as PAAWUZ thus accused 
GAPWUZ of sabotaging the rural working class:  
―..GAPWUZ, which is the only union negotiating for workers‘ salaries, is sabotaging workers. 
The least paid worker it the agriculture sector is getting $72 per month and this is unsustainable. 
This is despite the fact that farmers are making good money out of tobacco. This is not fair at all. 
Workers are still living at the Rhodesia era‖ (Raymond Sixpence, PAAWUZ General Secretary 




Despite the admissions by one representative of the employers, Ben Purcell Gilpin 
(President of the CFU)
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 of the improvement of performance of farmers during the 
2016/17 season, GAPWUZ was adamant to negotiate higher wages for their constituency 
because the ―…economy was underperforming to sustain huge wage increases‖ 
(Magwaza 2017: Interview).  
However, GAPWUZ managed to extract concessions from the employers regarding 
reduction of working hours for permanent and seasonal labourers from 8.5 hours to 8 
hours putting them at par with the rest of the working class, which was Statutory 116 of 
2014. Furthermore, the period in which a seasonal worker could be considered permanent 
fell from eight months of continuous work in a calendar year to six months and the 
annual leave days that workers could accrue to the next year increased from 12 to 90 
days. Three years down the line, employers overturned some earlier gains through 
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Statutory Instrument 67 of 2017, which now permits seasonal labourers to be engaged for  
nine months and the contracts can be renewed up to six times before an employee can 
qualify to become permanent. As discussed above (section 6.5), the progressive changes 
in the conditions of employment at law remain largely ―paper rights‖ due to limited 
monitoring by the union and state.  
Notwithstanding the trade union‘s own internal shortcomings, their worker mobilisation 
efforts were clearly hamstrung by the state‘s limitations in guarranteeing them access to 
the farm workforce to monitor working conditions and recruit new members as permitted 
by the Labour Amendment Act of 2015 and Section 65 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
Amendment (No. 20) Act of 2013. State repression of union organisers by the security 
infrastructure also curtailed worker mobilisation. The A2 farmers, as noted above, 
sometimes barred them from accessing the farms instrumentalising the union‘s perceived 
linkage to the MDC. Furthermore, the cumbersome procedures for prosecuting strikes 
imposed by the overarching labour in contradiction of the supreme law closed a critical 
avenue that workers could deploy to extract concessions from the new small-scale 
capitalist farms. This could perhaps be one of the reasons that improvement in the 
working conditions have been slow to come for farm workers. 
The influence of farm worker trade unions have thus waned after land reform and in 
effect have been off the radar to address labour rights deficits since 2000 (Chambati & 
Magaramombe 2008). Yet, it is also worth remembering that farm worker trade unionism 
never really took off as many workers were not linked to them nor did the unions sponsor 
any radical actions that shifted the material conditions in a substantial manner (see 
Chapter Four). The absence of trade unions thus weakens the voice of farm workers 
seeking the enforcement of their labour rights. Their ―structural power‖ was thus key to 
organise resistance.  
6.6.2 Deploying “structural bargaining power” to advance “workerist” struggles  
From the discussion above, it can be discerned that farm wage labourers relied to a 
limited extent on the ―associational power‖ of belonging to trade unions to resist poor 
working conditions in the new farms (Silver 2003: 13). Nonetheless, the existence of 
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trade unions is not a precondition for the expression of agency by workers in the labour 
markets (Jha 2015; 1996; Wilderman 2014; Silver 2003). This section exposes how farm 
workers drew upon their ―structural power‖ to advance their material conditions in the 
new agrarian labour markets (Silver 2003:13). In particular, resistance strategies were 
being evolved on the basis of the skills they possessed demanded by the new capitalist 
farms in areas such as tobacco production and the availability of non-wage alternative 
forms of work in natural resource trading (e.g. gold panning) occasioned by the 
redistributive land reforms. The latter processes, have been characterised in the literature 
as ―market place bargaining power‖ (Silver 2003: 13). In addition, ―weapons of the 
weak‖ (Scott 1985: 35) type modes of resistance were also observed among the 
behaviour of farm workers in the new labour markets.  
6.6.2.1 “Weapons of the weak” resistance to poor labour conditions 
Detached from trade unions, farm workers were fashioning different types of resistance 
to the poor working conditions. In most cases the farm compounds were the sites of 
organisation of resistance and past employment positions, gender and connections to 
different types of local organisations affected the agency of farm workers in diverse ways  
(Chambati 2013b).  
Akin to James Scott‘s ―weapons of the weak‖ (Scott 1986: 35), the modes of resistance 
tended to steer away from the direct confrontation with employers. The strategies 
included ―voting with their feet‖ to identify the best working conditions, theft of farm 
produce, absconding from work, blacklisting poor employers and incessant complains 
about the bad workplace situation.
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 Complaints to employers about unpaid wages were 
a common strategy permanent farm workers across the two districts relied upon. 
However, this was met with threats of being fired from their jobs as employers took 
advantage of the increasing unemployment rate in the country to quell demands of the 
employees.  
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Since collective action is promoted by the concentration of workers at a particular 
location of production (Silver 2003), the few permanent employees that were being hired 
per farm unit betrayed this avenue of resistance. Moreover, eviction threats invoked by 
A2 farmers on workers living on their farms encumbered by the residential labour 
tenancy also curtailed collective action (see section 6.5.5). The capitalist A2 and 
remaining LSCFs, which employed large batches of workers, were the ones, which 
usually experienced strikes that ground production to a halt. But even there, it took a 
while before workers adopted this option to force concessions from the employers. 
Various press reports suggest outright defiance of employers through downing of tools by 
permanent and seasonal labourers emerged as form of resistance when workers had been 
pushed to corner through non-payment of wages for prolonged periods. For instance, at 
Hurudza A2 farm in Goromonzi, workers only refused to work after wage arrears had 
accumulated to 10 months.
173
 In another case also reported in the media, it took about 
four months of unpaid wages for farm workers to engage in a work strike.
174
 
Continuing to work without being paid any wages at all or receiving partial payments, 
some permanent employees resorted to ―moonlighting‖ in piece rate and/or daily work in 
neighbouring farms. This was reported by 16.6 percent of the permanent farm workers 
across the two districts. A larger proportion of Goromonzi permanent workers (29.3 
percent) participated in moonlighting than those from Kwekwe (4 percent). The latter had 
a relatively less developed farm wage labour market than the former (Section 6.2.3). 
Variations in moonlighting were not evident between full-time workers in the two 
FTLRP models. Seventy seven percent hired out their labour on farms elsewhere on rest 
days  and 11.4 percent did so upon acquittal of their work commitments at their place of 
regular employment. Additionally, others disrupted the workflows at their regular jobs 
through abseentism to perform part-time jobs (11.4 percent). Males who are usually 
considered as the breadwinners within the realm of partriarchy (Potts 2012; Mvududu & 
McFadden 2001; O‘Laughlin 1998) were more active in moonlighting (involving half of 
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them) compared to females (involving just over a quarter of them) in Goromonzi. The 
reverse was true for Kwekwe as 7.2 percent of the male permanent workers were 
partaking in such endeavours compared to 16.7 percent of female workers. As 
highlighted earlier, the increased demands for income within households to meet various 
costs such as health and children‘s education, which are no longer subsidised by the state 
after ESAP help to explain the insertion of women not only in the labour market, but also 
in multiple-job holding (Yaro et al. 2016; Bryceson 1980). 
As Rutherford (2001a) revealed, moonlighting was also present in LSCFs as some 
permant workers sought maricho during their off days. However there has been no 
systematic documentation of its extent in terms of the shares of workers that held 
multiple farm jobs. The movement of workers in and out of the farm compounds was 
tightly monitored by the former white farmers (Loewenson 1992; Tandon 2001; Scoones 
et al. 2018a). Further, farmers also tried by all means to curtail farm workers from 
purchasing consumer goods and seeking entertainment outside the LSCFs by operating  
stores and bars in the farm compound offering credit services so that when a demand for 
labour arose or emergenices such as fire outbreaks, workers on their off days could easily 
be mobilised (Chambati 2013b). Against this background, it is perhaps fair to conclude 
that moonlighting was not pervasive in the former LSCFs.  
Instead of the ―permanent‖ work that the literature associates with more security and 
regular work, some farm workers as a strategy quit permanent work for piece/daily rate 
work to cut their risks of not being paid for months on end (see also HRW 2018).
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Additionally, piece/daily work provides flexibility to combine different social 
reproduction strategies.  
A1 and A2 farmers complain of thefts of farm produce and accuse former farm workers 
in the old compounds as the culprits (Chambati & Moyo 2004; Scoones et al. 2010; 
Moyo 2011a; Matondi 2012). The absence of detailed security infrastructure in the 
resettled areas such as that observed in former LSCFs increases their vulnerability to 
theft. Availability of security guards who tightly controlled the movement of people, 
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goods and services in the former LSCFs was reported by full-time labourers - 39.8 
percent in Goromonzi and 20 percent in Kwekwe. 
176
 The Presidential Land Review 
Commission appointed to assess the FTLRP outcomes in 2003 thus recommended:  
―…that Government urgently addresses the situation of former farm workers in the farm 
compounds. Their continued presence on the farms had created numerous problems arising from 
illegal gold panning, misuse of farm facilities and resources and general criminal activities‖ (Utete 
2003: 6). 
 
This was in reaction to the concerns raised by the farmers blaming former farm workers 
for ―…contributing to activities like cattle rustling, vandalism and theft of farm 
machinery and equipment‖ (Utete 2003: 53). These findings suggested that ―stealing as 
form of resistance‖ (Addison 2013: 110) had taken root in the resettled areas. A court 
case of two farm workers accused of stealing two herd of cattle belonging to their 
employer, the late Vice President, John Nkomo, lends credence to these assertions.
177
 
After being convicted of stock theft, in their mitigation, the workers noted under payment 
of wages and poverty: ―[We stole the cattle] because the wages we were getting were not 
enough we were earning $50 per month and it was not enough‖.
178
 
Not entangled by the residential tenancy, piece/daily workers ―vote with their feet‖ to 
identify the best employment conditions in the resettled areas. Searching for better wages, 
some workers in Kwekwe had to walk exacting distances of between five and eight 
kilometres to escape the piece rates of US$0.50 per 100 metre line of weeding offered by 
A1 farmers instead of US$1.00 for the same amount of work paid by A2 farmers 
(Mavhuso 2017: Interview). 
After experiencing problems with wage payments with a particular employer, such 
information was widely shared within the confines of the old farm compounds. Quite 
detrimental to the labour mobilisation efforts of such employers, they were ―blacklisted‖. 
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In fact this tactic has endured since the colonial period, when foreign migrant workers 
retuning home after a stint in the Rhodesian LSCFs stuck posters along the journey routes 
to warn their colleagues of bad employers (Rubert 1998; see also Chapter Four). 
Operating as ―informal workers committees‖, the resistance was led by former senior 
(male) farm workers who disseminated information on labour grievances to residents in 
the old farm compounds. Farm workers thus neither responded to invitations for farm 
jobs offered by the later nor to wages they deem too low for the task. Far from 
confrontational, when employers with a bad record of infringing on labour rights visit the 
compound in search of workers ―… farm workers pretend to be busy with their domestic 
chores and promise to come for work once they are done and they never show up‖ (NYT 
2017: Interview). As discussed below (Section 6.6.6), it was this kind of resistance that 
forced some farm employers to send trucks to nearby towns and Communal Areas to look 
for piece/daily workers. 
New alternative livelihoods that farm workers were crafting in the context of the FTLRP 
such as trading of natural resource found in the resettled areas enhanced their ―market 
place bargaining power‖ (Silver 2003). Hence, some farm workers delinked from the 
labour markets and survived on activities such as gold panning, common in Kwekwe, 
while firewood and thatching grass trade provided an alternative in Goromonzi. 
Evidently, these activities have been blamed on dwindling supplies of farm labour (see 
6.6.6). Furthermore, some of the previous suppliers of farm labour were now landholders 
in their own right courtesy of the FTLRP, as well as other diverse sources of informal 
land access that they can survive on.  
6.6.2.2 Self-organised “specialist” labour groups 
The exponential growth in specialised crops such as tobacco in the resettled areas availed 
opportunities for farm workers to utilise their scarce skills as ―market based bargaining 
power‖ to extract higher wages in the farm labour markets (Silver 2003). Flue cured 
tobacco production was the preserve of large capitalist farms and the skills to produce 
were largely endowed in the former farm workers (Muir 2006). As the numbers of 
tobacco growers rose from 8,537 in 2000 (TIMB 2001: 11) to 81,801 in 2016 (TIMB 
2016: vi), so did the demand for farm labour skills in producing districts such as 
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Goromonzi. By 2016, the district had about 764 tobacco producers compared to only 42 
in Kwekwe district (TIMB 2016: 21).  
Former farm workers in Goromonzi have therefore been constituting themselves in 
independent specialist tobacco labour groups offering services that included curing, 
packing, harvesting and sorting the leaves into different grades for the market. Such 
forms of labour provision have also been characterised as,―consultancy‖ groups by others 
(see Matondi 2012:223). Not attached to a particular employer, they tended to consist of a 
group of workers under the leadership of a ―contract master‖, who were mostly former 
male senior farm workers (see also Chambati 2013b: 17). The ―contract masters‖ were 
responsible for looking for jobs and negotiating the fees to be paid for a particular task. 
Males predominantly occupied the membership of these groups. The existence of these 
forms of labour supply was confirmed by 26.6 percent and 19.7 percent of the workers 
interviewed in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively. Instead of offering specialised 
skills to the new farm employers, the groups in the latter district were mainly geared 
towards the provision of general tasks such as weeding (Table 6.74), while in the former 
half of the groups identified by the farm workers were focused on skill demanding tasks 
in tobacco production.  
Table 6.74: Activities farm labour groups sell their labour 
Activity  
Goromonzi  Kwekwe  
No. % No. % 
Tobacco curing 0 0 1 7.1 
Tobacco grading 5 23.8 0 0 
Weeding 6 28.6 11 78.6 
Harvesting maize 5 23.8 2 14.3 
Tobacco reaping 5 23.8 0 0 
Total 21 100 14 100 
 
Former farm worker groups were thus able to avert the low wages by using their 
expertise to bargain for more. The wages charged by one tobacco specialist group of 
curers and graders in Goromonzi were about three times more than the daily rate of 
piece/daily workers for the same time period of work.  
Kinship ties were infused in the labour supply groups. Another group of tobacco curers 
and graders encountered in Goromonzi, for example, was comprised of former farm 
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workers who used to work together before 2000 (JT 2017: Interview). The members of 
the group included three brothers, a son-in law and two friends who came from the same 
village of origin in Malawi, and thus also mobilised along ―foreign migrant identity‖.  
6.6.2.3 Mobilisation of identity and belonging  to advance material interests  
Africans are tied to the land through various cultural practices, including the maintenance 
of the graves of their ancestors and its other attendant ceremonies (Mujere 2011). 
Ancestral graves, especially, represent claims to ownership of a piece of land by kinship 
groups and/or clansmen (Mkodzongi 2015; Moyo 2011a; Sadomba 2008). During the 
FTLRP, some kinship groups successfully legitimised their demands for certain farms to 
be allocated to them on the basis of carrying the remains of their forefathers when they 
were ejected by the colonialists in the 19
th
 Century (Mkodzongi 2015; 2013; Murisa 
2010). 
Likewise, former farm workers also identified their ―belonging‖ to the old farm 
compounds through the graves of their ancestors. They continue to bury their deceased 
relatives in the graveyards established by the former LSCFs even in the new A1 and A2 
farms as indicated by 78.8 percent and 65.3 percent in Goromonzi and Kwekwe 
respectively. For those of foreign migrant origin, the old compounds in most instances, 
was their only home unlike the domestic migrants who had kinship linkages in the 
Communal Areas. Rather than the land owners, the granting of permission to bury their 
dead in A1 farms was now being mediated by the village heads similar to Communal 
Areas (Phiri 2017: Interview).  
Burials in the old compounds were accompanied by associated traditional ceremonies 
such as ―kurova guva‖
179
 that entails the appeasing of the spirit of a deceased person 
conducted after approximately one year after their death.
180
 Sixty percent of the former 
farm workers in Goromonzi confirmed these ceremonies were taking place in the farm 
compounds they lived. Again, the sabhuku granted permission to former farm workers for 
this. None identified the same in Kwekwe. These cultural practices reinforced the identity 
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of former farm workers, but however fell short for some to legitimating their claims of 
belonging to the old farm compounds. References such as ―…My parents worked at 
Banana Groove [Farm in Goromonzi] and I was born there. They are now late and their 
graves are within the farm. I grew up on the farm and I know no other home‖
181
 were 
commonly made by farm workers when faced with eviction threats or after evictions 
from the old farm compounds. Yet invoking belonging through ancestral graves had not 
stopped evictions from some A2 compounds. Different outcomes were experienced by 
the peasantry from the Communal Areas in mobilising for land allocations through this 
route as stated above.  
6.6.3 The state and protection of labour rights  
After the deregulation of the labour markets in 1991, the National Employment Councils 
(NECs) established for each industry were mandated to manage the labour relations under 
the supervision of the MPSLSW (see Chapter Four). According to Section 62 of the 
Labour Act (Chapter 28:08), the responsibilities of the NECs is to:  
―…assist its members in the conclusion of collective bargaining agreements…[including] settling 
disputes that [would] have arisen or may arise between employers and employers organisations on 
the one hand and employee, workers committees or trade unions on the other (35)‖.  
The adherence of the collective bargaining agreements and any regulations and statutes 
that are applicable to the industry also falls on the shoulders of the NECs. To deliver on 
their obligations, the NECs are empowered to conduct labour inspections without any 
unhindered access and are in fact supposed to furnish annual reports to the Minister 
detailing the conditions of employment in their sector. The designated agents appointed 
by the NEC are empowered by the Labour Relations Act (Chapter 28:08) to resolve 
labour disputes and unfair labour practices, as well as train employers and employees on 
labour laws and regulations.  
As specified earlier (see Chapter Five), the membership of the NECAIZ for the 
agricultural industry was composed of 10 seats for the employers, in which four seats 
were occupied by the ZNFU, while the remaining farmer organisations have one seat 
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 Likewise, the employee seats were also unevenly distributed, with GAPWUZ 
commanding seven seats, while HGAPWUZ had two seats and the last spot was allocated 
to KAWUZ.  
Returns from the interview with NECAIZ leadership revealed that the state labour 
relations framework was also under resourced (Jera 2017: Interview). The number of 
NECAIZ decentralised offices had been reduced from eight to six since the land 
reform
183
 on account of financial constraints. Taking the A2 sector alone at the national 
level, for every designated agent there were about 6,600 A2 farming units to manage 
labour disputes and conduct labour inspections. The NECAIZ was therefore evidently 
overstretched in terms of its organisational capacity to enforce labour rights. 
The financial base of NECAIZ at law originates from the Council dues of US$2 per 
month for every permanent or seasonal labourer equally contributed by the employers 
and employees. Further highlighting the detachment from the labour relations framework, 
the Chief Executive Officer of the employment council noted that many of A2 farmers 
were neither registered nor contributing the Council dues suffocating its organisational 
capacity. As such, contributions from the remaining LSCFs and plantations (tea, an 
timber and sugarcane) currently sustained their operations. Consequently, the NECAIZ 
focused its services on this constituency to the exclusion of most A2 farm workers. 
In particular, the members of the Zimbabwe Tobacco Association were singled out for 
contributing the largest share of the Council‘s budget due to the sector‘s performance.
184
 
Again, the employment council officials also mentioned the dominant presence of 
GAPWUZ on the membership as constraining the collection of Council dues as farmers 
also mobilise the rhetoric of the union‘s linkage to the MDC as the reason for not paying.  
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 These are the CFU, ZCFU, ZFU, ZAEO, ZTA and ZTGA. 
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 The offices were in eight towns or cities servicing the LSCFs in all the country‘s eight rural provinces, 
including Bindura (Mashonaland Central Province), Bulawayo (Matebeleland North), Chiredzi (Masvingo 
Province), Chinhoyi (Mashonaland West), Gwanda (Matebeleland South), Gweru (Midlands Province), 
Marondera (Mashonaland East Province) and Mutare (Manicaland Province). The Bindura and Gwanda 
offices have since been closed. 
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 Amongst the commodities produced in the country, tobacco has been leading the recovery in terms of 
output after the earlier declines experienced in the early 2000‘s due to the contract farming financing 
arrangements (Binswanger- Mhkize & Moyo 2012; Sakata 2017; Shonhe 2017). Actually, by 2015, tobacco 
output had surpassed the previous volumes produced by the former LSCFs (TIMB 2015). 
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Although farmers at law can seek exemptions from the NECAIZ from meeting the 
collective bargaining agreements with employees‘ consent, few did so. Between 2015 
and 2017, the designated agents responsible for the Southern regions
185
 only handled two 
requests while the Mashonaland East and West offices received nine and five requests 
respectively, implying that the gazetted collective bargaining agreements bound the 
generality of farming units. 
Barring the occasional deadlock, the NECAIZ has largely facilitated the successful 
conclusion of collective bargaining agreements. Teething problems were experienced in 
the initial years of land reform as mentioned earlier when the Minister of Labour refused 
to gazette the agreed minimum wages in 2003 and 2004 after complaints by the A2 
farmers that their voices were muted in the council. This was rectified by the inclusion of 
A2 farmers in the NECAIZ membership since 2006 (Chapter Five).  
Figure 6.19: Labour inspections conducted by selected NECAIZ offices  
 
Source: Compiled from data provided by NECAIZ 
Yet, it was on the enforcement of agreed conditions during the collective bargaining that 
the NECAIZ weakness stood out. Data availed to the author illustrates that between 2015 
and 2017, there was a wide gap between the labour inspections conducted by the 
NECAIZ and the number of farming units today. The Mashonaland East office (covering 
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Goromonzi) did not conduct any labour inspections in 2015 because the Designated 
Agent post was vacant due to financial limitations, while 48 and 27 were done in 2016 
and 2017 (Figure 6.19). Similar patterns were exhibited in the Mashonaland West office. 
The Bulawayo office outperformed its counterparts since it managed to deliver 156 
inspections in 2015, but the numbers have been on the decline since then. Altogether, 
during 2015 when most of the inspections were conducted, they did not surpass one 
percent of the total A2 farms distributed nationally. This evidence confirms findings from 
a recent study, which showed that out of 61 farm workers interviewed in Mashonaland 
Central and East and, Manicaland provinces, only three workers reported labour 
inspections on their farms in 2017 (HRW 2018: 62).  
Separate from the financial resource constraints, the NECAIZ officials also reported that 
the designated agents were denied entry into the farms by some A2 landholders on the 
grounds of their association with GAPWUZ. 
Figure 6.20: Wage disputes handled by selected NECAIZ offices, 2015-2017  
 
Source: Compiled from data provided by NECAIZ 
The majority of the labour disputes that were handled by the NECAIZ related to wage 
disputes confirming the patterns narrated by the workers (see section 6.4). These related 
to non-payment and underpayment of wages and originated from mostly from the farms 
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Reported wage labour disputes were more frequent in the Mashonaland East office 
compared to Mashonaland West and Bulawayo offices (Figure 6.20).  
Resultantly, the limited state protection farm workers and their trade union enjoy 
perpetuates the violation of labour and social rights. Not to mention that the majority of 
the workers now, the piece/daily workers, were excluded from the cover of the law.  
6.6.4 Advancing material interests through political parties  
The contribution of party politics in structuring the outcomes of the FTLRP has been a 
contentious issue, with debates ranging from the motives of the programme itself and 
how party politics influenced the land and agrarian reform practices during the 2000s. On 
the one hand, some academics have argued that land reform was implemented to restore 
waning support of the ZANU (PF) upon its defeat at the Referendum to adopt a new 
Constitution in 2000 (Simpson & Robertson 2018; Raftopolous 2013; 2009; Sachikonye 
2002; 2012). In contrast, other analysts have advanced that land reform sought to roll 
back the unjust land distribution inherited from colonisation (Hanlon et al. 2013; 
Mkodzongi 2013; Moyo 2013; Moyo & Yeros 2005b; 2007; Murisa 2009) and thus fulfil 
the objects of the liberation struggle. Land allocations and the attendant post-settlement 
support (e.g. input subsidies) were claimed to be partisan and it was mostly ZANU (PF) 
supporters who benefitted, while MDC supporters, including former farm workers were 
excluded (Laurie 2017; Zamchiya 2013; Marongwe 2009). Yet others have argued that 
beyond political party allegiance a wide array of factors influenced land allocations, 
including ―…professional, class, and other social networks, including church 
membership‖ (Moyo 2011a: 505; see also Scoones et al. 2010).  
Confirmation of the existence of political party structures was high across both districts 
Goromonzi and Kwekwe - 81.4 and 78.7 percent respectively. Both the two major 
parties, ZANU (PF) and MDC attracted interest of farm workers. In fact, their allegiance 
to either party has been dynamic over the last 17 years and conditioned by their changing 
material interests. In the early phases of the land occupations, alongside their union, farm 
workers joined the MDC, which was opposed to the land reform (Sadomba 2013; 2008) 
in order to protect their jobs in the LSCFs. Before, they had earlier participated in the 
 
 369 
Constitutional Referendum under the ―NO VOTE‖ banner to halt the clause on 
compulsory acquisition of LSCFs without compensation for land itself as noted above.  
ZANU (PF) has dominated the elections in the countryside, including the resettled areas 
in both districts by applying a combination of tactics, including violence, persuasion and 
patronage (Moyo & Yeros 2007).  The MDC has however struggled to penetrate most 
rural areas due to being physically barred from implementing any party activities for 
many years during the 2000s by ZANU (PF) activists (Raftopolous 2013). Violence has 
befallen its known supporters within and without electoral seasons in the post-2000, and 
many rural people are afraid to openly show their support of the MDC. Association with 
the MDC presented risks for farm workers, including threats of evictions from farm 
compounds and marginalisation from patronage programmes led by ZANU PF, including 
the distribution of agricultural input subsidies. At Chamvari Farm in Goromonzi, 50 
former farm workers who openly canvassed for the MDC during the 2008 elections had 
their houses destroyed and were evicted from the farm compound during the ―Operation 
Mavhotera Papi”
186
 that was instituted by ZANU (PF) after the President Mugabe was 
defeated by Morgan Tsvangirai in the initial leg of the Presidential elections (Joseph 
2017: Interview).  
Yet, voting returns during the elections held over the last 15 years do indicate also 
shifting allegiance to ZANU (PF) in the resettled areas. During the 2008 plebiscite, the 
MDC-T won three local authority seats in wards in Goromonzi‘s resettled areas against 
nine claimed by ZANU (PF).
187
 By 2013, the election fortunes of the MDC had 
floundered as it failed to win a single seat local authority contest,
188
 while in Kwekwe, it 
managed only one local authority seat in the Zibagwe Rural District Council in 2008. 
Similar to the situation in Goromonzi, the MDC could not manage a single local authority 
seat in 2013. In fact, ZANU (PF) won uncontested in five of the nine seats in Kwekwe 
resettled areas.  
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Most narratives therefore see ZANU (PF) as a perpetrator of violence towards farm 
workers, coerces them to attend rallies and violate their human rights by forced belonging 
to the party (Laurie 2017; Munyuki-Hungwe, 2011; JAG, 2008; Sachikonye 2012; 
Hartnack 2018). But this is not the complete story of how farm workers related to the 
ZANU (PF) party. Analysts have also discounted the point that farm workers‘ association 
with the ZANU (PF) party could in effect represent mobilisation of the ―associational 
power‖ of the political parties to advance their causes beyond furthering the agendas of 
the latter (e.g. Rutherford 2008; 2018). 
Evidently, farm workers‘ agency manifested in their claims of ―belonging to the party‖ to 
advance their material interests, including defending their residential rights in the 
compounds, searching for land and to benefit from agrarian resources parcelled through 
party structures. ―Tiri nhengo dzemusangano - we are members of the party, ZANU 
(PF)‖, many farm workers remarked during the interviews.
189
 Landless (former) farm 
workers in Kwekwe actively participated in musangano in order to improve their 
possibility to benefit from the land allocations that were underway after the MLRR had 
repossessed land from some oversized A2 farms as per the Maximum Farm Size policy in 
2017 (NYT 2017: Interview). ZANU (PF) still retains a position in the District Land and 
Provincial Land Committees across the country. Apparently, in both Goromonzi and 
Kwekwe District, during every land allocation a quota was reserved for party supporters 
(MGA 2018: Interview). Other farm workers also enhanced their productive capacities on 
their small plots of land after receiving inputs subsidies distributed through the party 
structures such as the Presidential Inputs Scheme (NYT 2017: Interview). 
When faced with eviction threats from old farm compounds in A2 farms, farm workers 
turned to ZANU (PF) for protection. At Matimati Farm in Goromonzi, one of the A2 
beneficiaries in whose plot the old compound lies tried to evict 800 farm worker 
households and their families in 2016, but was stopped by the District Chairperson of 
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 Musangano is a Shona word loosely translating to congregation and is used colloquially /local lingua 
franca) to refer to political parties. Reference to it in most rural areas however applies to ZANU (PF). 
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―…ZANU (PF) accused me of destabilising their source of support after the workers reported my 
intentions to the District Chairman of the party, especially in the context of the beckoning 2018 
General elections‖ (Gambara 2018: Interview). 
 
The planned eviction sought to extend the arable fields into the land occupied by the old 
farm compound to increase both summer maize and winter wheat production and curtail 
thefts of farm produce attributed to the former farm workers. Instead of outright eviction, 
the farmer had backtracked and was now contemplating relocating the farm workers to 
another part of the farm only after the 2018 elections: ―I don‘t want to evict the farm 
workers totally from the farm compound, l just want them to move to the area adjacent to 
the compound so that we can extend our fields‖ (Gambara 2018: Interview). 
At Bromely Farm in Goromonzi, farm workers sought refuge in ZANU (PF) after the 
new A2 owners wanted to evict them because they had refused to work for him.
191
 In 
fact, six of the former farm workers on this farm had started a company called the 
Mashonaland East Tobacco Graders and Contractors, which was  providing grading 
services to the A1 and A2 farms in Goromonzi and neighbouring Marondera district. 
Hence, the farm workers were no longer willing to reverse the newly gained autonomy 
for permanent work under the new A2 owner (see also section 6.6.2). They blocked the 
occupation of the property between 2011 and 2015 with support of ZANU (PF) party 
activists. The new owner was repelled every time he tried to settle at the farm. The A2 
farm owner only managed to take occupation of the farm after a High Court Order in his 
favour (case number 2137/14) and assistance provided by the MLRR in February 2015 to 
move onto the farm. The farm workers succumbed to eviction a short while later and 
some of them have been camped at the Bromely Shopping Centre where their belongings 
were dumped by trucks hired by the farm owner. 
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 Only 6 permanent workers on his 100 hectare plot were from the old farm compound, plus the 10 
women intermittently hired for piece rate work. 
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 See ―Govt settles Bromely Farm Wrangle, The Newsday, 23 February 2015, Harare, 
www.newsday.co.zw/2015/02/govt-settles-bromely-farm-wrangle/ [Accessed 29 April 2018]. 
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Not unique to the study district, media accounts on the eviction case at Sherpton Estates 
in Kadoma, also expose the commonality of associating with ZANU (PF) party to keep 
residential rights in the compounds. There two land beneficiaries had attained a court 
order to evict farm workers from the compound in 2014. In response, the workers wrote a 
petition to the then ZANU (PF) Chairman for Mashonaland West, Temba Mliswa, ZANU 
(PF) National Commissar – Webster Shamu, Muzvezve Member of Parliament – Peter 
Haritatos, Minister of Lands and the President‘s Office to request the party to shield them 
from eviction:  
―…We are not intruders but former farm workers who were promised our 10% of land portion 
near the farm compound of which our 10% portion was not given to us. We have clean party 
campaign records e.g. our former directors are the late Cde (Eddison) Zvobgo, the late Tiny 
Rowland during their time we campaigned for Cde (Edna) Madzongwe, Cde (Webster) Shamu, 




These tendencies reflect the resurgence of ZANU (PF) in safeguarding the rights of farm 
labourers in the LSCFs after independence until it began to fade in the mid 1990s. Recall 
in the early 1980s, farm workers who occupied abandoned LSCFs were regularised as 
official land beneficiaries of LRRP-I with the support of ZANU (PF) (Herbst 1990; 
Moyo et al. 2000). Moreover, the party structures active in the farm compounds after 
independence were key to the improvement of labour rights of farm workers and 
promoting collective action (Kanyenze 2001; Tandon 2001). What has changed now 
relates to its limited role in the direct protection of the working conditions since some of 
party members are also farmers that were infringing on labour rights.  
These findings of course do not mean that farm workers necessarily vote for ZANU (PF) 
in all the plebiscites. As the election results in the districts since 2000 elucidate, support 
to any political is not permanent. If anything, it demonstrates the agency of farm workers 
to draw on the associational power of belonging to ZANU (PF) to advance their material 
conditions. It reiterates Mkodzongi‘s claims that communities in redistributed areas 
―perform ZANU (PF)‖ at different times in order to extract material benefits that are 
                                                 
192
 See ―Farm workers face eviction‖, Newsday 15 March 2014. 
https://www.newsday.co.zw/2014/03/15/farm-workers-face-eviction/ [Accessed 18 July 2017]. 
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derived through the party such as inputs even if they do not support it in elections or 
otherwise (Mkodzongi 2013a; 2013b).  
6.6.5 Transformative struggles: negotiating access to agricultural land rights  
Farm labourers were conscious of the limits of pinning their hopes on the labour markets 
to realise adequate incomes for their sustenance. Their struggles thus exemplified semi-
proletarian tendencies, including taking action in the labour markets as noted above and 
struggling to access land for independent farming (Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Mueller 2011). 
The discussion below elucidates the ―transformative struggles‖ of farm workers 
represented by their quest for a post-wage economy, which more or less represents the 
translation into action the ―transformative approach‖ advocated by Moyo et al. (2000) to 
improve the fortunes of farm workers (see Chapter Two). These kinds of struggles to 
access farming land within and outside the remit of the formal FTLRP land allocation 
processes have been silent in the literature, which tended to see them as passive victims 
of the land reform (Ridderbos 2009; West & Rutherford 2005). Farm workers prosecuted 
the land struggles independently and in collaboration with other actors.  
6.6.5.1 Mobilisation for land during the FTLRP 
Accessing land for both independent residency and agricultural production has been a key 
strategy of farm workers to exit from oppressive LSCF labour markets or to at least 
supplement their meagre wages (Rutherford 2001a; Moyo et al. 2000; Vhurumuku et al. 
1998; see Chapter Four). In 2006, one national survey requested former farm workers to 
outline their preference before and during the land reform. Fifty two percent said they 
wanted to be resettled as the planning for the LRRP-II gathered momentum in the late 
1990s, while 31.3 percent preferred to be re-employed by new farmers (Moyo et al. 2009: 
33). Retrenchment packages, relocating to communal home and retirement were 
mentioned by the less than 10.0 percent of the former farm workers (Moyo et al. 2009: 
33). A higher proportion of former farm workers in Kwekwe (48.7 percent) opted for 
land than those in Goromonzi (40.4 percent) (Moyo et al. 2009: 33). There was an 
increase in those opting for land resettlement to 57.4 percent from 52.0 percent six years 
after the FLTRP began (Moyo et al. 2009: 33). Ostensibly, the confidence about the 
irreversibility of land allocations had become engrained among the former farm workers. 
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In Goromonzi, the share rose slightly to 42.4 percent compared to 62.5 percent in 
Kwekwe (Moyo et al. 2009: 33).  
Table 6.75: Aspirations of farm labourers  
  Goromonzi  Kwekwe  
Aspirations P S PWC Total P S PWC Total 
Get own piece of land 49 5 51.9 45.7 36.9 51.6 39.2 39.9 
Change profession 15 45 20.3 20.1 1 3.2 5.4 2.9 
Better paying farm job 13 20 12.7 13.6 27.2 6.5 14.9 19.7 
Buy cattle 12 0 8.9 9.5 9.7 16.1 10.8 11.1 
Start a business 11 30 6.3 11.1 25.2 22.6 29.7 26.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 100 20 79 199 103 31 74 208 
 
By 2017, still many aspired to be land owners and/or exit farm labour markets through 
changing profession or starting their own businesses (Table 6.75). If cattle ownership, 
which is also dependent on land access, is added to those wanting land, then land based 
social reproduction strategies predominantly marked the future aspirations of the farm 
workers. Resistance to proletarianisation therefore continues to undergird the struggles of 
farm labourers as they largely seek autonomous social reproduction outside the wage 
economy.  
Through participating in the land occupations and formally registering for land 
allocations with different authorities as per state policy, farm workers took direct action 
to translate their aspirations into reality (Moyo 2001; Moyo et al. 2000; Sadomba 2013; 
2011; 2008; Sadomba & Helliker 2012; Helliker & Bhatasara 2018). One scholar, 
Sadomba (2011; 2008), has in fact claimed that land occupations would not have been 
sustained nor covered the expansive LSCFs that they did without the involvement of farm 
workers from the year 2000 onwards due to the few number of war veterans leading the 
process. Farm workers were land short and poor like their counterparts from the 
Communal Areas and thus identified with the agenda to redress the inequitable land 
distribution being advanced by the land occupation movement. Race and class grievances 
thus converged in the land occupation movement encompassing peasants, farm workers 
and others (Moyo 2011a).  
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The participation of farm workers in the land occupations can be captured in four 
dimensions. First, they either participated voluntarily or were coerced by peasants and 
war veterans to join the land movement (Sadomba 2011; 2008; Sadomba & Helliker 
2012). Voluntary participation sometimes arose after farm workers developed 
―consciousness‖ for the need for equitable land distribution following the various 
―pungwes – re-education meetings‖ convened by war veterans after the occupations of 
each LSCF (Sadomba & Helliker 2012). A strategy deployed by farm workers in fear of 
reprisals from their employers entailed occupying LSCFs far away from their places of 
employment to avoid identification as a former tractor driver at Fodya Tisu Tinorima 
Farm in Goromonzi did: 
―When l heard of ―jambanja‖ I decided to join other war veterans who were leading the 
occupations here in Bromely Intensive Conservation Area. I participated in the occupations of 
LSCFs, which were far away from Fodya Tisu Tinorima Farm where l worked for fear of being 
fired from my job. Eventually l registered on the lists that were being compiled by war veterans 
for informal land they were allocating in 2000. When the FTLRP eventually came l got allocated 
an A1 plot by the authorities in 2001.Word eventually got to the white farmer through other 
employees that l was a participant in the land occupations. I got punished for it. I was asked to 
destump a very big section of the farm. I was demoted from my post as a tractor driver to a general 
hand. Life was tough in the farms. I could not do anything with the money l was earning in the 
farms. I was struggling to feed my family and send children to school who were resident in the 
Communal Areas of Rusape. Land reform provided me a chance to be independent and be a 
landowner‖ (Chitombo 2017: Interview). 
 
At every farm occupied, temporary residential bases would be set up for the land 
occupiers. The war veteran leadership of the land occupations would then proceed to 
occupy other LSCFs in the districts and leave behind a group of land occupiers. To 
sustain the numbers of the land occupiers, war veterans would then recruit farm workers 
from the occupied LSCFs to occupy other LSCFs (WZS 2017: Interview). Farm workers, 
therefore, became a critical constituent in sustaining and cascading the occupations of 
LSCFs in the year 2000 in districts such as Goromonzi.  
Second, some seasonal farm workers who split their time between work in the LSCFs and 
agricultural production in the Communal Areas on small arable lands were also part of 
the peasants from Chikwaka, Chinhamora and Chinyika in Goromonzi and Gokwe South, 
Silobela and Zhombe in Kwekwe that occupied neighbouring LSCFs. They were crucial 
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in providing information on employers with known records of worker brutality, a 
criterion used by war veterans to target LSCFs to be occupied (WZS 2017: Interview).  
Third, farm workers were not only mobilised by war veterans and peasants, but they also 
articulated their land grievances through land occupations they organised on their own. 
Indeed former farm workers were identified by white LSCFs as the third dominant group 
in perpetrating ―human rights‖ violations against land owners after liberation war 
veterans and ZANU (PF) members during the land occupations (ZHR & JAG 2007).  
Yet others, unsure of the eventuality of the land occupations, took the side of their white 
employers and fought war veterans and peasants, holding out their hopes on keeping 
LSCF jobs and residential rights in the old farm compounds instead of a new life as 
independent agricultural producers. Violence thus broke out pitting former farm workers 
and white farmers against the peasants and war veterans. At several moments, land 
occupiers were outnumbered and repelled by LSCFs and their workforce and had to 
retreat to re-strategise the execution of the land occupations (DMT 2017: Interview). As a 
matter of fact, this was one of the reasons why a strategy was developed to enlist farm 
workers as an ally in the land occupations (Sadomba 2008). This intra-class tensions 
between farm workers and other land occupiers earned the former the ―sell outs‖ label. 
Fourth, some farm workers lent logistical support, intelligence information and food 
supplies to the land occupiers. Following the occupations of Chamvari farm in 
Goromonzi in 2001, war veterans relied on food supplies from farm workers to maintain 
the presence on the occupied farm: 
―Although we did not physically join the land occupations, the agenda to reclaim land from the 
white farmers resonated with our aspirations. We also wanted land and these were our black 
brothers pursuing this cause. You know life in form had become so tough‖, Joseph continued. I 
mobilised food contributions from the rest of the workforce during the night and gave it to the 
occupiers‖ (Joseph 2017: Interview).  
Because no agricultural production was undertaken by the land occupiers between 2000 
and 2002, without the support of the likes of Joseph, war veterans and peasants would 
have been forced to retreat to the Communal Areas to look for food. The white LSCFs 
scuttled efforts to establish food production by the occupiers by destroying their crops.  
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During the occupations, they received informal land allocations from the liberation war 
veterans or were registered in lists of those wanting land. When the formal FTLRP began, 
land occupiers received priority and some farm workers had their informal plots 
regularised by the District Land Committees. Receipt of the formal FTLRP allocations 
were noted in five percent of the Goromonzi farm workers compared to 15.7 percent in 
Kwekwe (see Table 6.45). Across both districts, permanent workers had the least share of 
the FTLRP land owners. As proportion of land beneficiaries, formers farm workers 
constituted 3.9 percent and 8.3 percent of the A1 farmers in Goromonzi and Kwekwe 
respectively (see Table 6.20). Few had benefitted from the A2 scheme, 1.4 percent and 
4.8 percent in the corresponding districts (Table 6.20). Both male and female farm 
workers received FTLRP land allocations. In fact, in both districts, women had higher 
shares that benefitted - 7.4 percent in Goromonzi and 15.6 percent in Kwekwe. In 
comparison, 4.1 percent and 12.3 percent of the male farm workers had gained land in the 
two districts respectively.  
Kwekwe had relatively higher share of farm workers land beneficiaries because the 
District Land Committee there reserved a portion of the plots in every A1 farm to some 
of the farm worker resident on those farms (PLB 2018: Interview). Moreover, former 
farm workers in Kwekwe were active partakers in the land occupations than those in 
Goromonzi. Out of the 27 who got land in Kwekwe, 17 had taken part in the land 
occupations. In contrast, only two out of the 10 in Goromonzi had done so. District land 
committees were instructed by the MLRR to accommodate more farm workers in the 
land allocations from around 2002. Yet this could have been late as land reform now 
shifted focus towards resettlement in the A2 scheme (see Moyo 2013) – which many 
farm worker did not qualify as it required proof of financial resources to sustain a 
commercial farming operation during the application process. 
Given that only about 20 percent of the LSCFs experienced land occupations (Moyo et 
al. 2009: 19), many farm workers who got land utilised state policy of registering for land 
with the District Administrator or traditional Chiefs in the Customary Areas. Land 
registrations by former farm workers were not free from political tensions as there was a 
tendency to paint them with a blanket brush as MDC supporters (Chambati 2011). This 
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association with white farmers and the MDC hamstrung their quest for land against the 
politically connected peasants from the Communal Areas (see Moyo 2011a).  
Regardless of being registered on the lists compiled by war veterans during the 
occupations in Mazowe and Goromonzi together with other peasant occupiers, names of 
farm workers were removed by the land allocating authorities in the early 2000s (WSZ 
2017: Interview). These assertions were also corroborated by one farm worker at 
Chamvari Farm, who recalled doing the same in 2001, but lost out during the formal land 
allocations in 2003 (Joseph 2017: Interview). Stories were also heard of how former farm 
workers in Goromonzi were turned away by the land allocating authorities on attempting 
to enlist for land, evidence also corroborated by Sadomba (2008). To dodge these 
challenges, some farm workers that had gained concealed their identity as former farm 
workers when applying for land with the authorities but instead used their connections to 
the Communal Areas (Moyo et al. 2009). Such an option was not present for farm 
workers of foreign migrant origin. Yet other war veterans also excluded them because 
they were ―…sell outs who fought against the land occupiers and did not deserve to be 
allocated land‖ (DM 2017: Interview). 
Farm workers also lost the struggle for land on account of being wrongly perceived as 
foreigners (Daimon 2014; Moyo et al. 2000; see also Section 6.4) not eligible for FTLRP 
allocations. Furthermore, farm workers of foreign origin historically faced challenges to 
procure Zimbabwean identity documents which were required to access land (see 
Magaramombe 2001). In Goromonzi, 6.7 percent and 10 percent of the interviewed 
former farm workers whose parents were born in Mozambique and Malawi had no 
identity documents and could thus not apply for land during the FTLRP, while in 
Kwekwe, these were 14.3 percent and 25 percent respectively. Farm workers of foreign 
migrant origin were thus failed by the limited accessibility of the state registration 
services for them to acquire national identity cards and passports to prove that they are 
Zimbabweans as provided for by the Section 43 of the Consitution of Zimbabwe 
Amendment Act (No. 20) Act 2013. 
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Not all farm workers who wanted FTLRP land allocations succeeded in this enterprise 
and thus other avenues were thus pursued, encompassing informal land allocations within 
and without the resettled areas. Yet is not correct to imply that farm workers were 
completely marginalised from land access as some analysts do (Alexander 2003; 
Riderboos 2009). 
6.6.5.2 Procuring land in the Communal Areas  
After being displaced from the farm compounds as the occupations of LSCFs unravelled, 
some farm workers had trekked back to their Communal Areas of origin (Sachikonye 
2003; IDMC 2008; Magaramombe 2010; Kinsey 2010). Others followed suit after 
missing out on FTLRP land allocations, and utilised various avenues to negotiate for land 
in these areas, including on places vacated by resettled farmers. As permanent workers 
did prior to 2000 (Vhurumuku et al. 1998; Moyo et al. 2000; Rutherford 2001a), seeking 
land in the Communal Areas continued to be a route towards realising a ―peasant path‖ 
for farm workers (Moyo et al. 2013: 94). Owning a musha or Communal Area home was 
significantly associated with the current type of farm employment. Permanent workers 
accounted for at least 75 percent of Communal Area landholders in both districts.  
Thirty two percent of the farm workers in both districts owned Communal Area land 
(Table 6.45). Male former farm workers had a relatively larger share of Communal Area 
landholders than females. In Goromonzi, 35.1 percent of the former compared to 25.0 
percent of the latter were counted. Similar patterns were exhibited in Kwekwe as 35.1 
percent of the male former farm workers owned plots in these rural areas compared to 
23.1 percent among female former farm workers. Traditional leaders which dominate the 
allocation of land operate on a patriarchal plane which partly explains why women lag 
behind men in the ownership of land in the Communal Areas (see Bhatasara & Chiweshe 
2017; Chiweshe, Chakona & Helliker 2014; Makura-Paradza 2010). Most former farm 
workers in Goromonzi had obtained this land after 2000 (70.5 percent), while in 
Kwekwe, 48.8 percent did so at this time.  
Communal Area land was accessed through negotiating with traditional leaders, 
purchases in the informal markets, inheritance and family subdivision (Table 6.76). Farm 
 
 380 
workers of migrant origin lacked the kinship ties that were key to accessing land in the 
Communal Areas and thus compared to those of Zimbabwean roots fewer of them were 
successful in this endeavour. Among the latter, 41.8 percent had managed to acquire land 
in the Communal Areas compared to 27 percent of the former in Goromonzi. The same 
situation prevailed in Kwekwe where 26.9 percent of the former farm workers of 
Zimbabwean origin now owned rural land juxtaposed to 11.1 percent of those of foreign 
migrant origin. 
Table 6.76: Avenue utilised to access Communal Area land  
Avenue used  
Goromonzi Kwekwe 
P S PWC Total P S PWC Total 
Traditional leader 36.6 30 38.5 36.4 25 0 22.2 21.2 
In-laws 0 30 3.8 5.2 11.1 0 0 7.7 
Bought it 9.8 10 0 6.5 5.6 0 0 3.8 
Inherited the land 14.6 0 19.2 14.3 11.1 14.3 33.3 15.4 
Family 39.1 30 38.5 37.7 47.2 85.7 44.4 51.9 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 41 10 26 77 36 7 9 52 
 
Similar to urban workers who held Communal Area homes as a form of long-term 
security (Potts 2012; 2000; Makura-Paradza 2010; Yeros 2013a; 2002) in case of 
unemployment, infirmity and/or sickness, farm workers actively sought land in the 
Communal Areas in the context of the FTLRP. Such a strategy resonated with the story 
presented by George, a former farm worker at Chamvari Farm (Box 6.3). 
Box 6.3: Procuring a rural home in the Communal Areas 
Not sure of his age, George started working in LSCFs in 1947 having migrated from Tete Province in 
Mozambique. Having risen through the ranks to become foremen, George unlike many of his counterparts 
managed to send his children to school - who later become his source of security in the advent of the 
FTLRP. Now in retirement, George faced the evictions from the compound in 2005 and then again in 2013 
as new farmers demanded to occupy his home – brick and asbestos occupied by senior farm workers. This 
tenuous tenure security in the farm compound prompted George‘s children, the elder a farm manager at 
nearby agro-industrial chicken farm to marshal resources to purchase a plot/kumusha for their father 
composed of half hectare for the residency and half hectare of arable land to grow crops. ―At least now I 
have a place I call my own – independent from the threats of the of the land beneficiaries. My children will 
now be able to inherit this piece of land when I deport this planet unlike the case in the farm compound 
commented George.  
Source: George (2018: Interview)  
Their social reproduction now involved straddling between wage work in the resettled 
areas and joining other family members at weekends or month ends during the rainy 
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season to contribute labour supplies on their plots in the Communal Areas. Analogous to 
the land beneficiaries, agricultural production by farm workers in the Communal Areas 
was focused on food crops (see Hanlon et al. 2013; Matondi 2012; Moyo et al. 2009) for 
auto-consumption. Hence, savings were generated by skipping some purchases in volatile 
food markets. Arable land sizes owned in Communal Areas averaged 1.48 hectares in 
Goromonzi and 2.78 hectares in Kwekwe. 
6.6.5.3 Informal land access in the resettled areas  
Formal land allocations have been emphasised in the literature to signal the exclusion of 
former farm workers from the FTLRP (Sachikonye 2003; Ridderboos 2008; Rutherford 
2008; Hartnack 2016). This underplayed the agency of farm workers to fashion other 
variegated channels to access land, including from the land beneficiaries and through 
―self-provisioning‖ of unused lands in the resettled areas (Moyo 1995: 17). As some 
analysts have argued, the beneficiaries of land reform went beyond those formally 
recognised and include other people whom they share their land with including farm 
workers (Moyo et al. 2009). The farm workers surveyed were able to seek informal 
access to land, including from their employment connections especially amongst the 
permanent workers (see section 6.5.6). As stated earlier, just over 16 percent of them in 
both districts accessed land informally in the resettled areas, which was excised from the 
plots of the land beneficiaries.  
Loose kinship ties such as sharing the same totem with land beneficiaries was also 
harnessed to negotiate for access by some piece/daily workers. As noted below, the 
extent of success through this strategy partially depended on the countries of origin of 
farm workers. Instead of the capitalist oriented A2 landholders, it was mostly the A1 
farmers who gave portions of their land to their workers across both districts. In 
Goromonzi, 62.6 percent of the farm workers that enjoyed informal land access were 
given by A1 households and the proportion escalated to 88.2 percent in Kwekwe. Former 
farm workers of foreign migrant origin were less able to connect with land beneficiaries 
in order to access informal land than their counterparts of Zimbabwean roots. Twenty 
seven of the 33 farm workers benefitting from informal land leasing in Goromonzi had 
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their fathers born in Zimbabwe, while only one farm worker of foreign migrant origin out 
of 34 did so in Kwekwe. 
The land areas parcelled by land beneficiaries to workers were larger in Kwekwe, 
averaging 1.66 hectares matched to 0.99 hectares in Goromonzi. Food production (maize, 
groundnuts and vegetables) was the predominant land use again on these small plots of 
land, while a few also grew cash crops such as tobacco and soyabeans (Figure 6.21). 
Only males were producing cash crops. Informal land access, as a ―social wage‖ 
contributed substantially in meeting part of the food meals of farm workers. An average 
of 1300 kilogrammes of maize grain was harvested by farm workers on the land leased 
from beneficiaries during the 2016/17 season, while in Kwekwe the mean output was 
1,026 kilogrammes. This translated to annual grain requirements for 6.27 and 4.94 adults 
in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively.
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Figure 6.21: Crop production on informal lands accessed by farm workers, 2016/17 
season 
 
Some senior (male) former farm workers have continued to access the land in the farm 
compounds, which they used to produce food before the FTLRP (Vhurumuku et al. 1998; 
FCTZ 2001). Two maps (Figure 6.22 and 6.23) of the farm compounds in Goromonzi 
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 According to World Health Organisation (WHO) guidelines, an adult requires about 207.3 kgs of maize 
grain or grain per year at recommended consumption rate of 568 grams per adult equivalent per day 
(www.indepth-network.org/Resource٪20DSS٪20Resource٪20kit/Measuring food security survey 
rounds.htm [Accessed on 19 February 2018] 











and Kwekwe depict the scenario found in most farm compounds visited during the 
research in relation to the outlay of housing infrastructure and the availability of small 
arable land sizes. Larger farm workforces employed in Goromonzi LSCFs, implied that 
compounds tended to bigger in size than those found in Kwekwe district. Moreover, in 
Kwekwe, some LSCFs, especially those involved in livestock production, had no farm 
compounds, but shared this infrastructure with other farms (MRT 2017: Interview). 
Multiple farm owners also maintained compounds on one of the farms rather than on all 
of the farms they owned. 
Figure 6.22: Map of farm compound at Komuredhi Farm in Goromonzi District 
 
 





Since almost all LSCFs in Goromonzi had a farm compound, there was a higher 
proportion of farm workers (31.8 percent) accessing arable land in the farm compounds 
in this district compared to those in Kwekwe (20.0 percent), which did not have this 
infrastructure on all the farms (Table 6.77). Agricultural land rights in compounds were 
more prevalent in former LSCFs resettled under the A1 scheme, followed by those on 
subdivided A2 farms (Table 6.77). New compounds constructed by land beneficiaries on 
their plots provided the least land access to farm workers – only 7.9 percent and 11.1 
percent in Goromonzi and Kwekwe respectively. 
Table 6.77: Type of farm compounds where farm workers are accessing land 
Type of compound Goromonzi (%) Kwekwe (%) 
  P S PWC Total P S PWC Total 
Old compound on A1 farm 44.4 100 61.3 57.1 16.7 0 12.5 11.1 
Old compound on A2 subdivided farm 37 0 32.3 31.7 66.7 100 25 55.6 
Old compound on A2 wholesome farm 0 0 6.5 3.2 0 0 12.5 5.6 
New farm compound on A2 subdivided farm 14.8 0 0 6.3 16.7 0 12.5 11.1 
New farm compound on A1 farm 3.7 0 0 1.6 0 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 27 5 31 63 6 4 8 18 
 
The plot sizes in the compound in Goromonzi ranged from 0.1 to 1.00 hectares compared 
to between 0.20 and 1.50 hectares in Kwekwe.  
 
Box 6.4: Gaining land rights on lands vacated by former senior male workers 
Mavhuso a female former farm worker at Chitoti Farm in Kwekwe worked as a general hand until the 
farm was acquired for resettlement in 2005. She did not have any piece of land to farm in the 
compound. Her neighbour, a male foreman owned about 0.05 hectares of land behind his house. After 
he left the compound to assume ownership of his new A1 plot in the district in 2006, an opportunity 
emerged for Mavhuso to take over the piece of land. She has been producing maize for family 
consumption since then, alongside piece/daily work in the new farms. During the 2016/17 season, 
Mavhuso had harvested four 50 kilogramme bags of maize grain. This was enough to last about 10 
months for the family of three, including her mother and nephew. A similar story echoed with Sharon, 
former junior female farm worker at Matimati Farm in Goromonzi. She had also taken over a plot left 
behind by a senior male farm worker who moved back to his Communal Area home in 2007 after the 
redistribution of the farm to A2 landholders. Together with her husband and five children, Sharon also 
produces maize on the 0.08 hectare plot, while working as permanent worker at a neighbouring 
horticultural export farm. Others had also extended residential space as they accommodated the 
married children in vacant houses left by their colleagues as happened at Komuredhi and Ivhue Redu 
Farms in Goromonzi.  
Source: Mavhuso (2017: Interview) 
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New and former farm workers acquired agricultural land rights in the compounds from 
the former LSCFs, and new land beneficiaries (Table 6.78). Moreover, the agency of 
farm workers was also seen from the self-allocations of land in the old farm compounds 
on lands vacated by their former colleagues who had left for various destinations. This 
involved 32.3 and 38.9 percent Goromonzi and Kwekwe labourers respectively (Table 
6.78; see also Box 6.4). 
Table 6.78: Who allocated farm workers land in the farm compounds 
 Allocated by 
Goromonzi Kwekwe 
P S PWC Total P S PWC Total  
Former LSCF 23.1 0 38.7 29 16.7 50 25 27.8 
New land beneficiary 65.4 0 22.6 38.7 50 25 25 33.3 
Self-allocated 11.5 100 38.7 32.3 33.3 25 50 38.9 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 26 5 31 62 6 4 8 18 
Chi-Square 22.540  2.250  
p 0.000*  0.690**  
*Significant at p<0.05  **Not significant at p<0.05  
Before 2000, exploitation of fields in the compound for those who had it was constrained 
by the long work schedules in the LSCFs. Today, flexibility offered by piece/daily work, 
which many former farm workers were now mainly involved enables more latitude to 
apply labour from within their families to produce both food and cash crops:  
―…We used to start work at 6am and finish at 4pm between Monday and Saturday. There was no 
time to tend your crops. Now that I don‘t have a regular job, I can manage my time between 
tending my own small plot and selling my labour to the A1 and A2 land beneficiaries. During the 
season, I start to work on my small plot in the compound before I go to look for paid labour‖ 
(Mavhuso 2017: Interview).  
 
Food crops such as maize, sweet potatoes and vegetables were popular land uses in the 
farm compounds before land reform. In particular reference to maize, the average harvest 
of 420 kgs and 662 kgs in Goromonzi and Kwekwe were adequate to feed 2.02 and 3.19 
adults per year respectively.
194
 Besides free range chicken, livestock production was 
largely restricted in the old farm compounds. A case study in Mazowe district 
documented by Scoones et al. (2018a: 16) is worth reciting. There one farm worker 
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 According to WHO guidelines (see Section 6.6.5.3).  
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narrated how he was ordered at the ―farmers‘ own court‖ to stop the production of 
chicken broilers in the compound without permission.   




Former farm workers were evolving a wide range of land uses, not to mention the non-
farm enterprises, seen in the compound nowadays pointing to the newly acquired 
―freedoms‖ non-existent under the controls imposed by the former LSCFs. Four of the 
twenty-four farm workers who had access to compound arable land in Goromonzi had 
grown tobacco in the 2016/17 season (see Figure 6.24). These dynamics were uncommon 
in Kwekwe. Cattle and goats have also found their way into old farm compounds in 
Goromonzi (see Figure 6.25).  
Figure 6.25: Goat production at Matimati Farm Compound, Goromonzi  
 
 
Beyond the new agricultural land uses, an array of income generating took place in the 
farm compounds. Farm shops operated by LSCFs have now been replaced by informal 
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tuck shops and bars/sheebens, alongside those run by land beneficiaries. Other activities 
observed included brick making and furniture making in the compound (see Figure 6.26 
and 6.27). On many former LSCFs, nobody was allowed to sell items that were found in 
the farm shops and bars (Sharon 2017: Interview). White farmers monopolised these 
income-generating activities as a way to recapture the wages paid through cash and credit 
purchases of the overpriced goods and services (Loewenson 1992; Gibbon 2011) as 
indicated earlier (Section 6.5.4.1). 
Figure 6.26: Brick making and thatching grass trade, Goromonzi  
 
 
This evidence shows that farm compounds were not just places of residency, but also 
deployed by farm workers as productive zones for both agricultural and non- agricultural 
activities. This contradicts claims by other scholars that farm workers who remained in 
the compounds were ―displaced in situ‖ and without work (Magaramombe 2010).  
Figure 6.27: Furniture making at Matimati Farm, Goromonzi 
 
 
Emphasising the collapse of social services such as medical facilities, piped water and 
toilets (Matondi 2012; GAPWUZ 2010; Pilosoff 2012), and/or the use of the same 
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without compensation to landholders (Utete 2003) has thus missed the expression of farm 
workers‘ agency through the emerging forms of production relations and livelihoods in 
the old farm compounds. These struggles by both farmers and workers in the compounds 
are also omitted altogether by focusing on farm worker strategies beyond the compound 
(Hartnack 2016).  
―Self-provisioning‖ of unused lands (Moyo 1995: 17) in the resettled areas outside of the 
compounds also provided informal land access to one percent of the permanent and 3.8 
percent of piece/daily workers in Goromonzi (see Table 6.45). Such land access was 
reported by 1.4 percent of the piece/daily workers in Kwekwe.  
6.6.6 Peasant and capitalist farmers’ responses to labour struggles 
The outcomes of the farm labour struggles were discernible through the ―labour 
shortages‖, which the new farm employers faced despite the availability of workers in the 
old farm compounds. Uncommon in the LSCFs because labour could be summoned at 
peak periods from the farm compounds that always housed ―surplus labour‖ than which 
was required at any given point in time, including from the families of the permanent 
workers (Tandon 2001). Moyo et al. (2009: 106) exposed the severe ―labour shortages‖ 
that were being experienced by 38.4 percent of the 2084 A1 and A2 households surveyed 
nationally. These challenges also did not go unnoticed by Utete (2003) and Matondi 
(2012) who assigned blame to the alternative livelihoods such artisanal gold mining, in 
which farm workers were now involved instead of participating in farm labour markets.  
Perhaps, it is also worth retrieving the complaint made by the chairperson of the 
Zimbabwe Agricultural Employers Organisations in the press regarding the ―shortages of 
labour‖ in 2005. The available farm labour in the old farm compounds were noted to be 
refusing to work because of the poor wages that were being offered by the new farm 
employers.
195
 This reflected the increased bargaining power that had accrued to farm 
workers to ―vote with their feet‖, and new farmers‘ inability to compel labour through the 
residential tenancy. Challenges of labour mobilisation in the new agrarian structure 
                                                 
195
 See ―Labour crisis hits new farms‖, The Independent, 4 March 2005, 
https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2005/03/04/labour-crisis-hits-new-farmers/[Accessed 13 May 2018]. 
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elicited differentiated responses from both the peasant and capitalist farms, which are 
uncovered below. 
6.6.6.1 Improve working conditions of farm labour  
An array of incentives have been introduced to attract and retain labour. To discourage 
non-attendance at work by permanent labourers seeking extra income in piece work and 
other non-farm activities work attendance bonuses had surfaced in the new resettlement 
areas  (Table 6.67). Allocation of tasks would be affected if some workers did not report 
for duty and farmers feared the adverse consequences on agricultural production and 
productivity. The work attendance bonus were paid depending on the number of days an 
employee pitched up for work, unless proof of a valid reason was furnished to the 
employers for being absent from work. Production bonuses were also observed and 
represented farm employers‘ strategy to contain staff turnover especially amongst the 
skilled group of workers (Table 6.67). These responses were concentrated in the capitalist 
farms in the A2 sector, which relied on hired labour to organise their farming than the 
peasant farms in the A1 scheme. 
The average wages for permanent workers were 1.4 times significantly higher in 
capitalist farms than those in the middle peasant farms. Some new farm employers 
surpassed the negotiated minimum wages to keep workers in their employ. Past the 
negotiated wages, the members of the ZTA for instance, were paying an additional 
US$15 as part of the work retention schemes (Jera 2017: Interview). The skills in tobacco 
production were mostly endowed by former farm workers and were scarce on the labour 
markets since this commodity was largely produced in the LSCFs before the land 
reforms.  
The provision of meals at work to piece/daily workers had become an instrument to 
attract labour during periods of intense competition for workers, usually between 
November and December (MPEW 2017: Interview). Apparently, this had transformed 
into a standard in the piece/daily labour markets of Goromonzi since the workers were 
demanding an additional US$1.00 to cover meals if the employers did not provide food 
(BLG 2017: Interview). Permanent workers were also recipients of meals at their 
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workplaces on top of the monthly food rations provided by some employers. The 
issuance of meals to piece/daily workers was more common in Goromonzi than in 
Kwekwe (section 6.5.6).  
6.6.6.2 Labour mobilisation strategies: “spatial fix” 
The importation of labour as is common in contexts where large-scale farming 
predominates has been a common strategy adopted by both A1 and A2 farm employers to 
mobilise farm labour supplies (Delgado Wise & Veltmeyer 2016; Gibbon 2011; Selwyn 
2014; Oya & Pontara 2015). Rather than the relocation of industries to areas where 
―surplus labour‖ exists as a ―spatial fix‖ to respond to increased labour struggles 
discussed by Silver (2003) in reference to the US automobile industries shift to Europe 
and later to Asia in the 1960s, new farm employers were shifting from depending on the 
old farm compounds for farm labour supplies to include Communal and other areas.  
In place of local sources of permanent labour from the old farm compounds, the A1 and 
A2 farm households had expanded the boundaries of recruitment. A2 farmers‘ responses 
to why they were not hiring all their labour from the existent sources in the old farm 
compounds were more akin to the rhetoric of the ―lazy native‖ (Li Murray 2011: 286). 
Former farm workers were often characterised as a ―lazy‖ and ―ill disciplined‖ lot who 
were refusing to work for the new farmers rather than evolving resistance to the poor 
wages.  
The sources of permanent labour now include their Communal Area of origin or kumusha 
irrespective of the distance to their farm households. About 15.4 percent of the 
Goromonzi A1 households had recruited permanent labour from there (Table 6.79). None 
of the A2 households in this district had mobilised labour from their kumusha. Other 
Communal Areas including, Chikwaka (Western side) and Chinhamora (North-Eastern 
side) that are on the margins of the resettled areas, and Chinyika located at the centre of 
the districts provided permanent labour to 80.8 percent and 67.7 percent of the A1 and 
A2 farms (see Figure 3.2). Overall, permanent farm workers in the surveyed households 
were mobilised from over 12 districts spread in half of the eight rural provinces in the 
country. Only three of the districts were in Mashonaland East province where Goromonzi 
 
 391 
is found namely Mutoko, Murehwa and Seke. The peasantry as source of permanent 
labour now consists of those from the Communal Areas working alongside the new 
peasantry from the local A1 farms that 4.8 percent of the A2 landowners in Goromonzi 
hired. 
The recruitment from the same district was more frequent among A2 farms than it was in 
the A1 farms in Goromonzi (Table 6.79). Former farm workers were mentioned as a 
source of permanent labour by 15.4 percent and 83.9 percent of the A1 and A2 farms 
respectively (Table 6.79). An estimated 6.5 percent of the A2 farm households had 
imported former farm workers from outside Goromonzi as well. That the A2 were the 
ones frequently integrated into production of commodities for international markets (e.g. 
tobacco) and valued the skills of former farm workers thus echoed in their hiring patterns 
of permanent labour. 





Goromonzi  Kwekwe  
Goromonzi Kwekwe 
A1 A2 A1 A2 CA A1 
A2 CA A1 A2 CA 
Communal 
Area of origin 15.4 0 6.1 17.5 100 50.8 0 90 3.7 4.1 100 
Other 
Communal 
Areas 80.8 67.7 71.4 72.5 0 5.1 56.9 10 2.8 14.3 0 
Local A1 
farmers 0 4.8 16.3 27.5 0 8.5 1.5 0 87 73.5 0 
Urban Areas 0 0 0 10 0 74.6 0 0 7.4 16.3 0 
Former farm 
workers in 




district 0 6.5 4.1 0 0 6.8 1.5 0 0 0 0 
N 26 62 49 40 4 55 65 20 108 49 10 
 
Comparable sources of permanent labour were identified from farm households in 
Kwekwe, but urban areas not cited in Goromonzi featured in this district (Table 6.79). 
Once more, the Communal Areas was the primary source of permanent labour and was 
mostly from other areas not their kumusha (Table 6.79). Because of alternative 
livelihoods (Murray Li 2011), especially in gold panning, peasants from Silobela and 
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Zhombe Communal Areas in Kwekwe resist poorly paid farm work offered by the new 
range of producers, which they combine with low productivity agricultural production 
(see also Moyo et al. 2009; Chigumira 2018). Consequently, Gokwe South district, 
neighbouring Kwekwe on the Northern border of the district was a key source of 
permanent labour.
 196
 In fact, over 51 percent of the farms that had utilised Communal 
Areas as source of permanent labour mobilised from there compared to 18.4 percent from 
Zhombe and Silobela Communal Areas. The balance was spread in other districts in the 
Midlands, Masvingo, Mashonaland West and Manicaland provinces. Overall, permanent 
farm workers engaged in Kwekwe in the A1 and A2 households were traced to 16 rural 
districts in Zimbabwe.  
Mobilisation of part-time labour was dependent mostly on local sources of labour within 
the redistributed farms in direct contrast to that of permanent labour. Those in Goromonzi 
relied mostly on old farm compounds, while the new peasantry from the A1 farms was 
however the main source of part-time farm labour in Kwekwe (Table 6.79). Urban areas 
were also supplying casual labour to all the settlements except the A2 farms in 
Goromonzi (Table 6.79). 
A1 and A2 households on their plot subdivisions tied the importation of labour to the 
construction of new farm compounds (see section 6.4.6). Such tendencies have been on 
the rise nationally and were dominated by the Mashonaland Provinces that have the most 
developed labour markets.
197
 Like the old farm compounds, the new ones simulate the 
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 Furthermore, Gokwe South is one of the 11 districts that did not have any LSCFs and many peasants 
from this area‘s prospects to gain land were more constrained than others belonging to districts, which 
implemented the FTLRP (see Mkodzongi 2013b). This was largely due to the ethno-regionalism whereby 
those originating from within the district were preferred for land offers than those from elsewhere (see 
Moyo 2011; 2013). So, compared to other Communal Areas in districts with LSCFs, land shortages were 
more rife and compelled residents in Gokwe South to farm labour markets in Kwekwe and beyond. 
Additionally, peasants in Gokwe, options to survive on the small pieces of land was severely dented by the 
collapse of cotton production that had been its mainstay for decades due to the challenges in contract 
farming and slump in international prices of cotton lint (Poulton & Hanyani-Mlambo 2009; Binswanger-
Mkhize & Moyo 2012).  
 
197
 This evidence is substantiated by the rise in the investment in new farm housing for workers by both A1 
and A2 since 2009 captured by the national statistical agency (ZIMSTAT 2015a; 2015b). The amount of 
money spent on new houses for workers by A2 farmers rose from US$702,267 in 2009 to US$4,095,063 in 
2014 (ZIMSTAT 2015a:125). On average, US$1572,866.80 was spent per annum in the A2 scheme on new 
worker housing during this period. The investment in the A1 farms was much lower, but still an increase 
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residential labour tenancy relationship and guarantee the supply of labour from the 
workers and their families. The A1 farmers however were housing imported labour 
within their homesteads.  
New farm employers also attempted to force the piece/daily workers living in the old 
farm compounds to channel labour to their farms in Goromonzi or be evicted from their 
housing. Due to the different policy relating to the farm compounds in the A1 and A2 
schemes, the outcomes of eviction threats also varied. Over 31 percent of the piece/daily 
workers in Goromonzi A1 farms were confronted with threats of eviction from their 
houses in the compounds compared to 7.2 percent of the permanent labour (Table 6.80). 
The main reason provoking eviction threats in Goromonzi was their reluctance to sell 
labour to the new landholders as mentioned by over 50 percent of them. The incidence of 
eviction threats affected only 3.1 percent of the piece/daily workers and none of the 
permanent workers in Kwekwe.  




P S PWC Total P S PWC Total 
Yes 7.2 5.3 31.2 16.6 0 7.1 3.1 2.2 
No 92.8 94.7 68.8 83.4 100 92.9 96.9 97.8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 97 19 77 193 93 28 65 186 
Chi-
Square 19.757  5.625  
p 0.000*  0.060**  
*Significant at p<0.05  **Not significant at p<0.05  
Goromonzi defended their residential rights by engaging in violent confrontations with 
the land beneficiaries that were reported by 20.3 percent of the piece/daily workers. 
Fewer permanent and seasonal labourers alluded to this - 8.0 percent and 5.3 percent 
respectively. None in Kwekwe described these trends.  
Fifty farm worker families at Chamvari A1 farm in Goromonzi were evicted from the 
compound in 2005 after resisting to supply wage labour to the peasants whom they 
                                                                                                                                                 
from US$112,721 to US$372,546 was recorded between 2009 and 2014 (ZIMSTAT 2015b:138). 
Mashonaland Provinces, which command the highest demand for farm labour dominated the investments in 
new worker housing. For instance in 2014, Mashonaland East A2 farms (where Goromonzi is located) 
spent US$275,260 in new worker housing compared to US$18,746 in Midlands (where Kwekwe is located) 
(ZIMSTAT 2015a: 131). 
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accussed of underpaying them (Jospeph 2017: Interview). Their pole and dagga houses 
were razed to the ground by the A1 farms. The prospective MDC Member of Parliament 
for the area referred them to ZLHR, which launched an application against the farmers at 
Goromonzi Magistrate Court. They returned to their residency after the A1 farmers cited 
in the application were directed by the court to allow the former workers to return to their 
homes without any conditions (see Annex 6.1). So besides relying on ZANU (PF) for 
protection from evictions in the farm compounds (see section 6.6.4), NGOs such as 
ZLHR were critical allies of farm workers in blocking displacements from the 
compounds.  
Those on A2 farm compounds were not so lucky in returning or keeping their houses 
after facing evictions. For instance, the farm workers at Banana Groove (an A2 
settlement farm in Goromonzi) were initially protected from evictions by ZLHR at the 
local court around 2011 (Chimbga 2017: Interview)  were eventually evicted after the A2 
farmer in possession of the compound overturned the judgement on appeal at the High 
Court in Harare.
198
 Since 2015, eight families who did not have anywhere else to go of 
foreign migrant origin constructed makeshift houses along the road next to the farm with 
no resolution in sight. 
Indeed, precedence was set at the Constitutional Court that farm workers living in the old 
farm compounds in A2 farms could be evicted if they were not employed on the farm 
through the Gazetted Lands (Consequential Provisions) Act of 2006. Forty six farm 
workers at Mgutu of Great B farm in Mazowe district allocated to 33 A2 farmers were 
charged at the Magistrates Court for illegal occupation of the farm compound since the 
new owner did not formally employ them. Once more, with the help of the ZLHR, the 
farm workers lodged an appeal at the Constitutional Court, Application Number CCZ 
245/12, in 2015 arguing the impending evictions would violate their ―right to life‖ among 
other constitutionally enshrined rights. The Constitutional Court upheld the judgement of 
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 See ―Stranded ex-farm workers suffer three year ordeal‖, The Standard 16 April 2017, Harare, www.the 




the lower court that the former farm workers were contravening the Gazetted Lands 
(Consequential Provisions) Act of 2006 which enjoins the: 
―…former owners and occupiers [including farm workers] who ha[ve] no lawful authority [are] 
legally obliged to cease occupying or using such land upon the expiry of the prescribed 
period…By operation of law, the former owners or occupiers of acquired land loose all rights to 
the acquired land‖ (GoZ 2016a: 7).  
This has now, at law, provided impetus for the A2 farmers to institute the residential 
labour tenancy in the farm compounds that fall under their jurisdiction. According to the 
ZHLR, the ruling ―…put a final nail in the coffin to their advocacy work to secure the 
residential rights of farm workers through legal means‖ (Chimbga 2017: Interview).  
The judgement, Mr. Chimbga added, had exposed farm workers in A2 farms to 
exploitation of the labour rights as farmers use eviction threats to cow farm workers into 
submission. Indeed, this was the case at Hurudza A2 farm in Goromonzi when the owner 
after accumulating huge salary arrears threatened to evict farm workers who had engaged 
in a strike to demand wage payments (Chimbga 2017: Interview). It was only after the 
intervention of ZLHR, which threatened with litigation, that the owner retreated on the 
planned evictions. Notwithstanding the setbacks experienced at the Constitutional Court, 
the example cited above represents the tactic being used by ZLHR to deter evictions as 
some A2 farmers were not prepared to direct scarce financial resources to legal fees to 
attain judgements at the Courts. The opportunity cost was of course forgone investments 
in agricultural production. New landholders also tried to redirect labour to their farms by 
imposing land use rules in the compound that only food production was permissable as 
cash crops were enhancing the autonomy of farm workers from the labour markets.  
A third of the former farm workers possessing agricultural land in the old compounds 
surveyed in Goromonzi had been barred from the producing tobacco because they 
stopped selling labour to A1 and A2 employers. Such patterns were not observed in 
Kwekwe. Former farm workers growing tobacco were additionally accused of causing 
―environmental degradation‖ by cutting down trees belonging to the land beneficiaries in 
order to cure tobacco.  
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State policy and institutions, which allows farm workers to continue staying in the old 
farm compounds in the A1 farms regardless of their employment status was thus 
deployed to successful effect by farm workers. In contrast, their counterparts in A2 farms 
have fallen foul of state policy, which empowers their evictions in the event they were 
not employed by the new land beneficiaries. However, the absence of a definitive 
position entrenched in the laws on their residential rights beyond being allowed to remain 
in the compounds poses uncertainity on their long-term tenure security and fuels 
struggles over mandatory labour supplies on the basis of residency in the new farming 
units.   
6.6.6.3 Adoption of labour displacing technologies: “technological fix” 
At various points, the state intervened to assist the new farm employers to counter the 
labour shortages through various mechanisation and input distribution programmes (see 
Shonhe 2018; World Bank 2006; Moyo & Nyoni 2013; Scoones et al. 2010). A 
―technological fix‖ to the labour problems (Silver 2003) has thus been underway in the 
resettled areas relying on the personal savings of farmers and to a large extent on state 
subsidies to widen the availability of labour displacing technologies.  
By 2007, as the labour shortages continued to bite, under the aegis of the central bank, 
the state had initiated a ―Farm Mechanisation Programme‖ (RBZ 2008). Varied types of 
electric powered equipment were distributed to mostly the A2 landholders in three phases 
for free and on cheap credit terms. The A2 households received overall, about 2,625 
tractors and 1,846 ploughs nationally by 2008 (Murisa & Mujeyi 2015: 93). The A1 and 
other small-scale farm households in the Communal Areas were allocated animal drawn 
equipment such as scotch carts, cultivators and ploughs from the second phase onwards 
(RBZ 2008).  
Yet again, through the ―Command Agriculture‖, the state has been expanding access to 
farm machinery since 2016 to the A2 landholders. Similar machinery as that distributed 
during the earlier farm mechanisation programme was also allocated to some A2 farmers 
under this programme. Further to the machinery, other agricultural inputs such as seeds 
and fertiliser and labour displacing technologies such as herbicides, were given to 
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farmers on credit with a 12 percent annual  interest rate that was supposed to be paid after 
they delivered the targeted maize output with the Grain Marketing Board (Chemura 
2017).  
Besides ownership, some A2 farmers were hiring machinery in the leasing markets 
evolving in the resettled areas. By way of an example, one A2 farmer had mechanised 
most of the farm tasks for the 50 hectares of maize produced in the 2016/17 season 
through the hiring of farm equipment from former LSCFs who were providing equipment 
services at nearby farm (Gambara 2018: Interview). Daily human labour was only used 
for fertiliser application, while ploughing was done with a tractor and weeding was 
performed using a tractor powered boom sprayer to apply herbicides. For harvesting the 
maize, a combine harvester, which aggregated the removal of grain from the stalks, 
shelling and bagging of the output ready for the market at a cost of US$80 per hectare. 
Such levels of mechanisation radically reduced the demand for human labour, and with it 
farmers were spared the ―complex negotiations‖ with piece/daily workers over the wage 
rates (Gambara 2018: Interview). 
Both A1 and A2 households have also been enlisting on private agribusiness contract 
farming schemes to access scarce agricultural inputs and output markets (Sachikonye 
2016; Mazwi & Muchetu 2015). Through these schemes, which have grown 
tremendously in tobacco (Sakata 2017; Shonhe 2017; see section 6.4.4), farmers have 
been accessing labour displacing technologies such as herbicides, as well as credit to 
acquire machinery such as tractors.  
By and large, the adoption of herbicides has been the most pervasive strategy 
implemented by farmers to offset the labour shortages arising from various labour 
struggles in the resettled areas. AGRITEX has been at the forefront of recommending to 
the farmers to adopt herbicides to counter labour shortages, in addition to improving 
productivity.
199
 According to AGRITEX, herbicides saves farmers labour since they are 
only applied once and there is no repeated weeding as is the case when manual human 
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 See ―Calls to consider herbicides‖, The Herald, 24 June 2011, Harare. 
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labour is used. Moreover, they argue that application of herbicides greatly enhances the 
yield of crops such as maize.  
Examples provided by the extension workers showed that one of the herbicides used in 
maize production, nicosulfran, required 20 grammes for a hectare of land and two people 
using knapsack sprayers could apply the chemical over a day (MPEW 2017: Interview). 
Inclusive of the herbicide cost (US$20 per 20 grammes) and the two sprayers paid 
US$5.00 each for the work, the total cost for weeding hectare of land translated to 
US$30. In contrast, the use of human labour would require about 20 people for the 
hectare, each paid US$5.00 for mugwazo escalating the bill to US$100 per hectare. 
Besides displacing human labour, herbicide application therefore saved the farmers 
substantially on the wage bill. 
Compared to past surveys, the field evidence suggests that there has been a growth in the 
utilisation of herbicides, especially in the wetter Mashonaland districts such as 
Goromonzi. Round about 2006, the use of all agro-chemicals were concentrated in 
tobacco and cotton production, encompassing 37.1 percent and 42.5 percent of the A1 
and A2 farms respectively (Moyo et al. 2009: 70). In other crops such as maize, wheat, 
soyabeans and sunflower, less than 17 percent of the farmers applied these chemicals 
(Moyo et al. 2009: 70). The evidential base from farm household surveys imply the 
proliferation of herbicide use in Goromonzi as it was reported in 75.7 percent and 87.8 
percent of the A1 and A2 maize producing households. Because of the drier conditions, 
herbicide use in maize was not widely recommended in Kwekwe as it can lead to crop 
damage (MRT 2017: Interview). Thus, adoption rates were much lower and limited to 
only 3.6 percent of the A1 households and 22.2 percent in the A2 scheme. 
6.6.7 State attempts to marshal labour towards farm labour markets 
The land reform policy envisaged former farm workers would be absorbed as labourers 
by the new farming units and were thus not prioritised in the land allocations like the 
peasantry from the Communal Areas (see section 6.6.5). Depriving them of means of 
production would thus ensure their continued attachment to the labour markets for their 
survival. Furthermore, various initiatives to assist farmers to cope with labour shortages 
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such as the farm mechanisation programmes, were accompanied by wide reaching 
repressive programmes by the state to dismantle activities thought to be siphoning labour 
from agriculture. Operation Chikorokoza Chapera
200
 launched in 2007 targeted gold 
panning in order to redirect labour back to the farms since former farm workers were 
fingered by policy makers as one of the key actors (see Utete 2003). This targeted gold 
producing districts such as Kwekwe. So beyond controlling leakages of revenue through 
the smuggling of gold for sale in South Africa attributed to informal gold miners, which 
have been emphasised (Speigel 2015; Chigumira 2018), Operation Chikorokoza Chapera 
had multiple objectives, including doubling up to redress the labour shortages in districts 
endowed with this resource.  
According to IDMC (2008:39), ―tens of thousands‖ of illegal gold panners were violently 
ejected by the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) from mining sites national and 25,000 
people were arrested. Many of those displaced were former farm workers (Sadomba 
2013). However, the policy regarding gold panning had begun to shift from 2009 to 
accommodate and formalise small-scale mining as production in large mining companies 
floundered in a context where the government was desperate to harness the scarce foreign 
currency (Speigel 2015; Chigumira 2018).  
Firewood trading as alternative to farm labour markets others also came under attack as 
former farm workers and others were increasingly being arrested from the mid 2000s for 
the non-possession of permits that are required for this enterprise (MPEW 2017: 
Interview). Due to the widespread electricity load shedding in the urban areas between 
2002 and 2008, together with the rise in tobacco production (requiring firewood for 
curing), the demand for firewood were growing substantially (Moyo et al. 2009). The 
Environmental Management Agency (EMA) ratcheted its operations in the resettled areas 
during this period to halt a host of ―environmental degradation‖ practices, including 
firewood trade. To avoid detection by environmental authorities, firewood was being 
harvested and transported in the dead of the night to nearby Seke and Epworth urban 
areas from Goromonzi, while in Kwekwe, Mbizo and Redcliff were the predominant 
                                                 
200
 Illegal gold mining is colloquially referred to as ―Chikorokoza‖ So the ―Operation Chikorokoza 
Chapera‖ translated to ―illegal gold mining has ended‖. 
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recipients of firewood from the resettled areas. The village heads in the A1 farms were 
also increasingly under pressure to implement various environmental regulations in the 
areas under their control as chairs of sub-committees established by EMA. Nonetheless, 
these initiatives did not totally reverse the trading of natural resources among both farm 
workers and land beneficiaries (Table 6.18).   
6.6.8 Summary of main findings  
Evidently, (former) farm workers were far from being ―passive victims‖ of the FTLRP, 
land owners and war veterans as some scholars suggested (Ridderbos 2009: 73; see also 
Hartnack 2005). Poor working conditions and land shortages for independent production 
conditioned the agency farm workers displayed in the redistributed farms. The farm 
labourers push back on the super-exploitiation in the new capitalist farms by drawing 
from their individual and collective agency in order to improve their material conditions.  
They were engaged in dual, if not contradictory, struggles to improve the conditions as 
―workers‖ as well as direct action to realise their aspirations to become peasants. Now 
this should be seen in different light from the thesis advanced by Bernstein (2014), which 
reduced peasants to ―fragmented classes of labour‖ thus should be presumably pre-
occupied by struggles to improve their conditions as workers. Yet, the evidence presented 
here suggests that both the land and labour questions remain key in rural areas of Africa. 
Most of the land short farm workers actually aspire for a post wage-economy for their 
social reproduction and actively seek land both in the formal and informal avenues.  
With limited protection from their unions and the state, different strategies were being 
crafted including using their own structural power to force reforms of their working 
conditions by the new farm employers and the levels of success differs according to their 
gender, skill levels and the commodity focus of the new farm employers. Their labour 
mobilisation efforts face challenges from the cumbersome requirements to undertake 
collective action imposed by the labour legislation, as well as the limitations of the state 
to guarrantee trade unions access to the workforce as required by the law. Instead of the 
union, associational power derived from political parties, in particular, ZANU (PF) has 
been key in protection of farm compound residential rights, as were their alliances with 
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human rights NGOs such as the ZLHR. Yet, the role of ZANU (PF) in fomenting 
violence in rural areas, including towards farm workers has been emphasised (see 
Munyuki-Hungwe 2011; Laurie 2017; GAPWUZ & JAG 2008), and this only partially 
reveals farm workers‘ relationship with political parties. 
Overall, the partial dismantling of the residential labour tenancy has seen the 
enhancement of the agency of farm workers. New A1 and A2 farmers were neither able 
to convert the residential population in the old compounds into farm labour supplies at 
ease as the former LSCFs did nor entrench their control on the off work relations of farm 
workers (Chambati 2013a). The absence of excessive control of employees enabled by 
the residential tenancy system has seen the rise in the independent forms of self-
mobilisation by farm workers beyond farm worker committees. Parallels could be drawn 
from Brazil and South Africa where self-mobilisation by workers has been documented 
when workers live off the farm (Selwyn 2014; Wilderman 2014).  
Indeed, the result of the worker resistance has been the emergence of labour shortages 
that were being experienced by the new capitalist farms. Free from the encumbrance of 
dependency relations, the piece/daily workers in A1 farms assume multi-occupational 
identities and some delink from the farm labour markets. After failing to compel workers 
from the old A1 compounds, new farm employers have been forced to diversify their 
sources of labour and evolve new forms of labour control by building their own 
compounds on their subdivisions and thus also ensure adequate availability of labour. 
The low wages alongside the prolongation of the binding together of employment 
contracts and accommodation in the old farm compounds in some A2 capitalist farms 
represents continuation of super-exploitation in the new labour relations. As a result, 
spatial control of the old compounds and the workers therein was a source conflicts  
especially in A2 farms. The qualitative difference in the conditions farm workers face in 
structuring their agency has gone unnoticed by some analysts who have characterised the 
new situation farm workers as ―conditional belonging‖ that overly assigns power to the 
new farmers in an undifferentiated manner (Rutherford 2018; Hartnack 2016). 
Notwithstanding the agency they exhibit, it is yet to substantially reverse the poor social 




This chapter has presented data analysis and interpretation of the findings on the 
transformation of agrarian labour relations after radical  land redistribution during the 
FTLRP based on the detailed qualitative and quantitative research undertaken in 
Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts, as well as from other sources. It illustrated that as the 
domination of a few LSCFs on the agrarian structure was dented by the FTLRP and the 
subsequent changes in land use, agricultural production and markets under rapidly 
changing agrarian policies and economic contexts, the agrarian labour relations shaped by 
unequal land distribution and its monopolisation as freehold land were changed.  
A new agrarian labour regime was now in place characterised by the rise in the use of 
self-employed family labour in the many smaller-scale farming units to add to that 
already existing in the Communal Areas, but not without farm labour markets, for they 
continue. Inequitable gender and generational tendencies were however not rolled back 
by the land reform as men (also frequently the landholders) more often than not still 
controlled the decisions about allocation and use of women and children‘s labour in both 
the new farms and old peasantry. Beyond own farming, family labour was also applied in 
other non-farm income earning activities as is common across rural areas in SSA due to 
the seasonality of agriculture. Yet this did not result in the permanent reallocation of 
family labour away from farming as anticipated by de-agrarianisation theorists 
(Brycesson 2002; 2000; 1997; Riggs 2006). In fact, agricultural production was universal 
among the interviewed households to underline the importance of land access and farm 
labour in both its paid and unpaid dimensions and for over a third of the farming units, 
agriculture was their only source of income. Rather than (rural) non-farm labour 
replacing farm labour, the two activities interacted in dynamic ways in the social 
reproduction strategies in the rural areas with either activity contributing financial 
resources to the other or making up the income gaps for their livelihood needs that one 
activity alone could not meet. Furthermore, the integration of households into rural non-
farm income earning activities by peasants was contigent upon natural resource 
availability in a particular locality. Semi-proletarianisation, as Moyo and Yeros (2005b) 
have theorised, was therefore the predominant outcome of the agrarian restructuring, 
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alongside the process of repeasantisation through return of urbanites to rural areas via 
FTLRP land access. 
With enlarged land access, most of the peasantry in the A1 scheme now farm on the basis 
of self-employed family labour and only a few of them were net sellers of farm labour to 
other households. It was mostly the land short Communal Area and farm worker 
households that hired out farm labour from their households to others, indicating the 
continued role of land access in shaping farm labour markets (Moyo 2011a; 2013; 
Cousins 2009; Shivji 2009). Agrarian labour reserve dynamics of the past thus persevere 
(Chambati 2013a), even though they are no longer dependent on a few LSCFs for 
employment since not all the landless were accomodated by the land reforms and still 
derive their survival from the rural labour markets. Additionally, patterns of withdrawal 
from the urban employment were witnessed among some of the people after obtaining 
access to resettlement land. Altogether, this suggests that access to land had reduced the 
compulsion for many poor peasants and/or semi-proletariats to enter the exploitative 
(agrarian) labour markets since they could now construct their livelihoods from own 
farming.  
These agrarian labour markets previously controlled by a few LSCFs are today 
characterised by an expanded and diverse set of farm employers mainly located in the A2 
scheme. Alternatively, the monopoly control the LSCFs had on the agrarian labour 
markets is now dispersed amongst the many landholders with reduced land sizes and 
different tenure arrangements. Nevertheless, labour hiring in also featured in the agrarian 
relations of the peasantry, but its the incidence was at a much lower scale compared to 
the latter. And as expected, the new peasantry in the A1 with access to larger land sizes in 
better agro-ecological zones out-competed their peers in the Communal Areas in the 
recruitment and utilisation of wage labour. The data therefore demonstrates that the 
consideration of wage labour utilisation as confined to large-scale capitalist farms by 
some analysts (Barret et al. 2001; Barret et al. 2005; Binswanger et al. 1995; Griffin et 
al. 2000; Robilliard et al. 2001), is not correct as it exists even in agrarian structures that 
are dominated by the peasantry such as the one that resulted from the agrarian change 
imposed by the radical land reforms in Zimbabwe.  
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There was differentiation in the use of hired in labour amongst the farming households. 
Specifically, the study through statistical cluster analysis delineated the households into 
the capitalist class, which were reliant on hired in labour and differentiated peasantries 
that depended on labour supplies from within their families to organise their farming. The 
utilisation of hired in labour was certainly a key indicator of the perceived wider rural 
social differentiation as the decline in its application was associated with the reduction in 
farm assets owned, use of modern inputs and technologies, as well as the production of 
cash/export crops and the incomes realised from agriculture by the surveyed farm 
households. The agro-ecological location, which in turn influenced the land utilisation 
patterns and demand for farm labour as seen in the former LSCFs counted in the 
formation of rural classes as evidenced by the uneven use of hired in labour across the 
study districts.  Goromonzi, located in a Natural Region with better soils and good 
rainfall, compared to the drier Kwekwe district ,dominated the use of farm wage labour 
and consequently the shares of capitalist farmers amongst the farm households 
interviewed.  
Continuities and changes marked the new agrarian wage labour relations. While the jobs 
that farm workers now occupy were commonly informal and part-time, the payment of 
wages well below the cost of social reproduction resonates with the tendencies in the 
former LSCFs. Even with the expansion of the wage structure through the receipt of 
―social wages‖ such as access to informal land for own production provided by land 
beneficiaries, natural resources trading and food subsidies, the poverty afflicting most 
farm workers has not been substantially altered. The farm workers who received ―social 
wages‖ were all the same relatively better off than their counterparts that solely depended 
on monetary wages for their survival. Also replicating past tendencies observed in the 
former LSCFs, the marginalisation of women in the labour markets as irregular wage 
earners has not relented.  
It can thus be concluded that the super-exploitation of farm workers is scale neutral, 
featuring in the former LSCFs and now continuing in the new small-scale capitalist 
farms. Tellingly, the evidence from other countries in SSA also indicates that this is not 
unique to Zimbabwe but a pervasive phenomenon in the different range of capitalist 
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farms (Hall et al. 2017; Torvikey et al. 2016; Visser & Ferrer 2015; Oya 2013). The 
findings therefore vaildate assertions by Tsikata (2015) that farm work in its many 
diverse contexts in Africa is one of the worst paid forms of wage work. If this is the case, 
then analyses that claim that wage labour in LSCFs is crucial for the survival of rural 
people in Settler-Southern Africa (Sender 2016; Bernstein 2014; Sender & Johnston 
2003; Hellum & Derman 2004) need to be revisited. To the contrary, it was the 
undervalued self-employed jobs within the peasantry that provided better prospects for 
the livelihoods of the rural people. Indeed, the inequalities in the material conditions of 
the landholders and land short farm workers were plain to see.  
Yet, it is also correct that some regressive practices witnessed in the LSCFs before 2000, 
including physical violence and the exploitative residential labour tenancy were on the 
wane. A substantial change in the agrarian labour relations related to the reduced ability 
to control labour by the smaller-scale employers as the LSCFs did due to the reformation 
of freehold title deeds to state tenures in the resettled areas, which offer less exclusive 
land rights (Moyo 2013; 2011a; Murisa 2014; 2009) and limited control over the old farm 
compounds that house farm workers especially in the A1 scheme. Furthermore, the 
nationalised land tenures that allow for greater mobility of people in the newly resettled 
areas opened up access to the farm labour markets for wider public scrutiny than in the 
private propertied LSCFs protected by trespass laws. The latter enabled some of the 
labour abuses to be hidden from the public eye. 
Farm labourers responded to the challenges in the labour markets and yonder in 
variegated ways and were by no means neither bystanders of their exploitiation nor 
devoid of agency as some scholars have described them (Sachikonye 2012; 2004; 
Johnson 2012; Ridderbos 2009; West & Rutherford 2005). Not so much dependent on 
―associational power‖ of the weak rural trade unions, labour resistance drew upon their 
―structural power‖ in the labour markets to advance farm working conditions. In 
particular, this power was based on the scarce skills they possessed demanded by the new 
farming units in areas such as tobacco production and the non-wage alternatives in 
natural resources trading occassioned by the FTLRP that enabled them to delink from 
wage labour. Belonging to political parties, especially the ruling party, ZANU (PF), was 
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instrumentalised to defend residential land rights by farm labourers, as were their 
alliances with other actors such as NGOs to use state policy to protect their interests, 
including in the courts of law.  
Somewhat contradictory, the agency of farm workers also sought to improve working 
conditions in the new farms, alongside resisting their ―proletarianisation‖ by both 
aspiring and struggling to access land for independent farming as the basis of their 
livelihoods. It can thus be deduced that labour resistance can be prosecuted through 
various means not necessarily tied to collective worker organisations such as trade unions 
(Jha 2016; Wilderman 2014; Silver 2003). Moreso, in the Zimbabwean situation where 
the wider occupational interests portrayed by the current farm workers were not 
encompassed in the narrow ―workerist‖ agendas of labour unions. 
In general, the partial dismantling of the residential labour tenancy relationship provided 
room for workers to express their agency in both the labour markets and elsewhere less 
encumbered by the dependency on one farmer for both work and accomodation. The 
―modes of belonging to the farm(er)‖ characterised in the former LSCFs (Rutherford 
2003: 191; 2001a) were thus few and far between. In fact, farm labourers now enjoy 
relative autonomy in their supply of labour to the new farms and ―vote with their feet‖ to 
identify better wages and working conditions. However, the capitalist farmers pushed 
back on the resistance of farm labourers, including through ―spatial fixes‖ - sourcing 
labour from further afield, including from their kinship networks in the Communal Areas 
and ―technological fixes‖ - through adoption of labour displacing farm technologies 
(Silver 2003), sometimes with state support. Moreover, they contested the autonomy of 
farm workers in old compounds and attempted to institute the residential labour tenancy 
and thus turning these spaces into sites of struggle over the control of labour. Indeed, 
differing degrees of success in this endeavour resulted in the investement in new 
compounds by small-scale capitalist A2 farms on their plot subdivisions to reproduce the 
residential labour tenancy. This reflected the growing agency of labour to defend their 
newfound autonomy in the labour markets outside the previous dependency relations, 
which bound work to residency on the former LSCFs. However, the observed worker 
resistance was yet to unravel the poor socio-economic conditions of farm workers.  
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Overall, land reform has reduced the inequities in land ownership and in the process 
generated self-employed jobs for many poor peasants through which they were managed 
to feed their families and meet other subsistence costs. Quite crucially, access to land 
provided them with a non-wage alternative for their living and resultantly less obligated 
to enter exploitative agrarian labour markets than the land short farm labourers and other 
Communal Area residents. In spite of the noted progressive agrarian changes and income 
redistribution to a wider segment of the populace beyond the few LSCFs, the persistence 
of super-exploitation of the farm wage labourers whose livelihoods were far from certain 
remains an issue of concern. Evidently, they were inadversely incorporated in the new 
agrarian structure both in terms of their land and labour rights. The final chapter presents 





FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The preceeding chapter detailed the research results on the qualitative and quantitative 
changes to the agrarian labour relations in the context of FTRLP that increased the 
number of smaller-scale agricultural employers who compete for access to agrarian 
labour in the new diversified farming sector that is characterised by differential 
production capacities in Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts. After recapitulating the 
discussion thus far, this concluding chapter synthesises the main research findings on the 
nature and scope of the new agrarian labour markets, quality of labour and resistance to 
the new material conditions. Policy recommendations to address the challenges identified 
in the agrarian labour markets follows next. The implications of the research results on 
the conceptual understanding of agrarian labour relations in former Settler economies and 
SSA in general precede the concluding remarks and further research requiring attention.  
7.2 STUDY SUMMARY 
Chapter One provided the background and context on the extensive agrarian restructuring 
prompting the study and outlined the research problem and questions investigated. In 
general, the research was motivated by the limited academic attention on the 
transformation of agrarian labour relations as most post-FTLRP research attended to the 
agricultural production outcomes and extent of land allocated to ―elites‖. Yet agrarian 
labour is important in sustaining many rural lives against the background of rising urban 
unemployment and poverty rates. Furthermore, the studies evaluating the outcomes of the 
implementation of the land reform negated a key tenet in public policy evaluation by 
paying inadequate attention to how the agrarian restructuring interacted with the other 
various policies and factors to impact the agrarian change. The overarching research 
problem identified in the literature on agrarian labour in Zimbabwe since 2000 related to 
the advancement of viewpoints that agrarian labour markets have been decimated by the 
parcelling of land to mainly peasants and were no longer able to absorb the majority of 
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the formal workforce as in the past. Research optics were also not directed to the 
transition of peasant labour relations in their agricultural and non-agricultural 
endeavours, particularly the character of wage and family labour utilisation and hired in 
wage labour was implied to be absent (Chambati & Moyo 2004), as well as the labour 
relations entailed in the new small-scale capitalist sectors generated by the A2 scheme, 
which did not necessarily resemble LSCF type work. Quite crucially, the new diversified 
agrarian structure had resulted from the land reforms, which not only transformed the 
landholding patterns, but also the land use practices, integration to markets and labour 
utilisation was omitted in the analysis (Moyo 2011c; Moyo 2013).  
The theoretical and conceptual frameworks, which formed the epistemological basis of 
the study were discussed in detail in Chapter Two. Three theoretical approaches 
predominantly utilised to assess agrarian labour relations, namely, the neo-classical 
equilibrium models, historical-structural approaches and the livelihoods analytic 
frameworks were reviewed. The neo-classical economic approaches were critiqued for 
their assumptions of linearity in agrarian transformation, emphasising the reduction in the 
importance of agriculture as economic growth proceeds apace. Rooted in the Lewisian 
dual economic models, they postulate the transfer of ―unlimited labour supplies‖ from the 
peasantry to wage labour in the urban industries leading to the disappearance of (self-
employed) agricultural labour. Moreover, the assumption of the existence of ―free 
markets‖, which in turn shape the demand and supply of labour negate their applicability 
in the ―imperfect markets‖ characterising SSA. The livelihoods analytic frameworks were 
also found short in terms of their under-emphasis of the role of land ownership in the 
formation of labour markets in rural areas, since agriculture is considered as just but one 
of the activities in which people could deploy their ―agency‖ to make a living. 
Altogether, these two approaches ignore the centrality of class, the role of (colonial) 
history in influencing the livelihood patterns today and/or the agrarian labour relations 
outcomes.  
Against this background, the historical-structural approaches rooted in the Marxist 
Political Economy frameworks were favoured by the study – emphasing as they do the 
importance of the broader historical context, economic and social structures in shaping 
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labour relations. However, the study was also attentive to the fact that class dynamics 
alone were not enough to understand the contemporary agrarian labour relations and as 
such gender issues, intra-household relations, kinship, citizenship and agency of the 
workers themselves were taken into account. Additionally, the existing perspectives, 
knowledge and questions articulated on agrarian labour relations in SSA in the literature 
were also critically examined. A key problem identified in the conceptualisation of 
AALR in the existing literature related to the restriction of the existence agrarian labour 
markets to Settler-Southern African where large-scale capitalist agriculture prevails. 
Another source of divergence concerned the importance of wage labour in capitalist 
farms and self-employment in the subsistence of the rural inhabitants, and whether non-
farm activities were part of the labour process of the peasantry. 
Chapter Three set out in-depth the methodological approaches that were applied to 
answer the study‘s research questions. A multi-layered analysis cascading from the 
national/macro-level, district level to micro-level (farm households and labourers) was 
adopted to decipher the new agrarian labour relations. 
A mixed methods approach informed the design of research, entailing quantitative and 
qualitative data collection at the micro-level. The qualitative methods were utilised 
mainly to mobilise complimentary information to elucidate the data gathered from the 
quantitative approach. The latter entailed questionnaire surveys of farm households 
allocated land during the FTLRP and peasants from the Communal Areas with a view of 
interpreting the changes in labour relations attributable to the land reform, as well as farm 
labourers employed in the new diverse farm units. Key informant interviews and 
structured physical observations formed the qualitative data gathering techniques 
employed by the research. Other secondary sources of data included reports from the 
national statistical agency, previous studies and media articles. Next was the  presentation 
of an overview of the study areas to outline the specific context in which the local 
dynamics of the agrarian labour were examined. The analytical approaches deployed to 
make sense of the primary data were then discussed,  alongside the strategies to ensure 
validity and reliability of the research. Various challenges encountered during the field 
work in the context of the sensitivity of Zimbabwe‘s land reform issues and how they 
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were remedied were noted. The chapter also outlined the ethical considerations adhered 
to during the study as guided by clearance provided by UNISA; including the obtaining 
of informed consent from the study participants, voluntary participation, guaranteeing the 
confidentiality of the data collected from the respondents.   
The themes gleaned from the literature review in Chapter Two were applied to examine 
the evolution of the agrarian labour relations in Zimbabwe throughout the colonial (1890-
1979) and post-colonial (1980–1999) periods prior to the onset of the FTLRP in Chapter 
Four. It was clear that the structural factors and/or class dynamics such as the distribution 
of landholdings and their intersection with gender, kinship and agency contributed 
immensely to the formation of agrarian labour markets since 1890 and that these have 
been undergoing transformation from thereon. Specifically, colonial land alienation, 
together with other legal and extra-legal mechanisms pushed the peasantry into wage 
work in the LSCFs and beyond. Yet the process was not a one-off event, but had evolved 
gradually dependent on the pace and extent of peasant dispossession over time and shifts 
in various domestic and international socio-economic policies. Nevertheless, the uneven 
and incomplete land dispossession implied the resilience of a differentiated peasantry, 
which combined the wage economy and farming on small arable plots for their survival.  
The minimal land redistribution after the attainment of independence in 1980 up until 
1999 meant that the agrarian labour relations were not substantially reconstituted as the 
white LSCFs retained their dominance over land ownership and subsequently their 
influence on agrarian labour relations (Moyo 2011a). Evidently, adverse working 
conditions were commonplace for the ―bonded‖ LSCF labour force two decades after 
independence and many workers struggled to make a living. The deregulation of labour 
markets via ESAP reversed the minor gains (farm) labour made in the early 1980s after 
the introduction of various state labour protection measures, including minimum wage 
setting. The socio-economic conditions deteriorated across town and country in the 
context of these neoliberal reforms, represented by rising unemployment, widespread 
poverty and land scarcity. Veterans of the liberation struggle, unemployed urban people 
and peasants thus challenged the inequitable bimodal agrarian structure through the 
occupations of LSCFs to access land for social reproduction from about 1997. The land 
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occupations escalated in 2000 and eventually forced the state to initiate radical land 
redistribution via the FTLRP.  
Chapter Five provided the study context, highlighting the in-depth structural change in 
the land ownership and land tenure relations resulting from the FTLRP countrywide and 
the dynamic shifts in the agrarian (labour) policies and, their implications for the 
transformation of agrarian labour relations. A diverse agrarian structure had emerged 
comprised of the peasantry, small-to-middle capitalist farms, large capitalists and agro-
estates (Moyo 2011a; 2013). Differentiation was apparent across districts in the size and 
composition of the new agrarian classes contingent upon the nature of land redistribution 
experienced, which consequently shaped the structure of the local level labour markets. 
The consequences of the decline and partial recovery in the economy and shifts in the 
agrarian and (rural) labour policies during the 2000s and subsequent impacts on land 
utilisation and farm labour demand were also analysed.  
The results of the primary study in Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts were then presented 
in Chapter Six. The main research findings are summarised next according to the research 
questions posed in Chapter One relating to the: 1) the new sources of agrarian labour; 2) 
diversification of family labour; 3) quality of farm labour in the new labour markets and 
4) resistance and/or agency of farm workers to the new material conditions. 
7.3 SUMMARY OF MAIN RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This section outlines the main research findings of the reconstitution of the agrarian 
labour relations following the FTLRP based on the detailed empirical investigations in 
Goromonzi and Kwekwe, as well as from other secondary sources of data. 
7.3.1 New sources of agrarian labour: trajectory capitalist labour relations  
The first research question focused on assessing the implications of the expansion of 
small-scale farming units and reduction of LSCFs arising from the extensive land 
redistribution during the FTLRP on the sources of farm labour:  
 
Does the redistribution of land to mostly small-scale producers and a retention of a 
reduced base of large-scale capitalist farms lead to a decline in capitalist wage labour 
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relations alongside the rise in the use of family farm labour, and/ or do new extensive 
forms of wage labour emerge? 
Various analysts have postulated the disruption of the farm wage employment as an 
outcome of the redistribution of large capitalist farms to peasants (de Janvry 1981; 
Sender & Johnston 2004; Hellum & Derman 2004; Sender 2016; Barrett et al. 2001; 
Griffin et al. 2002; Sender & Johnston 2004; Barrett et al. 2005). By implication, farm 
labour markets are expected to fade as self-employed family labour, which is assumed to 
be the only source of labour for the peasantry rises. The evidence from the field indeed 
showed that the use of self-employed family farm labour had been magnified compared 
to the past situation in the LSCFs where it was limited to a few of the (male) farm owners 
and their spouses to performing managerial functions rather than providing manual as 
was the case at present (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Moyo et al. 2000; Rutherford 2001a). To 
be precise, at least 82 percent of the A1 landholders drew farm labour from within their 
families. Even in the larger A2 farms earmarked to expand capitalist farming by the land 
reform policy, about 35 percent and 80.4 percent of the farming units in Goromonzi and 
Kwekwe utilised family labour respectively. As expected, the peasants from the 
Communal Areas that did not receive land dominated the use of family labour – recorded 
in over 98 percent of the households. Extra-household labour through cooperative labour 
arrangements between families represented another form of unpaid labour, which mainly 
operated in Kwekwe.  
Men were actively involved in providing family farm labour together with women, 
confirming the emerging evidence from recent studies in Africa (SOFA & Doss 2011; 
Palacios-Lopez et al. 2017). The inequitable gender relations in agrarian labour 
associated with male stranglehold on access to and control of rural land (Tsikata 2016; 
2009) was nonetheless evident through male control of the labour process, including in 
the decisions about the allocation of women and children‘s labour. It was thus akin to 
what has been characterised as ―…the family farms together, the decisions, however are 
made by man‖ (Djurfeldt et al. 2017: 601). After the inclusion of reproductive labour, 
which is critical for the maintenance of family labour (Gaidzanwa 1995; Doss et al. 2014; 
Naidu & Ossome 2016), women shouldered more labour responsibilities than men.  
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The hiring of farm wage labour did not however wither away but was instead common 
even among the smaller A1 landholdings. As much as 77.6 percent of them in Goromonzi 
hired in wage labour to augment the family labour supplies and 64.9 percent in the same 
land tenure category in Kwekwe. The incidence of recruitment of farm wage labour was 
widely noted in the new smaller-scale capitalist farms in the A2 scheme - 94.6 percent in 
Goromonzi and 88.9 percent in Kwekwe. Though not as widespread, farm labour markets 
were also alive in the Communal Areas of both districts. However, the contemporary 
farm labour markets were pervaded by the extensive wage labour in the form of 
piece/daily workers locally known as maricho, which were engaged for short-term 
assignments in line with the seasonal demands. The permanent and seasonal labourers 
that were the cornerstone of the LSCF labour force featured prominently only in the A2 
farms. These findings also revealed the shortcomings in the selection and targeting of a 
few A2 land beneficiaries that were exclusively reliant on self-employed family labour to 
organise their farming. Yet, this settlement scheme was meant to diversify commercial 
farming and thus a source of wage employment. 
The extent to which households depended on the exploitation of the labour of others i.e. 
hiring in wage labour for the organisation of agricultural production was nevertheless 
differentiated within the new agrarian structure. Four classes were discerned from the 
statistical clustering procedure utilised by the research to categorise households according 
to their labour utilisation trends and these included farm households exhibiting capitalist 
and peasant tendencies. The former relied on hired in labour for their farming, while in 
the latter, labour supplies were built around the family.  
Land sizes, which also coincided with the access to other agrarian resources, mattered in 
the use of hired in farm labour. The A2 farm households, which received the biggest land 
sizes during the FTLRP, constituted the majority of the rich peasants-to-capitalist class 
category that relied on hiring in labour for their farming, while the majority of those in 
the A1 scheme were located in the middle peasant class, which also hired in labour, 
although the family accounted for the bulk of the labour time contribution. Most 
Communal Area farm households, in contrast, were small and poor peasants who largely 
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exploited labour from within their families. Hiring out labour to other farm households 
also marked the latter class. 
It was clear that the trajectory of capitalist wage labour relations was also shaped by the 
agro-ecological location, which in turn impacted on the land uses and agricultural 
production. Very few of the Kwekwe farm households displayed capitalist tendencies and 
indeed most of them were in the family labour farm classes of middle and small peasants. 
Goromonzi district in contrast contributed the most farming units in the rich peasant-to-
capitalist class. Resultantly, the development of farm labour markets, similar to the trends 
obtaining in the former LSCFs, continued to be uneven with districts located in better 
agro-ecological zones, such as Goromonzi, dominant in the utilisation of hired in labour 
more than those in lower potential zones such as Kwekwe. Most women landholders 
were small and poor peasants reflecting the uneven access to and control of economic 
resources along gender lines.  
The wider production relations also varied between the farm classes. As the utilisation of 
hired in labour fell among the farm classes, so did the application of different factors of 
production, use of modern machinery, financial resources and consequent outcomes in 
agricultural labour productivity and farm incomes. Cash and/or export crop production 
was concentrated in the capitalist class, while food production to eat within the 
households and surpluses to sell was the dominant land use among the peasantries. On 
the whole, the findings on the sub-optimal land utilisation, constraints in access to 
finance and other farming technologies witnessed in differing degrees amongst the 
farming classes and more widely recognised among female landholders, indicate the 
absence of a coherent post-settlement policy accompanying land reform to bolster the 
production capacities of the new agricultural producers. In a situation where private 
agricultural lending from banks and self-financing sources were under strain, the state 
subsidies that emerged were mostly reactive to droughts and food shortages and were 
inadequate to cover the diverse needs of the enlarged farming units.  
To sum up, the findings certainly demonstrated that the redistribution of large capitalist 
farms to mostly peasants led to expanded family farming and/or the use of self-employed 
family labour in the organisation of agricultural production. Yet, the downsized small-
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scale capitalist farms, which have been a result of the land reforms together with a section 
of the peasantry, have meant that differentiated farm labour markets have remained a 
feature of the new agrarian landscape albeit with more informal hired in labour compared 
to those seen in the LSCFs.  
7.3.2 Replacement of farm labour with non-farm labour 
The second research question addressed the claims by many theoreticians that agriculture 
was loosing importance in the social reproduction of the peasantry and was being 
replaced by non-farm income earning activities in a permanent fashion. The import of 
these assertions was that self-employed family-farm and farm wage labour were being 
displaced by non-farm labour in the rural areas:  
To what extent is the diversification into non-farm rural labour activities replacing farm 
labour as an important source of income to land owning farm households domiciled in 
diverse locales? 
The study‘s findings indicated that rural households were not only involved in farming, 
but family labour was also being diversified into other non-farm income earning activities 
to constitute their social reproduction. Yet, this did not resemble the bold claims 
advanced by the de-agrarianisation thesis (Bryceson 1999; Bryceson 2002; Bryceson 
2000; Riggs 2006) of permanent re-allocation of family labour away from farming 
towards non-farm activities and therefore displacement of self-employed- and farm wage 
labour. The application of unpaid family farm labour on the small peasant plots in the A1 
and Communal Areas nonetheless remained ubiquitous even in the low potential agro-
ecological district such as Kwekwe. There, food production was also being undertaken 
season after season despite the low income returns and high probabilities of crop failure. 
In fact, during the 2015/16 and 2016/17 seasons observed by the study all the households 
interviewed across all the settlement models in both districts had cropped their land. 
Beyond farming, the family labour was being applied to a diverse set of activities, 
including formal wage employment in towns and non-farm rural labour activities and 
were indicated by rural households in all the settlement types in both districts. 
Nonetheless, it is also worth underlining that at least 30 percent of the households in each 
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of the settlements across both districts were not participants in non-farm activities. The 
capitalist farms in the A2 sector dominated formal wage employment, as well as the 
enterprises, which required capital investments, such as rural transportation and operation 
of retail shops, while the peasantries in the A1 and Communal Areas focused on natural 
resource trading.  
The latter were differentiated by the occurrence of a particular resource in a locality. 
Alluvial gold, existing in abundance in all settlements in Kwekwe was the most common 
activity amongst both the landholders and the farm workers. But in Goromonzi, the 
harvesting and trading of thatching grass that was used to roof pole and dagga houses 
held sway among landholders. River sand trading and brick moulding were also popular 
among farm workers in this district.  
Aggregate non-farm incomes were significantly higher in the rich peasants-to-capitalist 
and middle peasant classes compared to the small and poor peasantry. However, in terms 
of the share to the total household income, non-farm incomes were more salient for the 
small and poor peasantries than the labour hiring dependent class. Specifically, these 
farm classes had the least access to agricultural finance, which in turn transformed into 
poor financial returns, which on their own stopped well short of meeting their subsistence 
requirements through the lens of the PDL. Agrarian distress and/or risk aversion was thus 
major push for the diversification of labour resources (Jha 2016; Shivji 2017; 2009; 
Moyo & Yeros 2005a). Indeed, non-farm activities attracted a larger share of the land 
short Communal Area households facing inferior agro-ecological conditions than they did 
the resettled households in both districts, ostensibly because of the greater need to 
complement the reduced farm incomes.  
It was thus correct that non-farm incomes were increasingly occupying a significant share 
of the total household income for peasants as intimated by the de-agrarianisation 
scholars. Yet the importance of family farm labour for own production was underwritten 
by its role in satisfying the food requirements for many peasants in the A1 and 
Communal Areas. Specifically, all the farming classes were able to escape the FPL unlike 
the land short farm labourers.  
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Nevertheless the nature of farming in rural Zimbabwe, dependent as it is on seasonal 
rainfall also meant the slack time between seasons thus availed opportunities for the 
sampled households to enter non-farm labour markets (Moyo 2014), beyond the poor 
conditions of agricultural production induced by SAPs emphasised by the de-
agrarianisation theorists. Instructively, a substantial section of the peasant households in 
the A1 and Communal Areas inserted in non-farm rural activities for income generation 
did so between agricultural seasons. Moreover, some of the natural resources traded by 
the peasants such as thatching grass, brick moulding and firewood were mostly available 
during the dry season. The activities undertaken by the A2 households in both districts 
were however not seasonal and done throughout the whole with minimal conflict on their 
farming since they relied on hired in labour. 
Another dimension accentuating the importance of farming in the rural areas relates to 
the prevalence of farm labour markets in which some of the landholders sold labour to 
other households especially in the land short Goromonzi Communal Areas. A few of the 
A1 and A2 households in this district also hired out farm labour. Variations were noted 
between the two districts as relatively larger shares of resettled households in Kwekwe 
hired out farm labour to other farming units compared to Goromonzi, while in the 
Communal Areas, there were fewer participants than their colleagues in the latter. In 
terms of labour allocation, most of the household members were assigned to farming 
activities rather than to non-farm activities. In addition, the non-farm labourers were also 
part of the farm labour supplies to link the  both the agricultural and non-agricultural 
income earning activities in the social reproduction of the rural households. 
The evidence also refutes claims of the permanency of the divestment from agriculture by 
the peasantry in the aftermath of SAPs propounded by the de-agrarianisation thesis. 
Reversals were observed as various resettled landholders had quit formal employment 
and/or were retrenched from their jobs after getting access to FTLRP land and were now 
subsisting on the basis of farming. In similar vein, those from the Communal Areas who 
had lost their jobs had retraced their roots back to the land. These tendencies were also 




Instead of permanent de-agrarianisation and subsequent waning of farm labour in both its 
self-employed and wage dimensions, the study results reflect the continuation of semi-
proletarianisation of rural labour through the combination of farming and non-farm wage 
labour as an outcome of the land reforms. This was simultaneously occurring alongside 
processes of re-peasantisation as former proletariats and semi-proletariats delinked from 
the farm labour markets to subsist on farming - further suggesting that de-agrarianisation 
can in effect be amenable to reversal in relation to the changing socio-economic contexts. 
Non-farm incomes served different purposes to the diverse farm classes. In the capitalist 
class, they were a key source of agricultural finance to expand production and 
accumulation, while in the small and poor peasantries they were important in closing the 
farming income deficits not enough to meet subsistence requirements. Emphasis on either 
farming or non-farming activities thus risks the danger of missing out on the dynamic 
interrelationships between the two sectors. Moreover, the seasonality of both farming and 
non-farm income earning activities suggest the inevitability of their co-existence among 
the peasantry in the countryside.   
7.3.3 Quality of farm wage labour in the new labour markets  
Not only do some analysts consider LSCFs as the key source of (formal) agricultural 
employment, the quality of employment in terms of wages earned, types of contracts and 
working conditions are also assumed to be superior to what would be envisaged within 
agrarian structures dominated by the peasantry and involving smaller-scale capitalist 
farms due to their limited operational scales (Hellum & Dellum 2004; Palmer & Sender 
2006; Sender & Johnston 2003; Sender 2016). In fact, the LSCF jobs have been noted to 
be important for the sustenance of the rural folk, implying that wages earned were 
adequate to meet the cost of social reproduction (Sender 2016; Sender & Johnston 2003; 
Barret et al. 2001; Barret et al. 2005; de Janvry 1981) compared to income returns from 
self-employment in own farming. By implication, poor forms of wage employment and 
working conditions are foreseen in the context of redistributive land reforms. These 




Has the expansion of the number of farm households following redistributive land 
reforms resulted in increased competition for farm wage labour and consequently 
improvement in the quality of wage labour? 
The findings indicated that the number of farm employers has increased tremendously in 
the aftermath of the FTLRP and compete amongst each other to attract farm labour, as 
well as with other non-farm income earning activities, which siphon labour from 
agriculture. Where there were 253 LSCF employers in Goromonzi, 2,451 new farming 
units were generated by land redistribution. In similar vein, 290 LSCF employers were 
replaced by 3,852 new small landholdings in Kwekwe district. Notwithstanding the 
―continuity and change‖ characterising the agrarian wage labour relations today, the 
exploitation of the labour force through the payment of wages below the costs of social 
reproduction ever present under capitalism (Patnaik 1996) was vivid in the new 
diversified agrarian structure. The shift in the nature of agrarian capitalism was evident in 
the rise in the use of informal labour compared to those found in the former LSCFs, 
alongside changing land uses and agricultural production patterns, markets and sources of 
financing.  
More often than not, both full- or part-time jobs in the new capitalists farms were 
informal, operating without written contracts and the terms of employment were thus 
unclear for the workers and open to abuse by the farm employers. Like before, farm 
workers faced long working hours that were neither compensated via overtime pay nor 
additional rest days. Practices such as mugwazo or task work, which legally survived only 
in the agricultural sector after the demise of colonial rule, not only entrenched the 
unevenness between farm labour relations and those of other industrial sectors, but also 
subjected workers to undefined work days in terms of hours worked. Gender disparities 
continue to characterise the farm wage labour relations, as most women were located in 
the part-time forms of labour with irregular wages. But the findings also suggest 
women‘s representation in the permanent labour component has slightly improved 
compared to their position in the former LSCFs. As has been documented elsewhere in 
SSA (Tsikata 2015; 2009; Doss et al. 2014; Naidu & Ossome 2016), the few in full-time 
work were stuck at the bottom-end of the employment ladder earning the lowest wages. 
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The exploitation of children for low wages, also seen in the former LSCFs, was present in 
the new capitalist farms in conflict with their education but in service of farm profits. 
The result of the expansion of casual labour, mainly the piece/daily workers in the new 
capitalist farms has been that the working conditions of the majority of the agricultural 
workers now fall outside the protection of the farm labour laws, focused as they are on 
permanent and seasonal workers. Specifically, their conditions of employment were 
mediated at the local level. However, it should be underscored that even for the few 
permanent and seasonal labour embraced by the labour laws there was a wide variation in 
labour rights and the situation observed from the workers in the field. This was 
compounded by the local absence of the state and the farm worker trade unions to enforce 
the farm labour rights.  
Minimum farm wages negotiated through the collective bargaining process remained 
repressed throughout the 2000s and under attack from inflationary pressures at least until 
2009. Thereafter, wage freezes beset the farm workforce between 2011 and 2012 and 
then again between 2014 and 2016 signalling the upper hand of the new capitalist farms 
in the wage negotiations. Regardless of whether they met the statutory levels, the wages 
received by farm workers were well below their costs of social reproduction. As if this 
was not enough, underpayments, non-payments, part-payments and irregular payment 
dates enlarged the problems of low wages. Conversely, it is notable that the wage 
structure in the new agrarian landscape had evolved to exceed the monetary wages partly 
on account of the increased competition for labour and resistance to poor employment 
conditions. It now included ―social wages‖ such as informal access to land and subsidies 
such as monthly food rations. Recipients of these benefits clearly better off than those 
who exclusively depended on monetary wages for survival. Regular wage earners in 
Goromonzi had superior socio-economic indicators than those in the irregular and 
seasonal jobs. Such differences were not so obvious in Kwekwe as the piece/daily 
workers made up on farm wage deficits from non-farm labour markets, especially in 
alluvial gold mining that was not widely accessible to their colleagues in the other 
district. Despite the broadened wage structure, many farm workers remain mired in 
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poverty, unable to provide adequate food for their households and moreso send children 
to school.  
Land shortages and landlessness characterise most farm workers today like in the past, 
signalling the continued significance of  access to land in the formation of agrarian labour 
markets (Cousins 2009; Jha 2017; Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Moyo 2011a). Furthermore, the 
low levels of education of most farm workers suggest their origin from poor Communal 
Area families. Differentiation thus proceeds apace manifest in the observed gaps between 
the landholders and farm workers and the other land short Communal Areas in key social 
and economic indicators such as access to food and education.  
The low wages aside, it is also true that some regressive agrarian labour relations and/or 
labour management practices imprinted in the former LSCFs have dissipated in the new 
farming units. For many workers, the residential labour tenancy that bound workers to a 
single employer and constrained the autonomy and agency in labour markets fell away 
after the land redistribution and subsequent nationalisation of resettled farms. 
Nonetheless, their long-term tenure security in the old farm compounds still remains 
unresolved by the state. The unraveling of the freehold property rights on acquired farms 
also pried open the labour relations of the new capitalist farms to wider media and public 
examination, which was previously encumbered by the trespass laws enforced by the 
former LSCFs (Amanor-Wilks 1995; 2000). Abuse of farm labour that could be ―hidden‖ 
within the protected fences of the LSCFs, including the resolution of labour disputes 
through extra-legal mechanisms characterised as ―domestic government‖ (Rutherford 
2001a) had slowed down dramatically. Indeed, various media reports cited by the study 
exposed the exploitation of farm workers even by politically connected A2 capitalist 
farms. Perhaps it is thus not far-fetched to suggest that the observed substantial decline 
the inhumane practices such as physical violence, racism and verbal abuses post-2000, 
which were a common feature of the LSCF work environment, was partly due to this.  
The experiences of farm workers in the new labour markets were as much the outcome of 
the limited enforcement of the existing labour laws to protect their rights. Indeed the 
NECAIZ was financially constrained and maintained limited presence in the newly 
resettled areas. The state has also not adequately delivered on its mandate to sensitise the 
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new farm employers to be conversant with their legal obligations towards the agrarian 
labourers. The absence of a definitive position in land reform policy regarding the long-
term residential and agricultural land rights is a source insecurity to the livelihoods of 
farm workers. Although, they could benefit from land reform in practice the findings 
indicate that gaps in the implementation of the Citizenship Amendment Act of 2005, 
which prevented farm workers of foreign migrant origin to access national identity 
documents and passports to affirm their rights as Zimbabwe. Such documentation is 
required to register and benefit from public programmes, including land reform and other 
social protection initiatives run by the state. Furthermore, the social protection policies 
inadequately cover farm workers and their families and reflect on their poor socio-
economic conditions. Additionally the capacity of new farmers to meet their obligations 
to workers in terms of wages and other benefits is linked to financial constraints to fully 
utilise land and the consequent low productivity outcomes given that FTLRP was not 
accompanied by a coherent post-settlement support in context where private bank lending 
was declining dramatically. 
To conclude, the competition for farm labour arising from the increased number of farm 
households has not substantially altered the quality of labour as measured by the wages 
earned, types of employment contracts and working conditions. Although the low wages 
were characteristic of the wider economy, it will not be disputed too much that farm 
workers receive the least wages of all Zimbabwean formal employees. The struggles by 
farm workers to become independent agricultural producers should thus be perceived in 
light of the exploitative labour markets at present.  
7.3.4 Resistance of farm workers to the new material conditions 
Finally, the fourth research question sought to understand how the change in the 
structural conditions, including the landholding patterns and land tenure relations, were 
shaping the way farm workers supplied labour to the new farming units and their 
responses to the constraints and opportunities they were facing following the land reform:  
Has the reconstitution of the freehold land tenure into state land tenures, which compelled 
mandatory labour provision by labourers resident in the LSCFs‘ compounds, resulted in 
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the undermining of the residential labour tenancy system and increased the autonomy of 
farm labourers to sell their labour and organize for favourable conditions of labour supply 
and/or engage in other forms of agency/resistance? 
The literature reviewed in Chapter Two and subsequently applied to analyse the evolution 
of agrarian labour relations in Zimbabwe throughout the colonial and post-colonial period 
until 1999 in Chapters Four and Five emphasised that resistance by agrarian underclasses 
such as wageworkers and peasants was always an outcome of their exploitation by 
agrarian capitalists and the state (Jha 2015; 2016; 1996; Shivji 2009; Moyo & Yeros 
2005a; O‘Laughlin 2002). Yet, the expression of the agency and/or resistance as was the 
reaction it elicited from the state and capitalist classes was contingent upon the economic 
and political structures, which constrain their social reproduction at different points in 
time (Petras & Veltmeyer 2001). The findings presented in Chapter Six demonstrate that 
the structural changes accompanying the FTLRP manifest in the many smaller-scale 
farming units and replacement of freehold titles with state land tenures on redistributed 
LSCFs altered substantially the residential labour tenancy and with that the ways in 
which farm workers resident in the old compounds supply labour to new farms. In the A1 
farms, the old compounds where most workers live today, were not allocated to any 
particular landholder, but were instead retained as state land. Therefore, the new A1 
landowners were not able to totally compel workers staying in compounds on the farms 
they were resettled into employment to work for them.  
The old compounds on farms under the A2 model in contrast were redistributed to a 
single landholder whose was allocated the plot containing this infrastructure, while the 
other beneficiaries also given land within that original LSCF were not assigned rights 
over labour in these spatial zones. The owners with authority over the old compounds 
were empowered at law to institute the residential labour tenancy via the Gazetted Lands 
(Consequential Provisions) Act of 2006. It was thus mostly on the A2 farms where the 
residues of the residential labour tenancy relations were observed. However, the scale of 
operations in the downsized capitalist farms diluted the capacity of the A2 landholders 
allocated the compound to replicate the residential labour tenancy since they could not 
absorb all the labour resident in the large compounds especially in Mashonaland districts 
 
 425 
such as Goromonzi. Many of the workers living in these old A2 compounds were thus 
left with latitude to sell their labour within and without the original LSCFs unrelated to 
their residency.  
Most piece/daily workers (67 percent) lived in houses that were not ―owned‖ by their 
employers and/or not tied to their supply of labour to the farming units and were thus 
relatively less encumbered by residential labour tenancy. These piece/daily workers were 
neither bound nor dependent on any single farm employer for both employment and their 
residency. This permitted the now largest section of the agrarian labour force to ―vote 
with their feet‖ in the new labour markets. The newly acquired autonomy of piece/daily 
workers in the new labour markets was evident in their shifts between employers and 
fashioning diverse social reproduction strategies, including being the main actors in the 
trading of natural resources more than the other groups of workers. The permanent 
workers that were predominantly employed by the A2 farms were the ones that largely 
depended on the employers for both work and residency as indicated by up to 75 percent 
of them.  
The new landholders were therefore unable to automatically convert people resident in 
the old farm compounds to labour supplies with much ease as their predecessors in the 
LSCFs did. Tellingly, ―labour shortages‖, which were uncommon in the former LSCFs 
(Tandon 2001) became frequent for new farmers throughout the 2000‘s, despite the 
availability of workers in the old compounds.  
Access to labour from the old farm compounds therefore entailed struggles and 
contestations between the new capitalist farms and former farm workers. The piece/daily 
workers resident in both the A1 and A2 old farm compounds were pressurised by farmers 
to supply labour on the farms they live or be visited by evictions. Violent confrontations 
with the landowners especially in the A1 farms in Goromonzi sometimes erupted during 
the evictions and the old farm compounds thus represented sites of contestation and 
resistance over the control of labour. Empowered by the law, the A2 farmers also resorted 
to the courts to effect evictions. 
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New farm employers have been forced to diversify their sources of labour and evolve 
new forms of labour control via the construction of new independent compounds, 
particularly Goromonzi A2 farmers, to guarantee their labour supplies in response to 
challenges in recruiting labour from old farm compounds. Their strategies also entailed 
the increased co-optation of landless kith and kin from the Communal Areas into their 
families and subsequently exploiting them as unpaid farm labour. New capitalist farmers 
have also been broadening access to labour displacing technologies independently and 
with state supported initiatives such as the Farm Mechanisation Programme between 
2005 and 2007 and the Command Agriculture input subsidy programme since 2015. Over 
and above that, the state also intervened through repressive programmes such as 
Chikorokoza Chapera in 2007 to redirect labour back to farms in gold endowed districts 
such as Kwekwe and containment of other natural resource trading activities (e.g. 
firewood) to avert labour shortages.  
Farm labourers were mobilising their autonomy in the labour markets to resist poor 
working conditions independently and in alliance with other actors. Nonetheless, the 
defense of labour rights was less dependent on ―associational power‖ of belonging to 
trade unions. Very few workers knew about their existence and none retained 
membership in unions across both districts. While the reach in the LSCFs was very low 
before the FTLRP, the study results show that rural trade unions had lost further ground 
in terms of membership mobilisation and their organisational capacities were weak. 
Continued resistance for workers to unionise by the new capitalist farmers and state 
repression compounded the challenges of rural trade unions. Quite significant, the 
narrowly centred ―workerist‖ approaches of trade unions (Moyo et al. 2000) were 
deficient in representing the wider multi-occupational identities of the new potential 
membership base. To make matters worse the state also maintained limited presence in 
newly redistributed areas to enforce labour laws.  
Independent strategies advanced by farm workers included using their ―structural power‖ 
to force reforms of their working conditions and the levels of success differs according to 
their gender, skill levels and the land use patterns. Instead of the trade unions, 
―associational power‖ derived from political parties; in particular, ZANU (PF) has been 
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key in protecting residential rights of former farm workers in the old farm compounds as 
were alliances workers forged with human rights NGOs such as the ZLHR. The struggles 
of farm labourers addressed both challenges in the labour market and their aspirations for 
a post wage-economy by accessing land for independent agricultural production. 
The qualitative difference in the conditions farm workers face in structuring their agency 
has gone unnoticed by some analysts who have characterised the new situation farm 
workers as ―conditional belonging‖ that overly assigns power to the new farmers in an 
undifferentiated manner (Rutherford 2018; Hartnack 2016). These scholars have indeed 
failed to see the link between the diversification of farm labour sources and efforts to 
mimick the residential labour tenancy through the construction of new independent farm 
compound to the increased agency of labour. Nevertheless, the poor social reproduction 
conditions that many farm labourers face is yet to be significantly reversed in response to 
their resistance.  
The witnessed working conditions of farm workers were also a result of the constraints 
trade unions faced in worker mobilisation. Aside their internal weaknesses, the state did 
not adequately facilitate unfettered access to the farm workforce by the trade unions to 
monitor labour conditions recruit workers into their ranks as provided for in the labour 
laws as denials to enter some A2 farms indicate. The state itself also slowed down the 
work of the unions through repression of some of the organisers. Cumbersome 
procedures required to undertake collective action at the workplace spelt out in the 
Labour Ammendment Act of 2015 foreclosed a critical option, which workers and their 
union could effectively apply to disrupt agricultural production activities and force the 
improvement of their working conditions.  
In summary, the absence of excessive control of employees enabled by the residential 
tenancy system has seen the rise in the independent forms of self-mobilisation by farm 
workers beyond farm worker committees to advance their material interests. Their supply 
of labour to the new farming units was relatively more autonomous as a result of the 
unraveling of the residential labour tenancy in the new agrarian structure. Modes of 
―belonging to the farm(er)‖ characterising farm workers in the LSCFs, prior to 2000 
(Rutherford 2003: 191), were dissipating. The portrayal of farm workers as docile 
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bystanders of the land reform (Ridderbos 2009) or ―Zimbabwe‘s New clothes‖ (West & 
Rutherford 2005: 398) could not be further from the truth. 
7.4 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
It is apparent from the evidence that farm labour markets were still important for the 
survival of the remaining land short and/or landless rural people. Yet, the new farm 
labour markets were coloured by super-exploitation of workers, whose social 
reproduction was far from being guaranteed. Some of the challenges arose from the 
inadequate capacity of the capitalist farmers to meet their obligations to workers due to 
land underutilisation and resultant low incomes. This section thus proffers various policy 
recommendations geared towards advancing the material conditions of farm labourers 
through the protection of their labour rights, improving access to agricultural and 
residential land rights, reaffirming the citizenship rights of workers of foreign migrant 
origin and strengthening the employment capacity of the new landholders. 
7.4.1 Protection of farm labour rights  
Chapters Five and Six revealed the existence of legislation and/or policy measures to 
safeguard the labour rights of farm workers, including the Labour Act (Chapter 28:01) 
and the specific agricultural industry agreement negotiated during the Collective 
Bargaining; namely the Statutory Instrument 116 of 2014. The findings also revealed that 
the state‘s NECAIZ was under-resourced and maintained limited presence in the newly 
resettled areas to enforce the farm labour rights. 
Furthermore, matters were not helped by the declining capacity of the main agricultural 
workers trade union; GAPWUZ whose membership has been on the wane and like the 
state was off the radar to ensure the protection of farm labour rights. The fragmentation 
of GAPWUZ into various splinter trade unions leading to conflicts over membership and 
undermining each other during collective bargaining reduced the effectiveness of worker 
organisations. The A2 farmers recorded deficits in the appreciation of the labour relations 
framework and most of them were neither attached to farmer organisations nor registered 
with the NECAIZ as dictated by law. 
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The state should expand the manpower and financial resources to enable it to prosecute 
the existing labour laws in the new farms and disseminate information to raise awareness 
on farm workers‘ rights and employer obligations, including enabling access to trade 
unions to recruit members and monitor labour conditions in the new farms without the 
observed hindrances from A2 farmers as permitted by the Labour Amendment Act of 
2015 and entrenched in section 65 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) 
Act 2013. Furthermore, the encumbrance in the right of workers to engage in collective 
action engrained in the labour laws requires urgent redress. This will allow the 
prosecution of worker strikes to extract concessions from (agrarian) capitalists to improve 
their material conditions. Then workers can enjoy this constitutionally enshrined right in 
Section 65, subsection 3 without fear of loosing their employment. Altogether, these 
efforts will enhance the protection of the labour rights of farm workers. 
The national farmer organisations should serve as platforms to integrate farmers into the 
labour relations framework, including in the Collective Bargaining process. The state 
through the MLRR should thus advance the enlisiting of farmers into the agricultural 
producer unions, which was restricted to a few landholders. In turn vibrant farmer unions 
could be utilised by NECAIZ as conduits to provide labour relations training 
programmes, which was limited amongst the new small-scale capitalist A2 farmers. The 
farm worker trade union needs to enlarge its membership through vigorous recruitment 
efforts targeting both new and former farm workers across the diverse range of farms. 
This will expand its financial resource base and capacity to monitor the implementation 
of labour laws in the new farms, as well as advocate for labour policy reforms. The trade 
unions will also do well to unite their efforts under one umbrella union to recover the 
fragmented voices of labour under the many smaller trade unions.  
7.4.2 Improving the agricultural and residential land rights of farm labourers 
The tenure security of farm workers in the old compounds has not been addressed beyond 
the temporary residence permitted by state policy regardless of their employment status. 
The exploitative residential labour tenancy ought to have been included in the FTLRP 
land tenure reforms, together with the agricultural land needs of farm workers. The state 
should offer long-term tenure security akin to the permit tenure to farm workers resident 
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in the old compounds, which should be autonomous from the lands owned by the new 
farming units. Additional land should be excised from the landholders to expand access 
to agricultural land for farm workers near their residency to produce basic foods for their 
families. Priority should be accorded to marginalised women farm workers.The 
improvement of existing houses and construction of new ones could be funded by the 
state‘s National Social Security Authority to these longstanding contributors of pension 
funds maintained by the latter similar to what it has done to other segments of the 
working class. Some of the land that could be freed from multiple owners and oversized 
farms identified in the ongoing land audit should be availed for this purpose. 
7.4.3 Access to national identity and citizenship documentation  
Although the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No 20) Act 2013, Section 43, 
subsection 2(a) recognises farm workers of foreign migrant origin as Zimbabwe citizens, 
many of them and their families lack requisite documentation to prove them as such. 
Many farm workers could not apply for land during the FTLRP, which required one to 
provide national identity documentation to register on the prospective beneficiary lists. 
Additionally, it excludes immmigrant farm workers from accessing other public goods, 
including social welfare assistance programs for vulnerable groups run by the GoZ. More 
importantly, without national identity cards, farm workers cannot exercise their universal 
suffrage and struggle to register births of their children who cannot proceed beyond 
primary education without this documentation. The state should decentralise registration 
services normally witnessed during the election periods, including the recent 2018 
plebiscite to enable farm workers to apply for identity documents through the Registrar 
General‘s Office. Perhaps worth reiterating, this issue, which has been a longstanding 
concern for farm workers tracing their roots from across the borders before and after the 
land reform (Mugwetsi & Balleis 1994; Magaramombe 2001; Rutherford 2001a; Chadya 
& Mayavo 2002; Chambati & Moyo 2004) requires urgent attention of the government. 
The Citizenship Act (Chapter 4:01) should be immediately realigned to the provisions in 




7.4.4 Strengthening the employment capacity of landholders  
Land utilisation rates in the newly resettled areas were sub-optimal and consequently 
there still remains unfulfilled potential demand for both self-employed and hired in wage 
labour. Moreover, the seasonal rainfall dependent farming limited the recruitment of all 
year round full-time labour. Few A2 farmers accessed agricultural credit and many had to 
rely on narrow sources of self-mobilised finance, partly due to the unresolved impasse 
between the GoZ and financial institutions over the suitability of the A2 leasehold tenure 
as collateral. Inadequate access to agricultural inputs and other farming technologies thus 
ensued to the detriment of agricultural growth and farm labour demand.  
The GoZ increased support to farmers after 2000 through input subsidies and access to 
agricultural machinery to address these production constraints (World Bank 2012). With 
the exception of the recent Command Agriculture Programme that enabled the country to 
produce adequate maize to meet the domestic requirements in the 2015/16 season (GoZ 
2017b), state input subsidy programmes have tended to be associated only with marginal 
increases in the levels of maize output in the years that follow extreme droughts (World 
Bank 2014). Reaching a few A2 farmers, the scale of input subsidy beneficiaries has been 
limited (World Bank 2014) to substantially alter the demand for farm labour. 
The research recommends the state to maintain and increase the input subsidies towards a 
more universal approach to serve the diverse needs of both the peasantry and the new 
small scale capitalist farmers in their agricultural production. With that, the poor 
peasantries will be able to engage productively in food production and to increase land 
utilisation rates and demand for labour as the response to the wider input supply under 
the Command Agriculture Programme indicated (GoZ 2017b).  
The subsidy programmes should be expanded to capacitate farmers to invest in 
appropriate irrigation infrastructure and other farm technologies, which will also 
minimise the adverse efforts of recurrent droughts (Manzungu et al. 2018). Beyond 
enlarging the all year-round demand for agricultural labour, this will also expand farm 
incomes and the ability to remunerate wage labour. Labour intensive technologies (hand 
tools and animal drawn equipment) utilised by peasants should form the fulcrum of future 
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farm mechanisation programmes instead of the labour displacing large machinery such 
tractors for small-scale capitalist A2 farmers emphasised by previous policies (GoZ 
2007). While the evidence illustrated that access to tractors bolstered demand for farm 
labour and land utilisation in the A2 farms, additional investigation is required on the 
optimal level to avoid labour displacement as happened in the former LSCFs (Loewenson 
1992). Overall, the financial sustainability of the input subsidy programmes will require 
further research beyond the scope of this study. 
Alongside these interventions, the state should immediately conclude the negotiations 
with the banking sector on the use of 99-year leases as collateral by the farmers to access 
private credit. Recent press reports suggested an agreement between the two parties was 




7.4.5 Mainstreaming gender issues in agrarian labour policies  
The study results have highlighted the constraints that women face in the farm labour 
markets that were seen through their relegation to the irregular low wage earning work, 
while the few of them were lowly ranked in permanent work. The protection of their 
labour rights was limited. Moreover, land access was skewed in favour of men and the 
few independent women landholders lacked the financial resources to work the land with 
their families. Indeed many of the female landholders were poor peasants that obtained 
the least income returns from farming and hardly met their subsistence needs.  
The policy recommendations proposed above should mainstream gender issues in order 
to advance the material conditions of women farm wage workers and those of women 
landholders to effectively utilise their land resources. Specifically, the objective should 
be to enhance the protection of the labour rights of women, including the removal of the 
gender discrimination in the grading, wage payments and employment contracts. The 
Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013 that directs the state to ensure 
equitable distribution of resources across genders should be fully implemented to 
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promote women‘s secure access to land in their own right.
202
 This could entail setting up 
quotas for female beneficiaries in all future land resettlement programmes.  
Public agricultural input subsidies programmes should also be implemented along the 
same principles to ensure fair distribution between the genders, in order capacitate the 
land utilisation of women. Various public services tailored to meet the needs of women 
should be implement to redress their precarious livelihoods, including prioritising women 
farm workers to obtain identity and citizenship documentation and benefit from existing 
state social support services such as school fees assistance through the BEAM 
programme and food insecurity relief schemes.  
7.5 THESIS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE BODY OF KNOWLEDGE 
The main research question which the study sought to answer pertained to the nature and 
extent of structural change in land ownership and tenure reforms, and the resultant shifts 
in the agricultural production patterns and how markets have reshaped the organisation of 
labour relations amongst the broader base of agrarian classes within the new diversified 
agrarian structure which emerged since 2000. The findings unequivocally demonstrated 
that a new agrarian labour regime had evolved to replace the predominant organisation of 
farming activities in the former LSCFs around the exclusive use of hired in wage labour 
especially to perform manual labour (Figure 7.1). With the expansion of small-scale 
farming/peasantry through mainly the A1 resettlement schemes implemented nationally 
and in both districts, land redistribution expanded the use of family labour /self-
employment for own farming to add to that already existing in the Communal Areas. 
Yet, the hiring in of farm wage labour has continued to be pervasive through both the 
new peasantry in A1 schemes with enlarged land access in qualitative better agro-
ecological zones, and the new small-scale capitalist farms in the A2 scheme. Quite 
clearly the extent of the use of hired in farm labour was a key of marker differentiation 
amongst the farm units and was reflected in the wider production relations. Labour 
markets are therefore not restricted to large-scale capitalist farms and the diversification 
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of agrarian structures from one dominated by the latter to one largely occupied by the 
peasantry does not extinguish wage employment opportunities. 




Figure 7.1: Reformation of agrarian labour relations following land reform 
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This section draws out the wider implications of the research findings on the conceptual 
understanding of agrarian labour relations in former Settler economies and SSA in 
general. Specifically,  the study has elucidated the role of land reforms in the 
development of employment under conditions of stalled agrarian transitions, the 
reconstitution of the peasantry through repeasantisation and semi-proletarianisation 
processes, and the trajectories of the social reproduction of labour under rapidly changing 
agrarian structures and wider-socio-economic contexts (Figure 7.1). Additionally, it shed 
light on the relative importance of the self-employment vis-à-vis wage employment in 
capitalist farms in the livelihood outcomes in rural areas. 
7.5.1 Land reform is key in generating employment in contexts of stalled agrarian 
transitions 
These findings provide important pointers regarding the role of land reform in 
employment development in its wider sense to incorporate both self and wage 
employment, especially in a context where the urban and industrial labour markets in 
Zimbabwe have been ―loosening‖ or contracting over the last two decades. Land reform 
reversed the monopoly control over wage labour markets by a few LSCFs land and 
widened the potential employment base, as well as the possibilities for landholders to 
apply self-employment from within their families. This questions notions that view 
LSCFs as the key source of rural employment to the exclusion of the self and wage 
employment that could arise from the peasantry itself (Sender 2016; Sender & Johnston 
2003), and predominant focus on the urban labour markets for the resolution of the 
unemployment problem (LEDRIZ 2016). 
As indicated earlier (Chapters Four & Five) the outcome of the increase in capital 
intensity in the LSCFs was displacement of permanent labour and subsequent 
replacement with casual labour (see Clarke 1977; Loewenson, 1992; Amanor-Wilks 
1995; Rutherford 2001a). Moreover, employment growth was further hampered by land 
underutilisation in the LSCFs, below 50 percent of land held (Roth 1994: 321). The 
LSCFs were the major source of formal employment. Sluggish employment growth in the 
capital intensive LSCFs for over two decades and the limited employment capacity in the 
urban and industrial sectors therefore meant unemployment was a key challenge in the 
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country (Chapters Four & Five). Additionally, of all farm classes, the LSCF has 
historically absorbed the least workers per unit of cropped area. 
Indeed, the number of farming units in the two districts studied increased by over ten-
fold. For Goromonzi, this translated into the growth of permanent and casual farm jobs 
from 3,900 and 6,950 in year 2000 to over 4,665 and 16,619 workers respectively. 
Agricultural wage employment expansion was also registered in Kwekwe district from 
1100 and 800 full and part time workers to 2,613 and 1,082 workers respectively during 
the same period. Beyond the increase in the employment figures, workers exercised 
autonomy in the new farm labour markets since many were not fixed to a single employer 
on account of the residency. 
The largest gains were however registered in the self–employment family labour which 
rose from 1,696,128 to 5,185,233 nationally across all the farming classes between 2000 
and 2015 (Chapter Four & Five). The peasantry that originated from the land short 
Communal Areas was now able to utilise underemployed labour from their families on 
larger and better quality land provided by the FTLRP. Without land reform, the 
unemployment levels and the attendant social consequences would have been much 
higher. The importance of agriculture as a source of employment has increased as 
reflected by the growth in the share of people employed in agriculture as either self-
employed or wage workers increased from 54.78 percent in 2002 (CSO 2002: 106) to 
71.8 percent (ZIMSTAT 2013: 47) on account of the expanded number of farming units 
and decline in the urban and industrial employment. 
Overall, the new agrarian structure has generated more employment compared to before 
2000 despite the land utilisation rates being far from optimal. With the resolution of the 
lingering production constraints, a rise in farm labour demand should not be unexpected. 
Further to this, the nationalisation of land tenure has also enabled wider access to natural 
resources previously monopolised by the former LSCFs and in the process generated 
non-farm rural jobs in the trading of the same. The extent of the number of non-farm jobs 
requires further research, but suffice to say such non-farm rural jobs were important 
sources of income for the poor peasantries.  
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Land access is therefore a critical element in resolving the unemployment challenge, 
moreso in a context where the transition from farm to factory has stalled in SSA even in 
the most industrialised country, South Africa. The industrial base has not been able to 
absorb the burgoening labour force in both town and country (Losch 2012; Lumumba-
Kasongo 2015; Moyo et al. 2013). The rural, rather than the urban areas, are thus a key 
source of resolving unemployment problem. The prospects for rapid employment 
creation in the industrial sectors appear gloomly in Zimbabwe within the current context 
of poor economic performance and indeed in much of SSA (see ILO 2015a).  
7.5.2 Self-employment in own farming rather than (farm) wage labour is more 
important in the social reproduction of the rural poor  
Substantial proportions of wage employment arising from the agrarian restructuring were 
part time and seasonal in nature and/or maricho type work, further perpetuating the 
casualisation of labour trends that commenced in the LSCFs in the 1970s, not to mention 
the feminisation of the irregular wage earning part-time work. More importantly, the new 
agrarian capitalists like their LSCF predecessors paid wages below the costs of social 
reproduction and offered poor working conditions.  
The gender inequalities by way of operation of patriarchal relations aside, self-employed 
family labour based farming households with access to more land provided by the 
FTLRP were relatively better off than the land short proletariats and/or semi-proletariats 
reliant on the wage labour markets for their living on many key socio-economic 
indicators, including incomes, access to food and education. Specifically, many of the 
farm labourers faced difficulties in providing these key requirements for their families 
and the opposite was true for the landholders. The findings therefore challenged 
conventionally held wisdom, which undervalue the importance of self-employed jobs in 
social reproduction, and indeed associate land redistribution with loss of wages incomes 
from the LSCFs for their sustenance in the rural areas (Hellum & Derman 2004; Palmer 
& Sender 2006; Sender 2016; de Janvry 1981). 
Perhaps also worth emphasising is that super-exploitation of farm wage workers is not 
confined to small-scale capitalist farms and thus associated with the land redistribution in 
Zimbabwe. Indeed, the evidence from elsewhere in former-settler colonies such as South 
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Africa where large-scale capitalist farms still prevail, as well as in emerging large scale 
farms in former non-Settler economies, suggests that farm workers are amongst the lot of 
the poorest in society, without enough to eat, let alone school fees and healthcare costs 
for their families (see BFAP 2012; Visser & Ferrer 2015; Wisborg et al. 2013) and even 
further afield in countries such as Brazil (Selwyn 2014). 
To reinforce the importance of self-employment in own farming, the aspirations of the 
land short and/or landless majority of the farm labourers hinged on accessing land as the 
basis of their future social reproduction rather than continued dependency on the labour 
markets. The struggles of farm labour therefore exhibited tendencies of ―resistances to 
proletarianisation‖ by searching for land within and without the newly redistributed areas 
to explore the ―peasant path‖ (Moyo et al. 2013: 94 ) and/or other land based non-farm 
activities such as alluvial gold panning in the case of Kwekwe, alongside resistance 
aimed to improve their conditions as workers in the new small-scale capitalist farms.  
Agricultural based social reproduction organised around the use of self-employed family 
labour made possible by access to FTLRP land was crucial to providing access to food 
for the peasantry despite the diversified labour activities perceived in the countryside 
today. It is thus not correct that rural areas in SSA are permeated ―fragmented classes of 
labour‖ that are ―directly or indirectly” dependent on the wage economy for their 
survival as some scholars suggest (Bernstein 2014: S97-98 emphasis in original). 
Explicitly, the struggles in the countryside are informed by both the land and labour 
questions. The latter is reflected by wageworkers striving for better working conditions, 
secure forms of employment and adequate wages to meet their subsistence costs, while 
the former, through struggles by rural inhabitants, seek land to engage in independent 
agricultural production and other land based non-farm activities on the basis of self-
employed family labour. Self-employment in both farm and non-farm rural labour 
activities should thus equallly be accorded attention from researchers and policy makers 
that urban labour markets often receive.  
7.5.3 Repeasantisation as a form of labour resistance 
If resistance to dispossession of their lands by the peasantry and their consequent 
proletarianisation in the reconstituted large-scale capitalist farms and beyond constitutes a 
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form of labour unrest (Silver 2003) or resistance, then the reverse could be equally 
considered of re-peasantisation. In the latter, the labour resistance takes the form of 
defense of self-employed or unpaid family agricultural labour and to continue to subsist 
through farming on their small pieces of lands. As is now known, the dispossession 
peasant lands and subsequent conversion into large-scale capitalist farms and plantations 
in SSA and the wider Global South has been on the rise in the 2000‘s (Moyo 2008; Moyo 
2012; Hall et al. 2017), labour resistance of the type conceptualised by Silver (2003) has 
also been surging.  
Colonial land dispossession not only eroded the capacity of the peasantry to subsist 
outside of the capital-wage labour relation (Palmer 1977; Bush & Cliffe 1984; 
Neocosmos 1993), but also undermined their ―bargaining power‖ in the very same labour 
markets (Arrighi 1970). The latter, also known as ―market based bargaining power‖ 
(Silver 2003: 13), increases if workers have alternative non-wage forms of labour to 
centre their social reproduction upon. Turning this around, it could therefore be equally 
argued that land reform by enlarging land access provides both urban and rural 
proletariats and/or semi-proletariats with an alternative social reproduction path outside 
wage labour and restored the ability to resist insertion into the labour markets as seen in 
the data, as well as strengthening their ―market based bargaining power‖ in the same. 
During the FTLRP, repeasantisation was witnessed through land bidding by the 
unemployed and employed urbanites, as well as the struggles to access land by the 
current farm labourers and subsisting on the basis of family farm labour thereafter. 
Furthermore, a substantial number of landholders in formal employment delinked from 
their jobs after getting access to FTLRP land and similar patterns of returning to full time 
farming in the Communal Areas after urban employment were also witnessed. The 
interest in land access especially by the urban working classes, it is worth stressing 
escalated with crisis in the labour markets originating from the ESAP induced job 
retrenchments in the late 1990 (Yeros 2013b; 2002) and much later as inflation wiped 
away wages in the 2000s (Kanyenze et al. 2011). The retrenchments, as noted earlier, 
persisted in the 2000s as institutions faltered under the weight of economic decline 
(Chapter Five).  
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Building on the arguments of the later scholar, the study avers that being more than a 
struggle to reclaim dispossessed land (Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Moyo et al. 2013; Van der 
Ploeg 2008, 2011 van der Berg et al. 2016), re-peasantisation could also be seen as a type 
of labour resistance against the exploitation in wage labour markets in favour self-
employment on (newly) acquired lands. Alternatively, it is a resistance by proletariats 
and/or semi-proletariats to revert back to self-employed agricultural labour on 
independently owned land. Repeasantisation thus represents a ―resistance to 
proletarianisation‖ expressed by former proletariats and semi-proletariats through exiting 
from super-exploitation in the labour markets and deploying their agency to work the 
land together with their families for their survival. 
7.5.4 De-agrarianisation is not a permanent phenomenon 
The dynamic relationships that landholders had with the labour markets challenge widely 
held assumptions of the tendencies of labour to permanently divest away from farming 
towards other non-farm based activities, including wage employment espoused in the de-
agrarianisation thesis (Bryceson 1997; 2000; Riggs 2006). Instead of the movement of 
labour from ―farm to factory‖ as the only route perceived by these studies drawing on 
Lewisian dual models of economic transformation (see also World Bank 2013), the field 
research demonstrates that the reverse is equally true, when urban labour markets become 
unstable, access to land provides an escape route. Rather than being ―permanent‖ or 
totally severing links to the countryside (Petras & Veltmeyer 2001), rural-urban 
migration can indeed be overturned. As such, it is quite possible for people to be 
proletarianised in the rural/urban labour markets and revert back to peasants as the socio-
economic conditions in both town and country undergo transformation.  
What was also clear from the findings was that the combination of farm and non-farming 
activities within and without rural areas was common in the social reproduction strategies 
of surveyed farm households. Thus, semi-proletarianisation of rural labour was the 
dominant phenomenon (Moyo & Yeros 2005; Moyo 2011a), and has continued to 
characterise a substantial number of the households even after land reform. Quite 
crucially, these patterns also signal that understanding agrarian labour requires the 
examination of both the socio-economic conditions in rural and urban areas. Confining 
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the analysis to rural areas as a spatial zone misses the interrelationships between the two 
sectors, as well as the influence of the conditions on the agrarian labour outcomes. 
During land reforms, semi-proletarianisation and repeasantisation, can thus take place 
concurrently as Moyo and Yeros (2005b) have argued.  
7.5.5 Access to land leads to “stable” semi-proletarianisation  
Semi-proletarianisation has been seen in Settler Southern Africa literature as performing 
a dual role also referred to as ―functional dualism‖ (Moyo & Yeros 2005a; Neocosmos 
1993; Bush & Cliffe 1984). Due to the inadequate land for social reproduction in 
Communal Areas originating from colonial land dispossession, wage work was seen as a 
strategy to meet subsistence needs not met by farming and vice versa the latter considered 
petty agricultural production as subsidising capital since the meagre wages alone without 
being complemented by farming on small plots were not enough to support families. In 
this respect, semi-proletarianisation could be considered to have been unstable since rural 
households could not survive without income from either the wage economy or from the 
land.  
Not to discount land shortages, for they persists among the small and poor peasantry from 
the Communal Areas that did not receive FLTRP land, the evidence from the resettled 
areas indicates metamorphoses of the process of semi-proletarianisation. Rather than only 
supplementing inadequate land-based social reproduction, the semi-proletarian strategy 
amongst the lot of rich peasants-to-capitalist farms provided an important conduit for 
resources to invest in farming. With enlarged land access, the family based farm labour 
classes perpetuate semi-proletarianisation to recover deficits in farm labour income due 
to the financial constraints they face to exploit newly found lands. Even for those that 
wage economy does not serve, the purpose of investing in farms, semi-proletarianisation 
now proceeds with relative autonomy provided by FTLRP land access. As seen in the 
data, some land beneficiaries disengaged from the labour markets after obtaining access 
to land.  
Consequently, it could be argued that access to land provides for a more stable semi-
proletarianisation since they have an alternative to subsist in the absence of wage income, 
 
 443 
which would not be the case within a context of land shortages in poor agro-ecological 
zones. More than providing the means of production for farming, access to land enabled 
the farm households to partake in non-farm activities through exploitation of resources 
found on their newly found lands resulting in the intensification of the process of semi-
proletarianisation reported in the findings.  
7.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study has shown that the structural changes initiated by the FTLRP and the 
accompanying land uses, agriculture production and markets under rapidly changing 
socio-economic contexts, have reshaped the agrarian labour relations. Progressive 
changes noted include the diversification of agrarian structure to incorporate many poor 
peasants, who now access land of larger size in better agro-ecological zones. The 
peasantries work the land with their family labour to produce food for themselves and 
realise incomes from surplus sales to meet other subsistence requirements. Resultantly, 
this has seen the rise in the number of self-employed jobs to ameliorate the 
unemployment problem, whose origins can be traced to ESAP and insistent institution 
closures as the economy faltered in the 2000s. Ultimately, the agricultural incomes have 
been reallocated to many rural people beyond the few LSCFs. Access to land reduces 
their compulsion to enter exploitative (agrarian) labour markets since they can now 
derive their livelihoods from self-employment in own farming.  
It is also clear that land reforms do not necessarily allocate land to all the land short and 
landless people (Borras 2005; de Janvry 1981). Consequently, the agrarian labour reserve 
though reduced by the allocation of land to the formerly land short peasants will continue 
to operate as the farm labour markets retain their relevance as a source of livelihood for 
those remaining landless. The reformation of land tenure relations in redistributed LSCFs 
in Settler-Southern Africa, by delinking the residency and employment rights in the farm 
compounds can enhance the autonomy of workers in the labour markets and their 
prospects for self-mobilisation and/or agency. But this does not, however, guarantee the 
reversal of the poor socio-economic conditions of farm workers. The agrarian labour 
relations outcomes were not just contingent upon the agrarian restructuring, but were also 
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as much shaped by the interaction of the land reform policy with other agricultural, 
economic and labour policies. 
The study revealed that, as the new small-scale capitalist farmers accumulate capital at 
the expense of underpaid farm labourers, differentiation will proceed rapidly and deepen 
inequalities in the rural areas. This also signals that the scale of capitalist farming does 
not influence super-exploitation of farm workers, as it is common feature in its different 
variants ranging from to small to large capitalist farms. Overall, the study highlighted that 
the labour rights, socio-economic conditions and secure access to farming and housing 
land for farm labourers should remain a priority for research and policy discussions.  
7.7 FURTHER RESEARCH  
The study elucidated the new labour relations in the redistributed farms, but did not 
examine the remaining LSCFs and plantation estates. Further research will be required to 
explore the evolving agrarian labour relations in these sectors, alongside the dynamic 
changes in the agrarian and economic policies, including the new government‘s policy 
interest to attract foreign and domestic capital to address agrarian financing challenges 
through joint ventures in agricultural production with the peasantry and small-scale 
capitalist farms (GoZ 2018a). Moreover, a Transitional and Stabilisation Plan was also 
launched in October 2018, which, among other issues, proposes to reduce government 
expenditure (GoZ 2018b), and thus the fate of input subsidy programmes such as the 
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ANNEX 3.2: FARM HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
University of South Africa 
 
 









Universal Codes throughout the questionnaire. 
-1      Don’t Know 
-2      Refused to Answer 













Date Checked  
 
|___|___|___|___|___|___| 
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A. ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION 
A1. Enumerator‘s name ________________________________________serial No. |__|__|__| 
A2. Date of interview (DD/MM/YY)       |__|__|__|__|__|__| 
A3. Place of interview __________________________________________ 
B. LOCATION/IDENTIFICATION DETAILS  
B1. Province 1. Mash East 2. Midlands  |___| 
B2. District  __________________________________________  
B3. Natural Region __________________________________________ 
B4. Ward   __________________________________________ 
B5. FarmID__________________________________________ 
B6. Household ID _____________________________________ 
B7 Gender of plot owner      1=male 2=female |___|               B9 Age |______| 
B8. Model Type  
1= A1 villagised 2=A1 self-contained 3=A2 4=A2 peri-urban 5=remaining LSCF 6=Communal Areas  
 
C. SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC DATA (ASK OF PLOT OWNER) 
 
NB. C1 TO C5 – NEWLY REDISTRIBUTED AREAS ONLY, COMMUNAL AREAS GO TO C6. 
No. Question Response 
C1. What year did you settle on this farm? (YYYY) |___|___|___|____| 
C2. Where were you before being resettled here?  
1=CA in this district 2=CA in this province 3= CA from other provinces 4=LSCF in this district 5=LSCF in this province 





C3 If originated from Communal Area, what is the size of the arable plot in the Communal Area?(ha) |_______| 
C4. Are there any agricultural activities you are practicing in the CA? 1=yes 2=no |___| 
C5. If yes, please specify the activities?  
1=crop production only 2=livestock production only 3=crop and livestock  |___| 
C6. Are you in professional employment? 1=yes 2=no |___| 
C7. If yes, what is your current profession? 
1=private sector managerial 2=civil service managerial 3=self-employed 4=uniformed forces 5=private sector semi-skilled 
6=civil service semi-skilled 7=domestic worker 8=farm worker 99=other specify  
|____| 
C8. If no, were you previously employed? 1=yes 2=no |___| 
C9. Are you on pension? 1=yes 2=no |___| 
C10.  If no longer employed year you were last in employment             (YYYY) |___|___|___|___| 
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C12. Demographic characteristics of the household 
Household Member  Sex1 
  





to HH head5  
Formal Agricultural 
Training6 
Residency7 If off farm 
specify8 
1 HH head |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
2 Member 1 |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
3 Member 2 |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
4 Member 3 |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
5 Member 4 |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
6 Member 5 |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
7 Member 6 |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
8 Member 7 |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
9 Member 8 |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
10 Member 9 |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
11 Member10 |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
12 Member 11 |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
13 Member 12 |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
14 Member 13 |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
15 Member 14 |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
16 Member 15 |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
17 Member 16 |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
18 Member 17 |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
11=male 2=female 
21= permanent paid employee 2= casual employee 3= employer 4= farmer5= paid farm worker 6=unpaid family worker 7= self employed 8=student 9= housewife 10 
=preschool  99=other specify 
31= monogamously married 2 polygamous married 3=single 4=divorced/separated 5=widowed  
41= no formal education 2= some primary education 3= completed primary education 4= some secondary education ordinary level 5=completed secondary education 
6=completed advanced level 7= college education 8=university degree 9= vocational training 99=other (specify) 
51=self 2=son 3=daughter 4=wife 5=husband 6=relative 7=worker 8= mother 9= farmer 99=other (specify) 
61=no formal training 2=certificate 3=master farmer certificate 4=advanced master farmer certificate 5=diploma 6=degree 99=other (specify) 
71=on farm 2=off farm 
81=communal area 2=urban area 3=diaspora 99=other (specify) 
  
  QN No. |_______| 
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D. LAND BASE  
D1. How much land does this household own? (all in Ha) 
       Holdings Type of 
settlement1 











1 Owned |____| |________| |________| |_________| |_______| |_______| 
2 Sharecropped in |____| |________| |________| |_________| |_______| |_______| 
3 Borrowed (for free) |____| |________| |________| |_________| |_______| |_______| 
4 Rented out (for 
money) 
|____| |________| |________| |_________| |_______| |_______| 
5 Rented in (for 
money) 
|____| |________| |________| |_________| |_______| |_______| 
6 Sharecropped out |____| |________| |________| |_________| |_______| |_______| 
7 Lent out (for free)  |____| |________| |________| |_________| |_______| |_______| 
1Type of Settlement 1= A1 villagised 2=A1 self-contained 3=A2 4=A2 peri-urban 5=remaining LSCF 6=communal areas 
 
E. PRODUCTIVE AND OTHER ASSET OWNERSHIP, ACCESS AND INVESTMENTS  
E1. Provide the following information on agricultural production assets 














Animal drawn implements 
1 Scotch-cart |____| |____| |_______| |______| 
2 Plough  |____| |____| |_______| |______| 
3 Planter  |____| |____| |_______| |______| 
4 Ridger  |____| |____| |_______| |______| 
5 Cultivator  |____| |____| |_______| |______| 
6 Ripper  |____| |____| |_______| |______| 
7 Harrow  |____| |____| |_______| |______| 
Machinery, power-driven implements and equipment. 
1 Vehicles |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
2 Generator |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
3 Tractor |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
4 Water pump |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
5 Combine  |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
Fixed assets. 
1 Boreholes  |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
2 Deep wells |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
3 Cattle pens  |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
4 Pig sties |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
5 Poultry runs |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
7 Tobacco barns |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
8 Green houses 
 (include area 
covered in Ha) 
|____| |____| |_______| |____| 
1=proceeds from agric sales 2=personal savings outside agric 3=loan from bank 4=remittances from diaspora 5=local 
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E2. Provide the following information on other assets  











1 TV |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
2 Decoder |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
3 Radio |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
4 Cellphone |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
5 Solar panel |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
7 Electric 
stove 
|____| |____| |_______| |____| 
8 Beds |____| |____| |_______| |____| 





|____| |____| |_______| |____| 
1 1=proceeds from agric sales 2=personal savings outside agric 3=loan from bank 4=remittances from diaspora 5=local 
remittances 6=loan from relatives and friends 7=credit from supplier 8=contract farming 99=other specify 
 
No Question Response 
E3. Do you have access to electricity at your homestead?  1=yes 2=no  |____| 
 
F. LAND TENURE ISSUES 
No Question Response 
F1 How did you first access this piece of land?  
1= occupation 2= formally allocated = 3=inheritance 4=traditional leader 5=family subdivision 
6=bought it 99=other specify 
 
|____| 
F2 When you were formally allocated this piece of land? (year) (YYYY) |__|__|__|__| 
F3 When did you start farming operations? (year) (YYYY) |__|__|__|__| 
F4 Do you have any documentation for this piece of land? 1=yes 2=no  |____| 
F5 If yes what kind of documentation do you have?  
1=99 year lease 2=offer letter 3=permit 4=none 99=other specify  |____| 
F6 Are you sharing the land with anyone? 1=yes 2=no IF NO MOVE TO G1 |____| 
F7 If yes, who are you sharing your land with?  
1=relative/friend 2=squatters 3=former farm workers 4=former LSC farmer 99=other (specify) |___| 
F8 How much land are you sharing out? (Ha) |______| 
F9 What are they using the land for?  
1=residency 2=crop production 3=livestock production 4=crop and livestock 99=other (specify) |____| 
F10 Do the people you are sharing land have any obligation towards you? 1= yes 2=no |____| 
F11 If yes, what is the obligation? 1= provide paid labour 2=provide free labour 3=share 
harvest with land owner 4=sell harvest to land owner 99=other specify |_____| 
 
G. LAND USE, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND FOOD SECURITY 
G1. Who makes the following day-to-day decisions on this farm?  
 Activity Response  
1 Family labour allocation |____| 
2 Hiring in wage labour |____| 
3 Hiring out wage labour |____| 
4 Inputs used in agricultural production |____| 
5 Crops and livestock produced |____| 
6 Marketing of agricultural commodities |____| 
7 Use of income earned for agricultural commodities  |____| 
8 Mobilising financial resources for agricultural production  |____| 
1=male owner 2=female owner 3=husband 4=wife 5=husband & wife 6=son 7=daughter 8=manager 99=other specify 
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G2 Do you have irrigation on this plot? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
G3 If yes, what type of irrigation infrastructure do you have?  
1=drip 2=overhead 3=centre pivot 4=canal 5= hose pipes 6=bucket system 99=other specify |____| 
G4 Is the irrigation infrastructure operational? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
 
 
CROP PRODUCTION  
G5. Which dry land and irrigated crops did you grow in these past seasons?  





























 Dry Irrigated Dry Irrigated   Dry Irrigated Dry Irrigated   
1 Maize               
2 Wheat               
3 Cotton               
4 Tobacco               
5 Groundnuts               
6 Millet               
7 Sorghum               
8 Rapoko               
9 Sunflower               
10 Soyabeans               
11 Sweet potatoes               
12 Sugarbeans               
13 Cowpeas 
/nyemba 
              
14 Roundnuts 
(nyimo) 
              
15 Other (specify)               
1
Reason 1=GoZ directive 2=own consumption 3=profitability of venture 4=compatibility with available equipment 5=influenced by past land uses 6=to ensure land 
sustainability 7=inputs easily available 99=other (specify)




No  Question Response 





G7 If yes, provide the following details.  















































1 Baby corn  
 
              
2 Pumpkins                
3 Watermelons               
4 Okra               
5 Tomatoes               
6 Rape               
7 Onions               
8 Peas               
9 Green beans               
10 Gen squash                
11 Cabbage               
12 Rugare/covo               
13 Butternut               
14 Potatoes                
15 Paprika                
16 Other (specify)               




1=GoZ directive 2=food security 3=foreign currency generation 4=profitability of venture 5=compatibility with available equipment 6=influenced by 
past land uses 7=to ensure land sustainability 99=other (specify)
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No  Question Response 
G8 Are you engaged in crop contract 
farming? 1=yes 2=no 
|____| 
G9 If yes which season did you start 
contract farming? (YY/YY) 
|___|___|/|___|___| 
 
G10. Provide information on contract farming  




















|______| |___| |____|  |______| |___| |___| 
2 Seed maize  |______| |___| |____|  |______| |___| |___| 
3 Cotton  |______| |___| |____|  |______| |___| |___| 
4 Sorghum  |______| |___| |____|  |______| |___| |___| 
6 Tobacco  |______| |___| |____|  |______| |___| |___| 






|______| |___| |____|  |______| |___| |___| 
1Support1=seed 2=fertilisers 3=chemicals 4= technical advice 5= seed/fert 6=seed/chemicals 7=seed/fert/chemicals/technical 
advice/transport 99=other (specify)  
 
LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION 






No. No. owned Estimated Value 
(USD) 





d Value  




1 Cattle  |____| |____| |________| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
2 Goats  |____| |____| |________| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
3 Sheep  |____| |____| |________| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
4 Donk
eys 
|____| |____| |________| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
5 Pigs  |____| |____| |________| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
6 Rabbi
ts  





|____| |____| |________| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
8 Broile
rs 
|____| |____| |________| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
9 Layer
s*  

















|____| |____| |________| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
*For layers no. sold put in crates 
 
 
No Question Response 
G12 Are there any agricultural production activities that you are undertaking jointly with others on |____| 
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your plot in 2016/17?   1=yes 2=no 
G13 If yes, what agricultural production activities are you jointly undertaking?  
1=crop production only 2=livestock production only 3=crop and livestock  
|____| 
G14 With whom are you involved in joint agricultural operations?  
1=friend 2=relative 3=business partner 4=former LSCF owner 99=other specify 
|____| 
G15 On how much land area are the joint activities taking place? (Ha) |______| 
G16 How do you share the outputs from the joint activities? 1=share harvest 2=share profits 
99=other specify 
|____| 
G17 What is the basis on which output is shared? 
1= based on contribution to production costs 2=on ad-hoc basis 3=land owner determines 
sharing 99=other specify 
|____| 
G18 Who provides the labour for the joint agriculture activities? 1= wage labour paid by plot 
owner 2= wage labour paid by plot owner and family labour 3=wage labour paid by partner 
4=wage labour paid by partner and his/her family labour 5=family labour of partner 




H. AGRICULTURAL INPUTS 
H1. For each of the crops that you grew during the last two seasons, what levels, where and how did you access the 
inputs? (SPECIFY QUANTITY OF INPUTS USED IN KGS OR LITRES 















Seed Improved         
Retained          
Agrochemicals Herbicides          
Pesticides          
Fertiliser Basal          
Top          






Seed Certified         
Agrochemicals Herbicides          
Pesticides          
Fertiliser Basal          
Top          






Seedlings (no.) Flue-cured         
Air-cured         
Agrochemicals Herbicides          
Pesticides          
Fertiliser Basal          
Top          








Seed Certified         
 Retained         
Agrochemicals Herbicides          
Pesticides          
Fertiliser Basal          
Top          
manure         
1 1=local agro-dealer/retailer 2=Govt inputs scheme 3=NGO input scheme 4=nearest town 5=Harare agro-dealer 6=given by relative/friend 7=contract scheme 
99=other (specify)  




























Seed Certified         
Retained         
Agrochemicals Herbicides          
Pesticides          
Fertiliser Basal          
Top          









Seed Certified          
 Retained         
Agrochemicals Herbicides          
Pesticides          
Fertiliser Basal          
Top          




Seed Certified          
 Retained          
Agrochemicals Herbicides          
Pesticides          
Fertilizer Basal          
Top          




Seed Certified          
 Retained          
Agrochemicals Herbicides          
 Pesticides          
Fertiliser  Basal         
 Top          
 Manure         
1 1=local agro-dealer/retailer 2=Govt inputs scheme 3=NGO input scheme 4=nearest town 5=Harare agro-dealer 6=given by 
relative/friend 7=contract scheme 99=other (specify) 
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Livestock Inputs:  
H2. For each of the livestock enterprises, what levels, where and how did you access the inputs during the last three 
years? (SPECIFY THE UNITS FOR QUANTITY OF STOCKFEEDS USED IN KGS) 
Livestock 
type 





















Stockfeeds |____| |_____| |____| |_______| |____| |______| |____| |_______| 
Vet 
chemicals  





|____| |_____| |____| |_______| |____| |______| |____| |_______| 
Vet 
chemicals  





|____| |_____| |____| |_______| |____| |______| |____| |_______| 
Vet 
chemicals  










Stockfeeds |____| |_____| |____| |_______| |____| |______| |____| |_______| 
Vet 
chemicals  





|____| |_____| |____| |_______| |____| |______| |____| |_______| 
Vet 
chemicals  





|____| |_____| |____| |_______| |____| |______| |____| |_______| 
Vet 
chemicals  




















|____|  |____| |_______| |____|  |____| |_______| 
1 1=local agro-dealer/retailer 2=nearest town 3=Harare 99=other (specify) 
 
No Questions Responses 
H3 Are you involved in livestock contract farming? 1=yes 2=no |____| 




No Question Response 









H6. If yes please complete the following table for these periods for the main credit received? 
  2017 2016 2015 
1 If yes, what activity?1 |_____||_____| |_____||_____| |_____||_____| 
2 Source of funding2 |_____| |_____| |_____| 
3 Amount (US$) received |____________________| |____________________| |____________________| 
4 Repayment period in months |_____| |_____| |_____| 
5 Interest rate per annum (%) |_____| |_____| |_____| 
1Activity: 1=crop production 2=livestock production 3=infrastructure development 4=farm wage payments 5=equipment 
acquisition 99=other specify 
2Source: 1= government scheme 2=private company 3=commercial bank 4=relatives and friends 5=cooperatives 6=savings clubs 
7 microfinance institutions 8=chimbadzo 99= other specify 
 
I. AGRICULTURAL LABOUR 
No Question Response 




I2. If yes how many persons did you hire during the following periods? 























Permanent |______| |_________| |________| |_________| |_________| |_______| |_________| 
Casual 
Piecework |______| |_________| |________| |_________| |_________| |_______| |_________| 
Seasonal <3 
months > 8 
months 
|______| |_________| |________| |_________| |_________| |_______| |_________| 
Note one day = 8 working hours  
 
I3 Where did you recruit your current permanent farm workers from? 
 
 Source 1=yes 
2=no 
If yes specify district/location 
1 Your Communal Area of origin |____|  
2 Other Communal Areas |____|  
3 Urban area  |____| [Indicate suburb] 
4 Local A1 farmers |____|  
5 Former farm workers in same district |____|  
6 Former farm workers in different district |____|  
7 Other specify |____|  
  




I4 Where did you recruit your current casual farm workers from? 
 
 Source 1=yes 
2=no 
If yes specify district 
1 Your Communal Area of origin |____|  
2 Other Communal Areas |____|  
3 Urban area  |____| [Indicate suburb] 
4 Local A1 farmers |____|  
5 Former farm workers in same district |____|  
6 Former farm workers in different district |____|  









I6. If yes, how is the permanent workforce divided amongst the enterprises or sections? 
 Enterprise/Section No. of workers 
  Male Female 
1 Crop production  |_____| |_____| 
2 Livestock production |_____| |_____| 
3 Horticulture |_____| |_____| 
4 Farm engineering  |_____| |_____| 
5 Irrigation |_____| |_____| 
6 General hands |_____| |_____| 
7 Machinery operator/drivers.. |_____| |_____| 




Do your permanent workers perform the same tasks on the farms every day? 1=yes 2=no 
|____| 
 
I8. How many casual workers did you hire during these months? 
 2016 2017 
 Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar April May Jun Jul Aug 
No. of 
persons 







|____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
 Note one day = 8 working hours




I9. For which farming activities was casual labour hired during the last two seasons? 
  2016/17 2015/16 




1 Land clearing |____| |____| 
2 Ploughing  |____| |____| 
3 Planting  |____| |____| 
4 Weeding  |____| |____| 
5 Harvesting  |____| |____| 
6 Pest and disease control |____| |____| 
7 Marketing (selling of commodities) |____| |____| 
8 Livestock herding |____| |____| 
9 Farm repairs  |____| |____| 
10 Farm Security  |____| |____| 
11 Cattle dipping  |____| |____| 
12 Other (specify) |____| |____| 
  |____| |____| 
  |____| |____| 
 
No Question Response 
I10. Do you employ a farm manager? 1=yes 2=no 
 
|____| 
I11. If yes what agricultural qualifications does the farm manager hold?  
1=no formal training 2=certificate 3=master farmer certificate 4=advanced master 
farmer certificate 5=diploma 6= degree 99=other specify 
|____| 
I12 How do you mainly determine the wages of your permanent employees? 
1=government gazetted wages 2=local farmers agreement 3=negotiated between 
employee and employer 99=other (specify………………………….) 
|____| 
I13 How do you mainly determine the wages of your casual employees? 1=government 
gazetted wages 2=local farmers agreement 3=negotiated between employee and 
employer 99=other (specify………………………….) 
|____| 
I14 What kind of contracts do you have with your permanent workers?  
1= verbal 2= written  |____| 
I15 What kind of contracts do you have with your casual workers?  
1= verbal 2= written  |____| 
I16 How many days do your permanent workers work per month? 
 
|____| days 
I17 How many off days do you give your permanent workers per month? 
 
|____| days 
I18 What time do your permanent workers start work? [24 hour notation] 
 
|__|__|__|__| 
I19 What time do your permanent workers finish work? [24 hour notation] 
 
|__|__|__|__| 
I20 How long is your permanent workers tea break? [IN HOURS] 
 
|____| hrs 
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I22. How did you pay your workers during the following periods?  
Type of labour Mode of payment
1
 
 2008 2017 2016 2015 
Permanent |____| |____| |____| |____| 
Casual |____| |____| |____| |____| 
1
Mode of payment 1=cash only 2=kind only 3=cash and kind 4=land to grow crops 5=cash and land 6= 
electronic payments (mobile money and bank transfers) 99=other specify 
 
  
No Question Response 
I23 How much are you paying your permanent workers in cash per-month? US$|__________| 
I24 On average what is the daily payment for casual workers US$|__________| 
I25 How often do you pay your casual workers? 1=daily 2=weekly 3=fortnightly 
4=monthly 99= other specify 
|____| 
 
I26. What was the average monthly monetary wage for your permanent workers during the following periods 
(US$)?  
Months 2017 2016 2015 
January to June 
|__________| |__________| |__________| 
July to December 
|__________| |__________| |__________| 
 
I27. Did you provide these foodstuffs to permanent workers monthly during the following periods? 








1 Maize (kg) 
|____| |_______| |____| |_______| |____| |_______| 
2 Cooking Oil (l) 
|____| |_______| |____| |_______| |____| |_______| 
3 Sugar beans (kg) 
|____| |_______| |____| |_______| |____| |_______| 
4 Soap (bars) 
|____| |_______| |____| |_______| |____| |_______| 
5 Beef (kg) 
|____| |_______| |____| |_______| |____| |_______| 
6 Matemba (kg)  
|____| |_______| |____| |_______| |____| |_______| 
7 Salt (kg) 
|____| |_______| |____| |_______| |____| |_______| 
8 Sugar (kg) 
|____| |_______| |____| |_______| |____| |_______| 
9 Tea (kg) 
|____| |_______| |____| |_______| |____| |_______| 
 
I28. What other benefits did you provide to your permanent employees during the following periods? 
 Benefit 2017 2016 2015 
  Did you offer? 1=yes 2=no Did you offer? 1=yes 
2=no 
Did you offer? 1=yes 
2=no 
1 Housing |____| |____| |____| 
2 Paraffin |____| |____| |____| 
3 Firewood |____| |____| |____| 
4 Health support |____| |____| |____| 
5 Land to grow crops |____| |____| |____| 
6 Land to graze animals |____| |____| |____| 
7  Annual leave |____| |____| |____| 
8 Protective clothing |____| |____| |____| 
9 Funeral support |____| |____| |____| 
10 Other specify |____| |____| |____| 





I29. If you provide protective clothing what exactly do you provide? 
Protective clothing Permanent workers 1=yes 2=no Casual workers 1=yes 2=no 
Overalls |_____| |_____| 
Gumboots |_____| |_____| 
Gloves |_____| |_____| 






I30. Besides daily payments you pay to casual workers, are there any other benefits you provided during the 
following periods? 
 Benefit 2017 2016 2015 
  Did you offer? 1=yes 2=no Did you offer? 1=yes 
2=no 
Did you offer? 1=yes 
2=no 
1 Housing |____| |____| |____| 
2 Paraffin |____| |____| |____| 
3 Firewood |____| |____| |____| 
4 Health support |____| |____| |____| 
5 Land to grow crops |____| |____| |____| 
6 Land to graze animals |____| |____| |____| 
7 Food at work |____| |____| |____| 
8 Protective clothing |____| |____| |____| 
9 Funeral support |____| |____| |____| 
10 Monthly maize grain |____| |____| |____| 
 
No Question Response 
I31 Do you provide housing for your permanent workers?  1=yes 2=no |____| 
I32 If yes, did you construct the houses for the permanent workers? 1=yes 2=no 
 
|____| 
I33 If yes, what kind of housing are you providing?  
1=pole and dagga 2=timber structure 3=brick and tin roof 4=brick and asbestos 
99=other specify  
 
|____| 
I34  Where do you provide this housing for permanent workers? 1=my homestead 
2=new houses built on my plot 3=old LSCF compound 99=other specify 
 
|____| 
I35 If you do not provide accommodation, where do your permanent workers stay? 
1=farm compound where plot is located 2=farm compound on another farm 




Do you provide housing for your casual workers?  1=yes 2=no 
|____| 
I37 If yes, did you construct the houses for the casual workers? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
I38 If yes, what kind of housing are you providing?  
1=pole and dagga 2=timber structure 3=brick and tin roof 4=brick and asbestos 
99=other specify  
|____| 
I39  Where do you provide this housing for casual workers? 1=my homestead 2=new 
houses built on my plot 3=old LSCF compound 99=other specify 
|____| 
I40 If you do not provide accommodation, where do your casual workers stay? 
1=farm compound where plot is located 2=farm compound on another farm 
3=Nearby Communal Area 4=nearby town 5=A1 plot 99=other (specify) 
|____| 
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I42 If yes, what percentage of the harvest did you allocate to your workers in the 2016/17 
season? 
|____| 
I43 Have you allocated your permanent workers some pieces of land to grow their own 
crops on your plot? 
1=yes 2=no 
|____| 
I44 If yes, how many permanent employees did you allocate land? |_______| 
 
I45 How much land in total have you allocated to the permanent workers? |_______|Ha 
I46 Have you allocated your casual workers some pieces of land to grow their own crops 
on your plot? 
1=yes 2=no 
|____| 
I47 If yes, how many casual employees did you allocate land? 
 
|_______| 
I48 How much land in total have you allocated to the casual workers? 
 
|_______|Ha 
I49 Do you share the harvest from the plots you allocated to them?  
1 = Yes  2 = No 
|____| 
I50 Do you offer your permanent workers free inputs to crop the pieces of land you 
allocated them?  
1=yes 2=no 
|____| 
151 Do you offer your permanent workers inputs on credit to crop the pieces of land you 
gave them 1= yes 2=no 
|____| 








I54. If yes during which years did you face labour shortages and what was the most affected activity  








Main reason for shortage
3
 
1 2017 |____| |____| |____| 
2 2016 |____| |____| |____| 
3 2015 |____| |____| |____| 
1
Labour shortages 1=yes 2=no 
2
 Activities 1=land clearing 2=weeding 3=harvesting 4=marketing/selling 5=livestock herding 6=planting 
7=spraying/pest control 99=other specify 
3
Reasons for shortage: 1=too many employers 2=few employees 3=low wages 4= alternative jobs available 
99=other specify  
 
No Question Response 
I54 Besides the labour provided by permanent and casual workers, are there any other paid labour 
services that you are engaging (e.g. livestock diagnosis, tractor repairs, crop marketing)? 
1=yes 2=no 
|_____| 
I55 If yes, who provides these services? 1=former farm workers 2=new farm workers 3=other 
farmers 4=private companies 5=private individuals/contractors 99=other specify 
|_____| 
 
I56 If yes, what services are you engaging? 
 Service sourced Acknowledgement 1=ye 2=no 
1 tractor repairs |_____| 
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2 tobacco grading |_____| 
3 farm planning |_____| 
4 irrigation operation |_____| 
5 livestock diagnosis |_____| 
6 crop marketing |_____| 
7 Other specify |_____| 
 
 
I57 Are you hiring any labour groups/gangs for general tasks (weeding, harvesting, stumping 
etc.) 1=yes 2=no 
|_____| 
 
I58 If yes, who provides these services?  Response 
 1 former farm workers 1=yes 2=no  |_____| 
 2 new farm workers 1=yes 2=no  |_____| 
 3 other farmers 1=yes 2=no  |_____| 
 4 Government prison workers 1=yes 2=no  |_____| 
 5 Communal area people 1=yes 2=no |_____| 
 6 Urban area people 1=yes 2=no |_____| 
 7 other specify 1=yes 2=no  |_____| 
 
 
I59 Did you have any labour disputes with your workers in 2017? 1=yes 2=no  
 
|_____| 
I60 If yes, what was the cause of the dispute? 1=late wage payments 2=low wages 




I61 Do any of your family members/ relatives provide labour for the household agricultural 




I62. If yes, how many persons were involved in the agricultural production of the household and the amount of 
time spent during the following periods? 
  2016/17 
  Gender 
1=male 2=female 
Age  Ave. no. of days worked 
per month 
No. of months worked 
1  Member 1 |______| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
2  Member 2 |______| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
3 Member 3 |______| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
4 Member 4 |______| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
5 Member 5 |______| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
6 Member 6 |______| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
Note: One working day = 8 hours  
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163. Who mainly performed the following farm tasks within the farm households during the 2016/17 season?  
 Farming activity Response  
1 Land clearing |____| 
2 Ploughing  |____| 
3 Planting  |____| 
4 Weeding  |____| 
5 Harvesting  |____| 
6 Pest and disease control |____| 
7 Marketing (selling of commodities) |____| 
8 Livestock herding |____| 
9 Farm repairs  |____| 
10 Farm Security  |____| 
11 Cattle dipping  |____| 
12 Other (specify) |____| 
  |____| 
  |____| 
1= male adult 2=female adult (>16 years) 3=male child (<16 years) 4=female child (<16 years) 
 
I64. Which farm tasks were performed by family members and what percent of the work is done by hired labour in 
the 2016/17 season? 
 Tasks Family members do the 
task? 1=yes 2=no 
% of work done by hired 
labour 
1 Land clearing |_____| |_____| 
2 Ploughing |_____| |_____| 
3 Planting |_____| |_____| 
4 Weeding |_____| |_____| 
5 Harvesting  |_____| |_____| 
6 Marketing of crop commodities |_____| |_____| 
7 Pest and disease control |_____| |_____| 
8 Fertiliser application |_____| |_____| 
9 Other (specify) |_____| |_____| 
  |_____| |_____| 
 




Age 1= yes 2=no 
 Family farm 
















HH Head |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
Member 1 |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
Member 2 |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
Member 3 |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
Member 4 |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
Member 5 |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
Member 6 |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
Member 7 |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
Member 8 |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
Member 9 |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
 |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
 |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 




I66 Do any of your family members hire out wage labour for farming activities to other 
























No. of days 
wrkd per month  
No. of months 
worked 
Member 1 |_____| |____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
Member 2 |_____| |____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
Member 3 |_____| |____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
Member 4 |_____| |____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
Member 5 |_____| |____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
Total |_____| |____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
1 
1 = permanent 2= seasonal (>3<8 months) 3= piecework  
2 
1=FTLRP farm in this district 2= FTLRP farm elsewhere 3=CA in this district 4=CA elsewhere 5=LSCF in this 
district 6=LSCF elsewhere 
 
3 
1 =yes 2=no 
 





I69. If yes, in which activities were you practicing reciprocal labour arrangements during the last season? 
  2016/17 






How many days 
did your hh 
members 
contribute? 






1 Land clearing |____| |____| |____| |____| 
2 Planting |____| |____| |____| |____| 
3 Weeding |____| |____| |____| |____| 
4 Harvesting  |____| |____| |____| |____| 
5 Marketing of crop commodities |____| |____| |____| |____| 
6 Pest and disease control |____| |____| |____| |____| 
7 Other (specify) |____| |____| |____| |____| 
8  |____| |____| |____| |____| 
9  |____| |____|   
1 
1=male adults (>16 years) 2=female adults (>16 years) 3=male child (<16 years) 4=female child (<16 years) 
 
 
  QN No. |_______| 
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I70. Are you involved in non-farm rural income generating activities? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
I71. If yes, what non-farm rural income generating activities are you involved in? 







No. family members 
involved? 
Ave. Total 




























     Males Females       
1 Gold panning/mining |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
2 Firewood  |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
3 Collecting river/pit sand  |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
4 Wildlife hunting |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
5 Thatching grass |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
6 Wood carving |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
7 Stone carving |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
8 Tailoring  |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
9 Basketry |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
10 Building |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
11 Brick making |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
12 Pottery |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
13 Clothes vending  |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
14 Beer brewing  |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
15 Carpentry |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
16 Transport provision  |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
17 Small tuck-shop |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
18 Retail shop |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
19 Motor mechanics |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
20 Others (specify) |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
  |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
1 1=all year round 2=rainy season 3=dry season  
21=FTLRP area in this district 2=FTLRP elsewhere 3=Communal Area in this district 4=CA elsewhere 5=urban area 6=mining area 99=other (specify) 
31= Permanent 2=casual 
41=yes 2=no 
  
  QN No. |_______| 
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172. Are there any household members employed as wage labourers in a rural non-farm income generating activity? 1 =yes 2=no 
173. If yes, who in the household is employed as wage labourers in a non-farm rural income generating activity? 
  2016 
  Gender 
1=male 
2=female 
















No.. of days wrkd 
per month  
No. of months 
worked 
1 Member 1 |_____| |____| |_____| |______________| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
2 Member 2 |_____| |____| |_____| |______________| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
3 Member 3 |_____| |____| |_____| |______________| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
4 Member 4 |_____| |____| |_____| |______________| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
5 Member 5 |_____| |____| |_____| |______________| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
6 Member 6 |_____| |____| |_____| |______________| |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
1 
1 = permanent 2= seasonal (>3<8 months) 3= piecemeal 
 
2 
1=FTLRP farm in this district 2= FTLRP farm elsewhere 3=CA in this district 4=CA elsewhere 5=LSCF in this district 6=LSCF elsewhere  
3 
1 =yes 2=no 
 
K. FOOD CONSUMPTION  
K1. Please indicate whether your household faced food shortages, and the number of meals taken per day in the following years. 
 Year 2017 2016 2015 
1 Faced food shortages?  
1=yes 2=no 
|____| |____| |____| 
2 No. of meals per day 
|____| |____| |____| 
 
K2. Indicate your sources of food and then rank the three major ones in the past year (2016). 1=major source 




1 Own food production |____| |____| 
2 Purchases |____| |____| 
3 Food aid (free food handouts) |____| |____| 
4 Food for work |____| |____| 
5 Food rations from employer |____| |____| 
6 Grain loan schemes |____| |____| 
7 Other (specify) |____| |____| 
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K3. What kinds of foods did your household consume over the last seven days?  
Food  
category 
 Item Consumption and expenditure in previous month 
How many days did you 
consume this food item in 




Cereals (1) 1 Maize meal |____| |____| 
2 Sorghum meal |____| |____| 
3 Bread |____| |____| 
4 Flour |____| |____| 
5 Rice  |____| |____| 
Tubers(2)  6 Sweet potatoes |____| |____| 
7 Irish potatoes |____| |____| 
8 Cassava |____| |____| 
Pulses (3) 9 Beans  |____| |____| 
10 G.nuts  |____| |____| 
11 Peas  |____| |____| 
12 Round nuts (nyimo) |____| |____| 
Veggies(4) 13 Leafy vegetables |____| |____| 
Fruits(5) 14 Fruits |____| |____| 
Protein (6) 15 Fish |____| |____| 
16 Eggs |____| |____| 
17 Pork |____| |____| 
18 Beef |____| |____| 
19 Poultry |____| |____| 
20 Goats |____| |____| 
Milk(7) 21 Milk  |____| |____| 
Sugar(8) 22 Sugar |____| |____| 
Oils(9) 23 Cooking oil |____| |____| 
Condiments(10) 24 Salt |____| |____| 
1
Source of food 1=own production 2=purchase from local retail shop (specify area) 3=purchase from urban areas 
(specify area) 4=local agro-processor 5=gift/handout 6= bought from other farmers 99=other (specify) 
 
No. Question Response 
K4 How much money did you spend on food purchases last month? US$ |_____| 
K5. Did you afford to send all your children to school during these periods? 1=yes 2=no   
2017 2016 2015 
|_____| |_____| |_____| 
 
K6. If no how many were supposed to be in school and how many did you send during these periods? 
  2017 2016 2015 
1 No. supposed to be in school |_____| |_____| |_____| 
2 No. who went to school |_____| |_____| |_____| 
 
No. Question Response 
K7. How did they spend most of their time when they were not in school? 1=paid farm labour 
2=stay at home 3=assisting on own plot 99=other specify  |_____| 
 
  




K8. Did you afford to send all your family members to clinics when they fell sick during these periods? 1=yes 
2=no 
2017 2016 2015 




L1.What are your sources of money income for the household? 




received in 2017 
(US$) 
Total income 
received in 2016 
(US$) 
1 Farming  |____| |_____________|  
2 Remittances from Diaspora |____| |_____________| |_____________| 
3 Local remittances  |____| |_____________| |_____________| 
4 Pension  |____| |_____________| |_____________| 
5 Formal employment |____| |_____________| |_____________| 
6 Sale of forest products |____| |_____________| |_____________| 
7 Gold panning |____| |_____________| |_____________| 
8 Hiring out farm labour (permanent) |____| |_____________| |_____________| 
9 Hiring out farm labour (casual) |____| |_____________| |_____________| 
10 Petty trading |____| |_____________| |_____________| 
11 Commercial loans |____| |_____________| |_____________| 
12 Asset sells (excluding livestock) |____| |_____________| |_____________| 
13 NGO grants |____| |_____________| |_____________| 
14 Other 1 (specify) |____| |_____________| |_____________| 
15 Other 2(specify) |____|  |_____________| 
 
L2.What expenditures did you incur in the following periods? 
 Income/ use 2017 (US$) 2016 (US$) 
 Uses/Expenditure  |_____________| |_____________| 
1 Bought agric inputs |_____________| |_____________| 
2 Bought farm machinery |_____________| |_____________| 
3 Bought cattle |_____________| |_____________| 
4 Constructed farm infrastructure (include house repairs) |_____________| |_____________| 
5 Savings at bank |_____________| |_____________| 
6 Household consumption |_____________| |_____________| 
7 Education expenditure |_____________| |_____________| 
8 Health expenditure |_____________| |_____________| 
9 Bought household assets |_____________| |_____________| 
10 Bought clothing |_____________| |_____________| 
11 Bought vehicles  |_____________| |_____________| 
12 Levies (RDC, dipping fees etc.) |_____________| |_____________| 
13 Grind mill and other agro processing expenditures |_____________| |_____________| 
14 Funerals |_____________| |_____________| 
15 Social/cultural functions |_____________| |_____________| 
16 Farm wages |_____________| |_____________| 
17 Other specify |_____________| |_____________| 
 
  




M. CHALLENGES FACING THE FARMERS 
M1. In the following table, rank the three (3) greatest challenges your household has faced during the current and 
past two seasons. 1=most severe 
 Challenge 2016/17 2015/16 2014/15 
Rank Rank Rank 
1 Access to Credit |__________| |__________| |__________| 
2 Access to Inputs |__________| |__________| |__________| 
3 Access to markets |__________| |__________| |__________| 
4 Small land size |__________| |__________| |__________| 
5 Land tenure insecurity |__________| |__________| |__________| 
6 Draught power shortage |__________| |__________| |__________| 
7 Labour shortage |__________| |__________| |__________| 
8 High wages |__________| |__________| |__________| 
9 High transport costs  |__________| |__________| |__________| 
10 Poor road networks |__________| |__________| |__________| 
11  HIV/AIDS |__________| |__________| |__________| 
12 Droughts |__________| |__________| |__________| 
13 Infrastructure |__________| |__________| |__________| 
14 Lack of working cash capital  |__________| |__________| |__________| 
15 Other (specify) |__________| |__________| |__________| 
16 Other(specify) |__________| |__________| |__________| 
 
 








ANNEX 3.3: FARM LABOURERS’ QUESTIONNAIRE 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 














Please use the following universal codes throughout the questionnaire. 
-1      Don’t Know 
-2      Refused to Answer 










Date Checked  
 
|___|___|___|___|___|___| 











A. ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION 
A1. Enumerator‘s name ________________________________________serial No. |__|__|__| 
A2. Date of interview (DD/MM/YY)       |__|__|__|__|__|__| 
A3. Name of farm where interview is held __________________________________________ 
 
B. LOCATION AND IDENTIFICATION DETAILS  
B1   District 1=Goromonzi 2=Kwekwe  |____| 
B2  Natural Region 1=NRI 2=NRIIA 3=NRIIB 4=NRIV 5=NRV 6=NRIII |____| 
B3  Ward Name_______________________________________________________________ 
 
B4  Ward number  
|____| 
B5  Chieftainship__________________________________________________________  
B6  Headman  ________________________________________________  
B7  Type of settlement where farm worker resides 
1= A1 villagised 2=A1 self-contained 3=A2 4=A2 peri-urban 5=remaining LSCF 
6=Communal Areas 7=urban area 8=growth point 99=other specify |____| 
B8  If worker stays on farm, what is the original farm name?____________________________  
B9  Name of farm worker ____________________________________________________ 
 
B10  Gender of farm worker  1=male 2=female |___|        B11. Age |______|  
B12  What year did you start selling labour services to new farms? (YYYY) |__|__|__|__| 
B13  What was your main type of farm employment during the 2013/14 season? 1=permanent 2= 
seasonal (≥ 3 months) 3=piecework/maricho 99=other (specify)  |___| 
B14  What was your occupation before you started working in the new farms? 1= permanent paid 
farm worker 2=casual paid farm worker 3=unpaid family farm worker 4= unemployed 
5=self-employed (non-agric) 6=urban employment 7= mine worker 8=student 99=other 
specify____________________________________ |___| 
B15  Did you work in the Large Scale Commercial Farm (LSCF) sector before the FTLRP? 1=yes 
2=no |____| 
B16  If yes, which district where you employed? 1=Goromonzi 2=Kwekwe 3=other Mash East 
district 4=other Midlands district 5=Mash West 6=Mash Central 7=Mat North 8=Mat 
South 9=Masvingo 10=Manicaland |___| 
B17  When did you start work in LSCF sector before FTLRP (YYYY) 
|__|__|__|__| 
B18  If you did not work in the LSCF before 2000, where were you resident? 1=communal area 
2=urban area 3=old resettlement 4=mining town 5= Small-scale commercial farms (SSCF) 






C. SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC DATA 
C1. Demographic characteristics of the farm worker household 









HH head5  
Formal Agricultural 
Training6 
Stay at farm 
worker 
residency7 
If no where do they 
stay pecify8 
1 HH head |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
2 Farm worker |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
3  |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
4  |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
5  |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
6  |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
7  |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
8  |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
9  |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
10  |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
11  |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
12  |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
13  |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
14  |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
15  |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
16  |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
17  |___| |____| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 
11=male 2=female 
21= permanent paid farm employee 2= casual farm employee 3= self-employed farmer 4=unpaid family farm worker 5= self-employed (non-agric) 6=student 7= housewife 8 =preschool 9=retired/pensioner  99=other specify 
31= monogamously married 2= polygamous married 3=single 4=divorced/separated 5=widowed  
41= no formal education 2= some primary education 3= completed primary education 4= some secondary education ordinary level 5=completed secondary education 6=completed advanced level 7= college education 8=university degree 9= vocational 
training 99=other (specify) 
51=self 2=son 3=daughter 4=wife 5=husband 6=relative 7=worker 8= mother 9= father 99=other (specify) 
61=no formal training 2=certificate 3=master farmer certificate 4=advanced master farmer certificate 5=diploma 6=degree 99=other (specify) 
71=yes 2=no 




No. Question Response 
C2.  If married, from which country is your spouse from? 1=Zimbabwe 2=Mozambique 3=Zambia 
4=Malawi 99=other specify__________________________________ |____| 
C3. 
  
What is your place of birth? 1=Zimbabwe 2=Mozambique 3=Zambia 4=Malawi 99=other specify 
|____| 
C4.    
 
Where was your father born? 1=Zimbabwe 2=Mozambique 3=Zambia 4=Malawi 99=other  
 |____| 
C5.    
 
Is your great grandfather originally from outside Zimbabwe? 1=yes 2=no  
|____| 
C6. If yes, do you consider yourself a Zimbabwean? 1=yes 2=no  |____| 
C7. If your great grandfather is from outside Zimbabwe, do you possess identity documents 
for your country of origin? 1= yes 2=no |____| 
C8. Do you possess a Zimbabwean identity card? 1= yes 2=no |____| 
C9.    
 
If no, what are the reasons for not possessing an identity card? 1=don’t know where to get it 
2=no documents to process it 3=application denied by RG’s office/told l don’t qualify 
4=don’t see value in possessing ID 5=application being processed 99=other specify  |____| 
C10  If you do not possess national ID, are there any services that you have failed to access 
because of that? 1= yes 2=no  |____| 
C11  If yes, what services have you failed to access? 1=failed to apply for land 2=children could 
not write public exams 3=failed to access benefits from NSSA 4=failed to get food aid 
5=failed to benefit from input programmes 99=other specify |____| 
C12  Do most of your children below 16 years possess Zimbabwean birth certificates? 1= yes 2= 
no 3=no children |____| 
C13  If no, what are the reasons for children not possessing Zimbabwean birth certificates? 
1=don’t know where to get it 2=no documents to process it 3=application denied by RG’s 




D. PRODUCTIVE AND OTHER ASSET OWNERSHIP, ACCESS AND INVESTMENTS  
D1. Provide the following information on farmworker household ownership of farm equipment. 


































1 Hoes |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
2 Axes |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
3 Picks  |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
4 Spades  |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
5 W/ barrows |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
6 Watering cans |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
7 K/ sprayers |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
 Animal Drawn             
8 Scotch-cart  |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
9 Plough |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
 Power driven              
10 Generator |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| 
 
D2. Provide the following information on farmworker household ownership of other assets  




























Value of assets 
bought only (USD) 
Source of 
income1 
1 TV |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |_______| 
2 DVD player |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |_______| 
3 Satellite dish |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |_______| 
4 Radio |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |_______| 
5 Cell phone |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |_______| 
6 Solar panel |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |_______| 
7 Electric stove |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |_______| 
8 Beds |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |_______| 
9 Fridge |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |_______| 
10 Other (specify) |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |____| |____| |____| |_______| |_______| 
1 1=proceeds from agric sales 2=personal savings outside agric 3=loan from bank 4=remittances from diaspora 5=local remittances 6=loan from relatives and friends 7=credit from supplier 






E. LAND ACCESS AND HOUSEHOLD AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
FAST TRACK LAND REFORM ALLOCATION 
No. Question Response 
E1  Were you allocated land under the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP)? 1=yes 
2=no  
[IF NO MOVE TO E13.] |____| 
E2  If yes in which scheme where you allocated land? 1= A1 villagised 2=A1 self-contained 
3=A2 4=A2 peri-urban  |____| 
E3  How did you first access this piece of land?  
1= occupation 2= formally allocated by DA 3=inheritance 4=traditional leader 5=bought it 99=other 
specify  |____| 
E4  Do you have an offer letter for the FTLRP plot? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
E5  What is the size of your piece of land? HA  E5.1. Homestead_______  E5.2. Arable______  
E5.3 Grazing _______  
E6  What year did you access this piece of land? |__|__|__|__| 
E7  What year did you start farming operations?  |__|__|__|__| 
 
E8 .Which crops did you grow in these past seasons on your FTLRP plot? 
  2015/16 2014/15 2013/14 




































1 Maize             
2 Groundnuts             
3 Tobacco             
4 Sweet potatoes             
5 Rape             
6 Covo             
6 Tomatoes             
7 Onion             
8 Soyabeans             
9 Other specify             
1
Reason 1=GoZ directive 2=own consumption 3=profitability of venture 4=compatibility with available equipment 5=influenced by 
past land uses 6=to ensure land sustainability 7=inputs easily available 99=other (specify) 
 
 
No. Question Response 
E9  Do any of your family members participate in household agricultural production activities by 
providing manual labour on this Fast Track plot? 1= yes 2=no 
|____| 
 
E10  If yes, how many members participate in household agricultural production activities? (Including yourself) 
 Members No. of members 
1 Adult males (> 16 years) |____| 
2 Adult females (>16 years) |____| 
3 Children (< 16 years) |____| 
 
 
No. Question Response 
E11  Do you hire paid farm labour for agricultural activities on this plot? 1=yes 2=no  
|____| 
E12  If yes, what kind of labour do you mostly hire for your own agricultural activities on FTLRP 
plot? 1=permanent 2=seasonal (≥ 3 months) 3=piece work/maricho 99=other specify |____| 
 
INFORMAL LAND ALLOCATIONS IN NEW RESETTLEMENT AREAS BY LAND BENEFICIARIES 
No. Question Response 
E13  Have you ever been allocated land by any FTLRP beneficiaries on their plot to grow crops? 
1=yes 2=no [IF NO MOVE TO E31] |___| 
E14  If yes how much land have you been allocated? Ha |_____| 




E15  Under which scheme is the land beneficiary resettled? 1= A2 subdivided 2= A2 wholesome 
3= A1self-contained 4= A1villagised  99=other specify |___| 
E16  What year were you allocated this piece of land? 
|__|__|__|__| 
E17  Do you still have access to this piece of land? 1= yes 2= no [IF NO, MOVE TO E31] |___| 
E18  Are you supposed to provide anything to the land beneficiary in exchange for the land offer? 
1=yes 2=no |___| 
E19  If yes, what do you provide? 1=pay rentals 2=sell crop to them 3=share the harvest 
4=provide free labour 5=provide paid labour 99=other 
specify______________________________________ |___| 
E20  Are you employed by the land beneficiary who allocated you land? 1=yes 2=no |___| 
E21  Do you share the harvest from this plot with the land beneficiary? 1=yes 2=no  |___| 
E22  If yes, who gets the larger share of the harvest? 1=self 2=land beneficiary |___| 
E23  Do you receive any inputs from the land beneficiary to crop this piece of land? 1=yes 2=no  |___| 
 
No. Question Response 
E24  If you received inputs, are you supposed to repay the inputs you received from the land 
beneficiary? 1=yes 2=no |___| 
E25  If yes, how do you repay the inputs? 1=cash payments for inputs after selling crop 2=sell crop 
to them 3=share the harvest 4=provide free labour 5=provide paid labour 99=other 
specify__________________________________ |___| 
 
E26 . Which crops did you grow in these past seasons on the piece of land allocated by land beneficiaries? 
  2015/16 2014/15 2013/14 




































1 Maize             
2 Groundnuts             
3 Tobacco             
4 Sweet potatoes             
5 Rape             
6 Covo             
6 Tomatoes             
7 Onion             
8 Soyabeans             
9 Other specify             
1
Reason 1=GoZ directive 2=own consumption 3=profitability of venture 4=compatibility with available equipment 5=influenced by 
past land uses 6=to ensure land sustainability 7=inputs easily available 99=other (specify) 
 




Do any of your family members participate in agricultural production activities by providing 
manual labour on this plot accessed from land beneficiaries? 1= yes 2=no 
|___| 
 
E28 . If yes, how many members participate in household agricultural production activities? (Including yourself) 
 Members No. of members 
1 Adult males (> 16 years) |____| 
2 Adult females (>16 years) |____| 
3 Children (< 16 years) |____| 
 
No. Question Response 
E29  Do you hire paid farm labour for agricultural activities on the land allocated by land 
beneficiaries? 1=yes 2=no  |____| 
E30  If yes, what kind of labour do you mostly hire for your own agricultural activities? 
1=permanent 2=seasonal (≥ 3 months) 3=piece work/maricho 99=other specify |____| 
 
INFORMAL LAND ALLOCATIONS IN NEW RESETTLEMENT AREAS: SELF ALLOCATIONS 
No. Question Response 
E31  Is there any land for growing crops that you allocated yourself in new resettlement areas 




E32  If yes on which type of farm have you allocated yourself land? 1= A1 villagised 2=A1 self-
contained 3=A2 subdivided 4=A2wholesome  |____| 
E33  What is the size of your piece of land?  |____| 
E34  Which part of the farm have you allocated yourself land? 1=grazing land 2=occupied land 
beneficiary arable plot 3=unoccupied land beneficiary plot 4=state land (outside compound) |____| 
E35  What year did you access this piece of land? |__|__|__|__| 
E36  What year did you start farming operations?  |__|__|__|__| 
E37  Are you practicing crop production activities on this self-allocated land? 1=yes 2=no  |____| 
E38  Have land beneficiaries tried to stop you from cropping this land? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
E39  If yes, did you continue with the farming operations? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
 
LAND ACCESS IN THE FARM COMPOUND 
No. Question Response 
E40  Do you have access to land to grow crops in the farm compound? 1=yes 2=no  
[IF NO MOVE TO E54] |___| 
E41  If yes, in what type of compound do you have access to land? 1=old compound on A1 
villagised 2=old compound on A2 subdivided 3=old compound on A2 wholesome 4=new 
farm compound on A2 subdivided 5=new farm compound on A1 villagised 6=new farm 
compound on A2 wholesome |_____| 
E42  If yes what is the size of the land in the compound? HA |_____| 
E43  Who allocated you this piece of land? 1=former LSCF 2=new land beneficiary 3=District 
Administrator 4=self-allocated 99=other specify _______________ |____| 
E44  What year did you first access this piece of land? (YYYY) |__|__|__|__| 
 
E45 . Which crops did you grow in these past seasons on your farm compound plot? 
  2015/16 2014/15 2013/14 




































1 Maize             
2 Groundnuts             
3 Tobacco             
4 Sweet potatoes             
5 Rape             
6 Covo             
6 Tomatoes             
7 Onion             
8 Soyabeans             
9 Other specify             
1
Reason 1=GoZ directive 2=own consumption 3=profitability of venture 4=compatibility with available equipment 5=influenced by 
past land uses 6=to ensure land sustainability 7=inputs easily available 99=other (specify) 
 
E46 . If worked in LSCFs before 2000, which crops and livestock did you produce on the farm compound plot before 
2000 and what are you producing now? 
 Crops and livestock Did you grow it? 1=yes 2=no 
 CROPS 2015/16 Before FTRLP: 1999 
1 Maize |____| |____| 
3 Tobacco |____| |____| 
4 Sweet potatoes |____| |____| 
5 Groundnuts |____| |____| 
6 Sunflower |____| |____| 
7 Sugar beans |____| |____| 
8 Vegetables |____| |____| 
9 Tomatoes |____| |____| 
10 Onions |____| |____| 
 Other specify |____| |____| 
 LIVESTOCK   
1 Goats |____| |____| 
2 Cattle |____| |____| 
3 Rabbits |____| |____| 
4 Free range chickens  |____| |____| 




No. Question Response 
E47  Are there any crops that land beneficiaries do not allow you grow on the farm compound 
plots? 1=yes 2=no 
 |___| 
E48  If yes, mention one crop which farm workers are not allowed to grow in the farm 
compound? 1=tobacco 2=maize 3=paprika 99=other specify 
 |___| 
E49  Why are you not allowed to grow this crop? 1= realise better yields than land beneficiaries 
2=stopped selling labour to them 3=land does not belong to us 4=causing environmental 




Do any of your family members participate in agricultural production activities by 
providing manual labour on this farm compound plot? 1= yes 2=no |___| 
 
E51 . If yes, how many members participate in household agricultural production activities? (including yourself ) 
 Members No. of members 
1 Adult males (> 16 years) |____| 
2 Adult females (>16 years) |____| 
3 Children (< 16 years) |____| 
 
No. Question Response 
E52  Do you hire paid farm labour for agricultural activities on the farm compound plot? 1=yes 2=no  |____| 
E53  If yes, what kind of labour do you mostly hire for your own agricultural activities on the farm 
compound plot? 1=permanent 2=seasonal (≥ 3 months) 3=piece work/maricho 99=other specify 
|____| 
 
COMMUNAL AREAS  
No. Question Response 
E54  Do you have access to land in the Communal Area to grow crops? 1=yes 2=no 
[IF NO MOVE TO F1.]  |___| 
E55  If yes, where do you have access? 1= CA in same district 2= CA in same province 3= CA 
in different province |____| 
E56  If yes, what is the size of your arable plot in the communal areas? Ha 
 |___| 
E57  How did you access this piece of land? 1=allocated by traditional leader 2=allocated by in 
laws 3=bought it 4=inherited the land 5= informally allocated by relative/friend 
6=allocated by family 99=other specify_______________________________________ 
|____| 
E58  What year did you access this piece of land? (YYYY) 
 |__|__|__|__| 
E59  Who is living at your communal area home? 1=wife 2=husband 3=children 4=immediate 
family 5=extended family 6= employees 99= other 
specify______________________________ |____| 
E60  Do you practice agricultural (crops/livestock) production activities in the communal area? 
1=yes 2=no  |____| 
IF PERMANENT FARM EMPLOYEE, MOVE TO F1 
IF CASUAL FARM EMPLOYEE MOVE TO G1 
 
F. WORKING CONDITIONS OF PERMANENT WORKERS 
 
F1 On what kind of farm are you permanently employed?  
Name of farm Type of farm
1
 Do you live on this farm? 
1=yes 2=no 
 |____| |____| 









F2. Do you have the following types of employees at the farm you work? 
 Type of employee Do you have this employee? 1=yes 
2=no 
If yes, what is the gender of the current 
occupant? 1=male 2=female 
1. Farm manager |____| |____| 
2. Foreman |____| |____| 
3. Supervisor |____| |____| 
4. Farm clerk |____| |____| 
5. Farm accountant |____| |____| 
6. Salespersons |____| |____| 
7. Driver/messenger  |____| |____| 
8. Security guard |____| |____| 
 
F2  Do you hold any leadership position at your work place? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
F3  If yes, what leadership position do you hold? 1=supervisor 2=workers committee member 
3=foreman 99=other specify  
|____| 
F4  For how long have you been employed on this farm? (Number of Years) |____| 
F5  What work do you do at the farm? 1=general hand (multiple tasks) 2=tractor driver 
3=skilled work (irrigation, repairs, tobacco grading, mechanic) 4=supervisor 5= foreman 
6=farm security 99=other specify |____| 
F6  How many days do you work per month? 
|____| 
F7  What time do you start work? (HH/MM) [24 hour notation] 
|__|__|__|__| 
F8  What time do you finish work? (HH/MM) [24 hour notation] |__|__|__|__| 
F9  How long is your tea break? (Hours) 
|____| 
F10  How long is your lunch break? (Hours) 
|____| 
F11  Do you sometimes work overtime? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
F12  If yes, are you compensated for the overtime work you do? 1=yes 2= no 
|____| 
F13  If yes, how are you compensated for the overtime work? 1=overtime pay 2=given days off 
by employer 99=other specify |____| 
 
No. Question Response 
F14  Are you assigned to any specific section/enterprise on the farm? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
F15  If yes, which enterprise are you assigned? 1= field crops 2= horticulture 3=livestock 
4=engineering 5=transport 6=irrigation 7=security 99=other specify ________________ |____| 
F16  Are you given targets to accomplish on a daily basis at your workplace? 1=yes 2=no |___| 
F17  If given targets, what happens if you do not meet your target at your workplace? 1=pay 
deduction 2=work overtime 3=no punitive measure 99=other specify |____| 
F18  Who is responsible for allocating tasks daily? 1=employer 2=manager 3=supervisor 
4=foreman 5=fellow worker 99=other specify  |____| 
F19  Are you assigned work as a group at your workplace? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
F20  If yes, within the group are tasks further subdivided amongst the group members? 1=yes 
2=no |____| 
F21  Whose tools and/or equipment do you mostly use to perform your duties at your 
workplace? 1=own tools 2=employer’s tools 3=borrowed tools  |____| 
F22  Do you also work for other employers? 1=yes 2=no |___| 
F23  If yes when do you work for other employers? 1=off days 2=after work 3=abscond work 
99=other specify  
|____| 
 
F24  What kind of employment contracts do you have with your employer? 1=verbal 2=written  |____| 
F25  Do you engage in wage negotiations with the employer? 1=yes 2=no  |___| 
F26  If yes, what type of wage negotiations do you engage in? 1=individual negotiations 2=group 
negotiations 99=other specify |___| 
F27  What action is taken by workers if negotiations fail? 1= strike demonstrations 2=quitting 
3=abscond work 4=resort to laziness at work 5= no action taken 99=other specify |____| 
F28  If no, how are your wages determined? 1=employer determined 2=government regulations 




F29  How are you paid for your labour services? 1=cash 2=food 3=clothes 4=cash and kind 
99=other specify________________________________________ |____| 
 
F30 . How much was your monetary wage per month during these periods? US$ 
Months 2016 2015 2014 
January to May |_________| |_________| |_________| 
June to December |_________| |_________| |_________| 
 
F31 . How often did you receive wage payments during these periods? 
2016 2015 2014 
|____| |____| |____| 
1=daily 2=weekly 3=monthly 4=bi-monthly 5= quarterly 6= twice per year 7= once per year 99=other specify 
  
F32 . Did you encounter any problems in getting your payments during these periods?  
 Year Encountered problem? 1=yes 2=no Major Problem encountered?
1
 
1 2016 |____| |____| 
2 2015 |____| |____| 
3 2014 |____| |____| 
1= not paid on time 2= not paid fully at once 3= irregular payments 4=not paid at all 99=other specify 
 
No. Question Response 
F33  Are you currently owed any unpaid farm wages by your present employer? 1=yes 2=no |___| 
F34  If yes how much money are you owed by your employer in unpaid wages? USD |_________| 
F35  What have you done to claim your unpaid wages from your employer? 1=work strike 
2=demand payment from employer 3=confiscated employer’s asset 4= opted to be paid in 
kind 5= sort help from labour unions 6=resort to laziness at work 7=did not do anything 
99=other specify |____| 
 
No. Question Response 
F36  Are you provided meals at work during working hours? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
F37  If yes what meals are you provided per day? 1= breakfast only 2= lunch only 3= supper 
only 4= breakfast & lunch 5= breakfast & supper 6= lunch & supper 7= breakfast, lunch 
and supper |____| 
F38  Where do you eat during breaks at work? 1=at the workplace 2=my home  
99=other specify _____________________ 
|___| 
F39  Who cooks the food you eat during the breaks at work? 1=employer 2=employees 3=wife 




F40 . Did you receive these items as part of your benefits on a monthly basis during these years? 
Received 1= yes 2= no 
 Item 2016 2015 2014 
1 Maize |____| |____| |____| 
2 Cooking Oil |____| |____| |____| 
3 Sugar beans |____| |____| |____| 
4 Soap (bars) |____| |____| |____| 
5 Beef |____| |____| |____| 
6 Matemba  |____| |____| |____| 
7 Other specify |____| |____| |____| 
 
F41 . What other benefits are you provided by your employer? 
Received? 1= yes 2= no 
 Benefit 2016 2015 2014 
1 Housing |____| |____| |____| 
2  Firewood |____| |____| |____| 
3  Health insurance |____| |____| |____| 
4  Land to grow crops |____| |____| |____| 
5 Land to graze |____| |____| |____| 
6  Annual leave |____| |____| |____| 
7  Protective clothing |____| |____| |____| 
8 Funeral insurance |____| |____| |____| 
9 School fees |____| |____| |____| 
10 Work attendance bonus |____| |____| |____| 





No. Question Response 
F42  Have you ever received a cash loan from your employer? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
F43  If yes, what did you use the cash loan for? 1=buy food 2=buy clothes 3=buy household 
property 4=pay school fees 5=cover funeral costs 6= buy inputs 7= buy agric assets 
99=other specify |____| 
F44  Which year did you last receive the cash loan from your employer?  |__|__|__|__| 
F45  Were you charged interest on the cash loan? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
F46  Have you paid the cash loan back to your employer? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
F47  Were the cash loan repayments deducted from your wages? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
F48  Does your employer have a grocery shop on the farm? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
F49  If yes do you buy from the shop? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
F50  How do you mainly buy goods from the shop? 1=pay cash 2= credit in lieu of wage 
payments 3=exchange for labour 99=other specify_______________________________ |____| 
F51  Do you buy agricultural produce from your employer? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
F52  If yes, how do you mainly buy the agricultural produce from your employer? 1=pay cash 
2= credit in lieu of wage payments 3=exchange for labour 99=other 
specify___________________ |____| 
 
No. Question Response 
F53  Are you related to your farm employer? 1=yes 2=no |___| 
F54  If yes how are you related to your employer? 1=sibling of nuclear family of employer 
2=distant relative 3= share same totem 4=same communal area of origin 99=other specify |___| 
F55  If related to employer, are you paid a higher wage than the other employees doing the same 
work as yourself? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
F56  If related to employer, do you live in the same house with your employer? 1=yes 2=no 
|___| 
F57  If related to employer, do you eat the same food with your employer? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
 
No. Question Response 
F57.1 Are some of your family members also employed by the same employer you are working 
for? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
 
F57.2 If yes how many members of your household are employed by the same employer? 
 Members No. of members 
1 Adult males (> 16 years) |____| 
2 Adult females (>16 years) |____| 
3 Children (< 16 years) |____| 
  
F58 Have you been a victim of any sort of harassment at your current workplace from your employer? 
 Nature of abuse 1=yes 2=no What year did this 
occur 
1 Humiliation |____| |__|__|__|__| 
2 Verbal  |____| |__|__|__|__| 
3 Sexual |____| |__|__|__|__| 
4 Physical |____| |__|__|__|__| 
IF PERMANENT EMPLOYEE MOVE TO H1 
 
G. WORKING CONDITIONS OF CASUAL/PART TIME WORKERS  
G1 . On which farms do you provide your casual labour services?  
 Type of farm Do you provide casual labour in 
these farms? 1=yes 2=no 
Do you live on this farm? 
1=yes 2=no 
1 A2 Sub-divided |____| |____| 
2 A2 Wholesome |____| |____| 
3 A1 Self-contained  |____| |____| 
4 A1 Villagised |____| |____| 
5 LSCF |____| |____| 





No. Question Response 
G2  Do you work for the same employers every agricultural season? 1=yes 2=no |___| 
G3  If yes why do you work for the same employers every season? 1=related to employer 
2=offers good wages 3=pays wages on time 4=offered land to grow crops 5=offers food 
during working hours 6= proximity to where l live 7= trust employer 99=other specify |___| 
G4  How many kilometres is the nearest employer you work for from the place you live? Km |____| 
G5  How many kilometres is the furthest employer you work for from the place you live? Km |____| 
 
G6 During which months did you perform paid casual farm work in the 2013/14 season? 
  2016 2015 
 Month  Did you work 
1=yes 2=no 
No of days worked Did you work 1=yes 
2=no 
No of days worked 
1 January |___| |_____| |___| |_____| 
2 February |___| |_____| |___| |_____| 
3 March |___| |_____| |___| |_____| 
4 April |___| |_____| |___| |_____| 
5 May |___| |_____| |___| |_____| 
6 June |___| |_____| |___| |_____| 
7 July |___| |_____| |___| |_____| 
8 August  |___| |_____| |___| |_____| 
9 September |___| |_____| |___| |_____| 
10 October |___| |_____| |___| |_____| 
11 November |___| |_____| |___| |_____| 
12 December  |___| |_____| |___| |_____| 
 
G7 . Which farm tasks did you sell your casual labour during the 2015/16 season? 
 Task Did you sell? 1=yes 2=no Was this based on mugwazo or hours 
worked? 
1=mugwazo 2=hours worked 
1 Land clearing |____| |____| 
2 Planting |____| |____| 
3 Weeding  |____| |____| 
4 Harvesting |____| |____| 
5 Grading  |____| |____| 
6 Baling  |____| |____| 
7 Livestock herding |____| |____| 
8 Fertiliser application |____| |____| 
9 Operating irrigation |____| |____| 
10 Tractor driving  |____| |____| 
11 Other work specify |____| |____| 
 
G8  What has been the least number of days spent working for one employer during the 
2015/16 season? |____| 
G9  What main task were you performing during this time you spent the least number of days 
working for one employer? 1=weeding 2=harvesting 3=fertiliser application 4=land 
preparation 5=livestock rearing 6=tractor driving 7=operating irrigation equipment 8= 
planting 99=other specify  |___| 
G10  What has been the highest number of days you have spent working for one employer 
during the last (2015/16) season? |____| 
G11  What main task were you performing during this time you spent the highest number of 
days working for one employer? 1=weeding 2=harvesting 3=fertiliser application 4=land 
preparation 5=livestock rearing 6=tractor driving 7=operating irrigation equipment 8= 
planting 9= tobacco grading 99=other specify  |____| 
 
G12  Is most of your work based on mugwazo/piece work? 1=yes 2=no |___| 
G13  If yes, do you accomplish the mugwazo as an individual? 1=yes 2=no  |____| 





G15 . If you seek help from family members, how many people usually assist you in accomplishing your mugwazo? 
 Members No. of members 
1 Adult males (> 16 years) |____| 
2 Adult females (>16 years) |____| 
3 Children (< 16 years) |____| 
 
 
G16  Whose tools and/or equipment do you mostly use to perform your duties where you work? 
1=own tools 2=employer’s tools 3=borrowed tools  |____| 
 
No. Question Response 
G17  What kind of employment contracts do you have with most of your employers? 1=verbal 
2=written  |____| 
G18  How are the wage payments for casual farm tasks determined? 1=negotiated between 
employer and employees 2=set by employees 3=set by employers 4= market determined 
99=other specify |___| 




G20 . How often did you receive wage payments during these periods? 
2016 2015 2014 2013 
|____| |____| |____| |____| 
1=daily 2=weekly 3=monthly 4=bi-monthly 5= quarterly 6= twice per year 7= once per year 99=other specify 
 
G21  How much income did you realize on a monthly basis from casual farm work during the 
2015/16 season? USD |_______| 
 
G22 . Did you encounter any problems in getting your payments during these periods? 1=yes 2=no 
 Year Encountered problem? 1=yes 2=no Major Problem encountered?
1
 
1 2016 |___| |___| 
2 2015 |___| |___| 
3 2014 |___| |___| 
1= not paid on time 2= not paid fully at once 3= irregular payments 4=not paid at all 99=other specify 
 
No. Question Response 
G23  Are you currently owed any unpaid farm wages by your employers from the 2015/16 
season? 1=yes 2=no |___| 
G24  If yes how much are you owed by your employers? US$ |________| 
G25  What have you done to claim your unpaid wages? 1=sought union assistance 
2=confiscated employer’s asset 3=physical confrontation with employer 4= did not do 
anything 5= opted to be paid in kind 99=other 
specify________________________________________ |____| 
 
No. Question Response 
G26  Do most of the farmers you work for provide meals at work during working hours? 1=yes 
2=no |___| 
G27  If yes, what meals do they mostly provide per day? 1= breakfast only 2= lunch only 3= 
supper only 4= breakfast & lunch 5= breakfast & supper 6= lunch & supper 7= breakfast, 
lunch and supper |___| 
G28  Where do you eat during breaks at work? 1=at the workplace 2=my home  
99=other specify __________________ 
|___| 
G29  Who cooks the food you eat during the breaks at work? 1=employer 2=employees 3=wife 
4=husband 5=son 6=daughter 7= self 99 =other specify__________________________ 
|___| 
 
No. Question Response 





G31  If yes, what main service does your group provide to new land beneficiaries? 1=tobacco 
curing 2=tobacco grading 3=weeding 4=building/construction 5=harvesting maize 
6=tractor repairs 7= tobacco planting 8= tobacco reaping 9=irrigation operations 
99=other specify  |___| 
G32  How does your team mainly source for jobs? 1=approach farmers 2=approached by 
farmers 3=advertise for services 99=other specify |____| 
G33  How are you paid for your group labour services? 1=cash 2=food rations 3= cash and kind 
99=other specify |___| 
.  
G34 Have you been a victim of any sort of harassment at the workplace from your farm employers? 
 Nature of abuse 1=yes 2=no What year did this occur 
1 Verbal |____| |__|__|__|__| 
2 Sexual |____| |__|__|__|__| 
3 Physical |____| |__|__|__|__| 
4 Humiliation |____| |__|__|__|__| 
 
H. FARM LABOUR ORGANISATION 
 
No. Question Response 
H1  Are you aware of any agricultural labour union operating in this area? 1=yes 2=no [IF NO 
MOVE TO H9] |____| 
H2  If yes what is the name of the union? 1=GAPWUZ 2=Horticulture GAPWUZ 3=Zimbabwe 
Agricultural Workers Union 99=other specify |____| 
H3  If yes, what major activity is the agricultural union involved in? 1=resolution of labour 
disputes 2=wage negotiation 3=worker education 4=assisting farm workers evicted from compounds 
5= unfair dismissal 99=other specify |____| 
H4  Are there any disputes that the union has assisted workers resolving in this area during the 
2013/14 season? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
H5  If yes, what were the disputes about? 1=unpaid wages 2=eviction from compound 3=long 
working hours 4=provision of protective clothing 5= unfair dismissal 99=other specify  |____| 
H6  How did the union assist the workers in resolving the dispute? 1=organized strike 
2=negotiated with employer 3=provided legal assistance 4= Union forced employer to 
comply 99=other specify |____| 
H7  Are you a member of any agricultural workers union? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
H8  If yes, which agricultural workers union are you a member of? 1=GAPWUZ 2=Horticulture 
GAPWUZ 3=Zimbabwe Agricultural Workers Union 99=other specify |____| 
 
No. Question Response 
H9  Do you have a workers committee at your workplace? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
H10 If yes, what is the main role of the workers committee? 1=wage negotiations 2=resolve 
work disputes between workers 3=resolve labour disputes between employer and employee 
99=other specify  |____| 
 
H11 Are any of these social groups existent amongst farm workers on the farm you live? 
 Group Is it found? 1=yes 
2=no 
If found, are land beneficiaries also participating 
in this group1=yes 2=no 
1 Nyau dance group |____| |____| 
2 Football team |____| |____| 
3 Burial society |____| |____| 
4 Savings club |____| |____| 
5 Churches |____| |____| 
6 Maricho labour groups  |____| |____| 
7 Workers committee |____| |____| 
8 Political party structures |____| |____| 
9 School development committees  |____| |____| 
10 Other specify |____| |____| 
 





H13 .  If yes, what is the name of the NGO, year they started operating here and the activities they are involved in? 
 Name of NGO Year started operations Main Activities/Issue of 
concern 
1  |__|__|__|__| |____| 
2  |__|__|__|__| |____| 
3  |__|__|__|__| |____| 
4  |__|__|__|__| |____| 
1=food aid 2=health services 3=water and sanitation 4=human rights 5= Labour issues 99=other specify 
I. RESIDENCY AND TENURE SECURITY OF AGRARIAN LABOUR HOUSEHOLD 
 
No. Question Response 
I1  Where are you currently staying? 1=old farm compound on A1 self-contained 2=old farm 
compound on A1 villagized 3=old farm compound on A2 subdivided 4=old farm compound 
on A2 wholesome 5=LSCF compound 6=new compound on A2 subdivided 7=new compound 
on A2 wholesome 8=homestead of A1 land beneficiary 9=homestead of A2 beneficiary 
10=own A1 plot 11=own Communal Area home 12= urban area 13=new A1 compound 
14=live in the same house with employer 99=other specify |___| 
I2  What year did you occupy your current residency? (YYYY) |__|__|__|__| 
I3  Is your residency tied to providing labour services on this farm where you stay? 1= yes 2=no |___| 
I4  Do you work for other employers outside this farm where you are staying? 1=yes 2=no |___| 
I5  What kind of housing facilities do you have? 1=brick and asbestos 2=pole and dagga 
3=compound dormitory 4=brick/thatch 5=brick/zinc 6= wooden/cabin 7= metal/cabin 99=other 
specify |____| 
I6  Who is the owner of the housing facilities you are currently using? 1=self 2=employer 3=state 
4= relative 99=other specify |____| 
I7  Have you been threatened with eviction from your residency since the beginning of the 
FTLRP? 1=yes 2=no  |____| 
I8  If yes, by whom? 1= government 2=A1 farmers 3=A2 farmers 4=white LSCF 5= war veterans 
99=other specify |____| 
I9  Which year were you last threatened with eviction from your residency? (YYYY) |__|__|__|__| 
I10  What was the reason for the eviction threats? 1=refusal to work for new farmers 2=growing 
crops not allowed in the compound 3=wage disputes 4=accessing beneficiaries’ land 
5=firewood cutting 6=grass cutting 7=brick making 8= dismissed from employment 9= not 
employed on the farm 10=land owners wanted the place for themselves 99=other specify  |____| 
I11  How were the eviction threats resolved? 1=took employment 2=stopped growing forbidden 
crops 3=stopped accessing land belonging to beneficiaries 4= stopped accessing natural 
resources 6=reported matter to police 7=got peace order from court 8=local authority 
intervened 9= Ministry of lands intervened 10= land owners back-tracked 99=other 
specify___________________________  |____| 
I12  Have you been actually evicted from your residency since the beginning of the FTLRP? 
1=yes 2=no  |____| 
I13  If yes, what year were you evicted from your residency? (YYYY) |__|__|__|__| 
I14  If yes, did you manage to get back to your residency? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
I15  If yes, what year did you manage to get back to your residency? (YYYY) |__|__|__|__| 
I16  If yes, how did you manage to get back to your residency? 1=court order 2=police order 
3=government order 4=returned by force 5= local authority order 99=other specify  |____| 
I17  Has there been any violent confrontation between former farm workers and new farmers on 
this farm? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
I18  If yes, what was the source of the violent confrontation? 1=farm compound residency 2=access 
to land 3=refusal by former farm workers to work for new farmers 4=stock theft 5=tree cutting 6=non- 
payment of farm wages7= new farmer not willing to employ former farm workers 99=other specify |____| 












I20 . Do you access these natural resources on the farm where you live and what do you use them for? 




If yes, what do you 




If you do not access, were 
you denied permission to 
harvest resource? 
1=yes 2=no 3=resource 
not available on farm 
Who denied you 





1 Thatching grass |____| |____| |____| |____| 
2 Fish |____| |____| |____| |____| 
3 Firewood |____| |____| |____| |____| 
4 Alluvial gold |____| |____| |____| |____| 
5 Medicines (herbs e.t.c) |____| |____| |____| |____| 
6 Other specify  |____| |____| |____| |____| 
1
Who denied  1=land owners 2=Environmental Management Agency (EMA) 3=traditional authority 4=lands officer 5= 
committee of seven 99=other specify 
 
No. Question Response 
I21  Do farm workers hold traditional ceremonies/rituals in the farm compound? 
1=yes 2=no [IF NO MOVE TO I30] |____| 
I22  If yes when was the last traditional ceremony held in the compound? (MM/YY) |__|__|__|__| 
I23  What was the purpose of the traditional ceremony? 1=memorial service 2=appeasing dead 
spirit (kurova guva) 3=cleansing ceremony4=nyau dances 5= rain making ceremony 
99=other specify |____| 
I24  Do you first seek permission to hold traditional ceremonies? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
I25  If yes, from whom is permission sought? 1=village head 2=land owners 3=police 
4=district administrator 99=other specify |____| 
I26  Has permission ever been denied to hold a traditional ceremony?1=yes 2=no |____| 
I27  If yes, did farm workers proceed in holding traditional ceremony without the permission? 
1=yes 2=no |____| 
I28  If proceeded, what year did this happen? (YYYY) |__|__|___|___| 
I29  How did land owners react to farm workers proceeding with traditional ceremony without 
permission? 1=threatened to evict farm workers from compound 2=evicted some workers 
from the compound 3=nothing happened 4=destroyed homes of some workers 99=other 
specify  |____| 
I30  Are you allowed to bury your deceased relatives on the farm? 1=yes 2=no |____| 
I31  If not allowed, where do people living the farm compound bury their deceased relatives? 
1=own Communal Area 2=public cemetery shared with land beneficiaries 99=other 
specify  |___| 
I32  If allowed, do farm workers first seek permission to bury their deceased relatives? 1=yes 
2=no |____| 
I33  From whom is permission sought by farm workers to bury their deceased relatives? 
1=village head 2=leader of the compound 3=district administrator 4=chief 5=Committee 
of Seven 6=land owner 99=other specify |____| 
 
I34. Do you pay any charges for your residency and other services to land beneficiaries? 
 Charges Do they pay 
it? 1=yes 
2=no 





How much is 
paid? US$ 
1 Rental for accommodation |____| |____| |____| 
2 Water usage |____| |____| |____| 
3 Electricity |____| |____| |____| 
4 Other specify |____| |____| |____| 







J. HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY 
J1. Please indicate whether your household faced food shortages, and the number of meals taken per day in the following 
years. 
 Year 2016 2015 2014 2013 
1 Faced food shortages?  
1=yes 2=no 
|____| |____| |____| |____| 
2 No. of meals per day 
|____| |____| |____| |____| 
 
J1 . If you faced any food shortage in the past 12 months, what coping strategies did you use?  
 Coping mechanism Did it happen 
1=Yes 2=No 
If you used strategy, how 




1 Borrowed money to buy food or got food on credit |____| |______| 
2 Reduced the number of meals  |____| |______| 
3 Mother ate less |____| |______| 
4 Father ate less |____| |______| 
5 Children ate less |____| |______| 
6 Substituted commonly bought foods with cheaper kind |____| |______| 
7 Modified cooking method |____| |______| 
8 Mortgaged/sold assets |____| |______| 
9 Borrowed from neighbours |____| |______| 
10 Went for food for work programs |____| |______| 
11 Government /NGO programs |____| |______| 
12 Begging |____| |______| 
1
How often: Number of times per year 
 
J2 . Indicate your sources of food and then rank the three major ones in the past year (2016).  
1=major source 
 Food source  Is source? 
1= Yes 2=No 
Rank 
(First 3) 
1 Own food production |____| |____| 
2 Purchases |____| |____| 
3 Food aid (free food handouts) |____| |____| 
4 Food for work |____| |____| 
5 Food rations from employer |____| |____| 
6 Grain loan schemes |____| |____| 
7 Other (specify) |____| |____| 
 
J3 . Did you receive food aid during the last three years? 









1 2013 |____| |____| |____| 
2 2012 |____| |____| |____| 
3 2011 |____| |____| |____| 
1 





J4  What kinds of foods did your household consume over the last 7 days and have there been changes since 2009? 
Food  
Category 
 Item How has your 
consumption of food 
item changed since 
2009? 
Consumption and expenditure in previous month 
1=increase 2=decrease 
    0=no change 
How many days did 
you consume this food 
item in the last 7 days? 
Source 
of  food1 
How much did you spend 
on this food item? (US$) 
(Sum of last 30 days) 
Cereals (1) 1 Maize meal 
|____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
2 Sorghum 
meal 
|____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
3 Bread |____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
4 Flour |____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
5 Rice  |____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
Tubers(2)  6 Sweet 
potatoes 
|____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
7 Irish 
potatoes 
|____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
8 Cassava |____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
Pulses (3) 9 Beans  |____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
10 G.nuts  
|____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
11 Peas  
|____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
12 Round nuts 
(nyimo) 
|____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
Veggies(4) 13 Leafy 
vegetables 
|____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
Fruits(5) 14 Fruits 
|____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
Protein (6) 15 Fish 
|____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
16 Eggs 
|____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
17 Pork 
|____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
18 Beef 
|____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
20 Poultry 
|____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
21 Goats 
|____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
Milk(7) 22 Milk  
|____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
Sugar(8) 23 Sugar 
|____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
Oils(9) 24 Cooking oil 
|____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
Condiments(10) 25 Salt 
|____| |____| |____| |_____________| 
1Source of food 1=own production 2=purchase from local retail shop (specify area) 3=purchase from urban areas (specify area) 
4=local agro-processor 5=gift/handout 6= bought from other farmers 99=other (specify) 
 
No. Question Response 
J5  How much money did you spend on food purchases last month? US$ |_____| 
 
J6 . Did you afford to send all your children to school during these periods? 1=yes 2=no   
2016 2015 2014 







J7 . If no how many were supposed to be in school and how many did you send during these periods? 
 2016 2015 2014 
No. supposed to be in school |_____| |_____| |_____| 
No. who went to school |_____| |_____| |_____| 
 
No. Question Response 
J8  How did they spend most of their time when they were not in school? 1=paid farm labour 
2=stay at home 3=assisting on own plot 99=other specify  |_____| 
 
J9 . Did you afford to send all your family members to clinics when they fell sick during these periods? 1=yes 2=no 
2016 2015 2014 
|_____| |_____| |_____| 
 
K. NON FARM RURAL LABOUR/ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES 
No. Question Response 
K1  Are you involved in non-farm paid labour activities? 1=yes 2=no |_____| 
 
K2 . If yes, what non-farm paid labour activities are you involved in? 







Is activity carried 














1 Gold panning |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
2 Firewood selling |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
3 Collecting river/pit sand |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
4 Wildlife harvesting |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
5 Wood carving |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
6 Stone carving |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
7 Tailoring  |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
8 Basketry |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
9 Bricklaying |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
10 Pottery |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
11 Beer brewing  |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
12 Carpentry |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
13 Repair work |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| |____| 
14 Thatching grass       
15 Others specify       
11=supplement farm wages 2=farm work opportunities limited 3=natural resource now more accessible 99=other specify 
21=male adult  2=female adult  3=male child  4=female child 5=male & female adult 6= male adults &children 7= female adults and 
children 8= males adults, females adults & children  
 
L. INCOME 
No. Question Response 
L1  What is your major source of income for your household? 1=farm wages 2=non-farm 





L2 . What are your other sources income for the household besides farm wages? 
 Income source 2016 2015  2014  2013 
  1=yes 2=no 1=yes 2=no 1=yes 2=no 1=yes 2=no 
1 Remittances from Diaspora |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
2 Local remittances  |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
3 Pension |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
4 Formal employment in town  |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
5 Sale of forest products  |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
6 Gold panning  |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
7 Petty trading |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
8 Commercial loans  |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
9 NGO grants  |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
10 Other 1 (specify) |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
11 Other 2 (specify)  |_____| |_____| |_____| |_____| 
 
L3 .How much income did you receive during the last three years? 
 Income 2016 (USD) 2015 (USD)  2014 (USD) 
1 Total income from own farming  |____________| |____________| |____________| 
2 Farm wages  |____________| |____________| |____________| 
3 Non-farm activities  |____________| |____________| |____________| 
4 Other income  |____________| |____________| |____________| 
 
 
M. CHALLENGES FACING FARM WORKER HOUSEHOLDS 
M1 .  What challenges have you faced as a farm worker household since 2000 and please rank the 
top three challenges you faced in the last three years 
1=most severe 3=least severe 
 Challenge Did you face it 
since 2000? 1=yes 
2=no 
2016 2015 2014 
1 Poor wages |___| |___| |___| |___| 
2 Poor working conditions |___| |___| |___| |___| 
3 HIV/AIDS |___| |___| |___| |___| 
4 Insecurity of residential tenure |___| |___| |___| |___| 
5 Landlessness |___| |___| |___| |___| 
6 In access to farm natural resources |___| |___| |___| |___| 
7 Land conflicts |___| |___| |___| |___| 
8 Poor social relations with new farmers |___| |___| |___| |___| 
9 Food insecurity |___| |___| |___| |___| 
10 Schools fees shortages |___| |___| |___| |___| 
11 Input shortages |___| |___| |___| |___| 
12 High input costs |___| |___| |___| |___| 
13 Other specify |___| |___| |___| |___| 
 
M2  What are your aspirations for the future? 1=get own piece of land 2=change profession 





ANNEX 3.4: INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
 




Purpose of the study: You are being asked to participate in a research study. The purpose of this 
study is to examine the qualitative changes to the agrarian labour relations in the context of 
FTRLP that increased the number of smaller-scale agricultural employers who compete for 
access to agrarian labour in the new diversified farming sector that is characterised by 
differential production capacities. This research is being done by myself, Walter Chambati as 
part of my doctoral studies at the Department of Public Administration, University of South 
Africa (UNISA). 
 
Procedures: If you agree to participate, you will be asked to respond to my questionnaire survey 
that aims to elicit information on the transformations on agrarian labour relations brought about 
the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. The questionnaire survey interview will take 
approximately one and a half hours. 
 
Discomforts and risks: It is possible that some of the questions may make you feel 
uncomfortable or cause you to think about things that are upsetting. You do not have to answer 
any question that makes you uncomfortable. You can choose to stop responding to a given 
question or end to be part of the research at any time without any consequences on your part.  
 
Compensation and benefits: You will not be paid or compensated for participating in the focus 
group discussion. However, you may enjoy the experience of reflecting on how the land reform 
has transformed the utilisation of agrarian labour in your area.  
 
Confidentiality: If you decide to participate, the interviewer will write down and record your 
answers in the initial interview. Records will have your name on it. This record will be kept in a 
locked place, accessible only to the researcher. No one else will be given your name or told that 
you participated in the study. Views of research participants may appear in a report on this 
research but will not be linked to individuals. During the analysis of the questionnaire surveys, 
the responses of all the participants will be aggregated to deduce the trends and patterns. 
 
If you have a question or problem with the research, you can stop and ask your question to 
the researcher. 
 
Right to withdraw: It is your decision whether or not to participate in this study. You may 
refuse to participate and can end the interview at any time if you wish. You will not be penalized 
in any way for this decision. 
 
Informed consent: I have been read or read to myself this entire form in my own language or 






Concerns or Feedback 
Should you have any concern about this study or wish to provide a feedback, please feel free to 
contact my mentors/co-investigators or me: 
Walter Chambati Professor Thomas Mogale 
Department of Public Administration  College of Economics and Management Studies 
University of South Africa,  University of South Africa,  
Pretoria, South Africa. Pretoria, South Africa. 
Tel: +263772650199 Tel: +27 124294805 
E-mail: 58563229@mylife.unisa.ac.za E-mail: mogalmt@unisa.ac.za 
 
Professor S. Kahn 
Department of Public Administration 
University of South Africa 
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